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This article examines the reasons for adopting a non‑institutional character of the Visegrad cooperation in the years 1991‑1992. Its focus concerns two causes of the initial reluctance to institutionalise the Visegrad Group: the high level of unpredictability in Central Europe after the collapse of Communism and the symbolic role the Group was expected to play outside the region. These issues are considered through the prism of two theories in International Relations: neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Both provide theoreti‑ cal grounds to support the research hypothesis which assumes that the infor‑ mal character of the Visegrad cooperation was a pragmatic choice of its found‑ ing members. However, neorealist and neoliberal explanations of how the political background and security issues could have influenced their decision vary. The article concludes that the neorealist approach holds more explana‑ tory power in this regard, suggesting that the choice of the Visegrad states was dictated by the preservation of their national interests and subjected to ex‑ ternal limitations, rather than motivated by a common intention to facilitate their regional cooperation. ; Arkadiusz Nyzio

Zmiana instytucjonalna jest nieodłącznym procesem wpisującym się w rozwój społeczeństwa i gospodarki. Najistotniejszym procesem w ramach transformacji instytucji wydaje się dopasowywanie (się) instytucji formalnych i nieformalnych. Jest to niezbędne, aby system instytucjonalny działał sprawnie, aby generował odpowiednie bodźce na rzecz aktywności gospodarczej (niski koszt transakcyjny, przewidywalność, zaufanie). Efektem takich dostosowań jest ład instytucjonalny, który jest warunkiem trwałości rozwoju gospodarczego. Cechą instytucji jest długookresowe trwanie, choć jednocześnie odbywa się ich nieprzerwana ewolucja. Powstaje pytanie, w jaki sposób kształtuje się ład instytucjonalny, jaką rolę odgrywają w nim instytucje nieformalne. Za cel artykułu przyjęto określenie roli instytucji nieformalnych w kreowaniu ładu instytucjonalnego. Można wysunąć przypuszczenie, że instytucje nieformalne wraz z upływem czasu stają się trwałą podstawą ładu instytucjonalnego. W artykule wskazano również przejawy niesprawności systemu instytucji w Polsce, w tym instytucji nieformalnych. ; Institutional change is an integral process in the development of the society and economy. The seemingly most significant process in the transformation of institutions is the adjustment (also, mutual adjustment) of formal and informal institutions. This is critical to the proper functioning of the institutional system, so that it generates sufficient stimuli for economic activity (low transaction costs, predictability, trust). The result of such adjustments is institutional order which is a prerequisite of sustainable economic growth. One of the features of imitations is their longevity, even though they are constantly evolving. The question arises about how institutional order is formed and what the role of informal institution in this process is. The aim of the article is to determine the role of informal institutions in the formation of institutional order. It is possible that, given time, informal institutions become a solid foundation of institutional order. The article also indicates signs of irregularities in the institutional system in Poland, including in informal institutions. ; gruszad@gmail.com ; Uniwersytet w Białymstoku ; Aoki M., 2001, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London ; Boettke P.J., Coyne Ch.J., Leeson P.T., 2008, Institutional stickiness and the New Development Economics, American Journal of Economics & Sociology, vol. 67, iss. 2 ; Bossak J.W., 2008, Instytucje, rynki i konkurencja we współczesnym świecie, SGH, Warszawa ; Casson M.C., Della Giusta M., Kambhampati U.S., 2010, Formal and informal institutions and development, World Development, vol. 38, no. 2 ; Chavance B., 2008, Formal and informal institutional change: the experience of postsocialist transformation, The European Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 5, no. 1 ; Eggertsson T., 2006, On the survival of imperfect institutions, Revista de Análisis Económico, vol. 21, no. 2. ; Gardocka A., 2005, Kultura ekonomiczna jako instytucja, [w:] Teoretyczne aspekty gospodarowania, red. 