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Yahodzinska A.S. FOOD PRICE VOLATILITY IN UKRAINEPurpose. The aim of the article is to establish the level of food price volatility in Ukraine in order to develop national and regional food security programs in the framework of the 2030 sustainable development goals.Methodology of research. The theoretical basis of the study are the fundamental provisions of the food system, modern economic theory, which defines the goals and patterns of sustainable development of the world and Ukraine, scientific works of domestic and foreign scientists on food security, public administration and legislative settlement of this problem.The methodological basis of the study is the dialectical method and general and special methods of scientific knowledge. The following methods of economic research are used in the research process: abstract and logical (formation of principles, theoretical generalizations and conclusions); monographic (study of experience in food security); system analysis (determination of causal relationships); elementary-theoretical analysis and synthesis (establishment of patterns of development). Also in the process of research statistical methods are used: comparison, graphical and index. Using these methods, the state and dynamics of indicators of price fluctuations for food in Ukraine as a whole and in terms of territorial and administrative units, their economic and social consequences are analysed.The information base of the study is legislative and regulatory acts and program documents of state bodies of Ukraine and EU countries, official materials of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, methodical and statistical materials of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine and relevant services and institutions of other countries, scientific information from the world computer network Internet (research results of international organizations and FAO), the results of personal research of the author. Scientific work is based on the Agenda in the field of sustainable development "Ukraine 2016-2030".Findings. It is proved that if the established trends are maintained, it will not be possible to reach the target set in the National Report 2017 "Sustainable Development Goals: Ukraine" of CSW2 at consumer prices for food by 2030. In addition, the forecast values according to actual data significantly exceed the target.Originality. For the first time in Ukraine, the study is conducted on the basis of the indicators of the National Report 2017 "Sustainable Development Goals: Ukraine" in accordance with the identified objectives of CSW2, linking the results with the ability to achieve specific sustainable development goals – to reduce food price volatility.Practical value. Reducing food price volatility will have positive consequences for all actors in the food chain: consumers, producers and the state.Key words: volatility, index, price, food, Sustainable Development Goals, Ukraine.

Influences of agricultural technology on the size and importance of food price variability / Julian M. Alston, William J. Martin, and Philip G. Pardey ; comment: James M. MacDonald -- Corn production shocks in 2012 and beyond : implications for harvest volatility / Steven T. Berry, Michael J. Roberts, and Wolfram Schlenker ; comment: Derek Headey -- Biofuels, binding constraints and agricultural commodity price volatility / Philip Abbott ; comment: Brian D. Wright -- The evolving relationships between agricultural and energy commodity prices : a shifting-mean vector autoregressive analysis / Walter Enders and Matthew T. Holt ; comment: Barry K. Goodwin -- Bubble troubles? : rational storage, mean reversion and runs in commodity prices / Eugenio S.A. Bobenrieth, Juan R.A. Bobenrieth, and Brian D. Wright ; comment: Jock R. Anderson -- Bubbles, food prices, and speculation : evidence from the CFTC's daily large trader data files / Nicole M. Aulerich, Scott H. Irwin and Philip Garcia ; comment: Aaron Smith -- Food price volatility and domestic stabilization policies in developing countries / Christophe Gouel ; comment: Shenggen Fan -- Food price spikes, price insulation, and poverty / Kym Anderson, Maros Ivanic, and William J. Martin ; comment: Marc F. Bellemare -- Trade insulation as social protection / Quy-Toan Do, Andrei A. Levchenko, and Martin Ravallion ; comment: Ron Trostle.

Purpose. There are sufficient evidences in the literature that welfare of food producers and consumers is easily compromised due to unfavorable food price volatility dynamics. Therefore, this study investigates the volatility dynamics in food price index returns (FPIRETURNS), imported food price index returns (CIFCPIRETURNS), price of dollars at bureau de change (BDCRETURNS) and inter-bank rate (EXRETURNS). Design/Methodology/Approach. In view of the increasing quest to account for volatility behavior such as non-linear and time-varying risk premium in food price series using an appropriate tool, this paper adopts exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (EGARCH) model. This is because it allows error terms to be conditional heteroscedastic, and the dynamics process generating the underlying heteroscedasticity to be asymmetric. That is, the model introduces a parameter that can reveal how conditional variance respond to both positive and negative shocks of equal magnitude (asymmetric effect). Findings and Implications. The study finds leverage effect and high persistence in some of the selected models. Also, exchange rate volatility affects volatility of FPIRETURNS, but it is more pronounced on the volatility of CIFCPIRETURNS. Limitations. Inadequate data especially for CIFCPIRETURNS is a huge limitation in this study. Originality. However, this study has sufficient empirical evidences that instability in forex market flows into the Nigerian food market with pronounced leverage effect and persistence in food price volatility. The recommendation is, government should implement stabilization policy in the forex market as a precursor to ensuring stability in domestic food market.

