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The public law of the properties is in full transformation. The movements affect mainly the definition of the publicproperty and that of the public domain. In the heart of these notions is the affectation of the properties in the publicutility. Indeed, this last one is directly bound to the public domain. The first remedy in the crisis was the adoption ofthe legislative reform of 2006 ending in the general Code of the property of the public persons.The affectation is relatively emphasis within this Code. The reform remains, however, superficial. Indeed, a logicdifferent from that of the property should have prevailed to resolve the major stakes in this crisis. Whiledemonstrating the notion of affectation, autonomous with regard to that of the public property, has to remain afundamental element of recognition of the public domain, this last one that must be reduced to the main part. But, itespecially has to lead, once freed from the organic criterion, in a better valuation of the public properties.Today, properties allocated to the public utility belong to private persons. They are not certainly a part any more ofthe public domain but remain nevertheless subdued with care of a protective legal regime, comparable to the rules ofthe public domaniality.At the end, the protection of the affectation envisages except the public property, while reconciling the satisfactionof the general interest with the economic imperatives. ; Le droit public des biens est en pleine mutation. Les mouvements affectent principalement la définition de lapropriété publique et celle du domaine public. Au cœur de ces notions se trouve l'affectation des biens à l'utilitépublique. En effet, cette dernière est directement liée au domaine public puisqu'elle constitue un critère dereconnaissance de l'appartenance d'un bien au domaine public. Le premier remède à la crise fut l'adoption de laréforme législative de 2006 aboutissant au Code général de la propriété des personnes publiques.L'affectation est relativement mise en avant au sein de ce ...

The public law of the properties is in full transformation. The movements affect mainly the definition of the publicproperty and that of the public domain. In the heart of these notions is the affectation of the properties in the publicutility. Indeed, this last one is directly bound to the public domain. The first remedy in the crisis was the adoption ofthe legislative reform of 2006 ending in the general Code of the property of the public persons.The affectation is relatively emphasis within this Code. The reform remains, however, superficial. Indeed, a logicdifferent from that of the property should have prevailed to resolve the major stakes in this crisis. Whiledemonstrating the notion of affectation, autonomous with regard to that of the public property, has to remain afundamental element of recognition of the public domain, this last one that must be reduced to the main part. But, itespecially has to lead, once freed from the organic criterion, in a better valuation of the public properties.Today, properties allocated to the public utility belong to private persons. They are not certainly a part any more ofthe public domain but remain nevertheless subdued with care of a protective legal regime, comparable to the rules ofthe public domaniality.At the end, the protection of the affectation envisages except the public property, while reconciling the satisfactionof the general interest with the economic imperatives. ; Le droit public des biens est en pleine mutation. Les mouvements affectent principalement la définition de lapropriété publique et celle du domaine public. Au cœur de ces notions se trouve l'affectation des biens à l'utilitépublique. En effet, cette dernière est directement liée au domaine public puisqu'elle constitue un critère dereconnaissance de l'appartenance d'un bien au domaine public. Le premier remède à la crise fut l'adoption de laréforme législative de 2006 aboutissant au Code général de la propriété des personnes publiques.L'affectation est relativement mise en avant au sein de ce Code. La réforme demeure, cependant, superficielle. Eneffet, une logique différente de celle de la propriété aurait dû prévaloir pour résoudre les enjeux majeurs de cettecrise. C'est en démontrant que la notion d'affectation, autonome par rapport à celle de la propriété publique, doitrester un élément fondamental de reconnaissance du domaine public, ce dernier devant être réduit à l'essentiel. Mais,elle doit surtout conduire, une fois libérée du critère organique, à une meilleure valorisation des propriétés publiques.Aujourd'hui, des biens affectés à l'utilité publique appartiennent à des personnes privées. Ils ne font certes pluspartie du domaine public mais demeurent pourtant soumis à l'application d'un régime juridique protecteur,assimilable aux règles de la domanialité publique.In fine, la protection de l'affectation s'envisage en dehors de la propriété publique, tout en conciliant la satisfactionde l'intérêt général avec les impératifs économiques.

