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The aim of the article is to disclose a possible view held by Kant towards the solution of the Königsberg problem after World War II. Philosophers of today usually show little interest in discussing the so-called "Kaliningrad puzzle". This is a certain misunderstanding. As one of the most outstanding representatives of the idealistic paradigm of international relations, Kant can be treated as a full-fledged participant of the discussions on the future of the Kaliningrad region. His political philosophy contributes towards a better understanding of certain important aspects related to the Kaliningrad problem. Kant would stongly criticise the decisions made at the Potsdam conference. The above decisions contradict his understanding of international relations. However, Kant would not demand an urgent solution to the Kaliningrad problem. His flexibity is worthy of the respect shown by the realpolitik supporters. On the other hand, Kant did not have the slightest doubt as to the necessity of amending the injustice of improper political decisions. The European future of the Kaliningrad region is first and foremost related to the ability of the population to enforce the political principles formulated by Kant – the freedom of the citizens, the rule of law and the equality of every single citizen under the law. This seems to be the most topical message made by Kant to the present day population of his native town. The Kaliningrad region of today has failed to justify the requirements of civil society. It reminds one more of a hostage to the central power. From the perspective of Kant's political philosophy, one could state that the Kaliningrad region has not yet used the opportunity to become an association of free citizens. This is the only trustworthy way for this hostage of international politics of the 20th century to become part of cultural and political life within the unifying Europe.

From the end of the Cold war there is no shortage of academic analyses and political considerations on the possible directions of foreign and security policy of Ukraine. The researches usually stress the strategic location of the country. It is asserted that its foreign and security policy is conditioned not only by domestic (political, socio-economical) factors, but also by the position of the country between "overlaping integrational spaces". Ukraine is influenced by Western "neighbourhood" which has extended to the Central Eastern Europe and is manifesting itself.

The aim of the article is to disclose a possible view held by Kant towards the solution of the Königsberg problem after World War II. Philosophers of today usually show little interest in discussing the so-called "Kaliningrad puzzle". This is a certain misunderstanding. As one of the most outstanding representatives of the idealistic paradigm of international relations, Kant can be treated as a full-fledged participant of the discussions on the future of the Kaliningrad region. His political philosophy contributes towards a better understanding of certain important aspects related to the Kaliningrad problem. Kant would stongly criticise the decisions made at the Potsdam conference. The above decisions contradict his understanding of international relations. However, Kant would not demand an urgent solution to the Kaliningrad problem. His flexibity is worthy of the respect shown by the realpolitik supporters. On the other hand, Kant did not have the slightest doubt as to the necessity of amending the injustice of improper political decisions. The European future of the Kaliningrad region is first and foremost related to the ability of the population to enforce the political principles formulated by Kant – the freedom of the citizens, the rule of law and the equality of every single citizen under the law. This seems to be the most topical message made by Kant to the present day population of his native town. The Kaliningrad region of today has failed to justify the requirements of civil society. It reminds one more of a hostage to the central power. From the perspective of Kant's political philosophy, one could state that the Kaliningrad region has not yet used the opportunity to become an association of free citizens. This is the only trustworthy way for this hostage of international politics of the 20th century to become part of cultural and political life within the unifying Europe.

The aim of the article is to disclose a possible view held by Kant towards the solution of the Königsberg problem after World War II. Philosophers of today usually show little interest in discussing the so-called "Kaliningrad puzzle". This is a certain misunderstanding. As one of the most outstanding representatives of the idealistic paradigm of international relations, Kant can be treated as a full-fledged participant of the discussions on the future of the Kaliningrad region. His political philosophy contributes towards a better understanding of certain important aspects related to the Kaliningrad problem. Kant would stongly criticise the decisions made at the Potsdam conference. The above decisions contradict his understanding of international relations. However, Kant would not demand an urgent solution to the Kaliningrad problem. His flexibity is worthy of the respect shown by the realpolitik supporters. On the other hand, Kant did not have the slightest doubt as to the necessity of amending the injustice of improper political decisions. The European future of the Kaliningrad region is first and foremost related to the ability of the population to enforce the political principles formulated by Kant – the freedom of the citizens, the rule of law and the equality of every single citizen under the law. This seems to be the most topical message made by Kant to the present day population of his native town. The Kaliningrad region of today has failed to justify the requirements of civil society. It reminds one more of a hostage to the central power. From the perspective of Kant's political philosophy, one could state that the Kaliningrad region has not yet used the opportunity to become an association of free citizens. This is the only trustworthy way for this hostage of international politics of the 20th century to become part of cultural and political life within the unifying Europe.