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Grabska, M. Moszyński, WN PWN, Warszawa ; Meredyk K., 2014, Ład gospodarczy jako kategoria ekonomiczna, [w:] Spontaniczne i stanowione elementy ładu gospodarczego w procesie transformacji – dryf ładu czy jego doskonalenie?, red.P. Pysz, A. Grabska, M. Moszyński, PTE, Warszawa ; Nelson R.R., 2008, What enables rapid economic progress: What are the needed institutions?, Research Policy, vol. 37, no. 1 ; North D.C., 2009, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, New York ; Ostrom E., 2008, Institutions and the environments, Economic Affairs, vol. 28, no. 3 ; Platje J., 2007, Bodźce i koszty transakcyjne a zmiany instytucjonalne oraz stan polskiej gospodarki w latach 1970–2000, UO, Opole ; Platje J., 2008, "Institutional Capital" as a factor of sustainable development – the importance of an institutional equilibrium, Technological and Economic Development, vol. 14, no. 2. ; Rudolf S., 2010, Nowa ekonomia instytucjonalna, Przedsiębiorstwo Przyszłości, nr 1(2) ; Sautet F., 2005, The role of institutions in entrepreneurship: implications for development policy, Mercatus Policy Series, Policy Premier, no. 1 ; Soysa I. de, Jütting J., 2006, Informal Institutions and Development: Think Local, Act Global?, OECD and Development, Paris, s. 3, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/16/37790393.pdf. ; Tkacz A., 2008, Zmiany instytucjonalne w gospodarce: doświadczenia ukraińskie i polskie, Nierówności Społeczne a Wzrost Gospodarczy, zeszyt 10, s. 333. ; Vaal A. de, Ebben W., 2011, Institutions and the relation between corruption and economic growth, Review of Development Economics, vol. 15, no. 1, s. 110. ; Wilkin J., 2011, Institutional Equilibrium: What Is it about and what Is its Role in the Economy?, Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, nr 208, Ekonomia, vol. 15, s. 32. ; Williamson C.R., 2009, Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performances, Public Choice, vol. 139, iss. 3–4, s. 373. ; Williamson C.R., Kerekes C.B., 2011, Securing private property: formal versus informal institutions, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 54, no. 3, s. 544. ; Williamson O.E., 2000, The new institutional economics: Taking stocks, looking ahead, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 38, no. 3. ; Woźniak M.G., 2009, Instytucjonalne uwarunkowania wzrostu gospodarczego i sprawiedliwych nierówności społecznych, Nierówności Społeczne a Wzrost Gospodarczy, zeszyt 14, s. 40. ; Ząbkowicz A., 2014, Transformacja ładu instytucjonalnego. Samoregulująca się gospodarka z perspektywy Waltera Euckena i Karla Polanyi'ego, [w:] Ład gospodarczy a współczesna ekonomia, red. P. Pysz, A. Grabska, M. Moszyński, PWN, Warszawa, s. 40. ; 405 ; 55 ; 69

Przedmiotem artykułu są pokomunistyczne przemiany ustrojowe rozpatrywane w perspektywie politologii i ekonomii politycznej konstytucjonalizmu. Pierwsza część dotyczy występujących w literaturze założeń teoretycznych oraz hipotez empirycznych. Nacisk położono na wybór typu rządów, rodzaju ordynacji wyborczej i organizacji pionowej państwa. Część druga proponuje model teoretyczny służący wyjaśnieniu dróg przemian ustrojowych i ich skutków. Zawiera on czynniki wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne. Wśród pierwszych główną rolę odgrywa stopień zdominowania społeczeństwa przez komunistyczne monopaństwo: im jest większy, tym wyższe prawdopodobieństwo ustroju autorytarnego. Czynnik zewnętrzny to położenie kraju w stosunku do Zachodu (Bruksela) lub Wschodu (Moskwa): bliskość Moskwy podnosi prawdopodobieństwo opcji autorytarnej. Analiza strategii przemian ustrojowych skupia się na wyborze typu rządów oraz ordynacji wyborczej. Efekty transformacji mierzone są za pomocą zagregowanego indeksu ustroju politycznego. Uzyskane rezultaty odbiegają od przewidywanych na podstawie teorii przedstawionej w pierwszej części artykułu.JEL: A10; A12; B25; P10; P20; P21; P30 ; While there is a wealth of studies on selected aspects of economic and political transitions from communism, there are few, if any, analyses of the emergence of new political orders in terms of constitutional engineering, i.e. the adoption of the meta-rules governing the rules defining both the political structure and determining underpinnings of the ordinary law-making process. The paper begins with the review of menu of institutional choices related to type of government, electoral system and vertical organisation of the state and their impact on performance as reported in political science and constitutional political economy literature. It is posited that the binary outcome: democracy vs. autocracy is a function of two variables assuming two values: society (weak vs. autonomous sovereign citizen) and communist establishment (strong vs. weak). A strong communist state at the initial state of transition produces autocratic outcomes although proximity to Brussels may change political trajectory whereas a strong autonomous society generates trajectory leading to democracy. Surprisingly, the choice of the rules of political game bore little resemblance to what literature might suggest: ordinary political struggle has determinedthe choice of institutions with constitutions as a legal act being the result rather than a product of conscientious intellectual design.JEL: A10; A12; B25; P10; P20; P21; P30

