Suchergebnisse

This article examines how the World Trade Organization (WTO) affects institutional development and policy responses in India. India is a country traditionally resistant to external pressures but in which participation in an international organization stimulated a transformation in trade policy processes and procedures and unleashed a new bureaucratic politics, institutional innovation, and activation of policy—expert linkages. The author argues that we go beyond zero-sum assumptions in understanding the relationship between globalization and national state institutions. Key rules of international organizations increase transaction and sovereignty costs for states, which may catalyze new domestic capacities and create the impetus for new governance mechanisms. The author demonstrates this argument with an analysis of India's engagement with the WTO and with illustrative evidence of the interaction of China, Brazil, Japan, and United States with the WTO. The evidence is drawn from 18-month fieldwork in India, Washington, D.C., and Geneva; a newspaper database; and reliance on 100 interviews.

Examines how domestic politics shapes foreign policy and how international crisis outcomes affect domestic political survival; uses a potential war scenario.

Formal Models of Domestic Politics offers the first unified and accessible treatment of canonical and important new formal models of domestic politics. Intended for students in political science and economics who have already taken a course in game theory, the text covers eight classes of models: electoral competition under certainty and uncertainty, special interest politics, veto players, delegation, coalitions, political agency, and regime change. Political economists, comparativists, and Americanists alike will find the models here central to their research interests. The text assumes no mathematical knowledge beyond basic calculus, with an emphasis placed on clarity of presentation. Political scientists will appreciate the simplification of economic environments to focus on the political logic of models, economists will discover many important models of politics published outside of their discipline, and both instructors and students will value the numerous classroom-tested exercises.

The decade of 1960s and 1970s are significant to the American politics due to the rise of the Civil Rights movement to gain equality and reduce the differences between the minorities and the majority, mainly between the African American (Black) and the White population. The movement has gained many achievements including the peak in 2004 when the first African American President Barrack Obama won the election. For many decades, the differences between the Black and White populations have shaped not only the presence of the American society, but also its domestic politics' stage.

Formal Models of Domestic Politics offers a unified and accessible approach to canonical and important new models of politics. Intended for political science and economics students who have already taken a course in game theory, this new edition retains the widely appreciated pedagogic approach of the first edition. Coverage has been expanded to include a new chapter on nondemocracy; new material on valance and issue ownership, dynamic veto and legislative bargaining, delegation to leaders by imperfectly informed politicians, and voter competence; and numerous additional exercises. Political economists, comparativists, and Americanists will all find models in the text central to their research interests. This leading graduate textbook assumes no mathematical knowledge beyond basic calculus, with an emphasis placed on clarity of presentation. Political scientists will appreciate the simplification of economic environments to focus on the political logic of models; economists will discover many important models published outside of their discipline; and both instructors and students will value the classroom-tested exercises. This is a vital update to a classic text.

Studies of how economic globalization influences domestic politics have disproportionately focused on questions of policy rather than politics. Recently, however, a number of studies have examined how economic globalization influences politics-specifically electoral politics. This article surveys these new studies, which have often appeared in disparate research areas, and argues that they constitute considerable evidence that international economic integration influences seemingly domestic political processes. Adapted from the source document.

"The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation" published on by Oxford University Press.

Audience costs enable leaders to make credible commitments and to communicate their intentions to their adversaries during a crisis. I explain audience costs by simultaneously modeling crisis behavior and the domestic reelection process. I assume that a leader's ability influences the outcome of a crisis. As such, voters use outcomes as a signal of their leaders' quality. Leaders have incentives to make statements that deter their enemies abroad, since these statements also enhance their standing at home. Yet, such "cheap talk" foreign policy declarations are only credible when leaders suffer domestically if they fail to fulfill their commitments. In equilibrium, false promises are only made by the least competent types of leaders. Leaders that break their promises suffer electorally. Because initial domestic conditions and institutional arrangements affect the vulnerability of leaders to these domestic costs, such factors influence the credibility of policy declarations and, therefore, the crisis outcome.

Audience costs enable leaders to make credible commitments and to communicate their intentions to their adversaries during a crisis. I explain audience costs by simultaneously modeling crisis behavior and the domestic relection process. I assume that a leader's ability influences the outcome of a crisis. As such, voters use outcomes as a signal of their leader's quality. Leaders have incentives to make statements that deter their enemies abroad, since these statements also enhance their standing at home. Yet, such "cheap talk" foreign policy declarations are only credible when leaders suffer domestically if they fail to fulfill their commitments. In equilibrium, false promises are only made by the least competent types of leaders. Leaders that break their promises suffer electorally. Because initial domestic conditions and institutional arrangements affect the vulnerability of leaders to these domestic costs, such factors influence the credibility of policy declarations and, therefore, the crisis outcome. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

AbstractThe September 2006 military coup against the Thaksin government in Thailand has had a profound impact on Thai politics. It has arrested the process of democratic consolidation that was set in motion in the country in the 1990s. Although many of Thaksin's policies lacked the spirit of democratic governance, he was democratically elected and was ousted from power unconstitutionally. The entire tenure of Thaksin has brought to the fore two deep cleavages in Thailand. The first of these is the deep divide between the rural and urban electoral constituencies. The former provided a major vote bank with little bearing on the dispersion of power and resources that was effectively dominated by the latter. Thaksin and his populist policies effectively undermined the urban electorate and strengthened the rural constituency. The second and perhaps structurally more significant tension is that which has developed between the new business elite and the old establishment elite that comprise the monarchy, military, and the bureaucracy. This old elite has been at the forefront of displacing Thaksin through its fear of loss of control over the domestic political process. The drawn out confrontation that has spawned two social movements has significantly raised the country's political temperature and there is the real potential for the situation to deteriorate into violence. Despite these changes, a number of continuities unique to the Thai political situation continue to obtain as well.