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Whistle blowing on organisational wrongdoing is becoming increasingly prevalent. However, a renewal of existing literature reveals that every potential whistle blower is not always inclined to blow the whistle, despite protection being accorded to whistleblowers through legislation. The cost of blowing the whistle can be a deterrent to potential whistle blowers. It is quite plausible that an organisational culture which institutionalizes a dominant value based system can decrease whistle blowers expectations of retaliation. The purpose of this article is to provide a conceptual framework for a dominant value enacted organisational culture which can serve as an impetus for whistle blowing in the public sector. It is important that organisations make their value systems "lived" practices to motivate potential whistleblowers to report on wrongdoing. It can be argued that the institutionalisation of enacted values can lead to low perceptions of retaliation, which is often a deterrent in blowing the whistle.

This study aims to examine thewhistleblowing and Tri Hita Karana variables on fraud prevention inmanagingvillage funds. This study used a survey method with a questionnaire, while the method of determining thenumber of samples was the Slovin formula, which produced 88 villages as samples that received village funds in the Province of Bali. Data collection was done using personally administered questionnaires (personal questionnaires), which means that researchers can relate directly to the respondent and provide explanations as needed about the questionnaireand can be collectedimmediately after the respondent has answered them. Data analysis was conducted by using ordinary least square model multiple linear regression. The results of this study indicates that Tri Hita Karana culture significantly influences fraud prevention in managing village funds, while the whistleblowing variable does not show a significant effect on the prevention of fraud in village fund management. In village government and village fund management, mutual trust and mutual respect are regarded better compared to mutual accusation, meaning that the village government in Bali believes in national law and customary law in overcomingfraudulent perpetrators.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- About the Companion Website -- Chapter 1 Introduction: The Importance of Speak-up Arrangements -- Speaking Up in Organizations -- Speak Up Arrangements: A New Perspective for Theory and Practice -- Sustainable Speak-up Systems: A Model -- Rationale -- Who Should Read This Book? -- Purpose of the Book -- About the Authors -- About the Book -- Endnotes -- Chapter 2 Why Speak-up Systems: Why Now? -- Introduction -- Background: Why Speak-up Systems, Why Now? -- Importance of Effective Speak-up Systems: The Issue of Retaliation -- Existing Research into Speak-up Arrangements in Organizations -- Revisiting the Myths -- Speaking Up and Trust -- Research into Speak-up Arrangements -- Effective Speak-up Arrangements: Towards a New Framework -- Endnotes -- Chapter 3 A Comparative Study of Speak-up Arrangements in Banking, Engineering, and Healthcare Sectors -- Introduction -- Banking -- Speak-out in the Banking Sector -- Case in Focus -- Key Learning -- Engineering -- Speak-out in the Engineering Sector -- Case in Focus -- Key Learning -- Healthcare -- Speak-out in the NHS -- Case in Focus -- Key Learning -- Conclusion -- Endnotes -- Chapter 4 Challenges and Obstacles to Effective Speak-up Arrangements -- How Do People Speak Up? -- Whistleblowing Is a Protracted Process -- What Expectations Do Speak-ups Entail? -- Challenges of Operating Speak-up Arrangements -- Time -- Independence -- Responsiveness -- Barriers to Responsiveness -- Anonymous Concerns -- Legal Issues -- Invisibility of the Response -- Strategies for Trustworthiness (and Their Potential Pitfalls) -- Creating Trust -- Maintaining Trust -- Facilitators of Responsiveness -- Always Be as Responsive as You Can -- Using Speak-up Data -- Pattern Recognition -- Data for Training Purposes -- Publishing Aggregated Speak-up Data.

This article is an examination of the various ambivalences, limitations and dilemmas that are associated with the internal whistleblowing hotline – which is conceptualized as a management technique that strives to contain, codify, constrain, standardize, and neutralize acts of speaking up against illegal or unethical practices. In other words the interest is on what happens when the critical practice of whistleblowing or 'speaking truth to power' is sought institutionalized and transformed into a practice of 'speaking truth through power' – that is, through the managerial instrument of the whistleblowing hotline. The article argues that the Foucauldian concept of dispositive can help explain how a seemingly expedient and pragmatic technique such as the whistleblowing hotline, is in fact riddled with complexity and contradiction, which in turn creates a series of dilemmas and limitations related to aim and function the hotline. The analysis thus shows how the internal whistleblowing hotline can take different forms depending on the dispositive permeating it. Empirically, the analysis is based on descriptions of the use and function of internal whistleblowing hotlines in a Danish context.

The release of classified documents through outlets like WikiLeaks has transformed American politics by shedding light on the innerworkings of governments, parties, and corporations. The high-profile criminal cases associated with such releases – those of Julian Assange, Chelsea Manning, and Edward Snowden – have highlighted important questions about journalism, government secrecy, and the public's "right to know." Scholars have focused on the journalistic and legalistic implications but have yet to explore how the public views those who release classified materials, and what factors affect those views. Using data from the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we provide results from three embedded experiments testing the effects of two forms of framing on favorability ratings toward Assange, Manning, and Snowden. The first frame addresses partisanship (i.e., which party is injured by the release) and the second addresses how the action is framed (i.e., did the person "leak" or "blow the whistle"). The data show that both the party and leaking/whistleblowing frames significantly affect favorability in expected ways. The release of classified materials comes with both costs and benefits, but public opinion appears to be more sensitive to its implications for partisan competition.