The restructuralization process in the field of research and development and the barriers that have appeared during this process in the former Soviet Union and the former Soviet bloc countries are presented in this article. The author has paid particular attention to the role of transformation in the area of industrial research, an area that has suffered the most due to the new political and economic conditions. Furthermore, the author discusses the role of particular factors that determine the institutional transformation process, including the financial factors. The author also shows the differences among the restructuralization processes in selected countries, above all the differences in the situation of research personnel. ; W artykule zostały przedstawione uwarunkowania procesu restrukturyzacji sfery badawczo-rozwojowej - bariery występujące w trakcie realizacji tego procesu w byłych krajach socjalistycznych. Autor zwraca szczególną uwagę na rolę przekształceń w sferze badań przemysłowych, które najbardziej ucierpiały w wyniku nowych uwarunkowań politycznych i ekonomicznych. Ponadto omawia rolę czynników determinujących proces przemian instytucjonalnych, w tym czynników finansowych. Pokazuje także różnice w procesie restrukturyzacji między poszczególnymi krajami, a zwłaszcza sytuację kadr badawczych.

This paper is a short commentary on Elinor Ostrom's criticism of 'The Tradegy of Commons', which is part of her research on Common Pool Resources (CPR) institutions. She delivered an institutional theory of Common Pool Resources governance and also seriously undermined so called social paradoxes, as Olsons' logic of collective action or prisoners dilemma as a model of social situations. The core of these social paradoxes and Garett Hardin's Tragedy of Commons respectively, is an assumption of rational choice taken by an isolated, selfish and egoistic individual. In Ostroms opinion such theories are not really wrong, but are very special cases in the World of interpersonal communication, customs and institutions. Ostrom has developed an institutional analysis of CPR governance and formulated basic rules of a good and durable CPR Institution. Ostroms' works takes account of both laissez-faire and centralized, government-run allocation as the wrong approach toward management of the Commons. These analyses seem useful in Poland, where nowadays CPR governance is highly centralized.

In contemporary states the aims of public policy are more often met through the implementation of regulatory instruments. It appears vital then to analyse their theoretical background as well as to contextually specify the conditions of their effective implementation. The following paper aims to conduct an analysis of the regulatory instruments such as standards, soft law along with self-regulation. There are three types of regulatory standards pointed out (goal-oriented, resultative, specific). The choice of a given standard often depends on context-specific factors, and additionally it involves an important dilemma, i.e. whether they should be unified for all the subordinate entities or differentiated in terms of the given features of the regulated entities. The author analyses the so-called 'soft law' as a regulatory instrument, which is implemented both in national and international regulatory systems. The term is used within the framework of regulatory policy and holds that the aims of public policy can be met through the application of soft, and sometimes 'informal' tools, that in certain circumstances might turn out to be equally effective as typical hard regulatory tools that are subject to sanction. The article additionally aims to address the issue of self-regulation that encompasses a set of rules that economic entities have created in a voluntary way (informally) and reciprocally claim as legally binding. These can also entail formal rules (e.g. the codes of conduct) that are fully executed in courts. In the summary section it is claimed that the choice of regulatory instruments is the one that should be dependent on the level of maturity of the institutional structures functioning within an economy as well as the capacity of entities to adequately react to informative market signals.

