A budget of State (Government budget) in all countries is known as a financial plan of all planed incomes, expenses and revenues approved by the competent institution (in the Republic of Lithuania – by Seimas). It is a plan for saving, borrowing and spending by the State, that is drawned according to the requirements of the Law. The article deals with the problem of realization of principle of long-term (long-range) budget planning in the Republic of Lithuania. The legal definition and the essence of long-term budget planning, the reasons for changing to long-term budget planning is analyzed in the article. Particular attention is given to the question of the reform of budget planning in Lithuania that started in 1998 and signified transition from the model of short-term to the model of long-term budget planning. It' affirmed that the planning of budget of the State for particular period of time is established in Law on budgeting as one of the main principles of the whole budget process. According to the Law on budgeting and other legal acts the draft of the budget of the Republic of Lithuania shall be prepared for the period of three years basing on legislative acts of the Republic, information from state statistical agencies, socio-economic programmes and scientific-technological projections, etc.
A budget of State (Government budget) in all countries is known as a financial plan of all planed incomes, expenses and revenues approved by the competent institution (in the Republic of Lithuania – by Seimas). It is a plan for saving, borrowing and spending by the State, that is drawned according to the requirements of the Law. The article deals with the problem of realization of principle of long-term (long-range) budget planning in the Republic of Lithuania. The legal definition and the essence of long-term budget planning, the reasons for changing to long-term budget planning is analyzed in the article. Particular attention is given to the question of the reform of budget planning in Lithuania that started in 1998 and signified transition from the model of short-term to the model of long-term budget planning. It' affirmed that the planning of budget of the State for particular period of time is established in Law on budgeting as one of the main principles of the whole budget process. According to the Law on budgeting and other legal acts the draft of the budget of the Republic of Lithuania shall be prepared for the period of three years basing on legislative acts of the Republic, information from state statistical agencies, socio-economic programmes and scientific-technological projections, etc.
A budget of State (Government budget) in all countries is known as a financial plan of all planed incomes, expenses and revenues approved by the competent institution (in the Republic of Lithuania – by Seimas). It is a plan for saving, borrowing and spending by the State, that is drawned according to the requirements of the Law. The article deals with the problem of realization of principle of long-term (long-range) budget planning in the Republic of Lithuania. The legal definition and the essence of long-term budget planning, the reasons for changing to long-term budget planning is analyzed in the article. Particular attention is given to the question of the reform of budget planning in Lithuania that started in 1998 and signified transition from the model of short-term to the model of long-term budget planning. It' affirmed that the planning of budget of the State for particular period of time is established in Law on budgeting as one of the main principles of the whole budget process. According to the Law on budgeting and other legal acts the draft of the budget of the Republic of Lithuania shall be prepared for the period of three years basing on legislative acts of the Republic, information from state statistical agencies, socio-economic programmes and scientific-technological projections, etc.
A budget of State (Government budget) in all countries is known as a financial plan of all planed incomes, expenses and revenues approved by the competent institution (in the Republic of Lithuania – by Seimas). It is a plan for saving, borrowing and spending by the State, that is drawned according to the requirements of the Law. The article deals with the problem of realization of principle of long-term (long-range) budget planning in the Republic of Lithuania. The legal definition and the essence of long-term budget planning, the reasons for changing to long-term budget planning is analyzed in the article. Particular attention is given to the question of the reform of budget planning in Lithuania that started in 1998 and signified transition from the model of short-term to the model of long-term budget planning. It' affirmed that the planning of budget of the State for particular period of time is established in Law on budgeting as one of the main principles of the whole budget process. According to the Law on budgeting and other legal acts the draft of the budget of the Republic of Lithuania shall be prepared for the period of three years basing on legislative acts of the Republic, information from state statistical agencies, socio-economic programmes and scientific-technological projections, etc.
This dissertation analyses long-term intergenerational psychological effects of political trauma. According to trauma psychology and studies of impacts of political repression, it was presumed that the long-term psychological effects of political repression are felt not just by the survivors, but also by their adult children. The aim of this study is to evaluate long-term psychological effects of Soviet and Nazi repression to repressed second generation, and to establish intergenerational links of mental health between survivors of political repression and second generation. Altogether three groups of second generation were surveyed: children of survivors of Soviet and Nazi repression, Holocaust second generation and children of not-repressed Lithuanian citizens. According to the thematic analyses of qualitative data, various long-term psychological consequences of parents' political repression were identified, second generation connect some of their hardship with these experiences. Path analysis revealed relationship of posttraumatic reactions of parent and child. On the other hand statistical analysis disclosed that current posttraumatic reactions of second generation in general, hopelessness and sense of coherence of second generation of survivors of political repression in Lithuania are the same as in two comparison groups. These results are in line with Holocaust second generation research trends – there are long-term consequences, but second generation does not differ by their psychopathology.