The low rank of Indonesia's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2021 indicates that government fraud is still a significant problem. One improvement in bureaucracy reform is the whistleblowing system to report wrongdoing. Although this system is applicable, the effectiveness of whistleblowing as a mechanism to detect fraud depends on the willingness of an employee to report misconduct. As a part of government management systems in local government, the internal auditor has a unique position to detect fraud as early as possible in their organization. They conduct regular monitoring of other agencies to know the fraud before. This research investigates internal auditors' intention to report fraud in the local government. By employing the theory of planned behavior, variables in this study were attitude toward whistleblowing, subjective norms, perceived whistleblowing control, and internal whistleblowing intention. This study was mixed-method research with a sequential explanatory design approach. Data were obtained from questionnaires of 201 internal auditors in local government and in-depth interviews to produce a complete study result. The researcher adopted a higher-order model in PLS-SEM to explain the relationship between components of the theoretical construct. Higher-order models facilitate a construct on a more abstract higher-level dimension and its more concrete lower-order subdimensions. The findings of this research revealed that attitude toward whistleblowing, subjective norms, and perceived whistleblowing control positively affected the intentions of the internal auditor to report wrongdoings internally. The result of this study can be implemented by the local government to effectively improve some policies related to moral education and whistleblowing systems. ; The effectiveness of whistle-blowing as a mechanism to detect fraud depends on the willingness of an employee to report wrongdoing. The objective of this research is to investigate internal auditors' intention to report fraud in local ...

AbstractWe examine the various whistleblowing regimes in Canada which, across 13 provinces and territories and a single federal government, exhibits theoretically interesting variation on procedures, incentives and protections that are well positioned for comparative analysis. Drawing on a panel of Canadian public servants, we conducted a survey with both descriptive and experimental dimensions to identify and measure knowledge and confidence in the context of diverse whistleblowing regimes, and how that relates to perceptions of the legitimacy of unauthorized public disclosures. We find that confidence is high among public servants despite variation in the structure of whistleblowing regimes, is enhanced when respondents know the number of reported wrongdoings and their results, and that greater knowledge of whistleblowing protections delegitimizes unauthorized public disclosures (e.g., leaking to the media) of alleged wrongdoing.

One of the biggest challenges facing modern societies is how to monitor one's intelligence community while maintaining the necessary level of secrecy. Indeed, while some secrecy is needed for mission success, too much has allowed significant abuse. Moreover, extending this secrecy to democratic oversight actors only creates another layer of unobserved actors and removes the public scrutiny that keeps their power and decision-making in check. This article will therefore argue for a new type of oversight through a specialised ethical whistleblowing framework. This includes, first, outlining what intelligence wrongdoings justify whistleblowing; second, whether whistleblowing is the correct remedy – something not necessarily clear with intelligence; and finally, what form the whistleblowing should take. This framework will examine the Snowden case to determine whether he was correct leaking intelligence data and whether the means were appropriate, and second, whether those involved in the Central Intelligence Agency use of torture should have blown the whistle and if they now face blame for failing to act.

This paper argues that the concept of whistleblowing could best be understood as part of a larger regime of disclosure that includes personal revelations, truth-telling, leaking, informing, snitching and whistleblowing. Disclosure regimes are about knowledge that escapes. This paper discusses the conditions for this escaped knowledge and some of the consequences for organizations and communities. Two examples of disclosure regimes are provided: 1) the US Government's financial rewards for whistleblowing, in which disclosed knowledge of company wrongdoing can be packaged for company sanctions and courtroom litigation; and 2) Scandinavian community informing programs where citizens can anonymously inform authorities of neighbours' suspected welfare cheating or tax evasion. The examples of knowledge that escapes show disclosure regimes to be a field in which organizational or community loyalties confront employee/citizen duties, cultures of organizational/community solidarity and the ethos of non-interference/privacy. As new disclosure regimes and practices evolve, thanks to massive financial rewards, transparency encouragement and anonymous technologies, we will need to redefine what whistleblowing is all about. A focus on disclosure regimes can help reveal us the inner workings of organizations or communities, as knowledge managing groups.

A famous whistleblowing case of some years ago had a distinct Maltese flavour. This was the notorious case concerning a well-known multinational pharmaceutical firm. A Maltese citizen, Stanley Adams, a senior executive with this multinational company, discovered that his employers were engaging in price-fixing and other breaches of the competition laws. He revealed details of this illegal activity to the E.U. competition authorities in Brussels. For his pains, he was hounded and investigated, ending up in a Swiss jail for the unauthorised disclosure of business secrets. He later won some damages. Adams wrote a book about his experiences, a clear indictment of a system where business and the State apparatus can conspire "to send whistleblowers to jail to punish them for whistleblowing". ; peer-reviewed