International audience This article, which is part of the general framework of mathematics applied to economics, is a decision-making model in total ignorance. Such an environment is characterized by the absence of a law of distribution of the states of nature allowing having good forecasts or anticipations. Based primarily on the integral of Choquet, this model allows aggregating the different states of nature in order to make a better decision. This integral of Choquet imposes itself with respect to the complexity of the environment and also by its relevance of aggregation of the interactive or conflicting criteria. The present model is a combination of the Schmeidler model and the Brice Mayag algorithm for the determination of Choquet 2-additive capacity. It fits into the framework of subjective models and provides an appropriate response to the Ellsberg paradox. ; Cet article qui s'inscrit dans le cadre général des mathématiques appliquées à l'économie est un modèle de prise de décision dans l'ignorance totale. Un tel environnement est caractérisé par l'absence d'une loi de distribution des états de la nature permettant d'avoir des bonnes prévisions ou anticipations. Se basant principalement sur l'intégrale de Choquet, ce modèle permet d'agréger les différents états de la nature afin de prendre une meilleure décision. Cette intégrale de Choquet s'impose par rapport à la complexité de l'environnement et aussi par son caractère pertinent d'agrégation des critères interactifs ou conflictuels. Le présent modèle est une combinaison du modèle de Schmeidler et de l'algorithme de Brice Mayag pour la détermination de la capacité 2-additive de Choquet. Il s'inscrit dans le cadre des modèles subjectifs et apporte une réponse appropriée au paradoxe d'Ellsberg.

In my work I present a theory of alternative rationality to the traditional (neoclassical)) one on the basis of the insights gathered by the Hungarian economist Tibor Scotovsky (1910-2002) by studying the psychological theory of "arousal". In particular, I examine and put into question the propriety of the utility maximization principle, the principle of decreasing marginal utility, the principle of revealed preferences, of self-interest, of full rationality and of the utilitarian hedonism. By analyzing the dynamics on which, according to Scitovsky, individuals learn, think and decide, I conclude that Scitovsky has in fact proposed a theory of rationality alternative to neoclassical one; for he connects the individuals' satisfaction not to a predetermined outcome (end), but to the process (means). That vision has many elements in common with that of Herbert Simon (i.e. procedural rationality); for Simon (1972b, 1978 and 1987b) too links individuals' satisfaction to the procedures and to the intrinsic motivations (aspirations) which engage them and not to the outcome of whatever "expected utility". Nevertheless Scitovsky perspective also partially differs from that of Simon, according to the fact that Scitovsky understands emotions as the essential elements which engage and control the cognitive process. Thus, to Scitovsky, emotions don't bound, on the contrary heighten the level of individuals' rationality. Indeed, Scitovsky does not conceive human behaviour simply as an automatic response of an internal or external stimulus; he believes in the fundamental role played by the mind in selecting and processing information. Consequently (differently from Simon) to Scitovsky human behaviour is the consequence of a cooperative participation of reason and emotion. That is the reason why, to Scitovsky, (again differently from Simon) emotions don't bound the cognitive faculties of an individual; on the contrary they are fundamental for foresight, prevent, and correct possible errors in abstract reasoning. ; Mon travail ...

