Suchergebnisse

World War I is an episode that illuminates the long-term change in definitions of women's authority from the nineteenth-century hegemonic concept of female moral authority to a latter-twentieth-century at least partial acceptance of women's professional and official authority on the basis of competence and rights. Historians of women have not examined often how gender has operated in the construction of authority in specific historical contexts, how gendered definitions of authority have changed, or how women have understood authority they have exercised. This article examines particular definitions of authority women adopted in three career fields during World War I: Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) social workers, women police officers and patrols, and women industrial welfare supervisors. The central narrative focuses on the dramatic war's-end upheaval within the YWCA, which reveals a telling shift toward secularism in social workers' understanding of the mandate for their work. Calls for "modern," young YWCA workers were linked directly to notions that YWCA social work had become a paid career for trained women. Furthermore, for middle-class women seeking to prove their abilities and further their career possibilities, their relationships with working-class women formed an important basis for their self-justification. Studied together, these three expanding careers demonstrate women's blending of older and newer bases for their authority. While YWCA social workers increasingly introduced qualifications and methods of secular professionalism into an evangelical enterprise, women police and welfare supervisors drew upon older, religiously-based definitions of women's special nature to stake their claims in masculinist organizations.

The article deals with the work of one of the most outstanding representative of modern Muslim reformation but still has not been thoroughly studied in our country, Egyptian sheikh Ali Abdarraziq (1888-1966), the author of a famous book "Islam and the Foundations of Political Power" (1925). He was the fi rst Muslim theologian who evoked the idea of desacralization of caliphate and argumented the statement that Divine Law, in its essence, has nothing to do with the organization of political power.In the first part the personality of Ali Abdarraziq is presented in the historical context, with a focus on a pressing struggle for the restauration of Caliphate abolishedin 1924 due to Kemalist reforms. Against this restauration, namely, Abdarraziq directed his book. Here is analyzed the sharp discussion raised by the book in wide circles of Egyptian society, its critics and court trial organized by the ulemas of al-Azhar.The work of Abdarraziq is to become the most disputable since the times of book-printing in the Arab countries. It infl uenced greatly the following Muslim thought and till now acts a so-called guiding star for the modernists-secularists in all the Islamic world. ; Данная статья посвящена одной из наиболее ярких, но мало изученных в нашей стране фигур современного мусульманского модернизма — египетскому шейху Али Абдарразику (1888–1966), автору книги «Ислам и принципы правления» (1925). Он первым из мусульманских богословов выступил за десакрализацию халифата, обосновав положение о том, что по своей сущности Божественный закон/шариат не имеет отношения к организации политической власти.В первой части статьи освещаются исторические события, послужившие причиной появления на свет книга Абдарразика. Главным образом это движение за реставрацию халифата, которое возникло после его отмены в 1924 г. в Турции в результате кемалистских реформ и против которого, собственно, и была направлена книга богослова. Исследуются дискуссия вокруг книги, ее критика и судебный процесс над автором, организованный улемами ал-Азхара.Сочинению Абдарразика суждено было стать самым дискутируемым со времен книгопечатания в арабских странах. Оно оказало мощное влияние на последующую мусульманскую мысль, выступая в качестве своего рода путеводной звезды для модернистов-секуляристов во всем исламском мире.

Drawing on discourse analyses of 36 in-depth interviews with elite business people from Turkey, the study identifies the networking patterns of new and established business elites in the context of economic liberalization and socioreligious transformation of the country. Through a comparative analysis of the so-called secular and religious elite networks, we demonstrate the role of institutional actors such as the government, and identity networks, based on religion and place of birth in shaping the form and content of social networks among business elites in Turkey. In order to achieve this, we operationalize Bourdieu's notion of theory of practice and Granovetter's theory of social networks, illustrating the utility of combining these approaches in explicating the form and content of social networks in their situated contexts, in which power and divergent interests are negotiated.

When examining the cases on freedom of religion in the field of education, the European Court of Human Rights increasingly adopts the conception of hard or republican secularism. This approach has far-reaching implications for the Court's understanding of social integration as a legitimate ground for the restriction on individual's freedom. The judgement in Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland and the cases on wearing of religious attire at school demonstrate that despite its claim to neutrality, the republican conception of secularism has its inherent presuppositions about what society should look like and which values such a society should embrace. In consequence, the application of this conception results in standardisation and homogenisation of the society according to secular and thus non-neutral ethos. This outcome is difficult to reconcile not only with equal respect for individual freedom of religion and moral autonomy, but also with general principles underlying its axiological structure, such as pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness.

