An aspect of the battle over deconstruction is whether resort to legislative intent might help to determine the content of a statutory text that otherwise, in splendid isolation, could be deconstructed by simply positing different interpretive contexts. I examine the same issue by recounting my own quest for determinate meaning in statutes—a sort of personal legislative history. I do not claim for jurisprudence the role of ensuring faithful reception of the legislature's message, for that is impossible. At best, jurisprudential theory only reduces the degrees of interpretive freedom, and then only probably, not necessarily. The more significant thesis of this article is that all theories of statutory interpretation can only do that much and no more.
Summary: In the context of the development of the so-called environmental state of law: there is an interesting aspect at ius-philosophical level that takes place directly on the basis of the commitments made by the judges: the value of human dignity in relation to environmental care. This work is intended to demonstrate how respect for dignity is at the heart of the interpretative work and constitutes a guiding criterion in judicial decision-making in recent years of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Argentine Nation concerning the right to drinking water and the protection of water resources. ; Resumen: En el marco del desarrollo del denominado "Estado ambiental de derecho" existe un aspecto interesante a nivel iusfilosófico que tiene lugar directamente sobre la base de los compromisos asumidos por los jueces: el valor de la dignidad humana en relación con el cuidado del ambiente. Este trabajo se propone demostrar cómo en la jurisprudencia de los últimos años de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación argentina, concerniente al derecho al agua potable y la protección de los recursos hídricos, el respeto de la dignidad se encuentra en el centro de la labor interpretativa y constituye un criterio rector en la toma de decisiones judiciales.
The objective of the article is to find optimal ways to develop the judicial interpretation of legal norms as a form of application (explanation) by courts of norms of current legislation. Justice is one of the most important security functions of the judicial power system in Russia and, according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, is exercised in civil, administrative, criminal, and constitutional court proceedings. The inevitability of the existence of the judicial lawmaking institution implies the necessity to adjust the understanding of the principle of the separation of powers so that the lawmaking function is distributed among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of power. The leading method of studying the problem is deductive, which allows studying the legal nature of the judicial interpretation of legal norms. The article concludes that the existence of discretion in the legal system is conditioned by several objective factors. These factors include the objective impossibility of regulation by the general norm of all individual legal relations; the existence of evaluative concepts, dispositive, and peremptory legal norms containing relatively certain or alternative sanctions; the existence of open legal lists, gaps in the law, and collisions of legislation. The thesis is argued that it is impossible to level out by subjective preferences one of such objective phenomena of legal regulation as legitimacy and law enforcement discretion. At the same time, legitimacy is a phenomenon of a higher order. In a sustainable democratic legal system, law enforcement discretion can function only in terms of legitimacy.
It has been 20 years since section 15 of the Charter came into force. In this paper, Professor Hogg traces the "winding course" of judicial interpretation of section 15. The Supreme Court of Canada has changed the ground rules every few years as the judges have journeyed along that winding course. It has been a serious problem for any commentator foolish enough to try and keep a treatise on constitutional law up to date. Professor Hogg discusses the difficulty of applying a guarantee of equality focusing on cases from Andrews to Law and cases subsequent to Law and states that Law has unfortunately supplanted Andrews as the leading case on section 15. The element of human dignity, Professor Hogg points out, effectively sidelines the role of section 1. Section 1 at least had the advantage of providing very carefully structured legal tests and put the burden of proving each step of the way on government not the claimant. The element of human dignity that is now apparently firmly embedded in the jurisprudence is vague, confusing and burdensome to equality claimants. However in unusual cases section 1 justification may still uphold a discriminatory law.
Textualism or Originalism, as defended by Justice Antonin Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court, is a normative doctrine of method according to which the judicial interpretation of statutes and of the Constitution should aim at establishing the original meaning of the text. Textualism in the strict sense is unpopular not only among most judges but also among philosophers and theologians. In philosophy, Textualism was denounced as hopelessly naive by authors such as Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and their American followers. In theology, Textualism is not a viable option for believers who want both to accept as true the text of their holy book and to endorse the results of modern science and historical scholarship. I argue that Textualism is the only valid methodology of interpretation both in philosophy and in theology. For the judicial interpretation and application of statutes and constitutions, however, Textualism cannot be more than one methodological topos among many. We also have to accept other topoi, such as the topos that the system of statutes and treatises should form a consistent whole, and these other topoi cannot be considered as part and parcel of Textualism in the strict sense. It follows that the difference between a tenable sophisticated version of Textualism as a methodology of judicial interpretation and the so-called doctrine of the Living Constitution is one of degree and emphasis only. Justice Scalia's simple version of Textualism is a political ideology rather than a valid methodology of judicial interpretation.