From the end of the Cold war there is no shortage of academic analyses and political considerations on the possible directions of foreign and security policy of Ukraine. The researches usually stress the strategic location of the country. It is asserted that its foreign and security policy is conditioned not only by domestic (political, socio-economical) factors, but also by the position of the country between "overlaping integrational spaces". Ukraine is influenced by Western "neighbourhood" which has extended to the Central Eastern Europe and is manifesting itself.

The aim of the article is to disclose a possible view held by Kant towards the solution of the Königsberg problem after World War II. Philosophers of today usually show little interest in discussing the so-called "Kaliningrad puzzle". This is a certain misunderstanding. As one of the most outstanding representatives of the idealistic paradigm of international relations, Kant can be treated as a full-fledged participant of the discussions on the future of the Kaliningrad region. His political philosophy contributes towards a better understanding of certain important aspects related to the Kaliningrad problem. Kant would stongly criticise the decisions made at the Potsdam conference. The above decisions contradict his understanding of international relations. However, Kant would not demand an urgent solution to the Kaliningrad problem. His flexibity is worthy of the respect shown by the realpolitik supporters. On the other hand, Kant did not have the slightest doubt as to the necessity of amending the injustice of improper political decisions. The European future of the Kaliningrad region is first and foremost related to the ability of the population to enforce the political principles formulated by Kant – the freedom of the citizens, the rule of law and the equality of every single citizen under the law. This seems to be the most topical message made by Kant to the present day population of his native town. The Kaliningrad region of today has failed to justify the requirements of civil society. It reminds one more of a hostage to the central power. From the perspective of Kant's political philosophy, one could state that the Kaliningrad region has not yet used the opportunity to become an association of free citizens. This is the only trustworthy way for this hostage of international politics of the 20th century to become part of cultural and political life within the unifying Europe.

From the end of the Cold war there is no shortage of academic analyses and political considerations on the possible directions of foreign and security policy of Ukraine. The researches usually stress the strategic location of the country. It is asserted that its foreign and security policy is conditioned not only by domestic (political, socio-economical) factors, but also by the position of the country between "overlaping integrational spaces". Ukraine is influenced by Western "neighbourhood" which has extended to the Central Eastern Europe and is manifesting itself.

From the end of the Cold war there is no shortage of academic analyses and political considerations on the possible directions of foreign and security policy of Ukraine. The researches usually stress the strategic location of the country. It is asserted that its foreign and security policy is conditioned not only by domestic (political, socio-economical) factors, but also by the position of the country between "overlaping integrational spaces". Ukraine is influenced by Western "neighbourhood" which has extended to the Central Eastern Europe and is manifesting itself.

Muslims have known and used the term 'da'wa' throughout the history of Islam. The concept, or rather concepts, of da'wa has been elaborated upon since the early centuries of Islam. Muslims have applied the term to various specific activities of theirs. The broadly known explanation in Europe and North America for da'wa is that it constitutes activities, which in the Christian context fall under the term 'missions' or 'missionary activities'. Recently, however, there has been much discussion whether da'wa at all can be rendered as 'missionary activity', for it is argued by some Muslims as well as non-Muslim scholars that da'wa distinctly differs from what in the Christian tradition 'missions' have encompassed. From the available historical evidence, it appears that after Muhammad's death Muslims did not immediately embark upon da'wa activities – during and after the rapid conquests of the Byzantinian and Persian lands, they little if at all ventured to preach to local non-Muslims about the virtues of Islam. Da'wa in the sense of inviting non-Muslims to embrace Islam was not yet on conquering Muslims' agenda. The first waves of conversions to Islam from among the indigenous populations of the conquered lands took place with virtually no Muslim missionary activities in the background. But the concept of da'wa was not lost even on the early Muslims. They were very much aware of it and indeed capitalized on its exploitation. Yet, this first was done on the intra-community level, among the Muslims themselves. The term da'wa came into wider usage almost a hundred years after Muhammad's death, in the wake of the 'Abbasid propaganda against the then ruling Ummayad clan in the 720's. However, the 'Abbasid da'wa ceased as soon as the 'Abbasids were in power – the fact that attests to its political nature.

