Preferencje polityczne: postawy, identyfikacje, zachowania = Political preferences : attitude, identification, behavior
ISSN: 2449-9064
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ISSN: 2449-9064
The joint results of seven public opinion surveys (N=7223) conducted during January-July 2018 are analysed in the paper. A big number (compared to usual public opinion polls) of respondents allows to increase a statistical reliability of the analysis of small demographic groups, in this case – groups of income per family member. The relationships between income and trust in institutions (Parliament, courts, mass media, etc.) are analysed in the paper. Due to a problem of comparability (the structure of political parties' system has changed in this period), the relationship between income and voting preferences is analysed on a smaller data file (N=4127, April-July 2018). Joint data files allowed to evaluate a relationship between income and other social demographic parameters, as well. For example, the data showed that income per family member is going down depending on age (exception is 50-59 year group when respondents are still working, but don't have under-age children anymore). Respondents having high education level have considerably higher income compared to other education groups. A differentiation of income depending on the place of residence is essential: income in Vilnius is considerably higher compared to other towns and regions. This factor has important influence on the voting preferences. Analysis of joint data files didn't show significant differences in trust in state institutions Parliament, Government, courts, police, military forces, President – depending on different income groups. Similar attitudes towards education and health care systems were fixed, as well. On the other hand, there are important differences between lower and higher income groups in the attitudes towards the mass media, banks and the Church. Higher income groups trust in the mass media and the Church less, but trust in the banks more. Popularity of the two biggest parties (according to 2018 polls) has a strong relationship with income per family member: it has a strong positive relationship with voting for Homeland Union (higher income – more voters) and a strong negative relationship with voting for Peasants and Green Union. The ratings of other parties do not have a significant relationship with income per family member, much lower compared to the results fixed in 2013.
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The joint results of seven public opinion surveys (N=7223) conducted during January-July 2018 are analysed in the paper. A big number (compared to usual public opinion polls) of respondents allows to increase a statistical reliability of the analysis of small demographic groups, in this case – groups of income per family member. The relationships between income and trust in institutions (Parliament, courts, mass media, etc.) are analysed in the paper. Due to a problem of comparability (the structure of political parties' system has changed in this period), the relationship between income and voting preferences is analysed on a smaller data file (N=4127, April-July 2018). Joint data files allowed to evaluate a relationship between income and other social demographic parameters, as well. For example, the data showed that income per family member is going down depending on age (exception is 50-59 year group when respondents are still working, but don't have under-age children anymore). Respondents having high education level have considerably higher income compared to other education groups. A differentiation of income depending on the place of residence is essential: income in Vilnius is considerably higher compared to other towns and regions. This factor has important influence on the voting preferences. Analysis of joint data files didn't show significant differences in trust in state institutions Parliament, Government, courts, police, military forces, President – depending on different income groups. Similar attitudes towards education and health care systems were fixed, as well. On the other hand, there are important differences between lower and higher income groups in the attitudes towards the mass media, banks and the Church. Higher income groups trust in the mass media and the Church less, but trust in the banks more. Popularity of the two biggest parties (according to 2018 polls) has a strong relationship with income per family member: it has a strong positive relationship with voting for Homeland Union (higher income – more voters) and a strong negative relationship with voting for Peasants and Green Union. The ratings of other parties do not have a significant relationship with income per family member, much lower compared to the results fixed in 2013.
BASE
The joint results of seven public opinion surveys (N=7223) conducted during January-July 2018 are analysed in the paper. A big number (compared to usual public opinion polls) of respondents allows to increase a statistical reliability of the analysis of small demographic groups, in this case – groups of income per family member. The relationships between income and trust in institutions (Parliament, courts, mass media, etc.) are analysed in the paper. Due to a problem of comparability (the structure of political parties' system has changed in this period), the relationship between income and voting preferences is analysed on a smaller data file (N=4127, April-July 2018). Joint data files allowed to evaluate a relationship between income and other social demographic parameters, as well. For example, the data showed that income per family member is going down depending on age (exception is 50-59 year group when respondents are still working, but don't have under-age children anymore). Respondents having high education level have considerably higher income compared to other education groups. A differentiation of income depending on the place of residence is essential: income in Vilnius is considerably higher compared to other towns and regions. This factor has important influence on the voting preferences. Analysis of joint data files didn't show significant differences in trust in state institutions Parliament, Government, courts, police, military forces, President – depending on different income groups. Similar attitudes towards education and health care systems were fixed, as well. On the other hand, there are important differences between lower and higher income groups in the attitudes towards the mass media, banks and the Church. Higher income groups trust in the mass media and the Church less, but trust in the banks more. Popularity of the two biggest parties (according to 2018 polls) has a strong relationship with income per family member: it has a strong positive relationship with voting for Homeland Union (higher income – more voters) and a strong negative relationship with voting for Peasants and Green Union. The ratings of other parties do not have a significant relationship with income per family member, much lower compared to the results fixed in 2013.