Textualism or Originalism, as defended by Justice Antonin Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court, is a normative doctrine of method according to which the judicial interpretation of statutes and of the Constitution should aim at establishing the original meaning of the text. Textualism in the strict sense is unpopular not only among most judges but also among philosophers and theologians. In philosophy, Textualism was denounced as hopelessly naive by authors such as Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and their American followers. In theology, Textualism is not a viable option for believers who want both to accept as true the text of their holy book and to endorse the results of modern science and historical scholarship. I argue that Textualism is the only valid methodology of interpretation both in philosophy and in theology. For the judicial interpretation and application of statutes and constitutions, however, Textualism cannot be more than one methodological topos among many. We also have to accept other topoi, such as the topos that the system of statutes and treatises should form a consistent whole, and these other topoi cannot be considered as part and parcel of Textualism in the strict sense. It follows that the difference between a tenable sophisticated version of Textualism as a methodology of judicial interpretation and the so-called doctrine of the Living Constitution is one of degree and emphasis only. Justice Scalia's simple version of Textualism is a political ideology rather than a valid methodology of judicial interpretation.
R v BM is the latest case to consider the exceptions to Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA). The exceptions allow an action causing injury that would be a criminal offence to become lawful if the person injured consents to the action. The outcome of this judgement is that body modifications are categorised as medical procedures (and therefore subject to the medical exception only) and new exceptions should not be developed on a case by case basis, instead allocating development of the exceptions to Parliament. Two implications follow from the BM judgement. First, it provided a limited definition of body modifications which are now categorised as medical procedures. Second, their Lordships have restricted further development of the lawful exceptions to offences against the person. This is a lost opportuni-ty for developing the common law exceptions to the OAPA through an autonomy-based lib-eral judicial interpretation.
PH.D.LAW ; This dissertation is about the development of new ideas and proposition of solutions in order to bridge the numerous legal lacunae encountered in the course of the decisionmaking process surrounding planning applications, whether such decisions are taken before the Planning Authority, the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal or the Court of Appeal. The author points out that the entire process, already complicated as is, is made even more so when there are problems with ambiguous drafting, badly interconnected definitions, incomplete provisions and inconsistent scope of application. Each time there is a legal quandary, the Maltese courts are the final arbiter who has the final word on what ought to have been done in the given circumstances. Even though the court contributed its fair share to solve many of the arising issues, several fundamental questions remain. This is because the court's reasoning is occasionally flawed or too broad in scope. Occasionally, the judgments are inconsistent with previous ones whereas the court's arguments, at times, simply do not hold water. This study aims to respond to what the court thus far has been unable to answer. To achieve this, the road that led to Section 72 of the current Development Planning Act, dealing with development permissions, will be discussed first. This will be complemented by an assessment of how the court went about determining whether planning applications should be decided in line with policies in force at the onset of the application process or those in vigore at the time of the decision, notwithstanding the applicant being put in a position he could not previously envisage. The extent to which a developer already in possession of a planning permission can claim to have a vested right should he decide to carry out a new development is also covered. Finally, it shall be seen whether the said Section 72 in view of which decision makers ought to no longer 'apply' plans and policies but simply 'have regard' of the same, had any bearing on the court's thinking. The role of the current EPRT and what led to its current status shall then be assessed with a view to understanding the context within which 'a point of law' could be reviewed by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). This will be supplemented by an assessment of concrete situations wherein the Court held itself competent to hear an appeal from Tribunal decisions. Armed with this information, the study moves on to provide a meaningful definition of 'a point of law'.position he could not previously envisage. The extent to which a developer already in possession of a planning permission can claim to have a vested right should he decide to carry out a new development is also covered. Finally, it shall be seen whether the said Section 72 in view of which decision makers ought to no longer 'apply' plans and policies but simply 'have regard' of the same, had any bearing on the court's thinking. The role of the current EPRT and what led to its current status shall then be assessed with a view to understanding the context within which 'a point of law' could be reviewed by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). This will be supplemented by an assessment of concrete situations wherein the Court held itself competent to hear an appeal from Tribunal decisions. Armed with this information, the study moves on to provide a meaningful definition of 'a point of law'. ; N/A
