Suchergebnisse

Autorica istražuje mogućnost da se pesimizam etablira kao relevantan pravac unutar teorije realizma međunarodnih odnosa u objašnjavanju kako prošlih, tako i budućih događaja u međunarodnoj politici. U radu se koristi metateorijska interpretativna metoda kako bi se iznijele neke od temeljnih niti vodilja misli pesimizma, pri čemu je fokus samo na klasičnom realizmu unutar realističke teorije, budući da su njezine postavke ujedno i temeljna izvorišta pesimizma. U prvom dijelu rada iznosi se temeljne odrednice i biti realizma i pesimizma, drugi dio se fokusira na intelektualnu pozadinu pesimistične misli u radovima Schopenhauera, Nietzschea i Freuda, a posljednji dio iznosi kritiku optimizma i temeljne opreke u poimanju koncepta vremena između pesimizma i optimizma, kao i implikacije koje pesimizam ima za međunarodne odnose. Pesimizam kao pravac unutar teorije realizma međunarodnih odnosa ima filozofsku snagu i jaku teorijsku pozadinu te može imati svoje mjesto unutar realističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa. ; The author evaluates the possibility of the concept of pessimism establishing itself as a relevant factor within the theory of realism in international relations, that is, for explaining past and future events in international politics. The approach applies the meta theoric interpretative method in order to expose some of the tenets of the leading pessimistic theories where the focus is on classical realism within the realistic theory, since its origins are also the fundamental origins of pessimism. The first part exposes the fundamental postulates and essence of realism and pessimism, while the second part focuses on the intellectual background of the pessimism thought found in the works of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud. The last part expose a criticism of optimism as well as the fundamental contradictions in understanding the concept of time between pessimism and optimism, as well as the implications of pessimism on international relations. Pessimism, as a part of the theory of realism in international ...

O poimanju ljudske prirode u Machiavellijevu djelu možemo govoriti na dvije razine. Prva je razina njegov temeljni antropološki pesimizam. Polazna je točka Machiavellijeve političke filozofije da su ljudi po prirodi skloni zlu, što, kako navodi u Raspravama o prvoj dekadi Tita Livija, kao početnu pretpostavku mora uzeti i svaki zakonodavac. Na drugoj razini, narav je pojedinoga čovjeka po njemu bitno nepromjenjiva pa kada se ona slaže s vremenima, on uspijeva (primjer pape Julija II.), a kada je u neskladu s onim što zahtijeva kontekst, neuspjeh je neizbježan. Na nizu primjera iz Machiavellijevih djela pokazuje se da je njegov pesimistički uvid u ljudsku prirodu temelj na kojem se gradi cijela njegova politička teorija. Zlu i sebičnosti sklona ljudska priroda objašnjenje je za stvaranja zajednice, zakona i državnih institucija, ali i dinamike koja dovodi do njihovog kvarenja i propasti. ; The concept of human nature in Machiavelli's work can be discussed on two levels. The first level regards its fundamental anthropological pessimism. The starting points of Machiavelli's political philosophy is that people are inclined by nature to be evil, which, as quoted in The Discourses on Livy, must be taken as a starting assumption by every legislator. On the second level, the nature of a particular man is essentially unchangeable, and thus when it agrees with the times, he succeeds (Pope Julius II being an example), and when a man is in contradiction with what is required by the context, failure is inevitable. Many examples from Machiavelli's work show that his pessimistic insight into human nature is the foundation upon which his entire political theory is built. The human nature, prone to evil and selfishness, is the explanation for the creation of communities, laws and state institutions, but also for the dynamics that lead to their decay and destruction.