Artykuł spogląda na polską politykę po 1989 roku z perspektywy instytucjonalnej. Wychodząc z teoretycznych przesłanek neoinstytucjonalizmu, broni tezy, że obecny stan polskiej polityki stanie się zrozumiały, gdy opowieść o jego ramach instytucjonalnych będzie przedstawiona na dwóch poziomach. Poziom pierwszy to reguły konstytucyjne, które strukturyzują konflikt polityczny i sprawiają, że Polska uznawana jest za skonsolidowaną demokrację. W tym wymiarze głównym wątkiem ostatniego ćwierćwiecza była udana próba stworzenia z rządu dominującego ośrodka podejmowania wiążących decyzji publicznych. Reguły konstytucyjne są jednak korodowane przez operacyjne reguły działania administracji i tworzenia prawa. To ten poziom kształtowania ram instytucjonalnych, analizowany w artykule na przykładzie rządowego procesu legislacyjnego, odpowiada za jakość polskiej demokracji. Na tym właśnie poziomie konstytucyjnie silny rząd traci możliwość wyznaczania strategicznych celów polityki państwa, strategicznego alokowania zasobów, koordynowania działań swoich jednostek organizacyjnych.The article is an attempt to interpret the developments of Polish politics after 1989 from an institutionalist perspective. In order to understand the current state of Polish politics the narrative on the institutional framework of politics has to be presented on two levels. On the first level, constitutional rules structure political conflict and make Poland a consolidated democracy. The main line of development of this narrative of the last 25 years is a successful attempt to make the government the dominating pole of taking binding political decisions. However, constitutional rules are weakened by the rules at the second level – operating rules of administration and lawmaking. This level of the institutional framework of politics, analyzed in the article as an example of the governmental legislative process, is responsible for the quality of Polish democracy. This is the level where the constitutionally powerful government loses the capacity to make strategic policy choices, strategically allocate resources or coordinate the activities of its sub-units.

Socio-economic transformation as profound and thorough reform of the system and institutions promotes corruption practices and can be the mean to fight against one, too. Two kinds of understanding of corruption may be indicated: narrow (pathologic and functional interpretation) and wider underlined the neo-institutional argumentation, pointing out to systemic and structural causes of corruption. A theoretical and practical problem remains, whether corruption are of systemic nature (fundamental institution), or are secondary (consequence institutuion). The analysis of corruption, may be done by means of the new institutionalism and consequence theories: transaction costs, theory of property rights, theory of clubs, principal-agent theory, theory of asymmetry information, capture theories, rent seeking theory, theory of games and theory of public choice. The dynamics of the polish economy and wide researches of corruption (the differences between perceiving and experiencing) indicates that the corruption factors which paralyse the economic development have not dominated the economic system in Poland as yet, and that system maintains its autonomy. Still, typical corruption-clientelistic societies are contemporary not common, in Poland too. The above problems do not change the fact that corruption are a major problem and in the long run would causes loss of competitiveness polish economy on the global market. ; Społeczno-ekonomiczna transformacja jako głęboka reforma systemu i instytucji przyczynia się do korupcyjnych praktyk, ale może być też narzędziem w walce z tym zjawiskiem. Występują dwa rozumienia korupcji: węższe (patologiczna i funkcjonalna interpretacja) i szersze podkreślające argumentację neoinstytucjonalną (systemowe i strukturalne źródła korupcji). Teoretycznym i praktycznym problemem pozostaje więc, czy korupcja ma naturę systemową (fundamentalna instytucja), czy drugorzędną (instytucja pochodna). Narzędziem badań może być nowy instytucjonalizm i zawierające się w nim teorie: kosztów transakcyjnych, praw własności, klubów, pryncypała-agenta, asymetrii informacji, .zawłaszczenia, pogoni za rentą, teorii gier i teorii wyboru publicznego. Dynamika polskiej gospodarki i szerokie badania korupcji (różnice między jej postrzeganiem a doświadczeniem) wskazują, że korupcyjne czynniki, które ograniczają wzrost ekonomiczny nie zdominowały jeszcze polskiej gospodarki i zachowuje ona swoją autonomię. Typowe społeczeństwa klientelistyczno-korupcyjne nie są obecnie zjawiskiem powszechnym, także w Polsce. Nie zmienia to jednak tego, że korupcja pozostaje głównym społecznym problemem i dłuższym horyzoncie czasowym może powodować utratę konkurencyjności polskiej gospodarki na globalnym rynku.

