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ObjectiveThis article evaluates the voting experience in the first election using cumulative voting for the Board of Trustees in Port Chester, New York. A growing number of local jurisdictions in the United States are using cumulative voting for multimember elections. While the Port Chester election included some other new features in addition to cumulative voting, the village implemented an extensive voter education program to prepare voters and candidates for the election.MethodsWe conducted an exit poll of 1,946 Port Chester voters in June 2010, more than half of the voters in the local election. We used a variety of survey questions to measure voting experience and voting behavior. We also examined election returns for Port Chester, including the 2010 and 2013 elections using cumulative voting.ResultsWe find that the voter education program helped inform residents about casting a ballot with cumulative voting. Port Chester voters, and Hispanic voters in particular, reported a positive experience in the 2010 election. A large majority of voters also indicated that they understood cumulative voting and cast all of the votes allotted to them. Finally, we find evidence of strategic use of cumulative voting in order to help elect a candidate of one's choice.ConclusionsOur results indicate that voters are capable of effectively participating in elections with cumulative voting. Communities that are weighing the adoption of cumulative voting for local elections should also be prepared to implement a parallel voter education effort.

A long research tradition in behavioral political science evaluates the performance of democracy by examining voter competence. This literature got its start arguing that voters' lack of information undermines a defense of democracy rooted in electoral accountability. A more recent literature deepens the debate, with some authors claiming that voters effectively use cues to substitute for information about candidates and policies, and other authors claiming that voters are insufficiently rational to do so. We argue that, regardless of its conclusions about voter competence, this literature's single-minded focus on voter behavior is misguided. We use a sequence of formal models to show that traditional intuitions are incomplete because they ignore the effect that changes in voter behavior have on the equilibrium behavior of politicians. When this strategic interaction is taken into account, increases in voter information or voter rationality sometimes make democratic performance better and sometimes make democratic performance worse. One simply cannot assess the implications of voter characteristics for democratic performance without also studying how those characteristics affect the behavior of politicians.

We look at economic voting during times of financial crisis using individual-level survey data from the 2008 and 2011 Canadian Election Studies. We posit that in times of crisis, the economy's impact on incumbent voting can be twofold. There is first an impact that is more traditional in nature and based on retrospective assessments of national economic conditions (which are necessarily bad given the crisis context). There is also an impact that is based on perceptions of the parties' competence at managing the economy. Depending on these perceptions, the competence effect can compensate for incumbent vote losses that might be incurred from bad economic times (traditional effect). In more general terms, looking at competence-based issue ownership allows us to add a neglected valence component to the economic voting model. Adapted from the source document.