Suchergebnisse

Rusku carsku obitelj Romanov pogubili su boljševici tijekom noći sa 16. na 17. srpnja 1918. u podrumu kuće trgovca Ipatjeva u Jekaterinburgu. Njihovo smaknuće otvorilo je brojna pitanja i pokrenulo kontroverze. Ono je simbol ne samo pada dinastije Romanov, već i pada Ruskog Carstva. U radu će biti proučene posljedice smrti ruske carske obitelji. Korišteni su izvori i uspoređena su glavna djela sovjetske, suvremene ruske i zapadne historiografije. Neki su izvori godinama držani u tajnosti zbog intrigantnog pitanja careva groba. Upravo takve intrigantne izvore sovjetska vlada nije željela otkriti. No, postoje i izvori koje je sovjetska vlada ipak željela otkriti te su oni postali dostupni tek desetljećima kasnije, tj. uoči raspada Sovjetskog Saveza. Glavni cilj ovoga rada je prikazati stvaranje mitologije o obitelji Romanov kao glavnu posljedicu njihove smrti. Opažanje toga mita različito je na Zapadu i u Rusiji. Na Zapadu je prevladao mit o preživjeloj obitelji Romanov. U radu se proučavaju čimbenici koji su koji su bili važni za njegov nastanak. U ruskoj pravoslavnoj sredini prevladao je mit o Nikoli II. kao svetom caru, a u Ruskoj Pravoslavnoj Crkvi careva je obitelj kanonizirana u rang "strastoterpeca". Tezom se pokušava objasniti kakav utjecaj obitelj Romanov ima na suvremeno rusko društvo. ; The Russian Imperial Romanov family was executed by the Bolsheviks on the night of 16/17 July 1918 in the cellar of the Ipatiev House in Ekaterinburg. Their execution opened many issues and initiated controversy. It symbolized not only the decline of the Romanov dynasty, but also the fall of the empire. This paper analyses the consequences of the death of the Russian imperial family. Sources are studied and the main works of Soviet, contemporary Russian and Western historiography are compared. Some sources were kept secret for years because of the intriguing issue of the Emperor's grave, sources which the Soviet government didn't want to reveal and which became available only decades later, in the face of the fall of the ...

"Kristalna noć" najčešće se povezuje s nacističkim uništavanjem židovske imovine 1938., ali u kontekstu rata u Hrvatskoj neki taj pojam koriste i za uništavanje srpske imovine u Zadru i njegovoj okolici 2. svibnja 1991. Dok se u većini hrvatske javnosti taj događaj ignorira, dio javnosti interpretira ga kao početak progona srpskoga stanovništva u organizaciji Hrvatske demokratske zajednice, zadarskih općinskih vlasti te hrvatske policije. Takav stav uglavnom je posljedica medijskih manipulacija i nema uporište u činjenicama. Premda se dio povjesničara u svojim znanstvenim radovima dotaknuo zbivanja u Zadru početkom svibnja 1991., zadarska "kristalna noć" uglavnom je ostala historiografski neistražena. Rad se temelji na neobjavljenim arhivskim izvorima Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske, Jugoslavenske narodne armije, tisku i relevantnoj literaturi. ; On 2 May 1991, Serbian property in Zadar and its surrounding area came under attack. The attacks took place after months of tensions between Croats and Serbs, and later became known as the 'Night of Broken Glass'. These tensions were the direct consequence of the Serbian armed rebellion that erupted in northern Dalmatia, Lika, and the hinterland of Zadar in August 1991. The public security system that met the rebellion was created in January 1990, when the Secretariat of the Interior for the area of the Benkovac, Biograd na Moru, Obrovac, Pag, and Zadar municipalities was established in Zadar. In this area, Croats were an absolute majority in the Biograd na Moru and Zadar municipalities, and the Serbs in the Benkovac and Obrovac municipalities. The rebellion prompted divisions not only among the population, but also among the police. By January 1991, most policemen of Serbian nationality had left the Zadar police force and joined the rebels. Despite being weakened in terms of manpower, the Zadar police for the most part managed to successfully preserve public safety. The security situation worsened after a skirmish between Croatian police and rebel Serbs at the Plitvice Lakes on 31 March 1991. A significant increase in shootings, setting of bombs, road blockades, and other forms of criminal activity, mostly nationally motivated, was recorded. In addition to the rebel Serbs, the instability was caused by the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), which deployed its forces in Zadar's hinterland in early April 1991, causing alarm among the Croatian population. This deployment was part of a broader plan through which the YPA sought to set up a 'buffer zone' in order to close off the areas held by rebel Serbs and prevent the Croatian police from interfering. On 2 May 1991, the security situation throughout Croatia, and therefore in the area under the jurisdiction of the Zadar police, collapsed. Serb rebels killed 12 Croatian policemen in Borovo Selo near Vukovar, and severely wounded Zadar policeman Franko Lisica in Polača near Biograd na Moru; he soon died of his wounds. Despite the Croatian authorities' calls for peace, spontaneous unrest erupted throughout Croatia, and Serbian property and companies were attacked. Furthermore, there were incidents involving the YPA. The mood of the Croatian population in Zadar after the murder of the policeman Lisica was similar to that in other parts of Croatia. Despite the municipal authorities' calls for peace and their organising of a peaceful protest march, various uncoordinated groups demolished and plundered Serbian property on 2 May. The Zadar police failed to stop them because most of the policemen were engaged in the area affected by the Serb rebellion, while others were busy protecting the residential buildings in Zadar in which members of the YPA and their families resided. Soon, due to a feeling of insecurity, a mass exodus of Serbs from Zadar took place; these Serbs took refuge in the areas occupied by the rebels. Apart from the Zadar Serbs, Croats in the areas held by Serb rebels also began to leave their homes in early May 1991. On 1 May 1991, rebel Serbs drove many Croats from the areas around Knin. On the night of 6 to 7 May, as an act of revenge for the events in Zadar, the property of Croats, Albanians, and Croatian companies was attacked and plundered. Different sources give different data regarding the extent of the damage caused to Serbian property. Criminal charges raised by the Croatian police against unknown perpetrators on 2 May 1991 mention that 175 catering establishments, commercial premises, stands, kiosks, and automobiles were damaged. Apart from the property of Serbs, property belonging to Croats, Muslims, Roma, and Croatian companies was also damaged. There are numerous prejudices and controversies regarding the 'Night of Broken Glass', which mostly ignore the then security-political context. Certainly, there were those among the Croats who did not consider the attacks on Serbian property and their exodus from Zadar as anything controversial, but available sources clearly point towards the conclusion that the destruction of Serbian property was not organised and was not a part of the policy of the Croatian leadership.

