Suchergebnisse

PROSPECT THEORY OFFERS POWERFUL INSIGHTS AND PROPOSITIONS INTO POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING, ESPECIALLY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT STATESMENT ARE INDEED RISK-ACCEPTANT FOR LOSSES. THIS WOULD HELP EXPLAIN OBSERVED PATTERNS IN BARGAINING, DETERRENCE, THE ORGINS OF WARS, AS WELL AS SUGGESTING WHY STATES ARE LESS LIKELY TO BEHAVE AGGRESSIVELY WHEN DOING SO WOULD PRODUCE GAINS THAN WHEN SUCH BEHAVIOR MIGHT PREVENT LOSSES.

The life-cycle theory of saving behavior (Modigliani, 1988) suggests that humans strive towards an equal intertemporal distribution of wealth. However, behavioral life-cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) proposes that people use self-control heuristics to postpone wealth until later in life. According to this theory, people use a system of cognitive budgeting known as mental accounting. In the present study it was found that mental accounts were used differently depending on if the income change was positive or negative. This was shown both in a representative nationwide sample of households and in a student sample. Respondents were more willing to cut down on their propensity to consume when faced with an income decrease than to raise it when the income increased. Furthermore, contrary to the predictions of behavioral life-cycle theory, it was found that the respondents adjusted their propensity to consume the most when the income increases or decreases took place immediately. Hence, it is suggested that theories of intertemporal choice (e.g., Loewenstein, 1988; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) provide a better account of the data than does the behavioral lifecycle theory.

"Wir analysieren das optimale Verhalten eines profitmaximierenden
Monopolisten mit stochastischen Produktionskosten, der an rationale,
verlustaverse Konsumenten verkauft. Hierzu entwickelt der Beitrag
übertragbare Techniken, die es erlauben, die Nachfrage von verlustaversen
Konsumenten herzuleiten, und bestimmt die optimale Preissetzungsstrategie
des Monopolisten. Ein Konsument empfindet einen Verlust, wenn er den von
ihm gezahlten Kaufpreis mit erwarteten niedrigeren Preisen des Monopolisten
vergleicht. Dieser Verlust reduziert die Zahlungsbereitschaft des Konsumenten
und senkt somit seine Nachfrage. Der Beitrag zeigt auf, unter welchen
Bedingungen eine Firma mit kontinuierlich verteilten Grenzkosten diesen
'Vergleichseffekt' (lokal) eliminiert, indem sie eine diskrete Preisverteilung wählt - also, eine Preisverteilung mit Preisstarrheit. Diese Preisstarrheit tritt umso
eher auf, je höher die Dichte der Kostenverteilung, je niedriger die
Nachfrageelastizität oder je größer die Kaufwahrscheinlichkeit des
Konsumenten ist. Unabhängig davon, ob die optimale Preisverteilung
Preisstarrheit aufweist oder nicht, schwächt der Monopolist diesen
Vergleichseffekt ab in dem er antizyklische Preisaufschläge verlangt. Auf der
anderen Seite führt die Kauferwartung des Konsumenten dazu, dass er einen
Verlust realisiert, wenn er das Gut nicht konsumieren kann. Eine höhere
Kauferwartung führt somit zu einer höheren Zahlungsbereitschaft des
Konsumenten. Daher kann es trotz der Tendenz zur Preisstarrheit auch
Umstände geben, unter denen eine Unternehmung mit fixen Grenzkosten
zufällige 'Sonderangebote' macht, welche die Kauferwartung des Konsumenten
erhöhen und somit mehr Nachfrage bei höheren Preisen generieren." (Autorenreferat)

Prospect theory deviates from expected-utility theory by positing that how people frame a problem around a reference point has a critical influence on their choices and that people tend to overweight losses with respect to comparable gains, to be risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses, and to respond to probabilities in a non-linear manner. This study examines these and related observed anomalies in expected-utility theory, summarizes how prospect theory integrates these anomalies into an alternative theory of risky choice, and explores some of the implications of prospect theory for international conflict and for bargaining and coercion in particular. One hypothesis is that political leaders of adversarial states behave differently when they are bargaining over gains than when they are bargaining over losses. Another is that crisis behavior may be more destabilizing than commonly predicted by rational choice theories because leaders are less willing to make concessions and more willing to risk large losses in the hope of eliminating small losses altogether.

International relations theorists have tried to adapt prospect theory to make it relevant to the study of real‐world decision‐making and testable beyond the constraints of the laboratory. Three experiments with undergraduate samples were conducted in an effort to clarify the advantages and limitations of prospect theory as adapted to explain political behavior. The first experiment tested hypotheses regarding the impact of prospect framing on group polarization, but these were only weakly supported. The second and third experiments examined alternative adaptations of the concept of framing; the results suggest that the political science expansion of the concept of framing may, under certain conditions, produce clear and robust preference reversals.