This paper proposes an alternative explanation of Muslims' endorsement of secular values based on their belonging to religious minorities. We argue that, contrary to what is often asserted in both the academic literature and the public debate, Muslims' endorsement of secular values is not simply a matter of strong individual religiosity, but may also result from belonging to a religious minority. We suggest that this group-level variable may explain differences in the support for democratic values by Muslims in Europe, in addition to the individual-level variable pertaining to individual religiosity. Our findings show that belonging to a religious minority in the country of origin positively affects the degree of support of secularist values. More generally, they suggest that denominational Muslim identities should be investigated by taking into account the role of belonging to religious minorities. Moreover, the article will show how belonging to a religious minority can moderate the negative effect of religiosity on secular values.

Chapter One: Distinguishing Post-Modern Philosophy and Post-Modern Culture -- Chapter Two: The Roots of Post-Modernity in Liberalism -- Chapter Three: The Roots of Post-Modernity in the Emergence of Capitalism -- Chapter Four: The Roots of Post-Modernity in Secularization -- Chapter Five: The Time Consciousness of Secular Post-Modernity -- Chapter Six : The Characteristics of Neoliberal Post-Modernity.

This article explores the complex role of political ideologies in everyday politics and for urban middle-class Bangladeshis' evaluation of political parties. Drawing on long-term ethnographic research and, more specifically, conversations and contentions around the removal of 'Lady Justice' from the front of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in 2017, I show that although the Awami League continues to be considered a 'secular party', many people do not believe that the Awami League is implementing secular policy and criticise it for what they perceive as 'hypocrisy'. I argue that this seemingly paradoxical situation can be explained by a political structure that is marked by high factionalism and party competition. Data from research among politicians and the left-leaning, so-called 'culturally-minded' milieu in Sylhet, shows that certain segments of the educated middle class acknowledge the pragmatic realities of politics and do not expect the Awami League to act 'progressively'. Nonetheless, they continue to position the party's 'progressive' and 'secular' ideological basis as a primary reason for supporting the party. The article thus contributes to a deeper understanding of contemporary popular and elite practices and perceptions of party politics, democracy, and what might be labelled the 'party-state effect'.

Después del gobierno militar que concluyó en 1982 con la Guerra de Malvinas, el pueblo de la Nación Argentina volvió a elegir gobiernos constitucionales. El primer presidente de la etapa de la democracia fue Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) quien, en el aniversario de la promulgación de la ley 1420, decidió convocar a un Congreso Pedagógico Nacional. La Nación debía diseñar un nuevo proyecto político y, consecuentemente, un nuevo proyecto pedagógico. Las Asamblea Final del Congreso Pedagógico (1988) reconoció que, en sus años de existencia, Argentina no había podido ponerse de acuerdo sobre un modelo de país y que, por tanto, carecía de un proyecto educativo que contribuyera a formar en una identidad común a las jóvenes generaciones. En este artículo queremos mostrar que el laicismo escolar representó el ideal político de un grupo dirigente de fines del siglo XIX, que logró imponerse en la transformación de muchas instituciones pero que, a pesar de su importancia, no ha podido matar las raíces de la cultura cristiana que animan a la nación argentina desde sus orígenes.

This article traces the formation of the secular in Bangladesh during the period of 1947–71. Arguably, this is a period when the idea of a 'secular Bengali nation' as opposed to 'Islamic Pakistani nationalism' was coined in by the political forces to foster imagination of a Bengali root of East Pakistan. This article argues with multiple evidence that particular project of secular Bengali nationalism in the sense of strict separation of religion and politics as opposed to religious nationalism makes little sense in contemporary Bangladesh as major parties here are found to manipulate religious nationalism in a society where simplistic and unenlightened interpretation of religion plays a significant role. This article argues that the idea of secular nationalism had multiple meanings and roots during 1947–71 and by acknowledging diverse roots of secular nationalism, it is possible to make sense of contemporary Bangladesh that is by all secular indicators turned into an intolerant entity but at the same time it is equally important to note that Bangladesh's intolerance is devoid of enlightened application and teaching of Islam.