This essay comparatively analyzes post-Yugoslav ethnic nationalist movements in Croatia and Serbia focusing on political uses of ethnic diasporas. The author examines the role of ethnic diasporas in the reconstruction of nationhood and legitimating new regimes; in new political discourses and also in the new political competition including internal competition within political arenas of the new nations, but also in the context of the rivalry between Serb and Croat nationalisms which did not end with the ending of the wars of Yugoslav succession. In addition, the author provides a brief genealogy of the Diaspora myth and concludes that, like all myths utilized in politics, this myth also entails contradictions that produce effects and outcomes which the initial political benefactors from this myth could not incalculate or fully control and eventually had to face certain undesirable consequences. Twenty years after the collapse of Yugoslavia, the political uses of ethnic diasporas still can be observed in the discourses and politics of ethnic nationalistic parties, although it is also clear that the appeal of the myth is diminishing. Adapted from the source document.

With the new concept that he invented and promoted - 'Life-World' ('Lebenswelt') - Husserl for the first time in the history of philosophy problematized something that had not been seen as a particular problem before him. The world, as something primary and self-evident, was simply overlooked as a problem. This is the result of the fact that we forever live in some world, and the world is thus for us always something self-evident. It is thus an unquestioned area full of our many questions and considerations. This is so because all our academic achievements have been made within the Life-World: they receive meaning from it. Husserl's main aim was to understand this self-evidentness, with which we have always been viewing the world's Sein. It is from this position that we establish the existence of the 'world as it is', the one which we live in. Thus, all interpretations - whether they are myths, or science, or philosophy - are grounded in the Life-World, and they return and belong explicitly or implicitly into this concrete World. The aim of phenomenology is to interpret and analyse this self-evidentness of the essence of the concrete World, and this is what Husserl tries to do through the idea of one ontology of the Life-World. Adapted from the source document.

This essay comparatively analyzes post-Yugoslav ethnic nationalist movements in Croatia and Serbia focusing on political uses of ethnic diasporas. The author examines the role of ethnic diasporas in the reconstruction of nationhood and legitimating new regimes; in new political discourses and also in the new political competition including internal competition within political arenas of the new nations, but also in the context of the rivalry between Serb and Croat nationalisms which did not end with the ending of the wars of Yugoslav succession. In addition, the author provides a brief genealogy of the Diaspora myth and concludes that, like all myths utilized in politics, this myth also entails contradictions that produce effects and outcomes which the initial political benefactors from this myth could not incalculate or fully control and eventually had to face certain undesirable consequences. Twenty years after the collapse of Yugoslavia, the political uses of ethnic diasporas still can be observed in the discourses and politics of ethnic nationalistic parties, although it is also clear that the appeal of the myth is diminishing. Adapted from the source document.