In my work I present a theory of alternative rationality to the traditional (neoclassical)) one on the basis of the insights gathered by the Hungarian economist Tibor Scotovsky (1910-2002) by studying the psychological theory of "arousal". In particular, I examine and put into question the propriety of the utility maximization principle, the principle of decreasing marginal utility, the principle of revealed preferences, of self-interest, of full rationality and of the utilitarian hedonism. By analyzing the dynamics on which, according to Scitovsky, individuals learn, think and decide, I conclude that Scitovsky has in fact proposed a theory of rationality alternative to neoclassical one; for he connects the individuals' satisfaction not to a predetermined outcome (end), but to the process (means). That vision has many elements in common with that of Herbert Simon (i.e. procedural rationality); for Simon (1972b, 1978 and 1987b) too links individuals' satisfaction to the procedures and to the intrinsic motivations (aspirations) which engage them and not to the outcome of whatever "expected utility". Nevertheless Scitovsky perspective also partially differs from that of Simon, according to the fact that Scitovsky understands emotions as the essential elements which engage and control the cognitive process. Thus, to Scitovsky, emotions don't bound, on the contrary heighten the level of individuals' rationality. Indeed, Scitovsky does not conceive human behaviour simply as an automatic response of an internal or external stimulus; he believes in the fundamental role played by the mind in selecting and processing information. Consequently (differently from Simon) to Scitovsky human behaviour is the consequence of a cooperative participation of reason and emotion. That is the reason why, to Scitovsky, (again differently from Simon) emotions don't bound the cognitive faculties of an individual; on the contrary they are fundamental for foresight, prevent, and correct possible errors in abstract reasoning. ; Mon travail propose de présenter une théorie de la rationalité alternative à celle de la pensée néoclassique traditionnelle, reposant sur les idées rassemblées par l'économiste hongrois, Tibor Scitovsky (1910-2002), en étudiant la théorie psychologique de l'« arousal ». En particulier, j'examine la validité du principe de maximisation de l'utilité, de l'utilité marginale décroissante, des priorités révélées, de l'intérêt personnel, de la pleine rationalité et de l'hédonisme utilitariste. En analysant les dynamiques par lesquelles, selon Scitovsky, les individus apprennent, pensent et décident, j'en arrive à affirmer que celui-ci propose, en fait, une théorie de la rationalité alternative à celle de la pensée néoclassique ; il relie la satisfaction des individus non pas au résultat prédéterminé (la fin), mais au processus (les moyens). Cette vision comporte beaucoup d'éléments communs à celle d'Herbert Simon (par exemple, la rationalité procédurale) ; pour Simon (1972b, 1978 et 1987b) lier les satisfactions individuelles aux procédures et aux motivations intrinsèques (les aspirations) les engageant et non au résultat de n'importe quelle « utilité attendue ». Cependant, la perspective de Scitovsky diffère aussi partiellement de celle de Simon, car elle considère les émotions comme éléments essentiels qui engagent et contrôlent le processus cognitif. Ainsi, d'après lui, les émotions ne limitent pas, mais, au contraire, augmentent le niveau de rationalité des individus. En effet, Scitovsky ne conçoit pas les comportements humains simplement comme réponses automatiques d'un stimulus interne ou externe ; il croit au rôle fondamental joué par l'esprit dans sa fonction de sélection et de traitement des informations. Par conséquent (et à la différence de Simon), selon lui, les comportements humains sont la conséquence d'une participation coopérative de l'émotion et de la raison. C'est pour cette raison que, pour Scitovsky (et toujours à la différence de Simon), les émotions ne limitent pas les facultés cognitives de l'individu ; au contraire, elles sont fondamentales pour prévoir, prévenir, et corriger les éventuelles erreurs d'un raisonnement abstrait.

Le tribunal de grande instance de Paris fût amené à se prononcer, dans son jugement du 20 novembre 2013, sur la qualité d'archives publiques de différents télégrammes rédigés par le Général de Gaulle à Londres entre 1940 et 1942. De cette question patrimoniale découle une interrogation sur le statut même de la France libre, ainsi que sur sa coexistence avec la France de Vichy. Le présent article analyse la décision du tribunal via le prisme de la théorie du droit, en mobilisant notamment la réflexion de Hart en termes de jugements internes et externes. ; The High Court of Paris was required to rule in its judgment of November 20th 2013 on the quality of public archives of telegrams written by General de Gaulle in London between 1940 and 1942. This issue leads to a question about the status of Free France as a State, and its coexistence with Vichy France. This paper analyzes the Court's decision through the prism of Legal Theory mobilizing Hart's reflection in terms of internal and external points of view. ; Peer reviewed

The strength of rational choice theory and the decision models derived from its axiomatic base (e.g., expected utility, game theory, deterrence, etc.) has always depended on the degree to which the theory's underlying assumptions offer at least a close approximation of reality. Proponents of political psychology have compiled what appears to be an impressive body of evidence against the utility of theories derived from these assumptions. Decision-makers, particularly in a time of crisis, are either unwilling or unable to live up to the demands of rationality. Conflicting empirical evidence from rational choice theorists continues to fuel the debate.
In the absence of any attempt to identify areas of consensus, theoretical progress on the question of how to effectively manage international crisis mil remain elusive. In the conviction that this ongoing debate has become counterproductive to the development of crisis management theory, the following paper attempts, in part, to identify areas of consensus and to develop an alternative research agenda around Prospect Theory.

The article aims at exploring the possibility and the structure of moral pluralism by focusing on a particular case: the joint valuation of utility and freedom of choice. The study was conducted on the basis of the "freedom of choice literature", whose purpose is to characterize the rankings of opportunity sets according to the axiomatic method which is typical of social choice theory. Some refinements of the cardinal ranking take into account the value of constraints, the value of choice, the variety of options, and the value of options in order to capture distinct notions of freedom. I discuss the role of utility or preferences in the rankings of opportunity sets, and thus distinguish between the status of reasonable preferences and actual preferences. The rankings based simultaneously on the value of actual or potential utility as well as on freedom of choice capture some notion of pluralistic overall well-being. The structures of relationship between the utility and freedom may then be described according to various forms of commensurability: the instrumental value of freedom for utility, weighting values, equal consideration of values, the lexical order of values, and discontinuity. From this analysis is inferred the possibility of fundamental pluralism of values in the case of rankings of opportunity sets capturing a discontinuous valuation of utility and of freedom of choice. Adapted from the source document.