Socio-economic transformation as profound and thorough reform of the system and institutions promotes corruption practices and can be the mean to fight against one, too. Two kinds of understanding of corruption may be indicated: narrow (pathologic and functional interpretation) and wider underlined the neo-institutional argumentation, pointing out to systemic and structural causes of corruption. A theoretical and practical problem remains, whether corruption are of systemic nature (fundamental institution), or are secondary (consequence institutuion). The analysis of corruption, may be done by means of the new institutionalism and consequence theories: transaction costs, theory of property rights, theory of clubs, principal-agent theory, theory of asymmetry information, capture theories, rent seeking theory, theory of games and theory of public choice. The dynamics of the polish economy and wide researches of corruption (the differences between perceiving and experiencing) indicates that the corruption factors which paralyse the economic development have not dominated the economic system in Poland as yet, and that system maintains its autonomy. Still, typical corruption-clientelistic societies are contemporary not common, in Poland too. The above problems do not change the fact that corruption are a major problem and in the long run would causes loss of competitiveness polish economy on the global market. ; Społeczno-ekonomiczna transformacja jako głęboka reforma systemu i instytucji przyczynia się do korupcyjnych praktyk, ale może być też narzędziem w walce z tym zjawiskiem. Występują dwa rozumienia korupcji: węższe (patologiczna i funkcjonalna interpretacja) i szersze podkreślające argumentację neoinstytucjonalną (systemowe i strukturalne źródła korupcji). Teoretycznym i praktycznym problemem pozostaje więc, czy korupcja ma naturę systemową (fundamentalna instytucja), czy drugorzędną (instytucja pochodna). Narzędziem badań może być nowy instytucjonalizm i zawierające się w nim teorie: kosztów transakcyjnych, praw własności, klubów, pryncypała-agenta, asymetrii informacji, .zawłaszczenia, pogoni za rentą, teorii gier i teorii wyboru publicznego. Dynamika polskiej gospodarki i szerokie badania korupcji (różnice między jej postrzeganiem a doświadczeniem) wskazują, że korupcyjne czynniki, które ograniczają wzrost ekonomiczny nie zdominowały jeszcze polskiej gospodarki i zachowuje ona swoją autonomię. Typowe społeczeństwa klientelistyczno-korupcyjne nie są obecnie zjawiskiem powszechnym, także w Polsce. Nie zmienia to jednak tego, że korupcja pozostaje głównym społecznym problemem i dłuższym horyzoncie czasowym może powodować utratę konkurencyjności polskiej gospodarki na globalnym rynku.

Mimo ścisłych związków między technologią i stosunkami międzynarodowymi istnieje niewiele prac w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych, które podejmują próbę teoretycznego połączenia obu tych sfer rzeczywistości społecznej. Podstawowym celem artykułu jest historyzacja technologii militarnej w społecznej historii stosunków międzynarodowych. Autor przedstawia proces historycznego wzrostu znaczenia technologii militarnej w funkcjonowaniu społeczeństw i jej destruktywny wpływ na życie społeczne. Przekonuje, że nowe technologie rozwinaje są przez istoty ludzkie, a nie "odkrywane". Dokonane wynalazki odzwierciedlają określone interesy, posiadanie adekwatnych zasobów do ich dokonania i istnienie określonego instytucjonalnego wsparcia. W takim rozumieniu nauka, technologia i innowacje są funkcją ludzkich wyborów, interesów, idei, instytucji i zasobów. ; Despite close connections between technology and international relations, there are few works in international relations studies that would make an attempt to theoretically connect both of these two spheres of social reality.The main aim of the article is a historization of military technology in a social history of international relations. The author presents the process of historical growth of importance of military technology in functioning of societies and its destructive influence on social life. He convinces one that new technologies are developed, not "discovered" by human beings. Inventions reflect specific interests, owning proper resources to develop them and the existence of determined institutional support. In this understanding, science, technology and innovations are functions of human choices, interests, ideas, institutions and resources.In the first part of the article, the author presents relations between science, technology and innovations, as well as main attitudes in international relations studies in the context of comprehending these relations. Problems caused by technological development are also discussed. In the second part of the article, the author presents the meaning of military technology in international relations through its historization. By showing different contexts of "war machines" (horse, chariot, cavalry, cannons, conventional and nuclear weapon, information technology),one can observe the influence of military technology on international relations in the process of uneven and related development of different societies in different times from antiquity to the present day. In particular, the results of transformation of relations between armed forces and scientific institutions after World War II into permanent structures of society and government are shown. On the example of United States of America, the author points negative consequences of forming bureaucratic national security services for many aspects of social life. Finally, referring to James Der Derian's analysis, the author presents transformative influence of information technology on international relations.