Zadatak razvijanja znanja o afričkim ruralnim područjima od strane urbanih afričkih istraživača susreće se s dva značajna izazova: nadmoć mitova i 'biće kao sila' u mreži ruralne afričke gnoze i prijezirno držanje urbanih afričkih istraživača spram domorodačkih sustava znanja (IKS). Ovaj je pristup rezultat kolonijalnih nastojanja da se sačuva epistemička hegemonija i neokolonijalizacija uz pomoć Afrikanaca koje se okrenulo protiv mogućnosti afričkog sustava znanja. Fiksacija na mit i silu ruralnih aktera i zapadnjačkog akademski orijentiranog sistema znanja sačinjava obostrano antagonističke strukture moći s kumulativnim efektom zagušivanja pokušaja da se Afriku razumije iznutra prema van. Ovaj rad, usmjeravajući se na društveno znanje Yoruba, primjenjuje rekonstruktivni pristup predlažući dva puta do razvoja robusne afričke baze znanja. Prvi put argumentira da se ruralni akteri koji doprinose razvoju afričke spoznaje moraju raščarati gdje je to potrebno. Drugi je put usmjeren na urgentnost postizanja potpune dekolonizacije. Dok prvi put vidi kretanje ruralnog od mitova prema artikulaciji liberalnog epistemičkog sistema, drugi put želi ukloniti nevjericu i prijezir koji urbani istraživači imaju o zbilji znanja u Africi. Znanje koje ima koristi od afričke originalnosti može se konsolidirati otvorenim dijalogom između urbanih istraživača i ruralnih aktera koji imaju izravnu vezu s ispostavom afričke gnoze u pogledu politike, prava, etike, farmakognoze, zdravstva, ekonomije i okoliša. ; The task of advancing knowledge on Africa from rural African spaces by urban African researchers confronts two formidable challenges; namely, the preponderance of myths and 'being as a force' in the network of rural African gnosis and the contemptuous poise of the urban African researcher against indigenous knowledge systems (IKS). This attitude is the aftermath of colonial efforts at reserving epistemic hegemony and neo¬colonisation by Africans who have been inundated against the possibility of an African knowledge system. The fixation on myths and force by rural agents and western academy-¬derived knowledge system constitute mutually antagonistic power structures with the cumulative effect of stifling efforts at understanding Africa from inside out. This paper focusing on the Yoruba knowledge society employs a reconstructive approach in proposing two paths to the development of a robust African knowledge base by African researchers. The first path argues that rural agents contributing to developing African episteme must disenchant where necessary. The second is directed at the urgency of achieving a consummated decolonisation. While the former path sees the rural moving from a system of myths to the articulation of liberal epistemic system, the latter seeks to nullify the incredulity and contempt urban researchers have about the reality of knowledge in Africa. Knowledge that has the benefit of African originality can thus be consolidated on an open dialogue between urban researchers and rural agents who have direct relations to the deposit of African gnosis pertaining to politics, law, ethics, pharmacognosy, health care, economy and the environment. ; La mission des chercheurs africains issus des milieux urbains pour développer le savoir dans les zones de l'Afrique rurale se confronte à deux défis significatifs : la prédominance des mythes et « l'être comme force » au sein du réseau africain de la gnose, et l'attitude méprisante des chercheurs issus des milieux urbains envers les systèmes de connaissances indigènes (IKS). Cette