The Colombian State is a Social Standing of right (that way defines it the article 1 of our Politic letter), with the one that you look for the realization of the social justice and the human intervening dignity the public authorities's grip in the beginning, rights and social duties of constitutional order. From there, it is inferred for the right to be so important Constitutional, since the principal branch is the public right insofar as you participate at all of the own it stratums juridical and specially of the structure of the status like base of all institutional political organizing, reason for which to get along well like the discipline of the right entrusted of the conceptual studies of the social standings of right, the surging of the Political Constitution is vital so much seemingly as of his interpretation, from the study of his foundations to the assimilation of one hermeneutical juridical that you lead to all the governed for the standard of standards. According to the concept previously indicated, to appraise the reach of the Constitutional Interpretation in the general context of the Magna Carta making the judicial exegesis easy and his critical contents getting to an explanatory connection of any juridical and extra-juridical problem becomes necessary. ; El Estado colombiano es un Estado social de derecho (así lo define el Artículo 1º de como de su interpretación, desde el estudio de sus fundamentos hasta la asimilación de una hermenéutica jurídica que encamine a todos los gobernados por la norma de normas. De acuerdo al concepto anteriormente señalado, se hace necesario valorar el alcance de la Interpretación Constitucional en el contexto general de la Carta Magna facilitando la exégesis judicial y su contenido crítico, llegando a una conexión explicativa de cualquier problema jurídico y extrajurídico.nuestra Carta Política), con el cual se busca la realización de la justicia social y la dignidad humana mediante la sujeción de las autoridades públicas a los principios, derechos y deberes sociales de orden constitucional. De allí, se desprende que sea tan importante el Derecho Constitucional, ya que es la principal rama del derecho público por cuanto participa en todos los estamentos propios de lo jurídico y especialmente de la estructura del Estado como base de todo ordenamiento institucional político, razón por la cual al entenderse como la disciplina del derecho encargada de los estudios conceptuales de los estados sociales de derecho, es vital tanto el surgimiento de la Constitución Política
The Colombian State is a Social Standing of right (that way defines it the article 1 of our Politic letter), with the one that you look for the realization of the social justice and the human intervening dignity the public authorities's grip in the beginning, rights and social duties of constitutional order. From there, it is inferred for the right to be so important Constitutional, since the principal branch is the public right insofar as you participate at all of the own it stratums juridical and specially of the structure of the status like base of all institutional political organizing, reason for which to get along well like the discipline of the right entrusted of the conceptual studies of the social standings of right, the surging of the Political Constitution is vital so much seemingly as of his interpretation, from the study of his foundations to the assimilation of one hermeneutical juridical that you lead to all the governed for the standard of standards. According to the concept previously indicated, to appraise the reach of the Constitutional Interpretation in the general context of the Magna Carta making the judicial exegesis easy and his critical contents getting to an explanatory connection of any juridical and extra-juridical problem becomes necessary. ; El Estado colombiano es un Estado social de derecho (así lo define el Artículo 1º de como de su interpretación, desde el estudio de sus fundamentos hasta la asimilación de una hermenéutica jurídica que encamine a todos los gobernados por la norma de normas. De acuerdo al concepto anteriormente señalado, se hace necesario valorar el alcance de la Interpretación Constitucional en el contexto general de la Carta Magna facilitando la exégesis judicial y su contenido crítico, llegando a una conexión explicativa de cualquier problema jurídico y extrajurídico.nuestra Carta Política), con el cual se busca la realización de la justicia social y la dignidad humana mediante la sujeción de las autoridades públicas a los principios, derechos y deberes sociales de orden constitucional. De allí, se desprende que sea tan importante el Derecho Constitucional, ya que es la principal rama del derecho público por cuanto participa en todos los estamentos propios de lo jurídico y especialmente de la estructura del Estado como base de todo ordenamiento institucional político, razón por la cual al entenderse como la disciplina del derecho encargada de los estudios conceptuales de los estados sociales de derecho, es vital tanto el surgimiento de la Constitución Política
In a previous law review article, this author analyzed the seemingly arbitrary and contradictory decisional patterns in American insurance law cases. The article concluded that these contradictory judicial patterns could be understood and appreciated if one recognized the fundamental impact-and clash-of two competing theories of American jurisprudence: Legal Formalism and Legal Functionalism in an insurance law context. Broadly speaking, Legal Formalism is based upon the traditional view that correct legal decisions are determined by pre-existing legal rules, and that the courts must reach their decisions in a logical, socially neutral manner. Formalist judges therefore apply the philosophy of judicial restraint in favor of established legislative and administrative authority. In an insurance law context, Legal Formalism is exemplified by the writings of Professor Samuel Williston and others who believe that insurance contracts ought to be judicially interpreted under the same legal principles as contracts in general, with the exception of various insurance forms, laws, and procedures that are regulated by statute. Legal Functionalism, on the other hand, is based upon the view that the paramount concern of the courts should not be logical consistency, as the Formalists