BASE
The joint results of seven public opinion surveys (N=7223) conducted during January-July 2018 are analysed in the paper. A big number (compared to usual public opinion polls) of respondents allows to increase a statistical reliability of the analysis of small demographic groups, in this case – groups of income per family member. The relationships between income and trust in institutions (Parliament, courts, mass media, etc.) are analysed in the paper. Due to a problem of comparability (the structure of political parties' system has changed in this period), the relationship between income and voting preferences is analysed on a smaller data file (N=4127, April-July 2018). Joint data files allowed to evaluate a relationship between income and other social demographic parameters, as well. For example, the data showed that income per family member is going down depending on age (exception is 50-59 year group when respondents are still working, but don't have under-age children anymore). Respondents having high education level have considerably higher income compared to other education groups. A differentiation of income depending on the place of residence is essential: income in Vilnius is considerably higher compared to other towns and regions. This factor has important influence on the voting preferences. Analysis of joint data files didn't show significant differences in trust in state institutions Parliament, Government, courts, police, military forces, President – depending on different income groups. Similar attitudes towards education and health care systems were fixed, as well. On the other hand, there are important differences between lower and higher income groups in the attitudes towards the mass media, banks and the Church. Higher income groups trust in the mass media and the Church less, but trust in the banks more. Popularity of the two biggest parties (according to 2018 polls) has a strong relationship with income per family member: it has a strong positive relationship with voting for Homeland Union (higher income – more voters) and a strong negative relationship with voting for Peasants and Green Union. The ratings of other parties do not have a significant relationship with income per family member, much lower compared to the results fixed in 2013.
BASE
A recent wave of migration has brought a lot of children to the EU. Children in migration face a stronger risk of becoming victims of violence, physical or sexual abuse, and trafficking. Social workers in the receiving countries are usually the ones who most often provide services to them. The study, using focus group methodology and aiming to identify the needs of social workers for training and their training preferences in this context, was carried out in 2018, in 7 EU countries.The results have shown that the main issue is the absence of specific, systemic training aimed at improving the knowledge and skills needed for work with migrants. The public or governmental institutions did not have an interest in providing such kinds of training, they were organized on an ad-hoc basis by NGOs mainly. Lack of knowledge about legal systems, the difference between the theory and practice, and the lack of practical experience working with migrant minors were named by participants as the main gaps that need improvement.
BASE
A recent wave of migration has brought a lot of children to the EU. Children in migration face a stronger risk of becoming victims of violence, physical or sexual abuse, and trafficking. Social workers in the receiving countries are usually the ones who most often provide services to them. The study, using focus group methodology and aiming to identify the needs of social workers for training and their training preferences in this context, was carried out in 2018, in 7 EU countries.The results have shown that the main issue is the absence of specific, systemic training aimed at improving the knowledge and skills needed for work with migrants. The public or governmental institutions did not have an interest in providing such kinds of training, they were organized on an ad-hoc basis by NGOs mainly. Lack of knowledge about legal systems, the difference between the theory and practice, and the lack of practical experience working with migrant minors were named by participants as the main gaps that need improvement.
BASE
A recent wave of migration has brought a lot of children to the EU. Children in migration face a stronger risk of becoming victims of violence, physical or sexual abuse, and trafficking. Social workers in the receiving countries are usually the ones who most often provide services to them. The study, using focus group methodology and aiming to identify the needs of social workers for training and their training preferences in this context, was carried out in 2018, in 7 EU countries.The results have shown that the main issue is the absence of specific, systemic training aimed at improving the knowledge and skills needed for work with migrants. The public or governmental institutions did not have an interest in providing such kinds of training, they were organized on an ad-hoc basis by NGOs mainly. Lack of knowledge about legal systems, the difference between the theory and practice, and the lack of practical experience working with migrant minors were named by participants as the main gaps that need improvement.
BASE
A recent wave of migration has brought a lot of children to the EU. Children in migration face a stronger risk of becoming victims of violence, physical or sexual abuse, and trafficking. Social workers in the receiving countries are usually the ones who most often provide services to them. The study, using focus group methodology and aiming to identify the needs of social workers for training and their training preferences in this context, was carried out in 2018, in 7 EU countries.The results have shown that the main issue is the absence of specific, systemic training aimed at improving the knowledge and skills needed for work with migrants. The public or governmental institutions did not have an interest in providing such kinds of training, they were organized on an ad-hoc basis by NGOs mainly. Lack of knowledge about legal systems, the difference between the theory and practice, and the lack of practical experience working with migrant minors were named by participants as the main gaps that need improvement.