Od samih početaka ljudske civilizacije vanjska politika je jedna od nezaobilaznih i najvažnijih državnih politika i bez nje je nemoguće zamisliti funkcioniranje države. Budući da je riječ o složenoj i raznolikoj aktivnosti države, postavlja se pitanje kako na najbolji znanstveni način analizirati takvu politiku. U radu je stoga na pregledan način predstavljen neoklasični realizam, u radovima unutar hrvatske akademske zajednice relativno malo zastupljen teorijski okvir, koji bi, prema našem mišljenju, mogao biti češće korišten zbog svoje pluralnosti i relativno širokih mogućnosti primjene s obzirom na to da omogućava testiranje širokog spektra varijabli. Neoklasični realizam objedinjuje elemente klasičnog realizma i neorealizma na način da neorealističku analizu nadopunjuje elementima klasičnog realizma i interesom za unutarnju politiku i ulogu lidera. Pritom se vanjsku politiku država kao zavisnu varijablu nastoji objasniti analiziranjem nezavisnih varijabli na strukturnoj/sistemskoj razini te intervenirajućih varijabli na jediničnoj odnosno državnoj razini. ; Foreign policy has been one of the essential and most important state policies since the beginning of human civilization, without which it is impossible to imagine the functioning of a state. Given the fact that foreign policy is a complex and diverse activity of the state, the question arises how to analyse such a policy in the best scientific way. This paper presents a review of the neoclassical realism, as a theoretical framework that is relatively underrepresented in the literature within the Croatian academic community, and which, in our opinion, could be used more often due to its plurality and relatively wide area of application, given that it allows testing of a wide range of variables. Neoclassical realism combines elements of classical realism and neorealism, in a way that complements neorealist analysis with elements of classical realism and interest in domestic politics and the role of state leaders. In doing so, it tries to provide explanation of the foreign policy, as a dependent variable, by analysing independent variables at the structural/systemic level and intervening variables at the unit/state level.

This paper examines some of the main assumptions on which the IR theory of political realism is based. According to the theory of political realism, national interest and not morality is the main criterion by which the state acts in its foreign affairs. In its first part this article examines three arguments in support of realists' skepticism towards morality in international relations. In the second part the concept of national interest and the possibility of its application as the main criterion in choosing the state action in international relations are examined. The author argues that the only plausible version of morality is universal morality based on respect for fundamental human rights. Realists' view of morality at the international level cannot be defended in a convincing manner. Still, the theory of political realism provides valuable insights about the nature of international morality and the limits of its application. Adapted from the source document.

Polazište ovog rada nedavni je prijepor suvremenih realista oko aktualne dvojbe je li vanjskopolitička doktrina američkog predsjednika Donalda Trumpa realistička. Autor ukazuje da je navedena polemika posljedicom zastarjelog, tautološkog, ali još uvijek i neprevladanog dualističkog diskursa u teorijama međunarodnih odnosa, koji dijeli teoriju i vanjskopolitičku praksu na dva dominantna pravca: realizam i liberalizam. Na temelju dosadašnje teorijske kritike novog realizma, ili neorealizma, članak potvrđuje da ovaj suvremeni realistički pravac epistemološki ne pripada tradiciji realizma na koju se poziva, nego se svojim predodžbama o moći, državi i međunarodnom sustavu utemeljuje u političkom idealizmu: pravcu mišljenja koji se redovno pripisuje liberalima I kojemu je tradicionalni, ili "klasični" realizam bitno suprotstavljen. Analizirajući glavne podudarnosti između pretpostavki neorealizma i načela Trumpove doktrine, ovaj rad navodi na zaključak da Trump nije realist nego protuliberalni idealist. Pojam "protuliberalni idealizam" prikladniji je za razmatranje aktualne američke vanjske politike u kontekstu njene hegemonijske pozicije u liberalnom međunarodnom poretku. ; The article's initial motive is the recent controversy among contemporary realists, who questioned the supposed realism of US president Donald Trump's foreign policy doctrine. The author argues that the polemic is a consequential outgrowth of outdated, tautological, and yet still actual binary discourse, that divides international theory and foreign policy practice on Realism and Liberalism. Referring to the established critique of Neorealism, the article argues that Neorealism does not in epistemic terms belong to the tradition of Realism, to which it is a self-proclaimed successor. On the contrary, with its notions of power, state and international system it is established in political idealism: the tradition of thought that is conventionally attributed to Liberalism, and to which "classical" Realism was fundamentally opposed. By analyzing evident congruence between principles of Neorealism and Trump's America First doctrine, the article concludes that Trump is not a realist, but illiberal idealist. His idealistic nationalist world-view, when translated into foreign policy objectives, is in stark contrast to the professed principles of Realism. Furthermore, the concept of illiberal idealism offers an analytical framework for further analysis of present US foreign policy in the context of its hegemonic position in the Liberal International Order.