International audience ; Many countries adjust their trade policies counter-cyclically with food prices, to the extent that the use of restrictions by food-exporting countries has occasionally threatened the food security of food-importing countries. These trade policies are inconsistent with the terms-of-trade motivation often retained to characterize the payoff frontier of self-enforcing trade agreements, as they can worsen the terms of trade of the countries that apply them. This article analyzes trade policy coordination when trade policies are driven by terms-of-trade effects and a desire to reduce domestic food price volatility. This framework implies that importing and exporting countries have incentives to deviate from cooperation at different periods: the latter when prices are high and the former when prices are low. Since staple food prices tend to have asymmetric distributions, with more prices below than above the mean but with occasional spikes, a self-enforcing agreement generates asymmetric outcomes. Without cooperation, an importing country uses its trade policy more frequently because of the concentration of prices below the mean, but an exporting country has a greater incentive to deviate from a cooperative trade policy because positive deviations from the mean price are larger than negative ones. Thus, the asymmetry of the distribution of commodity prices can make it more difficult to discipline export taxes than tariffs in trade agreements. ; De nombreux pays ajustent leur politique commerciale de manière contracyclique par rapport aux prix alimentaires, au point que les restrictions aux exportations utilisées par beaucoup de pays exportateurs ont occasionnellement menacé la sécurité alimentaire des pays importateurs. Notre article analyse la coordination des politiques commerciales lorsque celles-ci sont motivées à la fois par la manipulation des termes de l'échange et par le désir de limiter la volatilité des prix alimentaires domestiques. Ce cadre théorique implique que les pays ...

International audience ; Many countries adjust their trade policies counter-cyclically with food prices, to the extent that the use of restrictions by food-exporting countries has occasionally threatened the food security of food-importing countries. These trade policies are inconsistent with the terms-of-trade motivation often retained to characterize the payoff frontier of self-enforcing trade agreements, as they can worsen the terms of trade of the countries that apply them. This article analyzes trade policy coordination when trade policies are driven by terms-of-trade effects and a desire to reduce domestic food price volatility. This framework implies that importing and exporting countries have incentives to deviate from cooperation at different periods: the latter when prices are high and the former when prices are low. Since staple food prices tend to have asymmetric distributions, with more prices below than above the mean but with occasional spikes, a self-enforcing agreement generates asymmetric outcomes. Without cooperation, an importing country uses its trade policy more frequently because of the concentration of prices below the mean, but an exporting country has a greater incentive to deviate from a cooperative trade policy because positive deviations from the mean price are larger than negative ones. Thus, the asymmetry of the distribution of commodity prices can make it more difficult to discipline export taxes than tariffs in trade agreements. ; De nombreux pays ajustent leur politique commerciale de manière contracyclique par rapport aux prix alimentaires, au point que les restrictions aux exportations utilisées par beaucoup de pays exportateurs ont occasionnellement menacé la sécurité alimentaire des pays importateurs. Notre article analyse la coordination des politiques commerciales lorsque celles-ci sont motivées à la fois par la manipulation des termes de l'échange et par le désir de limiter la volatilité des prix alimentaires domestiques. Ce cadre théorique implique que les pays importateurs et exportateurs ont des incitations à dévier de la coopération à des périodes différentes: les exportateurs lorsque les prix sont élevés et les importateurs lorsque les prix sont bas. Dans la mesure où les prix des matières premières alimentaires ont une distribution asymétrique avec une queue de distribution étalée vers les prix élevés, un accord commercial tendrait à générer des résultats asymétriques. En l'absence de coopération, un pays importateur utilise plus fréquemment sa politique commerciale du fait de la concentration des prix mondiaux en dessous de leur moyenne, mais un pays exportateur aura une plus grande incitation à dévier de la coopération car les déviations positives des prix par rapport à leur moyenne sont plus importantes que les déviations négatives. L'asymétrie de la distribution des prix alimentaires pourrait donc rendre difficile tout accord international pour discipliner l'usage des restrictions aux exportations.