This dissertation analyses long-term intergenerational psychological effects of political trauma. According to trauma psychology and studies of impacts of political repression, it was presumed that the long-term psychological effects of political repression are felt not just by the survivors, but also by their adult children. The aim of this study is to evaluate long-term psychological effects of Soviet and Nazi repression to repressed second generation, and to establish intergenerational links of mental health between survivors of political repression and second generation. Altogether three groups of second generation were surveyed: children of survivors of Soviet and Nazi repression, Holocaust second generation and children of not-repressed Lithuanian citizens. According to the thematic analyses of qualitative data, various long-term psychological consequences of parents' political repression were identified, second generation connect some of their hardship with these experiences. Path analysis revealed relationship of posttraumatic reactions of parent and child. On the other hand statistical analysis disclosed that current posttraumatic reactions of second generation in general, hopelessness and sense of coherence of second generation of survivors of political repression in Lithuania are the same as in two comparison groups. These results are in line with Holocaust second generation research trends – there are long-term consequences, but second generation does not differ by their psychopathology.
The Zapatista National Liberation Army first came to prominence on 1 January 1994 when they attacked several cities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas in protest against the NAFTA agreement. Though having been quickly defeated by the Mexican Army, the movement was able to reorganize and reinvent itself, moving from armed struggle to socio-cultural resistance, and embracing the new opportunities, provided by the development of communications, thus outlining the path that was to be taken by other movements. However, the activity and popularity of the movement declined significantly, presumably due to its inability to sustain the momentum in the long-run. The article is aimed at analyzing long-term challenges faced by the Zapatistas as a paradigmatic case for other movements seeking radical political change by non-military means. These include the ideological, organizational and communicative plains. First of all, the openness of the Zapatista worldviews has had a paradoxical effect. It proved to be highly useful in the short-term, when many groups and individuals were attracted by the Zapatistas' inclination to search for solutions rather than give final answers, by their pluralism and refutation of any hierarchy in power and knowledge. This, however, appeared as a self-defeating strategy when the Zapatistas had the possibility of constructing a nationwide reform movement and to propose a program for political change. This should be seen as a decisive moment, when the Zapatistas had to either betray their principle to 'lead by obeying' and to take initiative, or to risk losing the momentum, which was precisely what happened. The Zapatistas also failed to achieve substantive improvements in economic and social conditions of their communities. Although many Zapatista sympathisers were ready to accept hardship in the short run, later deep rifts and conflicts, especially over outside help, started to appear, with entire villages leaving the Zapatista front and siding with the government. The fact that the Zapatistas failed to create a viable practical alternative and to attract people even in their home region both diminished their credibility and led to an internal weakening of the movement. Finally, even though the Zapatistas were (and often still are) heralded for their innovative use of the Internet, this argument should also be reconsidered. While the movement has undoubtedly been successful in rallying support and spreading its message, the current situation appears to be less promising. Whereas the Zapatistas entered the Internet with no significant competition, the current surge and proliferation of information online as well as the loss of 'freshness' raises the costs of being heard significantly; furthermore, the bonds formed online tend to be fleeting and inconsistent, it appeared to be much more difficult to form stable supporters' networks. All this raises significant doubts over the Zapatistas' ability to remain effective in the long-term, something other radical movements should also take into account.
The Zapatista National Liberation Army first came to prominence on 1 January 1994 when they attacked several cities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas in protest against the NAFTA agreement. Though having been quickly defeated by the Mexican Army, the movement was able to reorganize and reinvent itself, moving from armed struggle to socio-cultural resistance, and embracing the new opportunities, provided by the development of communications, thus outlining the path that was to be taken by other movements. However, the activity and popularity of the movement declined significantly, presumably due to its inability to sustain the momentum in the long-run. The article is aimed at analyzing long-term challenges faced by the Zapatistas as a paradigmatic case for other movements seeking radical political change by non-military means. These include the ideological, organizational and communicative plains. First of all, the openness of the Zapatista worldviews has had a paradoxical effect. It proved to be highly useful in the short-term, when many groups and individuals were attracted by the Zapatistas' inclination to search for solutions rather than give final answers, by their pluralism and refutation of any hierarchy in power and knowledge. This, however, appeared as a self-defeating strategy when the Zapatistas had the possibility of constructing a nationwide reform movement and to propose a program for political change. This should be seen as a decisive moment, when the Zapatistas had to either betray their principle to 'lead by obeying' and to take initiative, or to risk losing the momentum, which was precisely what happened. The Zapatistas also failed to achieve substantive improvements in economic and social conditions of their communities. Although many Zapatista sympathisers were ready to accept hardship in the short run, later deep rifts and conflicts, especially over outside help, started to appear, with entire villages leaving the Zapatista front and siding with the government. The fact that the Zapatistas failed to create a viable practical alternative and to attract people even in their home region both diminished their credibility and led to an internal weakening of the movement. Finally, even though the Zapatistas were (and often still are) heralded for their innovative use of the Internet, this argument should also be reconsidered. While the movement has undoubtedly been successful in rallying support and spreading its message, the current situation appears to be less promising. Whereas the Zapatistas entered the Internet with no significant competition, the current surge and proliferation of information online as well as the loss of 'freshness' raises the costs of being heard significantly; furthermore, the bonds formed online tend to be fleeting and inconsistent, it appeared to be much more difficult to form stable supporters' networks. All this raises significant doubts over the Zapatistas' ability to remain effective in the long-term, something other radical movements should also take into account.