The fundamental problem faced by the states that have emerged in the area of the former USSR involved the definition of the desired form of their own political regime. The choices made in this respect in the first stage of political transformation were frequently limited only to the formal stipulation of model legal and constitutional solutions. The post-communist elite wielding power in the new states was characterized by a desire to form a one-man organ of state in the form of a strong president. The absence of democratic traditions and the negative legacy of the USSR have profoundly influenced the processes of shaping the political regimes in the post-Soviet area, and have actually become the predominant reason to legitimize authoritarianism. Only a few states of the former USSR have decided to adopt a model of governance other than a strong presidential system. Latvia deserves attention in this respect, as it has decided to reinstate the tested political principles of the interwar period. In the process of political transformation, the Latvian political elite has opted for the parliamentary system of governance and chose a weak presidency and the primacy of parliament. The transformation process was quickly completed allowing Latvia to be classified today as a non-consolidated democracy. Moldova's adopting the system of parliamentary governance in 2000 was, in turn, an unintentional result of a political conflict caused by the President's endeavors to form a strong presidential system. Moldovan parliamentarianism is a product of a protracted shaping of the institutional foundations of the political system and a byproduct of political competition between the legislative and executive powers. The domination of Communists on the Moldovan political stage, however, resulted in the state's appropriation by one group and President Vladimir Voronin, who enjoyed a great influence exerted both on the parliamentary majority (as the leader of the ruling party) and the government, despite the formal system providing for a parliamentary republic. There emerged a dangerous precedent of the President exceeding his rights and thus becoming the actual leader of a formally parliamentary republic. In the period from 2001–2009, Moldova was a system of controlled democracy where apparently democratic institutions were in fact a cover for undivided, informal power wielded by a small circle. This triggered a social revolution in 2009 and early parliamentary elections, which resulted in a transfer of power and the establishment of a coalition of liberal and democratic parties clearly expressing their intention to implement market reforms and European integration. Despite political obstruction in Moldova's shaping of its political system, the country stands out among the former post-Soviet republics. It is the only state in the Commonwealth of Independent States where a continuous and uninterrupted cycle of the transfer of power by means of elections can be observed to conform to the law and constitution since the country declared independence in 1991. ; The fundamental problem faced by the states that have emerged in the area of the former USSR involved the definition of the desired form of their own political regime. The choices made in this respect in the first stage of political transformation were frequently limited only to the formal stipulation of model legal and constitutional solutions. The post-communist elite wielding power in the new states was characterized by a desire to form a one-man organ of state in the form of a strong president. The absence of democratic traditions and the negative legacy of the USSR have profoundly influenced the processes of shaping the political regimes in the post-Soviet area, and have actually become the predominant reason to legitimize authoritarianism. Only a few states of the former USSR have decided to adopt a model of governance other than a strong presidential system. Latvia deserves attention in this respect, as it has decided to reinstate the tested political principles of the interwar period. In the process of political transformation, the Latvian political elite has opted for the parliamentary system of governance and chose a weak presidency and the primacy of parliament. The transformation process was quickly completed allowing Latvia to be classified today as a non-consolidated democracy. Moldova's adopting the system of parliamentary governance in 2000 was, in turn, an unintentional result of a political conflict caused by the President's endeavors to form a strong presidential system. Moldovan parliamentarianism is a product of a protracted shaping of the institutional foundations of the political system and a byproduct of political competition between the legislative and executive powers. The domination of Communists on the Moldovan political stage, however, resulted in the state's appropriation by one group and President Vladimir Voronin, who enjoyed a great influence exerted both on the parliamentary majority (as the leader of the ruling party) and the government, despite the formal system providing for a parliamentary republic. There emerged a dangerous precedent of the President exceeding his rights and thus becoming the actual leader of a formally parliamentary republic. In the period from 2001–2009, Moldova was a system of controlled democracy where apparently democratic institutions were in fact a cover for undivided, informal power wielded by a small circle. This triggered a social revolution in 2009 and early parliamentary elections, which resulted in a transfer of power and the establishment of a coalition of liberal and democratic parties clearly expressing their intention to implement market reforms and European integration. Despite political obstruction in Moldova's shaping of its political system, the country stands out among the former post-Soviet republics. It is the only state in the Commonwealth of Independent States where a continuous and uninterrupted cycle of the transfer of power by means of elections can be observed to conform to the law and constitution since the country declared independence in 1991.

