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ARGUMENTS FOR TOLERANCE, AND CRITICISMS OF IT, REGULARLY PRODUCE PARADOXES AND OTHER KINDS OF CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTY. SEEK TO SHOW THAT THESE PARADOXES ARE UNNECESSARY, AND THAT THEY ARISE FROM MISCONCEPTIONS OF WHAT A THEORY OF TOLERANCE IS REQUIRED TO JUSTIFY. IMAGINED AS A "VIRTUE," TOLERANCE IS SIMPLY CONFUSED WITH OTHER CONCEPTS; UNDERSTOOD IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A THEORY OF "RIGHTS," THE ELEMENT OF CHOICE ESSENTIAL TO THE CONCEPT IS WHOLLY NEGLECTED; EXPLAINING THE CONCEPT IN TERMS OF SOME THEORY OF FALLIBILISM LEADS TO A CONFUSION OF PRAGMATIC WITH CONGNITIVE STANDARDS. MOREOVER, SUCH MISTAKEN APPROACHES OFTEN ARISE FROM AN EQUATION OF TOLERANCE WITH LIBERALISM OR PLURALISM: THE AUTHORS MAINTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT JUSTIFICATIONS OF TOLERANCE DO NOT REST ON A COMMITMENT TO ANY POLITICAL THEORY OR IDEOLOGY, BUT IMPLY ONLY A RECOGNITION OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION ITSELF.

AbstractArguments for tolerance, and criticisms of it, regularly produce paradoxes and other kinds of conceptual difficulty. We seek to show that these paradoxes are unnecessary, and that they arise from misconceptions of what a theory of tolerance is required to justify. Imagined as a "virtue," tolerance is simply confused with other concepts; understood in the framework of a theory of "rights," the element of choice essential to the concept is wholly neglected; explaining the concept in terms of some theory of fallibilism leads to a confusion of pragmatic with cognitive standards. Moreover, such mistaken approaches often arise from an equation of tolerance with liberalism or pluralism: the authors maintain, however, that justifications of tolerance do not rest on a commitment to any political theory or ideology, but imply only a recognition of the political situation itself.

1 SHALL ARGUE THAT TOLERANCE IS CENTRALLY A MORAL CONCEPT (although it is also used in a variety of non-moral ways). My differences with the two papers, with which I in many ways agree, derive from this observation. I shall argue that the definition they use must be extended to allow for claims to legitimacy characteristic of cases of tolerance, and I shall further argue (against Dr King) that tolerance characterizes social groups in a less formal sense than he allows, and (against Professor Crick) that tolerance is primarily a social rather than a political phenomenon.

IN THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WE ARE CONCERNED WITH tolerance, not as a physical problem, but as a problem of human relations. In this context, 'to tolerate' generally means to endure, suffer or put up with a person, activity, idea or organization of which or whom one does not really approve. One can 'put up with' an item both when one can and cannot do anything about it. For example, one can 'put up with' the excesses of a ruler whose behaviour one has no power to amend. Equally, one can 'put up with' the excesses of a child even where one has no need to do so. In the second case, one has control; in the first, one does not. Both cases could be advanced as instances of 'tolerance'. But cases of the first sort (powerlessness) I shall label as instances of 'acquiescence' or 'sufferance' or 'endurance', since it is obvious that acquiescence typically flows from powerlessness. I shall label cases of the second sort (powerfulness) as instances of tolerance. It is clear in any event that these two types of case are distinct, and, for the purposes of this discussion, at least, differential labelling is essential. In this context, an agent will be said to 'tolerate' an item where the item is disliked or disapproved and is yet voluntarily endured. On this definition it is plain that tolerance requires some form of self-restraint by the tolerator.

COMPARED WITH THE 19TH CENTURY, OURS IS AN AGE OF intellectual dishonesty. The 19th century did not invent the modern vision of the world, nor did it work out its implications. All that was already done in the 17th and 18th centuries. But it was in the 19th century that the awareness of these implications became widespread, partly through the sheer lapse of time, and more significantly, through the emergence of a large literate middle class which possessed the means, in various senses, for contemplating the new vision. The consequences of this are well known. The 19th century satisfied the demand and produced the secular prophets who wrestled, heroically, with the problem of finding a new meaning for life, honestly acceptable in the light of new critical standards and of the new knowledge.

The problem of orthostatic tolerance is discussed with respect to the factors affecting it, methods of assessment, and the analysis of orthostatic data. Orthostatic heart rate and blood pressure and responses of fainters and nonfainters measured by different methods are illustrated. It is shown that different tilt tables result in similar orthostatic responses, that results obtained in standing are not necessarily related to tilt-table responses, that qualitative and quantitative orthostatic responses are closely related, and that reclining heart rate alone can indicate tilt tolerance.

AbstractA review of univariate tolerance intervals is presented from an application‐oriented point of view. Both β‐content and β‐expectation intervals are defined and considered. Standard problems are discussed for the distribution‐free case and with various distributional assumptions (normal, gamma, Poisson) which occur most frequently in practice. The determination of sample size is emphasized. A number of examples are used to illustrate the types of problems which permit solutions with the excellent tables now available.

This article reports an effort to assess the extent and causes of inconsistency in the political tolerance attitudes of elites, based on the conflict in Skokie, Illinois, over the right of American Nazis to hold demonstrations. Relying on data from a survey of the membership and leadership of the American Civil Liberties Union and of Common Cause, the degree of congruence between abstract civil liberties attitudes and specific opinions on the Skokie dispute is assessed. We conclude that among the members of these elite groups, abstract commitments to democratic norms played a very significant role in structuring responses to the conflict. Thus, this analysis suggests that the attitudes of the democratic elite are vitally important to the protection of the civil liberties of minority political groups.