Suchergebnisse

Twenty percent of the Swedish laws & amendments are directly governed by binding EC decisions, directives & regulations. Another 10 percent are connected with the EU or the EC. That is the result of a study examining all new laws & amendments passed by the Swedish Parliament during the years 1998-2003. By investigating the government bills behind the 3,449 acts, the researcher has analyzed to what extent the bills are designed to implement binding EC legislation or remove obstacles & conflicts between national & EC law, & to what extent the legislation is in any way influenced by the EU membership. This is one of few studies that make a quantitative survey of the power that the European Union wields over Swedish democratic institutions. After ten years of EU membership, the "power transferred from Stockholm to Brussels" is still a big issue in the domestic debate concerning the European Union. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

In Sweden, there is a consensus that Swedish membership of substantial parts of the European Union (EU) entails cooperation that at least in parts implies supranationalism. Due to this consensus one may assume that there is also some sort of common understanding of the concept of supranationalism. However, while many researchers includes majority voting in their definition of supranationalism, this is rejected outright by others. As shown, both sides have a point and this article, therefore, suggests that three dimensions are noteworthy when it comes to supranationalism: (1) when states have transferred the right to exercise public power to an organization the states cannot make decisions alone, (2) the institution is autonomous and makes binding decisions, (3) the decisions taken by the institution have effective precedence over national ones. Adapted from the source document.

A world government based on democratic principles would be ideal, but this is unlikely to come about any time soon. However, the mere impossibility of immediately implementing an idea does not make that idea wrong. Meanwhile one can work through existing institutions such as the UN and European Union to improve accountability in the arena of world politics. Adapted from the source document.

The theory of social choice has recently benefited much from advances within the power index approach in game theory. One may start from the classical Wicksell framework of a unanimity regime & proceed to state the advantages of deviations from his model. A case can be stated for quantitative voting using some majority voting scheme, as it empowers the choice participants, also providing for blocking power. The power distinctions generated from the power index framework may be applied to the institutional evolution of the Council of Ministers with the EC or EU. It allows one to state in a concise manner the comparative advantages & disadvantages of alternative regimes for the European Community or Union. Tables, Figures, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

This study takes its starting -point in the Swedish referendum about a membership in the European monetary union. The purpose of the study is to explain the differences that became visible during the EMU-referendum, by thoroughly explore macro-factors & their importance to the voting against a membership at a municipal level. In earlier pursued research concerning voting behaviour & public opinion differences general explanations appear which work as an initial position for this study, the creation of three alternative explanation models & the macro factors to be tested. This study has a statistical design & its intention is to study macro-factors in the 290 municipals of Sweden through collecting material from several sources. The material has been compiled to analytical aggregate data & will be analysed through bivariate- & multivariate regressions. The result shows that the differences that became visible concerning the EMU-referendum can be explained from economic factors & economic structural differences between the municipals. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

This article deals with the allez and retour provisions (Claes 2005: 84 f) of the Swedish constitution in relation to IU membership. What are the rules governing the transfer of sovereignty to the Union? And what are the provisions for assessing the constitutionality of the incoming tide of Union law into the domestic legal order? I have three objects in this essay. First, to describe how these two groups of constitutional rules were actually modified in the 2010 revision of the 1974 Instrument of Government. 1 find that neither was changed in any material way. Second, to try to explain the apparent reluctance of the parties involved to clarify the constitutional implications of EU membership. I find that this reluctance is rooted in a belief that European integration is not furthered if the rules contained in the allez and retour provisions are made stricter and more precise. Third, to confront a question conspicuously omitted by the parties in their revision: namely, by what criterion should the allez. and retour provisions be intertwined, if an optimum of hi-level constitutionalism is to be achieved? I argue that, in the end, the underlying issue is whether Swedish citizens want to see the principle of free movement applied as widely as possible. Do they want this principle to be applied across the board? Or would they prefer instead to restrict its application to the case of capital and goods, thus leaving them free to structure the labour market and welfare state as they themselves see fit? Adapted from the source document.

The constitutional development & the parliamentarianism in Sweden since 1970 can schematically be divided into two periods. The first period was 1970-1990. The second was initiated in 1990. 1970-1990 stands out as a 'classical' period to the new constitution with its unicameral system & exact proportional representation above a 4 per cent threshold. The formation of government was mainly based on blocs with sharp opposition, although in combination with negotiating parliamentarianism in the Riksdag. In their years of parliamentary majority, 1976-1982 & 1991-1994, the right-wing patties introduced considerable constitutional changes which the social democrats in opposing position accepted. From 1990 & onwards, it is above all the disrupting EU dimension which generates new constitutional changes concerning the politico-economic institutions. The European influence in legal matters is regulated, as are the EU-processes between government & parliament. Moreover, the electoral period is extended by one year & an element of personalized voting is introduced. Both the vote of censure & the instrument of consultative referendum attain a partially new constitutional character through the development of praxis. One can also identify a series of minority governments (right-wing 1991-1994 & social democratic since 1994) with prolonged partial coalitions grounded on different issues, & with all the parties of the Parliament involved in different areas. The EU dimension is central in this respect too. The constitutional changes, the new form of parliamentarianism & the EU processes strengthen the government. In this period too, questions can be raised regarding the role of the opposition in Swedish parliamentarianism. References. Adapted from the source document.

Der Autor ist der Präsident der Region Åland

This article confronts some general methodological issues involved when analyzing 'euroscepticism,' ie., opposition to European integration. Reviewing the literature on party-based & public euroscepticism, the article proceeds with a presentation & critical examination of conceptual frameworks & models suggested in previous research on public attitudes towards the EU. Drawing on eg., the Eurobarometer surveys, the strengths & weaknesses of different analytical frameworks arc demonstrated. The article concludes with a discussion about measurement issues related to empirical analyses of public opposition to European integration. Adapted from the source document.

On 1 January 1995 Sweden became member of the European Union. This basic fact is not mentioned in Sweden's fundamental law. Nor does the Swedish constitution have anything to say about the important changes to the practice of public policymaking that have taken place since Sweden joined the EU. At the same time, it is indeed apparent that the basic rules of the political game in Sweden have been transformed dramatically after EU accession. This constitutional change, however has taken place without any substantial changes being made to the wording of the most important of Sweden's four fundamental laws, i.e., the Instrument of Government (regeringsformen). Constitutional change can be brought about in two different ways: Constitutional amendment, or explicit constitutional change, refers to a change of the rules of the game which implies a modified wording of the constitutional text. Constitutional alteration, or implicit constitutional change, means the constitutional document itself remains unaltered while its meaning is changed through judicial interpretation or legislative action. How frequently used are these different methods when it comes to the constitutional changes brought about by EU membership? How can we explain the differences between member states? How can these competing methods for constitutional change be normatively justified? Is one of them to be preferred? The research project "Hur regleras EU-medlemskapet?" seeks to answer these questions in a comparative study on how EU membership regulated in different member states. Adapted from the source document.

Political commitments in our time are often described as characterized by political de-collectivization & increasing individualism. In the article this polarity between individualism & collectivism is addressed. Empirically, it is based on a survey which 1066 global justice movement activists participated in. Among these, activism has both strong individual & collective orientations. Personal commitment & individual political action is emphasized at the same time as the activism aims at reforming institutions & is carried out in collective contexts, involving traditional political actors as parties & trade unions. Furthermore, this is done despite a low degree of trust in political institutions & traditional political actors, especially among activists who participated in the events during the EU summit meeting in Gothenburg 2001. Tables, Diagrams, References. Adapted from the source document.