BASE
While looking through the lens of governmentality, the article analyses how the Lithuanian energy secu-rity policy and the energy security risks constructed by the political powers coincide with the energy secu-rity preferences and perception of risks in Lithuania society. The article first analyses the rationality of Lithuanian energy policy (by examining the con-formity of the energy security policy chosen by the Government with the public interest) and then turns its attention to the implementation and consequences of specific energy projects (examining public opin-ion). The analysis of public attitudes is based on 2013 and 2017 and the analysis of energy policy as the most important energy policy documents for 2012–2017. The study shows that the mismatch between public opinion and policy goals can undermine the implementation of energy security policy
BASE
While looking through the lens of governmentality, the article analyses how the Lithuanian energy secu-rity policy and the energy security risks constructed by the political powers coincide with the energy secu-rity preferences and perception of risks in Lithuania society. The article first analyses the rationality of Lithuanian energy policy (by examining the con-formity of the energy security policy chosen by the Government with the public interest) and then turns its attention to the implementation and consequences of specific energy projects (examining public opin-ion). The analysis of public attitudes is based on 2013 and 2017 and the analysis of energy policy as the most important energy policy documents for 2012–2017. The study shows that the mismatch between public opinion and policy goals can undermine the implementation of energy security policy
BASE
While looking through the lens of governmentality, the article analyses how the Lithuanian energy secu-rity policy and the energy security risks constructed by the political powers coincide with the energy secu-rity preferences and perception of risks in Lithuania society. The article first analyses the rationality of Lithuanian energy policy (by examining the con-formity of the energy security policy chosen by the Government with the public interest) and then turns its attention to the implementation and consequences of specific energy projects (examining public opin-ion). The analysis of public attitudes is based on 2013 and 2017 and the analysis of energy policy as the most important energy policy documents for 2012–2017. The study shows that the mismatch between public opinion and policy goals can undermine the implementation of energy security policy
BASE
While looking through the lens of governmentality, the article analyses how the Lithuanian energy secu-rity policy and the energy security risks constructed by the political powers coincide with the energy secu-rity preferences and perception of risks in Lithuania society. The article first analyses the rationality of Lithuanian energy policy (by examining the con-formity of the energy security policy chosen by the Government with the public interest) and then turns its attention to the implementation and consequences of specific energy projects (examining public opin-ion). The analysis of public attitudes is based on 2013 and 2017 and the analysis of energy policy as the most important energy policy documents for 2012–2017. The study shows that the mismatch between public opinion and policy goals can undermine the implementation of energy security policy
BASE
While looking through the lens of governmentality, the article analyses how the Lithuanian energy secu-rity policy and the energy security risks constructed by the political powers coincide with the energy secu-rity preferences and perception of risks in Lithuania society. The article first analyses the rationality of Lithuanian energy policy (by examining the con-formity of the energy security policy chosen by the Government with the public interest) and then turns its attention to the implementation and consequences of specific energy projects (examining public opin-ion). The analysis of public attitudes is based on 2013 and 2017 and the analysis of energy policy as the most important energy policy documents for 2012–2017. The study shows that the mismatch between public opinion and policy goals can undermine the implementation of energy security policy
BASE
This paper analyzes the process of the services market integration in the context of Services Directive and the national preferences of member states towards this document in particular and towards the process of services liberalization in general. The methodological guidelines for the research are provided by one of the contemporary theories of EU integration – liberal intergovernmentalism, as developed by Andrew Moravcsik in his prominent book The Choice for Europe. The main argument of this author is that "European integration can be best explained as a series of rational choices made by national leaders."(A. Moravcsik: 18) What follows as the main hypothetical proposition is that the integration of services market in the European Union rests upon national preferences of member states, which are shaped by domestic economic interests groups and upon relative bargaining powers of these member states. According to A. Moravcsik's argumentation, it is assumed in this paper that it suffice to analyze three major member states – Germany, France and United Kingdom (UK). The analysis of this paper proved the relative interdependence between gains and bargaining power. It was showed, that UK has more competitive services providers, especially those providing professional services, then France and Germany. It is the reason why the service market opening could bring more benefits to British providers. This situation led UK to have less persuading arguments and made them make concessions. It was also proved that due to strong national concerns the Commission lacked ability to act as intermediate or shape national preferences towards its own position. In that case it was demonstrated, under A. Moravcsik terms, that the supranational body is irrelevant in EU policy making. It was partly vindicated that the governments pay more attention to the business interests. It was particularly true in UK, where the business interests were taken count of more then the interests of professional associations or consumer groups. But regarding the cases of France and Germany, the proposition of A. Moravcsik begs some reservations: when strong corporate culture thrives, well organized professional associations can counterweight the business interests, especially when the important referendums or elections are here to come. Lastly, it was impossible scientifically to test the validity of the statement, that UK strategically made concessions regarding the Services Directive, in order to gain more in other important issues, which were to be the beginning of Turkey accession talks, and the setting of financial perspective for the years 2007-2013. Such kind of evidence is possible only after some time, when the researcher can glance in to the archives. For the time being, the main hypothetical explanation could be the fact, that all those bargains were conducted during the period of British presidency in EU. The Services Directive case is a challenge for this paper in testing the explanatory capabilities of liberal intergovernmentalism. This theory is best in explaining "big" bargains, where only member states have a right to decide. The Services Directive is a piece of daily EU legislation, conducted under the co-decision procedure, where the European Parliament and the Council has an equal say. The paper showed that indeed some reservations should be made according to the institutional arena. Regarding the future of Services market integration, the research in this paper showed, that most probably the answer lies behind the member states. If their domestic interests groups see the process beneficial, and governments take that in to account, then there will be nothing that will stop Services Directive to be fulfilled to the greatest scale. Therefore the current, diluted version of this document should be considered as the second best solution for EU, and a marker for the future.
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