International audience ; Many countries adjust their trade policies counter-cyclically with food prices, to the extent that the use of restrictions by food-exporting countries has occasionally threatened the food security of food-importing countries. These trade policies are inconsistent with the terms-of-trade motivation often retained to characterize the payoff frontier of self-enforcing trade agreements, as they can worsen the terms of trade of the countries that apply them. This article analyzes trade policy coordination when trade policies are driven by terms-of-trade effects and a desire to reduce domestic food price volatility. This framework implies that importing and exporting countries have incentives to deviate from cooperation at different periods: the latter when prices are high and the former when prices are low. Since staple food prices tend to have asymmetric distributions, with more prices below than above the mean but with occasional spikes, a self-enforcing agreement generates asymmetric outcomes. Without cooperation, an importing country uses its trade policy more frequently because of the concentration of prices below the mean, but an exporting country has a greater incentive to deviate from a cooperative trade policy because positive deviations from the mean price are larger than negative ones. Thus, the asymmetry of the distribution of commodity prices can make it more difficult to discipline export taxes than tariffs in trade agreements. ; De nombreux pays ajustent leur politique commerciale de manière contracyclique par rapport aux prix alimentaires, au point que les restrictions aux exportations utilisées par beaucoup de pays exportateurs ont occasionnellement menacé la sécurité alimentaire des pays importateurs. Notre article analyse la coordination des politiques commerciales lorsque celles-ci sont motivées à la fois par la manipulation des termes de l'échange et par le désir de limiter la volatilité des prix alimentaires domestiques. Ce cadre théorique implique que les pays importateurs et exportateurs ont des incitations à dévier de la coopération à des périodes différentes: les exportateurs lorsque les prix sont élevés et les importateurs lorsque les prix sont bas. Dans la mesure où les prix des matières premières alimentaires ont une distribution asymétrique avec une queue de distribution étalée vers les prix élevés, un accord commercial tendrait à générer des résultats asymétriques. En l'absence de coopération, un pays importateur utilise plus fréquemment sa politique commerciale du fait de la concentration des prix mondiaux en dessous de leur moyenne, mais un pays exportateur aura une plus grande incitation à dévier de la coopération car les déviations positives des prix par rapport à leur moyenne sont plus importantes que les déviations négatives. L'asymétrie de la distribution des prix alimentaires pourrait donc rendre difficile tout accord international pour discipliner l'usage des restrictions aux exportations.

During food price spikes, food exporting countries frequently use export restrictions to insulate their domestic markets from high prices on the world market. Their use can be so widespread that the high levels reached by international prices could be seen as a consequence of these interventions (Dawe and Slayton, 2011), and the restrictions can be so stringent that they can lead to the near disappearance of the world market as happened to the rice market over nine months in 1973 (Timmer, 2010). Food importing countries also act: they decrease their tariffs to protect their consumers but when world prices are low, the situation is reversed and importers raise their import duties. In summary, in food markets, countries routinely adjust their trade barriers to insulate their domestic markets from international price variability (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012). The lack of commitment to leaving borders open can reduce trust in the world trade system and lead to costly policies. Importing countries that expect food exporters to restrict their exports in times of scarcity will move away from the specialization consistent with their comparative advantages in order to ensure greater self-sufficiency, or will carry expensive public stocks. For example, the current large-scale public interventions in the Asian countries, through which many countries attempt to achieve self-sufficiency in major staples, can be explained largely by their experience in the 1972/73 food crisis (Rashid et al., 2008). ; De nombreux pays ajustent leur politique commerciale de manière contracyclique par rapport aux prix alimentaires, au point que les restrictions aux exportations utilisées par beaucoup de pays exportateurs ont occasionnellement menacé la sécurité alimentaire des pays importateurs. Notre article analyse la coordination des politiques commerciales lorsque celles-ci sont motivées à la fois par la manipulation des termes de l'échange et par le désir de limiter la volatilité des prix alimentaires domestiques. Ce cadre théorique implique que les pays importateurs et exportateurs ont des incitations à dévier de la coopération à des périodes différentes: les exportateurs lorsque les prix sont élevés et les importateurs lorsque les prix sont bas. Dans la mesure où les prix des matières premières alimentaires ont une distribution asymétrique avec une queue de distribution étalée vers les prix élevés, un accord commercial tendrait à générer des résultats asymétriques. En l'absence de coopération, un pays importateur utilise plus fréquemment sa politique commerciale du fait de la concentration des prix mondiaux en dessous de leur moyenne, mais un pays exportateur aura une plus grande incitation à dévier de la coopération car les déviations positives des prix par rapport à leur moyenne sont plus importantes que les déviations négatives. L'asymétrie de la distribution des prix alimentaires pourrait donc rendre difficile tout accord international pour discipliner l'usage des restrictions aux exportations.