Muslims have known and used the term 'da'wa' throughout the history of Islam. The concept, or rather concepts, of da'wa has been elaborated upon since the early centuries of Islam. Muslims have applied the term to various specific activities of theirs. The broadly known explanation in Europe and North America for da'wa is that it constitutes activities, which in the Christian context fall under the term 'missions' or 'missionary activities'. Recently, however, there has been much discussion whether da'wa at all can be rendered as 'missionary activity', for it is argued by some Muslims as well as non-Muslim scholars that da'wa distinctly differs from what in the Christian tradition 'missions' have encompassed. From the available historical evidence, it appears that after Muhammad's death Muslims did not immediately embark upon da'wa activities – during and after the rapid conquests of the Byzantinian and Persian lands, they little if at all ventured to preach to local non-Muslims about the virtues of Islam. Da'wa in the sense of inviting non-Muslims to embrace Islam was not yet on conquering Muslims' agenda. The first waves of conversions to Islam from among the indigenous populations of the conquered lands took place with virtually no Muslim missionary activities in the background. But the concept of da'wa was not lost even on the early Muslims. They were very much aware of it and indeed capitalized on its exploitation. Yet, this first was done on the intra-community level, among the Muslims themselves. The term da'wa came into wider usage almost a hundred years after Muhammad's death, in the wake of the 'Abbasid propaganda against the then ruling Ummayad clan in the 720's. However, the 'Abbasid da'wa ceased as soon as the 'Abbasids were in power – the fact that attests to its political nature.

Muslims have known and used the term 'da'wa' throughout the history of Islam. The concept, or rather concepts, of da'wa has been elaborated upon since the early centuries of Islam. Muslims have applied the term to various specific activities of theirs. The broadly known explanation in Europe and North America for da'wa is that it constitutes activities, which in the Christian context fall under the term 'missions' or 'missionary activities'. Recently, however, there has been much discussion whether da'wa at all can be rendered as 'missionary activity', for it is argued by some Muslims as well as non-Muslim scholars that da'wa distinctly differs from what in the Christian tradition 'missions' have encompassed. From the available historical evidence, it appears that after Muhammad's death Muslims did not immediately embark upon da'wa activities – during and after the rapid conquests of the Byzantinian and Persian lands, they little if at all ventured to preach to local non-Muslims about the virtues of Islam. Da'wa in the sense of inviting non-Muslims to embrace Islam was not yet on conquering Muslims' agenda. The first waves of conversions to Islam from among the indigenous populations of the conquered lands took place with virtually no Muslim missionary activities in the background. But the concept of da'wa was not lost even on the early Muslims. They were very much aware of it and indeed capitalized on its exploitation. Yet, this first was done on the intra-community level, among the Muslims themselves. The term da'wa came into wider usage almost a hundred years after Muhammad's death, in the wake of the 'Abbasid propaganda against the then ruling Ummayad clan in the 720's. However, the 'Abbasid da'wa ceased as soon as the 'Abbasids were in power – the fact that attests to its political nature.

