Suchergebnisse

[110] p. ; Imprint from STC. ; With an index. ; Cambridge University Library also has a fragment (Sayle 244) in the same types as and corresponding to leaves G2,3,6 and 7 in this edition but in a different setting with "villayne" while this edition has "vyllayne" on leaf G2r line 1--STC. ; Imperfect; lacks leaf D7. ; Signatures: A-G (-G8). ; Reproduction of the original in the Cambridge University Library.

""Constructive engagement"" became a catchphrase under the Clinton administration for America's reinvigorated efforts to pull China firmly into the international community as a responsible player, one that abides by widely accepted norms. Skeptics questioned the effectiveness of this policy and those that followed. But how is such socialization supposed to work in the first place? This has never been all that clear, whether practiced by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, or the United States. Social States is the first book to systematically test the effects of soc

[2], 5 p. ; Imperfect: faded and stained with loss of print; text begins on signature Aaa. ; Reproduction of the original in the Harvard University Library.

2d. edition. ; No more published. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Title-page mutilated; first word of title supplied in MS. ; No more published. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Does the occurrence of flood disaster increase the risk of communal conflict and if so, does trust in state political institutions mitigate the adverse effect? This study addresses these questions by studying the intervening effect of trust in local governmental institutions at a sub-national level. The effect of flood disasters on the risk of communal violence is expected to be contingent on peoples' trust that local political structures are able to address potential disputes between groups. Violent conflicts, in that sense, are neither inevitable nor directly determined by the occurrence of disasters. They largely depend on the context of a given society and political response to these external shocks. To test this expectation, the study uses survey data on trust in local state institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa from the Afrobarometer (2005–2018), combined with geo-referenced communal conflict and flood data. In line with theoretical expectations, results suggest that flood disasters are associated with communal violence only for administrative districts that are governed by distrusted local state institutions. Conversely, flood disasters tend to be negatively associated with the risk of communal clashes in the presence of highly trusted local government councils and (especially) trusted judicial courts. Changing model specifications and estimation techniques produces similar results. An out-of-sample cross-validation also shows that accounting for political variables, in addition to flood disasters, improves the predictive performance of the model.

[23], 286, [3] p. ; A reprint of his Enchiridion with slight differences in arrangement of material. Issued in 1698 as the work of George Savile, 1st marquis of Halifax. ; Advertisements: p. [1]-[2] at end. ; Reproduction of original in Yale University Library. ; Includes index.

[228] p. ; An edition of: Quarles, Francis. Enchyridion. ; The words "Contemplative. Practicall." and "Ethicall. . Politicall." are bracketed together on title page. ; Signatures: A⁶ B-K¹² . ; Reproduction of the original in the British Library.

Classical works on authoritarian politics mostly considered political institutions under nondemocratic regimes as mere window dressing. Yet, contemporary works dispute that idea and argue that political institutions are used to facilitate survival in power. This dissertation explored how political institutions are manipulated by the political class and the potential factors why this has contributed to political instability and lack of survival in power in Guinea-Bissau from 1994-2019, differently from what we observe in other non-democratic societies. To achieve this goal, qualitative methods and thematic analysis were carried out with three major themes emerging. First, the manipulation of institutions for survival; second, the use of institutions for co-optation and the challenges of power-sharing; third, credible threat in relation to minimization of loss. Findings of this work show the following; first, institutions in Guinea-Bissau; the legislature and political parties are the root causes of instability rather than survival. Second, leaders do co-opt potential opponents but they do not redistribute rent and power sufficiently to ensure that co-optation eliminates the risk of coups. Third, political parties are important but with weak structures, very vertical and unable to distribute rent and to anticipate threats. Fourth, political parties pose credible threats to each other due to their use of military force but access to government and parliamentary or party positions are not a guarantee that opponents will not try to oppressively remove leaders from power. Therefore, the risk of manipulating institutions for survival comes with threats, and these threats have been the driven force for instability since 1994. ; A maioria dos clássicos sobre política autoritária considerava as instituições políticas em regimes não-democráticos como mera fachada. No entanto, as obras contemporâneas tendem a disputar essa ideia e argumentam que as instituições políticas são usadas para facilitar a sobrevivência no poder. Esta dissertação explora a forma como as instituições políticas são manipuladas pela classe política e os possíveis fatores que fazem com que as instituições contribuam para a instabilidade política e a falta de sobrevivência no poder na Guiné-Bissau entre 1994-2019 contrariamente ao que se sucede na maioria dos regimes não democráticos. A fim de alcançar este objetivo, foram utilizados métodos qualitativos e uma análise de três grandes temas. Primeiro, a manipulação de instituições para a sobrevivência; segundo, a utilização de instituições para a cooptação e os desafios da partilha de poder; terceiro, a ameaça credível em relação à minimização da perda. Os resultados deste trabalho mostram o seguinte: primeiro, as instituições na Guiné-Bissau, o parlamento e os partidos políticos são as causas profundas da instabilidade e não da sobrevivência; segundo, os líderes cooptam potenciais opositores mas não redistribuem suficientemente a renda e o poder para assegurar que a cooptação elimina o risco de golpes de Estado; terceiro, os partidos políticos são importantes mas têm estruturas fracas, muito verticais e incapazes de distribuir a renda e de antecipar ameaças; quarto, os partidos políticos representam ameaças credíveis entre si devido ao uso da força militar mas o acesso ao governo e as posições parlamentares ou partidárias não são garantia de que os opositores não tentem remover opressivamente os líderes do poder. Por conseguinte, o risco de manipulação das instituições para sobreviver no poder vem com ameaças, e estas ameaças têm sido a força motriz da instabilidade desde 1994.