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As the foreign ministers of NATO member countries gathered this week in Brussels to celebrate the alliance's 75th anniversary, the war in Ukraine is at a crossroads.
On the one hand, despite incremental movement in recent weeks, the latest tranche of aid for Kyiv remains stalled in the U.S. Congress. And while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to urge Washington to approve the package, Ukrainian military officers are now acknowledging that even if that aid ever arrives, it is unlikely to shift battlefield dynamics that currently favor Russia.
"There's nothing that can help Ukraine now because there are no serious technologies able to compensate Ukraine for the large mass of troops Russia is likely to hurl at us," an anonymous military source told Politico this week. "We don't have those technologies, and the West doesn't have them as well in sufficient numbers."
So far, however, NATO appears unmoved by these realities. Instead of pivoting its strategy, the alliance is leaning into a military-only solution to the war. To mark the anniversary, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland co-authored an op-ed in Politico, celebrating NATO as "the most successful defense alliance in history" and playing up the stakes of the war in Ukraine.
"For Europe to be at peace, Russian imperialism must be stopped. We cannot allow for any 'gray zones' because Putin sees them as an invitation to undermine territorial integrity and sovereignty, draw imaginary lines on the map and, ultimately, use military force," the foreign ministers wrote. "His full-scale invasion of Ukraine has also proven that a policy of concessions vis-à-vis Russia, in the hopes that it could bring peace or stability back to the Continent, is naive."
Given the possibility that Donald Trump returns to the White House in 2025 — and considering his and many in his party's apparent skepticism to continuing funding Ukraine's war effort — NATO is planning for ways to overcome Washington potentially taking a step back on the issue.
"Under a proposal being discussed this week at the military alliance's headquarters, NATO would oversee the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a group currently led by the United States that coordinates the donation and delivery of weapons to the battlefield," according to the New York Times. "Discussions are also underway about a plan floated by Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary general, to secure an additional $100 billion from the alliance's 32 member states for Ukraine over five years."
The $100 billion fund has been described by other media outlets as a way to "Trump-proof" future aid for Ukraine. Sources close to NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg told the Financial Times that he had framed the proposal as a way to "to shield the mechanism against the winds of political change."
Both the long-term funding structure and the plan to shift the leadership of the Defense Contact Group are in their early stages and could run into roadblocks. Hungary, which was the lone hold out on a recent European Union long-term aid package for Kyiv before eventually acquiescing, is again expected to raise opposition to Stoltenberg's suggestion.
And the U.S. may not want to take a step back from its leadership role in coordinating military support for Kyiv. While the Biden administration has refused to comment directly on the proposal, U.S. officials "appeared dubious," according to the New York Times. Both Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and National Security Council spokesman John Kirby lauded the success of the group under Washington's leadership.
"The contact group has been very, very effective," said Kirby. "We're going to continue to lead and convene it. And we know that our leadership of that contact group is valued, it's important."
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— Zelensky signed a law this week lowering his country's draft age from 27 to 25, bringing an end to a battle that started when the law was first passed last summer. "Discussion over who and how many people to mobilize has been divisive in a society that has otherwise been united by a common Russian foe," according to the The Washington Post. "Although support for the military is extremely high among Ukrainians, few people who haven't already volunteered to fight want to. Meanwhile, Ukrainian commanders have said they are in desperate need of reinforcements, especially in the forwardmost positions. Some soldiers have been fighting for more than two years with few breaks."
— In another sign of turmoil in Kyiv, Zelensky fired a number of aides last weekend. According to the Associated Press, Zelensky removed Serhiy Shefir from his post of first assistant, as well as three advisers and the presidential representatives in charge of volunteer activities and soldiers' rights.
— U.S. Speaker of the House Mike Johnson (R-La.) pledged to address the Ukraine aid package quickly once Congress returns from a two-week recess on Monday. It remains unlikely that the House takes up the national security supplemental that passed the Senate in February that contains about $60 billion for Kyiv, with the Speaker instead saying he would propose alternatives with some "important innovations." In an interview with Fox News on Sunday, Johnson floated three possible innovations: sending aid to Kyiv in the form of a "loan" instead of a grant; using seized Russian assets as a way to fund Ukraine; and tying the passage of more aid to legislation that would end a hold on new exports liquefied natural gas. Whether any of these options will be able to get through a fractured House remains unclear.
