USING THE CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE-INDUCED EQUIILIBRIUM, THIS ESSAY DEVELOPS A SIMPLE BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF ROLL CALL VOTING. THE MAIN RESULTS ARE (1) IF SOME COMMITTEES ARE PREFERENCE OUTLIERS RELATIVE TO THE LEGISLATURE AS A WHOLE, THEN ROLL CALL DATA ARE LIKELY TO BE ARTIFICIALLY UNIDIMENSIONAL. (2) THE UNIDIMENSIONAL BIAS PERSISTS EVEN AS THE DIMENSIONALITY OF THE POLICY SPACE BECOMES LARGE. (3) EVEN IF COMMITTEES ARE PREFERENCE OUTLIERS, IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DISCOVER THIS FACT BY LOOKING ONLY AT ROLL CALL VOTES.
THIS PAPER EXTENDS THE WORK ON STRUCTURE-INDICED EQUILIBRIA BY EXPLICITLY CONSIDERING VOTERS' EXPECTATIONS. THE STANDARD ASSUMPTION OF MYOPIC EXPECTATIONS IS CONTRASTED WITH THE ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTION OF PERFECT-FORESIGHT EXPECTATIONS.
IN THIS STUDY THE STRUCTURE-INDUCED EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH FOR MODELING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IS EXTENDED TO ALLOW FOR THE ADDED STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF EXECUTIVE VETO AND LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE. A MULTIDIMENSIONAL MODEL IS PRESENTED FOR A BUDGETARY PROCESS INVOLVING THREE ACTORS - A LEGISLATURE, AN APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, AND AN EXECUTIVE. IN ORDER TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE ROLE OF THE VETO AND OVERRIDE POSSIBILITIES, SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS ARE MADE WITH REGARD TO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE AGENDA FORMATION PROCESS. IN PARTICULAR, THE COMMITTEE HAS MONOPOLY AGENDA POWER, A CLOSED AMENDMENT CONTROL RULE IS OPERATIVE, AND PERFECT-FORESIGHT EXPECTATIONS ARE HELD BY THE COMMITTEE AND THE EXECUTIVE. GIVEN THESE ASSUMPTIONS, UTILITY MAXIMIZATION BY THE SEVERAL ACTORS GENERATES A BUDGET OUTCOME CHARACTERIZED AS A STRUCTURE-INDUCED EQUILIBRIUM. THE GENERAL MODEL IS ILLUSTRATED GEOMETRICALLY WITH A TWO-DIMENSIONAL EXAMPLE, PERMITTING BUDGET OUTCOMES TO BE ANALYZED FOR VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF VETO RULES AND OVERRIDE PROVISIONS. THE ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT BUDGET OUTCOMES ARE SENSITIVE TO ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF VETO RULES AND OVERRIDE PROVISIONS. IN THE ILLUSTRATION, EXECUTIVE VETO POWER IS SHOWN TO VARY DIRECTLY WITH BOTH THE PERMISSIVENESS OF THE VETO RULE AND THE STRINGENCY OF THE OVERRIDE PROVISION. SIMILAR RELATIONSHIPS, HOWEVER, ARE NOT FOUND TO EXIST FOR TOTAL BUDGET EXPENDITURES.
THIS PAPER WAS DESIGNED TO TEST THE HYPOTHESIS THAT, THROUGH A KNOWLEDGE OF SOCIAL CHOICE, JEFFERSON AND/OR MADISON WAS IN A POSITION TO INDUCE EQUILIBRIA IN THE INSTITUTIONS THEY DESIGNED (THE PARLIAMENTARY RULES OF CONGRESS, AND THE STRUCTURE OF CHECKS AND BALANCES RESPECTIVELY). THE AUTHORS EXAMINED ALL THE KNOWN PRIMARY DOCUMENTS WHICH APPEAR TO BEAR ON THE QUESTION, AND NONE OF THEM SHOWS ANY HINT THAT EITHER JEFFERSON OR MADISON UNDERSTOOD THE SOICAL CHOICE COMPONENTS OF CONDORCET'S WORK. THEY FIND THAT THE HYPOTHESIS FAILS. THE CONSTITUTION, THE "FEDERALIST PAPERS" AND JEFFERSON'S "MANUAL" ARE ALL MASTERPIECES BUT THEY ARE NOT MASTERPIECES OF HERESTHETICS.
Argues that the meaning of any particular package of new techniques is dependent upon the social structure within which the new technology is applied. New high-yielding seed varieties require the increased application of energy to the farming process. Once the meaning of an innovation package becomes dependent upon the social structure in which it is utilised, then the theory of induced technical change loses much of its meaning. (SJK)