The Zapatista National Liberation Army first came to prominence on 1 January 1994 when they attacked several cities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas in protest against the NAFTA agreement. Though having been quickly defeated by the Mexican Army, the movement was able to reorganize and reinvent itself, moving from armed struggle to socio-cultural resistance, and embracing the new opportunities, provided by the development of communications, thus outlining the path that was to be taken by other movements. However, the activity and popularity of the movement declined significantly, presumably due to its inability to sustain the momentum in the long-run. The article is aimed at analyzing long-term challenges faced by the Zapatistas as a paradigmatic case for other movements seeking radical political change by non-military means. These include the ideological, organizational and communicative plains. First of all, the openness of the Zapatista worldviews has had a paradoxical effect. It proved to be highly useful in the short-term, when many groups and individuals were attracted by the Zapatistas' inclination to search for solutions rather than give final answers, by their pluralism and refutation of any hierarchy in power and knowledge. This, however, appeared as a self-defeating strategy when the Zapatistas had the possibility of constructing a nationwide reform movement and to propose a program for political change. This should be seen as a decisive moment, when the Zapatistas had to either betray their principle to 'lead by obeying' and to take initiative, or to risk losing the momentum, which was precisely what happened. The Zapatistas also failed to achieve substantive improvements in economic and social conditions of their communities. Although many Zapatista sympathisers were ready to accept hardship in the short run, later deep rifts and conflicts, especially over outside help, started to appear, with entire villages leaving the Zapatista front and siding with the government. The fact that the Zapatistas failed to create a viable practical alternative and to attract people even in their home region both diminished their credibility and led to an internal weakening of the movement. Finally, even though the Zapatistas were (and often still are) heralded for their innovative use of the Internet, this argument should also be reconsidered. While the movement has undoubtedly been successful in rallying support and spreading its message, the current situation appears to be less promising. Whereas the Zapatistas entered the Internet with no significant competition, the current surge and proliferation of information online as well as the loss of 'freshness' raises the costs of being heard significantly; furthermore, the bonds formed online tend to be fleeting and inconsistent, it appeared to be much more difficult to form stable supporters' networks. All this raises significant doubts over the Zapatistas' ability to remain effective in the long-term, something other radical movements should also take into account.
This article analyses long-term energy contracts in relation with third-party access right to energy transmission and distribution system. Long-term energy supply contracts remain quite controversial: while enhancing the need to create competitive common energy market and to increase diversification of energy sources, the obligation to supply energy sources is contracted for a long time period with the appropriate contracted price. These contractual obligations are not reviewed or adjusted according to changing market conditions. A problem occurs because long-term energy contracts limit the possibility for new market participants to enter and compete with the existing ones. The transmission system owners often abuse their right to refuse grant third-party access using an argument of long-term energy supply contracts with take-or-pay obligations. There is a doubt if the capacity reservation mechanisms, takeor- pay obligations and other limitations dealt in long-term contracts are in line with EU competition law requirements. However, long-term contracts provide stability of energy supply and also economic benefit to the consumer. The article analyzes long-term energy supply contracts perspective in the light of European Union competitive internal energy market.
This article analyses long-term energy contracts in relation with third-party access right to energy transmission and distribution system. Long-term energy supply contracts remain quite controversial: while enhancing the need to create competitive common energy market and to increase diversification of energy sources, the obligation to supply energy sources is contracted for a long time period with the appropriate contracted price. These contractual obligations are not reviewed or adjusted according to changing market conditions. A problem occurs because long-term energy contracts limit the possibility for new market participants to enter and compete with the existing ones. The transmission system owners often abuse their right to refuse grant third-party access using an argument of long-term energy supply contracts with take-or-pay obligations. There is a doubt if the capacity reservation mechanisms, takeor- pay obligations and other limitations dealt in long-term contracts are in line with EU competition law requirements. However, long-term contracts provide stability of energy supply and also economic benefit to the consumer. The article analyzes long-term energy supply contracts perspective in the light of European Union competitive internal energy market.