approche est le résultat d'efforts coloniaux pour sauvegarder l'hégémonie épistémique et le néocolonialisme par le biais d'un assujettissement des Africains qui va à l'encontre d'un éventuel système de connaissances africain. L'idée fixe qui porte sur les mythes et sur la force des acteurs issus du milieu rural, mais également sur celle du système de connaissances acadé¬mique constitue, des deux côtés, des structures de pouvoir qui ont pour effet d'étouffer les tentatives accumulées pour comprendre l'Afrique de l'intérieur. Ce travail, en s'orientant vers le savoir de la communauté Yoruba, applique une approche de reconstruction en proposant deux voies qui mènent à un développement solide de la base du savoir africain. La première voie discute le fait que les acteurs ruraux qui contribuent au développement du savoir africain doivent éclaircir la situation là où il est nécessaire de le faire. La seconde voie se penche sur l'urgence pour parvenir à une complète décolonisation. Alors que la première voie conçoit l'évolution du rural à partir des mythes et se dirige vers la formation d'un système épistémique libéral, la se-conde voie souhaite se débarrasser de l'incrédulité et du mépris des chercheurs urbains envers la réalité du savoir en Afrique. Le savoir qui tire ses avantages de l'originalité africaine peut se consolider par le biais d'un dialogue ouvert entre les chercheurs urbains et les acteurs ruraux qui ont un lien direct avec la gnose africaine établie eu égard à la politique, au droit, à l'éthique, à la pharmacognosie, à la santé, à l'économie et à l'environnement. ; Die Aufgabe der Fortentwicklung des Wissens über afrikanische ländliche Gebiete seitens der urbanen Forscher Afrikas stößt auf zwei bedeutende Herausforderungen: die Überlegenheit der Mythen und "das Wesen als Macht" im Netz ruraler afrikanischer Gnosis sowie die verächtliche Haltung urbaner afrikanischer Forscher gegenüber den indigenen Wissenssystemen (IKS). Ein solches Herangehen ist das Ergebnis kolonialer Bemühungen, die epistemische Hegemonie und Neokolonialisierung beizubehalten, und zwar mithilfe von Afrikanern, über die man gegen die Interessen des afrikanischen Wissenssystems die Oberhand behielt. Die Fixierung auf den Mythos und die Macht der ländlichen Akteure sowie des westlichen, akademisch orientierten Wissenssystems vereint beiderseitig antagonistische Machtstrukturen mit dem kumulativen Effekt, Versuche zu ersticken, Afrika von innen heraus zu verstehen. Diese Arbeit, indem sie sich auf das Wissen der Yoruba¬-Gesellschaft konzentriert, setzt den rekonstruktiven Ansatz ein und schlägt zwei Wege zur Entwicklung einer robusten afrikanischen Wissensbasis vor. Der erste Weg argumentiert, dass die ruralen Akteure, die der Entwicklung der afrikanischen Erkenntnis ihren Beitrag leisten, erforderlichenfalls entzaubert werden müssen. Der zweite Weg ist auf die Dringlichkeit der Umsetzung einer vollständigen Dekolonisation ausgerichtet. Während der erste Weg die Fortbewegung des Ländlichen von den Mythen zur Artikulation des liberalen epistemischen Systems erkennt, verfolgt der zweite Weg das Ziel, den Unglauben und die Geringschätzung zu beseitigen, die urbane Forscher gegenüber der Wissensrealität in Afrika pflegen. Das Wissen, dem die afrikanische Originalität zugutekommt, lässt sich durch einen offenen Dialog zwischen urbanen Forschern und ruralen Akteuren konsolidieren, die eine direkte Verbindung zur Außenstelle der afrikanischen Gnosis in Bezug auf Politik, Recht, Ethik, Pharmakognosie, Gesundheitswesen, Wirtschaft und Umwelt haben.