The Act of 8 April 1946 nationalized electricity in France and created a new public monopoly, Électricité de France. A small group of people, mainly from the corps des Ponts-et-Chaussées, was assembled to provide the public utility with a pricing policy. Marcel Boiteux, Gabriel Dessus et Pierre Massé, to mention only a few names, thought they would apply to the power sector the best economic theory of their time, Maurice Allais' théorie du rendement social. The theory claimed that marginal cost pricing would bring the power sector to a state of maximum efficiency, that it would help governing the sector according to the public interest, and solve rationally the issue of nationalization and its aims. But the story turned out to be quite different. Pricing electricity did not mean applying to the sector the laws of efficiency through transfers of necessities. Rather, in a tentative, partial, progressive, often contradictory manner, the work allowed to describe and thus discuss possible exploitation projects. I propose to term this process the formulation of the optimum. Identifying such a process, I suggest, might contribute to the debate on the status of economics, the kind of truth it produces, and what we can expect from it, especially when it is closely associated with political decision making. ; La nationalisation de l'électricité en France par la loi du 8 avril 1946 crée un nouveau monopole public, Électricité de France. Un petit groupe, principalement issu du corps des Ponts-et-Chaussées, est réuni pour doter l'entreprise d'une doctrine tarifaire. Marcel Boiteux, Gabriel Dessus et Pierre Massé, pour ne citer que quelques noms, pensent, au début des calculs, appliquer la meilleure science économique du temps, la théorie du rendement social de Maurice Allais. Celle-ci stipule que l'égalisation des prix aux coûts marginaux permet de porter le secteur électrique vers l'état d'efficacité maximale, donc de le gérer selon l'intérêt général et de résorber en raison les débats sur les fins de la nationalisation. La ...

The Act of 8 April 1946 nationalized electricity in France and created a new public monopoly, Électricité de France. A small group of people, mainly from the corps des Ponts-et-Chaussées, was assembled to provide the public utility with a pricing policy. Marcel Boiteux, Gabriel Dessus et Pierre Massé, to mention only a few names, thought they would apply to the power sector the best economic theory of their time, Maurice Allais' théorie du rendement social. The theory claimed that marginal cost pricing would bring the power sector to a state of maximum efficiency, that it would help governing the sector according to the public interest, and solve rationally the issue of nationalization and its aims. But the story turned out to be quite different. Pricing electricity did not mean applying to the sector the laws of efficiency through transfers of necessities. Rather, in a tentative, partial, progressive, often contradictory manner, the work allowed to describe and thus discuss possible exploitation projects. I propose to term this process the formulation of the optimum. Identifying such a process, I suggest, might contribute to the debate on the status of economics, the kind of truth it produces, and what we can expect from it, especially when it is closely associated with political decision making. ; La nationalisation de l'électricité en France par la loi du 8 avril 1946 crée un nouveau monopole public, Électricité de France. Un petit groupe, principalement issu du corps des Ponts-et-Chaussées, est réuni pour doter l'entreprise d'une doctrine tarifaire. Marcel Boiteux, Gabriel Dessus et Pierre Massé, pour ne citer que quelques noms, pensent, au début des calculs, appliquer la meilleure science économique du temps, la théorie du rendement social de Maurice Allais. Celle-ci stipule que l'égalisation des prix aux coûts marginaux permet de porter le secteur électrique vers l'état d'efficacité maximale, donc de le gérer selon l'intérêt général et de résorber en raison les débats sur les fins de la nationalisation. La suite de l'histoire recèle un changement notable. De manière tâtonnante, partielle, progressive, souvent contradictoire, l'activité tarifaire, loin d'appliquer au secteur électrique français, par transferts de nécessité, les lois de l'efficacité, permet plutôt de décrire et donc de discuter les projets d'exploitation possibles. Nous proposons d'appeler ce processus formulation de l'optimum. Son repérage semble susceptible d'alimenter le débat sur le statut de la science économique, le type de vérité qu'elle produit, ce que l'on peut en attendre, surtout lorsqu'elle fonctionne au plus près de la décision politique.