When food prices spike in countries with large numbers of poor people, hunger and malnutrition are very likely to result in the absence of public intervention. For governments, this is also a case of political survival. Government actions often take the form of direct interventions in the market to stabilize food prices, which goes against most international advice to rely on safety nets and world trade. Despite the limitations of food price stabilization policies, they are widespread in developing countries. This paper attempts to untangle the elements of this policy conundrum. Price stabilization policies arise as a result of international and domestic coordination problems. At the individual country level, it is in the national interest of many countries to adjust trade policies to take advantage of the world market in order to achieve domestic price stability. When countercyclical trade policies become widespread, the result is a thinner and less reliable world market, which further decreases the appeal of laissez-faire. A similar vicious circle operates in the domestic market: without effective policies to protect the poor, such as safety nets, food market liberalization lacks credibility and makes private actors reluctant to intervene, which in turn forces government to step in. The current policy challenge lies in designing policies that will build trust in world markets and increase trust between public and private agents. ; Lorsque les prix alimentaires flambent dans des pays avec un grand nombre de personnes pauvres, en l'absence d'intervention publique la faim et la malnutrition sont très probables. Pour les gouvernements, intervenir est aussi une question de survie politique. Les interventions publiques prennent souvent la forme d'interventions sur le marché pour stabiliser les prix, ce qui va à l'encontre de la plupart des recommandations internationales, qui sont plutôt d'utiliser des filets de sécurité sociaux et de laisser le marché fonctionner librement. Cependant, malgré les limites des politiques de stabilisation des prix alimentaires, elles sont très répandues dans les pays en développement. Ce chapitre s'attache à éclairer cet état de fait. Les politiques de stabilisation des prix émergent comme le résultat de problèmes internationaux et domestiques de coordination. Il est dans l'intérêt de nombreux pays d'ajuster leurs politiques commerciales pour utiliser le marché mondial à des fins de stabilisation domestique. Mais, lorsque ces politiques commerciales se généralisent, le résultat est un marché mondial plus étroit et moins fiable, ce qui diminue d'autant l'attrait du libre-échange. Un cercle vicieux similaire opère sur le marché domestique. En l'absence de politiques à même de protéger les pauvres efficacement, comme des filets de sécurité sociaux, la libéralisation des marchés alimentaires manque de crédibilité, ce qui rend les acteurs privés réticents à s'investir, poussant les gouvernements à intervenir. L'enjeu politique actuel est donc de proposer des politiques qui permettent d'améliorer les confiances dans les marchés mondiaux et entre les acteurs privés et publics.

Biotic factors such as pests create biodiversity effects that increase production risks and decrease land productivity when agriculture becomes more specialized. We show in a Ricardian two-country trade setup that production specialization is incomplete under free trade because of the decrease in land productivity. Pesticides allow farmers to reduce these biodiversity effects, but they are damaging for the environment and for human health. When regulating farming practices under free trade, governments face a trade-off: they are tempted to restrict pesticide use compared to under autarky because domestic consumption partly relies on imports and thus depends less on them, but they also want to preserve the competitiveness of their agricultural sector on international markets. We show that at the symmetric equilibrium under free trade, restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky. As a result, trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries, and of some or all of the crops that are country-specific, depending on the intensity of the biodiversity effects.

Production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests create biodiversity effects that impede productivity. Pesticides reduce these effects but are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments weigh these side-effects against the competitiveness of their agriculture. In a Ricardian two-country setup, we show that free trade results in an incomplete production specialization, that restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky and that trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries and some of the specialized crops. If biodiversity effects are large, the price volatility of all crops is larger than under autarky.

Production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests create biodiversity effects that impede productivity. Pesticides reduce these effects but are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments weigh these side-effects against the competitiveness of their agriculture. In a Ricardian two-country setup, we show that free trade results in an incomplete production specialization, that restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky and that trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries and some of the specialized crops. If biodiversity effects are large, the price volatility of all crops is larger than under autarky.

Production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests create biodiversity effects that impede productivity. Pesticides reduce these effects but are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments weigh these side-effects against the competitiveness of their agriculture. In a Ricardian two-country setup, we show that free trade results in an incomplete production specialization, that restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky and that trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries and some of the specialized crops. If biodiversity effects are large, the price volatility of all crops is larger than under autarky.

We examine the importance of production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests in determining the pattern of trade and the distribution of prices in a Ricardian two-country setup. These elements create biodiversity eff ects that result in an incomplete specialization at the free trade equilibrium. Their influence on idiosyncratic production risks evolves depending on the countries' openness to trade. Pesticides allow these eff ects to diminish but they are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments have to counterbalance these side-eff ects with the competitiveness of their agricultural sector on international markets. Nevertheless, restrictions on pesticides under free trade are generally more stringent than under autarky.

We examine the importance of production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests in determining the pattern of trade and the distribution of prices in a Ricardian two-country setup. These elements create biodiversity eff ects that result in an incomplete specialization at the free trade equilibrium. Their influence on idiosyncratic production risks evolves depending on the countries' openness to trade. Pesticides allow these eff ects to diminish but they are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments have to counterbalance these side-eff ects with the competitiveness of their agricultural sector on international markets. Nevertheless, restrictions on pesticides under free trade are generally more stringent than under autarky.