Despite the fact that survivors of Soviet political repressions still feel the adverse long-term consequences of historical trauma (Kazlauskas, 2006), and their children notice some sort of negative impact of historical family trauma on their own psychological well-being (Vaskelienė, 2012), the results of this dissertation showed that the second and third generation offspring of politically repressed families do not differ in their post-traumatic reactions from those, who do not have such historical trauma experience in their family, but they are characterized by higher estimates of psychological well-being, subjective happiness, resiliency, optimism and hope. Significant protective factors involved in transgenerational trauma transmission in Lithuanian population are the following: more accurate knowledge of family member experiences of political repressions; greater identification with family history; more frequent expression of sadness, use of more symbols or humour, and more frequent expression of strength and pride in family communications about historical events; less frequent mother overprotection and more frequent father care in childhood; more frequent contact with family members or friends for help and praying. A model of psychological resilience to transgenerational trauma transmission was formulated and evaluated, in which the main protective factor of transgenerational trauma transmission is identification with family history. The most significant predictor of identification with family history is the expression of sadness in family conversations about historical traumas.
Despite the fact that survivors of Soviet political repressions still feel the adverse long-term consequences of historical trauma (Kazlauskas, 2006), and their children notice some sort of negative impact of historical family trauma on their own psychological well-being (Vaskelienė, 2012), the results of this dissertation showed that the second and third generation offspring of politically repressed families do not differ in their post-traumatic reactions from those, who do not have such historical trauma experience in their family, but they are characterized by higher estimates of psychological well-being, subjective happiness, resiliency, optimism and hope. Significant protective factors involved in transgenerational trauma transmission in Lithuanian population are the following: more accurate knowledge of family member experiences of political repressions; greater identification with family history; more frequent expression of sadness, use of more symbols or humour, and more frequent expression of strength and pride in family communications about historical events; less frequent mother overprotection and more frequent father care in childhood; more frequent contact with family members or friends for help and praying. A model of psychological resilience to transgenerational trauma transmission was formulated and evaluated, in which the main protective factor of transgenerational trauma transmission is identification with family history. The most significant predictor of identification with family history is the expression of sadness in family conversations about historical traumas.
Despite the fact that survivors of Soviet political repressions still feel the adverse long-term consequences of historical trauma (Kazlauskas, 2006), and their children notice some sort of negative impact of historical family trauma on their own psychological well-being (Vaskelienė, 2012), the results of this dissertation showed that the second and third generation offspring of politically repressed families do not differ in their post-traumatic reactions from those, who do not have such historical trauma experience in their family, but they are characterized by higher estimates of psychological well-being, subjective happiness, resiliency, optimism and hope. Significant protective factors involved in transgenerational trauma transmission in Lithuanian population are the following: more accurate knowledge of family member experiences of political repressions; greater identification with family history; more frequent expression of sadness, use of more symbols or humour, and more frequent expression of strength and pride in family communications about historical events; less frequent mother overprotection and more frequent father care in childhood; more frequent contact with family members or friends for help and praying. A model of psychological resilience to transgenerational trauma transmission was formulated and evaluated, in which the main protective factor of transgenerational trauma transmission is identification with family history. The most significant predictor of identification with family history is the expression of sadness in family conversations about historical traumas.
Despite the fact that survivors of Soviet political repressions still feel the adverse long-term consequences of historical trauma (Kazlauskas, 2006), and their children notice some sort of negative impact of historical family trauma on their own psychological well-being (Vaskelienė, 2012), the results of this dissertation showed that the second and third generation offspring of politically repressed families do not differ in their post-traumatic reactions from those, who do not have such historical trauma experience in their family, but they are characterized by higher estimates of psychological well-being, subjective happiness, resiliency, optimism and hope. Significant protective factors involved in transgenerational trauma transmission in Lithuanian population are the following: more accurate knowledge of family member experiences of political repressions; greater identification with family history; more frequent expression of sadness, use of more symbols or humour, and more frequent expression of strength and pride in family communications about historical events; less frequent mother overprotection and more frequent father care in childhood; more frequent contact with family members or friends for help and praying. A model of psychological resilience to transgenerational trauma transmission was formulated and evaluated, in which the main protective factor of transgenerational trauma transmission is identification with family history. The most significant predictor of identification with family history is the expression of sadness in family conversations about historical traumas.