believe, but socially desirable consequences. Functionalist judges therefore apply the philosophy of judicial activism, co-equal to legislative and administrative authority. In an insurance law context, Legal Functionalism is exemplified by the writings of Professor Robert Keeton and others who believe that the reasonable expectations of the insured ought to be honored, even though a careful examination of the insurance policy contractually would have negated those expectations. The article concluded that although Legal Functionalism is widely recognized as the dominant theory of legal jurisprudence in many other areas of American law today, Legal Formalism nevertheless has maintained continuing theoretical credibility with many courts in the field of insurance law, while Legal Functionalism-as exemplified by the Keeton insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations-has experienced a more limited judicial application than various commentators initially had predicted. The reaction to this article from a number of academic colleagues, practitioners, and judges has been supportive and encouraging. Indeed, I was asked if I might expand upon my original article and answer two additional questions: (1)Why do many courts, which seemingly apply a more Functionalist judicial approach to other areas of the law, still retain a more Formalistic judicial approach in cases involving insurance contract disputes? (2) Is there any viable way to reconcile these two competing doctrines of Legal Formalism and Legal Functionalism in an insurance law context? The answer to the first question necessarily leads to some speculation and alternative possibilities. However, law professors are seldom shy about rushing in where others fear to tread,Wo so I shall offer a number of possible answers to this first question. In answering the second-and the most important-question, I will argue that the best elements of Legal Formalist and Legal Functionalist judicial interpretations of insurance coverage disputes may indeed be reconciled and incorporated into a viable, contractually based, and eminently realistic judicial approach to insurance contract interpretation that a number of courts are already applying on an informal basis. It is a common sense "middle ground" judicial approach to the interpretation of insurance contract disputes that is both legally sound and socially expedient. Accordingly, I call this synthesis of judicial Formalism and judicial Functionalism in an insurance law context the realistic middle ground approach to insurance contract interpretation.
Section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act affirms the equal authority of the common law and civil law in the field of property and civil rights. The section states, subject to two exceptions, that federal enactments based on rules and concepts that are part of the law of property and civil rights are to be interpreted in accordance with these rules and concepts. Prior to the enactment of section 8.1 in 2001, courts had a tendency to opt for a uniform application of federal legislation based on common law concepts, with often negative results for Quebec civil law. Since then, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has had a number of opportunities to interpret federal legislation in light of section 8.1. Following an analysis of the Court's decisions, the author concludes that the SCC has had an ambivalent rapport with section 8.1, and has not yet subjected it to in-depth analysis or explained its underlying objectives. The author emphasizes that section 8.1 has the potential to promote exchanges between Quebec civil law and Canadian common law at the level of federal legislation and submits proposals in this regard.
"The contents of this volume consist in the main of a series of lectures delivered at the Illinois college of law in 1910." ; Mode of access: Internet.
The subject of the article is to determine the extent to which the judicial interpretation of the law is affected by the use of an open axiology argument in the course of adjudication. Assuming that the use of open criteria is based primarily on the application of the legislative construction of general reference clauses, it is important to link these references to a legislative policy in which they constitute a means of deliberately extending the scope of discretionary power, derived from natural (independent of the legislator) sources. The essential function of the references is the axiological opening of findings made in all essential phases of judicial interpretation – validation, reconstruction and construction, resulting, among other things, in a change in the relationship between the roles of particular interpretation rules. This may lead to various manifestations of abuse of the interpretative discretion of judges, which in turn necessitates the search for certain remedies, among which the formation of permanent lines of jurisdiction and precedential practice, as well as the transparency of the reasoning of judgements, seems to be of the utmost importance. ; Przedmiotem artykułu jest określenie zakresu wpływu, jaki na procesy sądowej wykładni prawa ma wykorzystanie w toku orzekania argumentu z otwartej aksjologii. Zakładając, iż sięganie po kryteria otwarte opiera się przede wszystkim na zastosowaniu legislacyjnej konstrukcji generalnych klauzul odsyłających, istotną kwestią jest powiązanie tych odesłań z polityką prawodawczą, w ramach której stanowią środek celowego rozszerzania zakresu swobody decyzyjnej, pochodzącej z naturalnych (niezależnych od prawodawcy) źródeł. Zasadniczą funkcją odesłań jest aksjologiczne otwieranie ustaleń dokonywanych we wszystkich zasadniczych fazach wykładni sądowej – walidacyjnej, rekonstrukcyjnej i konstrukcyjnej, mające skutek m.in. w zmianie relacji pomiędzy rolami poszczególnych reguł wykładni. Może to prowadzić do różnych przejawów nadużywania interpretacyjnej dyskrecjonalności sędziowskiej, co z kolei wymusza poszukiwanie pewnych środków zaradczych, spośród których kształtowanie się trwałych linii orzeczniczych i praktyki precedensowej oraz przejrzystość argumentacyjna uzasadnień orzeczeń wydają się mieć największe znaczenie.