International audience Since the beginning of the twentieth century, when the concept of "Well-being" has found its new place in economics, the welfare economics, has since consisted of evaluating economic situations, and mainly, the terms of distribution. The debate that was before is only about the measurement of value and utility. Happiness, or well-being, was synonymous with anything that provides satisfaction without necessarily being "useful", yet the relativity of measuring utility was simplified by cumulative aggregation. Indeed, collective well-being represents the sum of the levels of well-being (or utility) of the individuals who make up the community considered. The useful is therefore anything that contributes to maximizing social well-being.Utilitarianism, through functions of marginal utility, has made it possible to identify the optimum of collective and social well-being. On the other hand, and according to the principle of maximization of the sum of well-being, the hypothesis of an equitable distribution of shares, in particular of income between the members of a society, requires that the marginal gain in well-being, in the allocation of resources to different individuals, ie the same everywhere. The fundamental and recapitulated matrix of utilitarianism was uttered by Jeremy Bentham: "The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the measure of just and unjust." The utilitarian doctrine was therefore crucial in the development of several theories in economic and social sciences. We cite in particular the theory of justice. The latter stipulates according to its founder John Rawls, that Men are too egocentric and selfish to determine the principles of fair and equitable distribution of wealth: they seek only to derive their own benefit.Through a theoretical base which presents the economy of well-being, and the theory of justice, our article will deal with the problem of economic inequalities and its perspectives on the attainment of social well-being, in its most extreme ideal's ...

International audience ; Since the beginning of the twentieth century, when the concept of "Well-being" has found its new place in economics, the welfare economics, has since consisted of evaluating economic situations, and mainly, the terms of distribution. The debate that was before is only about the measurement of value and utility. Happiness, or well-being, was synonymous with anything that provides satisfaction without necessarily being "useful", yet the relativity of measuring utility was simplified by cumulative aggregation. Indeed, collective well-being represents the sum of the levels of well-being (or utility) of the individuals who make up the community considered. The useful is therefore anything that contributes to maximizing social well-being.Utilitarianism, through functions of marginal utility, has made it possible to identify the optimum of collective and social well-being. On the other hand, and according to the principle of maximization of the sum of well-being, the hypothesis of an equitable distribution of shares, in particular of income between the members of a society, requires that the marginal gain in well-being, in the allocation of resources to different individuals, ie the same everywhere. The fundamental and recapitulated matrix of utilitarianism was uttered by Jeremy Bentham: "The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the measure of just and unjust." The utilitarian doctrine was therefore crucial in the development of several theories in economic and social sciences. We cite in particular the theory of justice. The latter stipulates according to its founder John Rawls, that Men are too egocentric and selfish to determine the principles of fair and equitable distribution of wealth: they seek only to derive their own benefit.Through a theoretical base which presents the economy of well-being, and the theory of justice, our article will deal with the problem of economic inequalities and its perspectives on the attainment of social well-being, in its most extreme ideal's ...

This paper traces the genesis of the consumers surplus in Alfred Marshall's work, focusing on an analytical transition : first regarded as a monetary gain, the surplus gradually becomes a utility gain. This inquiry allows a reappraisal of Marshall's intellectual debt. Specifically, Cournot's influence seems to have to be restricted to the birth of the concept of surplus, whereas the critical assessment of Jevons Theory of Political Economy appears to have played a decisive role in the evolution of Marshall's problematic. However, the idea of an influence from Dupuit or Jenkin must be ruled out.

International audience ; This paper shows that Diderot's philosophy of education needs to be read as the theory of a public institution of education, in the context of the thought of civilization. From a critical ana- lysis of the power of money in modern society as a starting point, and through a comparative history of education in France and Russia, Diderot suggests a change of scale, and suggests to link a specifically school theory (curriculum, corpus, pedagogy, teachers position, school time, etc.) on the one hand to a political philosophy in favour of a republican authority, and on the other hand to a social philosophy which considers recruitment of civil servants as the key to meritocracy. Diderot advocates the idea that public education is of common utility, but neither in a utopian nor in a dully « useful » way. ; Cet article montre que la philosophie de l'éducation de Diderot trouve son sens dans le cadre d'une pensée de la civilisation, au sein de laquelle elle théorise le rôle de l'institution publique d'éducation. À partir d'une analyse critique du pouvoir de l'argent dans les sociétés modernes, et d'une histoire comparée de l'éducation en France et en Russie, Diderot propose un change- ment d'échelle et l'articulation d'une réflexion proprement scolaire (curriculum, corpus, péda- gogie, statut des maîtres, organisation et contenu des temps scolaires et non scolaires.) à une philosophie politique encourageant l'autorité républicaine et à une philosophie sociale pensant la distribution des emplois publics comme moteur d'une méritocratie. L'ensemble constitue une défense de « l'utilité » générale de l'éducation publique, qui n'est ni utopiste ni platement utilitaire.