The author analyzes the concept of balance of power in International Relations through critical overview of Realist tradition (both Classical and scientific), and its horizontal understanding of balancing of power as a principle per se. The first part analyzes the pessimistic phase (Classical Realism), with the emphasis on the works of H.J. Morgenthau, who promoted the balance of power as a principle per se in the hands of international power politics. In the second part, the scientific phase (Neorealism) empirically establishes the value-free balance of power concept in International Relations. By examining materialism and empiricism of Realism, in the third part the author indicates the limitations of the horizontal approach as a consequence of permanently ignoring the vertical aspect: ideational approach and norms and rules as the first principle of international system of society of states. Adapted from the source document.

The author describes the contemporary situation in the theory & practice of international politics in the field of nuclear weapons. The first part of the paper deals with past results in the process of proliferation & the process of reduction of nuclear weapons, as well as the contemporary nuclear policies of great powers. The second part presents different theoretical approaches to the problem of nuclear weapons -- realism, liberalism & the so called critical or alternative approaches. The author expects that the process of nuclear proliferation will be continued -- it will be gradual, controlled & directed by great powers & the USA, in particular. References. Adapted from the source document.

This paper examines some of the main assumptions on which the IR theory of political realism is based. According to the theory of political realism, national interest and not morality is the main criterion by which the state acts in its foreign affairs. In its first part this article examines three arguments in support of realists' skepticism towards morality in international relations. In the second part the concept of national interest and the possibility of its application as the main criterion in choosing the state action in international relations are examined. The author argues that the only plausible version of morality is universal morality based on respect for fundamental human rights. Realists' view of morality at the international level cannot be defended in a convincing manner. Still, the theory of political realism provides valuable insights about the nature of international morality and the limits of its application. Adapted from the source document.

Posljednjih je godina teorijska literatura o međunarodnim odnosima znatno napredovala u proširivanju i preciziranju tipologije revizionističkih država – država koje teže preraspodjeli moći u međunarodnom sistemu i/ili promjeni normativnog poretka. Istovremeno je malo pozornosti posvećeno pojmu status quo države, kojim se označava država koja teži zadržavanju moći i očuvanju postojećeg stanja. Status quo država uglavnom se svodi na status quo predrasudu koja se odnosi na države koje imaju averziju prema riskiranju u vanjskopolitičkim odlukama i ne sudjeluju aktivno u oblikovanju međunarodne politike ili pak na države koje nastoje egzistencijalno preživjeti u anarhičnom sustavu. Literatura pritom previđa ono bitno u opreci kategorija: sukob revizionističke i status quo države. Naime, otvoreno suparništvo s revizionističkom državom i agresivno pružanje otpora promjeni redovito se označava kao još jedan vid revizionizma. U ovom se radu pokazuje da kategorija status quo države nije slučajno u "mrtvom kutu" teorije međunarodnih odnosa. Razlog je tomu što uvjet njezine mogućnosti – konsenzualni međunarodnopravni poredak – u suvremenim okolnostima nije prisutan. Povijesno iskustvo pokazuje da u određenim, veoma rijetkim uvjetima konsenzualnoga međunarodnopravnog poretka države s agresivnim motivima i nerijetko ofenzivnim sredstvima mogu biti status quo države. Pokazat će se da su u moderno doba samo dva razmjerno kratkotrajna međunarodna poretka činila status quo državu mogućom: europski vestfalski sustav ravnoteže snaga u 18. stoljeću i hladnoratovski detant u drugoj polovici 20. stoljeća. ; In recent years, the International Relations theoretical literature has made significant progress in expanding and refining the typology of revisionist states – states that seek to redistribute power in the international system and/or change the normative order. At the same time, little attention is paid to the notion of the status quo state, which denotes a state that strives to retain power and preserve the status quo. The category of status quo states is mainly reduced to either status quo bias referring to the states that have an aversion to risk in foreign policy decisions and do not actively participate in international politics or to the states that seek to survive in the anarchic system. At the same time, the literature overlooks the key aspect of the opposing categories: the conflict between the revisionist state and the status quo state. Namely, open rivalry with the revisionist state and aggressive resistance to change is regularly labeled as another form of revisionism. This paper shows that the category of the status quo state is not accidentally in the IR theoretical "blind spot". The reason for this is that the condition of its possibility – a consensual international legal order – is not present in modern circumstances. Historical experience shows that in certain and very rare conditions of a consensual international legal order, states with aggressive motives and often offensive means can be categorized as status quo states. It will be shown that in the modern age only two relatively short-lived international orders made the status quo possible: the European Westphalian system of balance of powers in the 18th century and the Cold War détente in the second half of the 20th century.