Traditionally, when we talk about amending the constitution, we mean the transformation of its text. However, it would be too formalistic to see the constitution in its textual expression outside the practice of application, interpretation, and so on. Given the doctrinal approaches, the factor of interpretation clearly affects the content of the constitution, and the change of the already formed interpretation – even more so. Different terms are used to denote the influence of interpretation on the content of the constitution: development, transformation, change of the constitution. Constitutional courts play a key role in interpreting the Constitution in countries where there is a model of specialized constitutional review. However, as is well known, the CCU exercises a number of powers in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine, with separate powers regarding the official interpretation of the Constitution of Ukraine and the verification of a number of legal acts for compliance with the Constitution of Ukraine. It would be worthwhile to pay attention once again to the authority to officially interpret the Constitution of Ukraine by improving it and linking it to specific practical problems of law enforcement, or to abandon it altogether. Thus interpretation by the Constitutional Court should be carried out, however casually, – at consideration of a concrete case by the constitutional control. According to the position of the Venice Commission, it is precisely the constituent power that manifests itself through the mouths of the constitutional courts, which determines a high degree of their legitimacy. Thus, in any case, it is necessary to recognize the fact of transformation of the constitution by its judicial interpretation. It is always necessary to understand the alternative, which is the development of the constitution through the acts of the ordinary legislator. Moreover, the legitimacy of the legislature to speak on behalf of the constituent power is much less than that of the constitutional courts, if we take the approach of P. Rosanvallon. That is why the development of the constitution through its interpretation should not be contrasted with the concept of constituent power. ; Традиційно, коли говоримо про внесення змін до конституції, ми маємо на увазі трансформацію її тексту. Проте було б надто формалістично вбачати конституцію в її текстуальному вираженні поза практикою застосування, тлумачення тощо. З огляду на доктринальні підходи, чинник тлумачення однозначно впливає на зміст конституції, а зміна вже сформованого тлумачення і поготів. На позна-чення впливу тлумачення на зміст конституції вживають різні терміни: «розвиток», «трансформа-ція», «зміна» конституції. Ключову роль у тлумаченні конституції в тих країнах, де існує модель спеціалізованого консти-туційного контролю, відіграють конституційні суди. Проте, як відомо, Конституційний Суд України відповідно до Конституції України здійснює низку повноважень, окремо зафіксовано повноваження щодо офіційного тлумачення Конституції України і щодо перевірки на відповідність Конституції України низки правових актів. Варто було б ще раз звернути увагу на повноваження щодо офіційного тлумачення Конституції України шляхом його вдосконалення і прив'язки до конкретних практичних проблем правозастосу-вання або ж відмовитися від нього взагалі. Тлумачення Конституційним Судом має здійснюватися, проте казуально – під час розгляду конкретної справи, шляхом конституційного контролю. Відповідно до позиції Венеціанської комісії, устами конституційних судів якраз і проявляє себе установча влада, що зумовлює високий ступінь їхньої легітимності. Отже, за будь-яких умов варто визнати факт перетворення конституції шляхом її судового тлумачення. Варто завжди розуміти альтернативу, якою є розвиток конституції шляхом актів звичайного законодавця. Причому легітимність промовляти від імені установчої влади в законодавчої влади є значно меншою, ніж у конституційних судів, якщо поділяти підхід П. Розанваллона. Саме тому розвиток конституції шляхом її тлумачення не варто протиставляти концепції установчої влади.
