Japanese Judicial Law Interpretation Techniques
In: Courts & Justice Law Journal 2 (1), 76, 2020
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In: Courts & Justice Law Journal 2 (1), 76, 2020
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Working paper
The subject of the article is to determine the extent to which the judicial interpretation of the law is affected by the use of an open axiology argument in the course of adjudication. Assuming that the use of open criteria is based primarily on the application of the legislative construction of general reference clauses, it is important to link these references to a legislative policy in which they constitute a means of deliberately extending the scope of discretionary power, derived from natural (independent of the legislator) sources. The essential function of the references is the axiological opening of findings made in all essential phases of judicial interpretation – validation, reconstruction and construction, resulting, among other things, in a change in the relationship between the roles of particular interpretation rules. This may lead to various manifestations of abuse of the interpretative discretion of judges, which in turn necessitates the search for certain remedies, among which the formation of permanent lines of jurisdiction and precedential practice, as well as the transparency of the reasoning of judgements, seems to be of the utmost importance. ; Przedmiotem artykułu jest określenie zakresu wpływu, jaki na procesy sądowej wykładni prawa ma wykorzystanie w toku orzekania argumentu z otwartej aksjologii. Zakładając, iż sięganie po kryteria otwarte opiera się przede wszystkim na zastosowaniu legislacyjnej konstrukcji generalnych klauzul odsyłających, istotną kwestią jest powiązanie tych odesłań z polityką prawodawczą, w ramach której stanowią środek celowego rozszerzania zakresu swobody decyzyjnej, pochodzącej z naturalnych (niezależnych od prawodawcy) źródeł. Zasadniczą funkcją odesłań jest aksjologiczne otwieranie ustaleń dokonywanych we wszystkich zasadniczych fazach wykładni sądowej – walidacyjnej, rekonstrukcyjnej i konstrukcyjnej, mające skutek m.in. w zmianie relacji pomiędzy rolami poszczególnych reguł wykładni. Może to prowadzić do różnych przejawów nadużywania interpretacyjnej dyskrecjonalności sędziowskiej, co z kolei wymusza poszukiwanie pewnych środków zaradczych, spośród których kształtowanie się trwałych linii orzeczniczych i praktyki precedensowej oraz przejrzystość argumentacyjna uzasadnień orzeczeń wydają się mieć największe znaczenie.
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In: American political science review, Band 100, Heft 1, S. 85-97
ISSN: 1537-5943
This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.
In: NBER working paper series 11317
In: American political science review, Band 100, Heft 1, S. 85-98
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: NBER Working Paper No. w11317
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Working paper
In: Ip, Eric C., "Interpreting Interpretations: A Methodology for the Judicial Enforcement of Legislative Interpretations of the Hong Kong Basic Law", Public Law, 2017, v. 2017 n. Oct, p. 552-562
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In: Postmodern openings, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 17-23
ISSN: 2069-9387
PH.D.LAW ; This dissertation is about the development of new ideas and proposition of solutions in order to bridge the numerous legal lacunae encountered in the course of the decisionmaking process surrounding planning applications, whether such decisions are taken before the Planning Authority, the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal or the Court of Appeal. The author points out that the entire process, already complicated as is, is made even more so when there are problems with ambiguous drafting, badly interconnected definitions, incomplete provisions and inconsistent scope of application. Each time there is a legal quandary, the Maltese courts are the final arbiter who has the final word on what ought to have been done in the given circumstances. Even though the court contributed its fair share to solve many of the arising issues, several fundamental questions remain. This is because the court's reasoning is occasionally flawed or too broad in scope. Occasionally, the judgments are inconsistent with previous ones whereas the court's arguments, at times, simply do not hold water. This study aims to respond to what the court thus far has been unable to answer. To achieve this, the road that led to Section 72 of the current Development Planning Act, dealing with development permissions, will be discussed first. This will be complemented by an assessment of how the court went about determining whether planning applications should be decided in line with policies in force at the onset of the application process or those in vigore at the time of the decision, notwithstanding the applicant being put in a position he could not previously envisage. The extent to which a developer already in possession of a planning permission can claim to have a vested right should he decide to carry out a new development is also covered. Finally, it shall be seen whether the said Section 72 in view of which decision makers ought to no longer 'apply' plans and policies but simply 'have regard' of the same, had any bearing on the court's thinking. The role of the current EPRT and what led to its current status shall then be assessed with a view to understanding the context within which 'a point of law' could be reviewed by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). This will be supplemented by an assessment of concrete situations wherein the Court held itself competent to hear an appeal from Tribunal decisions. Armed with this information, the study moves on to provide a meaningful definition of 'a point of law'.position he could not previously envisage. The extent to which a developer already in possession of a planning permission can claim to have a vested right should he decide to carry out a new development is also covered. Finally, it shall be seen whether the said Section 72 in view of which decision makers ought to no longer 'apply' plans and policies but simply 'have regard' of the same, had any bearing on the court's thinking. The role of the current EPRT and what led to its current status shall then be assessed with a view to understanding the context within which 'a point of law' could be reviewed by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). This will be supplemented by an assessment of concrete situations wherein the Court held itself competent to hear an appeal from Tribunal decisions. Armed with this information, the study moves on to provide a meaningful definition of 'a point of law'. ; N/A
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In: The southwestern social science quarterly, S. 11-19
ISSN: 0276-1742
In: Essay in Roles and Perspectives in the Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Ivor Richardson. David Carter and Matthew Palmer (eds) (2002 Victoria University Press, Wellington)
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In: Archiv des Völkerrechts, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 67
ISSN: 1868-7121
In: Studies in political science 40