The fundamental problem faced by the states that have emerged in the area of the former USSR involved the definition of the desired form of their own political regime. The choices made in this respect in the first stage of political transformation were frequently limited only to the formal stipulation of model legal and constitutional solutions. The post-communist elite wielding power in the new states was characterized by a desire to form a one-man organ of state in the form of a strong president. The absence of democratic traditions and the negative legacy of the USSR have profoundly influenced the processes of shaping the political regimes in the post-Soviet area, and have actually become the predominant reason to legitimize authoritarianism. Only a few states of the former USSR have decided to adopt a model of governance other than a strong presidential system. Latvia deserves attention in this respect, as it has decided to reinstate the tested political principles of the interwar period. In the process of political transformation, the Latvian political elite has opted for the parliamentary system of governance and chose a weak presidency and the primacy of parliament. The transformation process was quickly completed allowing Latvia to be classified today as a non-consolidated democracy. Moldova's adopting the system of parliamentary governance in 2000 was, in turn, an unintentional result of a political conflict caused by the President's endeavors to form a strong presidential system. Moldovan parliamentarianism is a product of a protracted shaping of the institutional foundations of the political system and a byproduct of political competition between the legislative and executive powers. The domination of Communists on the Moldovan political stage, however, resulted in the state's appropriation by one group and President Vladimir Voronin, who enjoyed a great influence exerted both on the parliamentary majority (as the leader of the ruling party) and the government, despite the formal system providing for a parliamentary republic. There emerged a dangerous precedent of the President exceeding his rights and thus becoming the actual leader of a formally parliamentary republic. In the period from 2001–2009, Moldova was a system of controlled democracy where apparently democratic institutions were in fact a cover for undivided, informal power wielded by a small circle. This triggered a social revolution in 2009 and early parliamentary elections, which resulted in a transfer of power and the establishment of a coalition of liberal and democratic parties clearly expressing their intention to implement market reforms and European integration. Despite political obstruction in Moldova's shaping of its political system, the country stands out among the former post-Soviet republics. It is the only state in the Commonwealth of Independent States where a continuous and uninterrupted cycle of the transfer of power by means of elections can be observed to conform to the law and constitution since the country declared independence in 1991.

The fundamental problem faced by the states that have emerged in the area of the former USSR involved the definition of the desired form of their own political regime. The choices made in this respect in the first stage of political transformation were frequently limited only to the formal stipulation of model legal and constitutional solutions. The post-communist elite wielding power in the new states was characterized by a desire to form a one-man organ of state in the form of a strong president. The absence of democratic traditions and the negative legacy of the USSR have profoundly influenced the processes of shaping the political regimes in the post-Soviet area, and have actually become the predominant reason to legitimize authoritarianism. Only a few states of the former USSR have decided to adopt a model of governance other than a strong presidential system. Latvia deserves attention in this respect, as it has decided to reinstate the tested political principles of the interwar period. In the process of political transformation, the Latvian political elite has opted for the parliamentary system of governance and chose a weak presidency and the primacy of parliament. The transformation process was quickly completed allowing Latvia to be classified today as a non-consolidated democracy. Moldova's adopting the system of parliamentary governance in 2000 was, in turn, an unintentional result of a political conflict caused by the President's endeavors to form a strong presidential system. Moldovan parliamentarianism is a product of a protracted shaping of the institutional foundations of the political system and a byproduct of political competition between the legislative and executive powers. The domination of Communists on the Moldovan political stage, however, resulted in the state's appropriation by one group and President Vladimir Voronin, who enjoyed a great influence exerted both on the parliamentary majority (as the leader of the ruling party) and the government, despite the formal system providing for a parliamentary republic. There emerged a dangerous precedent of the President exceeding his rights and thus becoming the actual leader of a formally parliamentary republic. In the period from 2001–2009, Moldova was a system of controlled democracy where apparently democratic institutions were in fact a cover for undivided, informal power wielded by a small circle. This triggered a social revolution in 2009 and early parliamentary elections, which resulted in a transfer of power and the establishment of a coalition of liberal and democratic parties clearly expressing their intention to implement market reforms and European integration. Despite political obstruction in Moldova's shaping of its political system, the country stands out among the former post-Soviet republics. It is the only state in the Commonwealth of Independent States where a continuous and uninterrupted cycle of the transfer of power by means of elections can be observed to conform to the law and constitution since the country declared independence in 1991.