This article will explain why Russia annexed Crimea and is destabilizing eastern Ukraine. To do this, three different theoretical approaches on various levels of analysis will be used. It will be examined how far the expansion of NATO, as well as that of the European Union (Theory of Neorealism), was a motive for Russia's action. NATO's enlargement is analysed predominantly. In addition, politicalpsychological motivations of the Russian leadership are considered. But it is also analysed whether Russia's pure power interests have played a role (Theory of Realism). The focus here is on the Russian naval base in Crimea. It is necessary to examine whether preserving its fleet in the Black Sea was a motive for Moscow to annex the Crimean peninsula. ; This article will explain why Russia annexed Crimea and is destabilizing eastern Ukraine. To do this, three different theoretical approaches on various levels of analysis will be used. It will be examined how far the expansion of NATO, as well as that of the European Union (Theory of Neorealism), was a motive for Russia's action. NATO's enlargement is analysed predominantly. In addition, politicalpsychological motivations of the Russian leadership are considered. But it is also analysed whether Russia's pure power interests have played a role (Theory of Realism). The focus here is on the Russian naval base in Crimea. It is necessary to examine whether preserving its fleet in the Black Sea was a motive for Moscow to annex the Crimean peninsula.

Prvi hrvatski predsjednik Franjo Tuđman vodio je vrlo zanimljivu i kompleksnu vanjsku politiku. Njegovu vanjsku politiku obilježio je Domovinski rat te rat u Bosni i Hercegovini. Franjo Tuđman je vodio hrvatsku narod kroz jedan od najtežih perioda u njegovoj povijesti te je iza njega ostalo mnoštvo upitnika. U ovom radu će se, kroz prizmu realizma, analizirati određena dijela Franje Tuđmana i odnosi koje je vodio sa Srbijom te Bosnom i Hercegovinom, te će se, na temelju te analize, pokušati ponuditi odgovor na pitanje kakva je njegova vanjska politika uistinu bila, odnosno je li ona stvarno bila realistička. ; The first Croatian President Franjo Tuđman has lead a very interesting and complex foreign policy. His foreign policy was marked by the Homeland War and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Franjo Tuđman led the Croatian people through one of the most difficult times in Croatias history and behind him remained a multitude of questions. In this paper, through the prism of realism, we will analyze certain academic works of Franjo Tuđman and the relations he has strived to build with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on that analysis will try to offer an answer to the question of what his foreign policy really was and was it really realistic.

The perceptions of science by the Croatian public & the political elite are a combination of scientific-technological optimism, the exemption of science from social responsibility, the skepticism regarding the speed of changes that science brings into people's lives, & a mixture of cognitive realism & optimism, & the reservations towards the cognitive possibilities of science. Also, the perceptions of science by the public & by the elite differ significantly. The public perceptions link modernism & traditionalism, confidence & a lack of it in the socially responsible role of science (& technology). Politicians nurture three different views of science. The first view implies both the beneficial & the neutral social role of science. The second view implies the reservations of the elite regarding the humanistic social role of science & its cognitive power, while the third way links the cognitive limitations of science & the skepticism regarding the way in which it changes the traditional way of life. The perception of science by the public depends on the social composition, while the politicians' views are significantly influenced by their political worldview & orientations & party allegiance. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

The perceptions of science by the Croatian public & the political elite are a combination of scientific-technological optimism, the exemption of science from social responsibility, the skepticism regarding the speed of changes that science brings into people's lives, & a mixture of cognitive realism & optimism, & the reservations towards the cognitive possibilities of science. Also, the perceptions of science by the public & by the elite differ significantly. The public perceptions link modernism & traditionalism, confidence & a lack of it in the socially responsible role of science (& technology). Politicians nurture three different views of science. The first view implies both the beneficial & the neutral social role of science. The second view implies the reservations of the elite regarding the humanistic social role of science & its cognitive power, while the third way links the cognitive limitations of science & the skepticism regarding the way in which it changes the traditional way of life. The perception of science by the public depends on the social composition, while the politicians' views are significantly influenced by their political worldview & orientations & party allegiance. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.