Muslims have known and used the term 'da'wa' throughout the history of Islam. The concept, or rather concepts, of da'wa has been elaborated upon since the early centuries of Islam. Muslims have applied the term to various specific activities of theirs. The broadly known explanation in Europe and North America for da'wa is that it constitutes activities, which in the Christian context fall under the term 'missions' or 'missionary activities'. Recently, however, there has been much discussion whether da'wa at all can be rendered as 'missionary activity', for it is argued by some Muslims as well as non-Muslim scholars that da'wa distinctly differs from what in the Christian tradition 'missions' have encompassed. From the available historical evidence, it appears that after Muhammad's death Muslims did not immediately embark upon da'wa activities – during and after the rapid conquests of the Byzantinian and Persian lands, they little if at all ventured to preach to local non-Muslims about the virtues of Islam. Da'wa in the sense of inviting non-Muslims to embrace Islam was not yet on conquering Muslims' agenda. The first waves of conversions to Islam from among the indigenous populations of the conquered lands took place with virtually no Muslim missionary activities in the background. But the concept of da'wa was not lost even on the early Muslims. They were very much aware of it and indeed capitalized on its exploitation. Yet, this first was done on the intra-community level, among the Muslims themselves. The term da'wa came into wider usage almost a hundred years after Muhammad's death, in the wake of the 'Abbasid propaganda against the then ruling Ummayad clan in the 720's. However, the 'Abbasid da'wa ceased as soon as the 'Abbasids were in power – the fact that attests to its political nature.

Although the correlation of welfare and democracy is not direct, it is possible to sustain that the problems related with democracy satisfaction could be solved by public policy measures. Lithuanian's who reflect themselves as the losers of the transition reforms are unsatisfied with their socio-economic status and their anticipation of the prompt life improvement is rather high. If such tendencies start to dominate in the society of Lithuania, the question of political stability arises. Therefore social security, welfare network and infrastructure development as well as the increase of the redistribution amounts look like inevitable reforms in nowadays Lithuania. All appropriate compensatory measures could be related to the development of the welfare state in Lithuania. The liberal model of the welfare state should be the most suitable option for Lithuania at first sight. The Lisbon Strategy is implicitly based on this kind of welfare state model. Lithuania was trying to apply active labour market policy nevertheless the efforts were restrained by the small resources. The structural policy of the EU, mainly the measures financed by the European Social Fund, should increase the amount of funds allocated to the active labour market policy. Considering public policy in Lithuania an exclusive attention should be paid to the reduction of regional inequalities, establishment of the workplaces and social security infrastructure. Due to the Lithuanian budget restrictions it's necessary to develop a tax base and to improve tax administration. The second important component is partial decentralisation of programming and implementation of the EU funds by means of the EU Cohesion policy reform. The third component is the implementation of horizontal regional policy in Lithuania. Legal and organisational premises for the aforementioned steps are already established.

The article explores the effect of personal economic conditions and economic evaluations on the support for political regime. First, the relationship between different economic indicators and the support for democracy is examined using public opinion survey data. Further, the qualitative data are used to analyze the impact of socio-economic status on the regime support of an individual. Finally, the article explores how the evaluations of the national economic situation are formed. The qualitative research was carried out in July 2004 in four Lithuanian districts: Vilnius, Joniškis, Klaipėda and Tauragė. Vilnius and Klaipėda were selected as the most prosperous regions, and Joniškis and Tauragė were selected as the poorest regions of Lithuania. During the research, 40 in-depth interviews were made. The respondents were selected using the criteria of age, education and profession. The quantitative data are drawn from the 2001 Baltic Barometer survey. The results of the research reveal that support for democracy is mostly influenced by the evaluation of the national economic situation. The dissatisfaction with the economic performance of the political system, however, is only weakly related with the personal economic situation of an individual. Deprivation appears to be the strongest objective economic factor of political support. The other factors influencing the formation of the negative assessment of the economic development of Lithuania includes the economic situation of the region and neighborhood and the opinion of experts. The decisive criterion conditioning the attitudes toward the current economic situation in Lithuania is the comparison of the current life quality with that of Soviet times.

Regardless of the popular wisdom to make predictions in negotiations as if they always reflect the right according to the Bible– that "to every one who has will more be given" – this article starts with observation that weaker parties can and do sometimes successfully negotiate with stronger parties. Naturally this provokes questions: "Why can weak parties successfully negotiate with the stronger parties in asymmetric negotiations? How to explain this structural paradox?". The article argues that these questions would be old and answered if not for the long lasting tendency in the international relations discipline to analyze international negotiations from the point of view of the traditional power understanding, as well as systemic international relations theories. On another hand, difficulties objectively arise due to the fact that analysis of the structural paradox is connected to the problem of power – one of the most complex and difficult to define categories of the social science. And although much has been done recently in the social science to improve our understanding of the concept of power, it is still unclear what is the best way to conceptualise it.