This essay comparatively examines explanations of American foreign policy after 9/11. After introductory reviewing chronology of events, concurring evaluations of American foreign policy & justifications given by the public officials of the Bush administration, author describes six different approaches in explaining american foreign policy & position of USA in the world. Explanations search for causes of current American foreign policy in: myths of American culture, crusading mentality of Americans paired with legitimacy problem of American federal government, ideology of American neoconservatives, war for oil & attempt to geopolitically control the Middle East, logic of capitalist imperialism, & the decline of the capitalist world system. 27 References. Adapted from the source document.

Ovaj rad bavi se političkom simbolikom zastave kao sastavnim dijelom političkih rituala i političke mitologije te posebice desakralizacijom (profanacijom) zastave kao fenomenom izrazitog političkog simbolizma. U prvom dijelu rada iznosi se povijesni pregled desakralizacije zastave, nacionalne i državne, dok u drugom dijelu autor razmatra fenomen desakralizacije zastave među-narodnih organizacija. Zatim se analizira slučaj desakralizacije zastave Europske Unije u Hrvatskoj 2011. godine u kontekstu kaznenog progona počinitelja i u kontekstu interpretacije kaznenih sankcija, pri čemu autor tvrdi da se odredba članka 186. Kaznenog zakona ne može odnositi na zastavu Europske Unije jer je Lisabonskim ugovorom, koji je stupio na snagu 1. prosinca 2009., dotadašnja zastava EU-a prestala biti službenom. S druge strane EU nije klasična međunarodna organizacija, već politička asocijacija zemalja članica sui generis, pa tako izmiče definiciji međunarodne organizacije, što je potvrđeno i Rezolucijom Opće skupštine UN-a od 3. svibnja 2011. U takvom kontekstu promašen je kazneni progon palitelja zastave EU-a u Hrvatskoj, kao što je neprimjerena i kaznena odredba sa zapriječenom kaznom koja na simboliku paljenja zastave odgovara simbolikom represije. U zaključku autor iznosi da je za politologiju od posebne važnosti izučavanje političke simbolike, što obrazlaže svojom analizom na primjeru desakralizacije zastave Europske Unije. ; This article deals with the political symbolism of the flag as a constituent part of political rituals and political mythology, and special attention is given to the desecration of the flag as a phenomenon of exceptional political symbolism. The author reviews cases of flag desecration, national and international, while in the second part of the article deals with the desecration of international organizations' flags highlighting the desecration of the EU flag. Then the article analyses the desecration of the EU flag in Croatia in 2011 within the context of criminal proceedings initiated against the perpetrators. In doing so, the author finds that Art. 186 of the Croatian Penal Code cannot apply to the desecration of the EU flag as a symbol of an international organization, because the EU is not a classical international organization, but an association of states sui generis, as the German Federal Constitutional court ruled in 1993. Moreover, the flag of Europe is not the official flag of the EU any more since the provisions on EU symbols were cancelled in the Lisbon Treaty entering into force on December 1, 2009. Therefore flag burners or flag rippers cannot be prosecuted under the provisions of this article, because no one can be indicted for a non-existing symbol. However, the study of political symbols is very important in contemporary political science and this should be dealt with in analysis and research.

U tekstu se razmatra revizionistička struja u suvremenoj hrvatskoj historiografiji, a posredno i u politici, koja se bavi Nezavisnom Državom Hrvatskom (1941-1945). Revizionistički narativ čine tri glavne postavke: (a) NDH je bila normalna onodobna protupobunjenička država koja nije koristila državni teror kako bi uništila vjerske i etničke zajednice koje su u ustaškoj ideologiji i politici bile određene kao prirodni ili organski neprijatelji te tvorevine, nego je primjenjivala ograničena legitimna sredstva borbe da bi se zaštitila od političkih pobunjenika; (b) u NDH nisu izvršeni masovni zločini, a kamoli genocid, ni nad Srbima, ni nad Židovima, ni nad Romima; štoviše, glavne žrtve bili su Hrvati te zločine NDH treba desrbizirati i dejudeizirati; (c) logor Jasenovac bio je samo radni i sabirni logor, a ne koncentracijski logor smrti, u koji je NDH privodila političke protivnike kako bi se zaštitila od njihova razornog djelovanja, a ne kako bi ih ubijala; pravi smrtonosni logor u Jasenovcu osnovala je tek jugoslavenska komunistička vlast poslije svršetka Drugoga svjetskog rata. Pokušavajući dekonstruirati "jasenovački mit", revizionisti zapravo nastoje dekonstruirati "mit o genocidu" u NDH, a time potpuno ili djelomice rehabilitirati NDH. ; This article analyses the revisionist currents in Croatian contemporary historiography – and implicitly also in politics – which in its focus has interpretation of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH, 1941-1945). Three main elements of the revisionist narative are: a) NDH was just a normal state concerned with rebellion in its own territory, rather than the state which used state terror to exterminate religious and ethnic communities marked as its "natural and organic enemies". In other words, it only applied limited and legitimate instruments to protect itself from its political opponents. b) There were no massive crimes, and especially no genocide, neither against the Serbs, nor Jewish or Roma population. On the contrary, the main victims in 1941-1945 had been Croats, and thus the crimes of NDH should be de-Serbianized and de-Jewisized. c) Jasenovac was only a labour camp and prison, not a concentration death camp. The NDH used it for gathering and arresting its political opponents in order to prevent them from pursuing their destructive actions against the state. The real death camp in Jasenovac was formed only in 1945 by post-NDH communist authorities. By deconstructing what they call the "Jasenovac myth", the revisionists are in fact trying to deconstruct "the myth of genocide by NDH", and thus to rehabilitate the NDH either completely or partially.

The maxim that the people are the agent of the constituent power has, since the French revolution, been a universally accepted answer to the issue of the origin & the degree of validity of constitutional law, which, as the ultimate norm of a state's legal order, has no other higher positive law norm. But that maxim disregards political reality. Neither is it convincing from the point of view of the theory of state. The people are not the subject of activity but only of reference. The maxim on the constituent power of the people is a democratic myth. As such it is polyvalent: the reinforcement of revolution or its prohibition determine whether the existing constitutional regime is to be overthrown or legitimized. The doctrine of the constituent power of the people is not cognitively rewarding as a theory of legitimation, either, since the effectiveness of a constitution does not depend on its provenance but on the reception it gets here & now from its addressees: state agencies & citizens. Adapted from the source document.