—Russia's defense minister warned his French counterpart on Wednesday against sending French troops to Ukraine while also noting that Moscow was prepared to take part in negotiations, according to the Associated Press. This was the first time since October 2022 that the two defense ministers had spoken and came in response to comments from French President Emmanual Macron in February in which he did not rule out the possibility of NATO troops being sent to Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal published a profile of Macron on Wednesday that sought to explain how he had gone to one of the leading NATO proponents of having dialogue with Vladimir Putin to floating the possibility of having Western boots on the ground.
"In recent weeks, Macron has begun using dark rhetoric to prepare the French public for the possibility of a more direct confrontation with Moscow, warning that if Ukraine falls then a host of Central and Eastern European countries would be next," according to the Journal.
U.S. State Department news:
— In two press briefings held this week, State Department spokesman Matthew Miller fielded few questions on the war in Ukraine. In Monday's briefing, he was asked about an upcoming meeting between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
"So we have made clear that we have concerns with the, I think, full-scale partnership – I'm going to get the words exactly wrong – that we have seen between Russia and China," Miller said. "We have made very clear that we don't want to see China do anything to help support Russia's aggression in Ukraine, and we will continue to make that clear."

Chinese diplomat Li Hui, the Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs, traveled to Ukraine, Russia, and elsewhere in Europe this week in what he described as an effort to build consensus among various parties for eventual peace talks. It is Li's second round of shuttle diplomacy since Russia's invasion just over two years ago. The diplomat first traveled to Russia and Ukraine in May 2023, shortly before Kyiv launched its unsuccessful counteroffensive.The latest visit also comes at a crucial time in the war, as Russia recently made its first major territorial gain in months, and the next tranche of aid from the United States continues to be held up in Congress.During his trip, Li is also expected to visit Brussels, Paris, Berlin and Warsaw to get a sense of whether, given these developments, thinking in European capitals has changed, and there is an opportunity for Beijing to assume the role of peacemaker.Reports suggest that there is little optimism for any substantial breakthroughs during the trip. "Beijing's continued diplomatic and economic support of Russia since the war has been a sticking point in relations with Europe, which said its trust in Beijing has eroded as it steps up scrutiny of its trade with China," according to Bloomberg. "There's also skepticism over China's 12-point peace proposal issued in February 2023 to end the war." The Bloomberg report adds that the Ukrainian ambassador in Beijing has also been given the "cold shoulder," as only a handful of his more than 40 requests to meet with Chinese ministries have been granted.Public opinion polling also shows that Ukrainians have an increasingly negative view of China and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, however, has made clear that he wants China to be present at the series of "peace summits" that Ukraine and its allies have put together since last summer. "Ukrainian people see China as a hostile country. But at the same time, the Ukrainian president and officials still want to see China at the same table with other countries to discuss [Zelensky's] peace talks," Vita Golod, chair of Ukrainian Association of Sinologists, told the South China Morning Post. "I think Ukraine still sees a Chinese mediating role because China is the only country who is welcome to Moscow and Kyiv at the same time." Kyiv may also welcome Chinese involvement in mediation because it may legitimize Ukraine's stance with the Global South, which Zelensky has been trying to win over since the start of the war. As the SCMP article notes, Ukraine is unlikely to have confidence that Beijing can act as a neutral arbiter, given China's perceived closeness to Moscow. . "On his last trip to Kyiv, Li was given a list of steps China could take – short of condemning Russia – to help Ukraine," according to the SCMP. "These included working to return children transported to Russia; maintaining the openness of the Black Sea grain corridor; and helping ensure the safety of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station, which has been occupied by Russian forces."Speaking at a press conference on Thursday, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi said that Chinese "efforts point to one goal: that is to pave the way for ending the conflict and starting peace talks." "Past experience shows that a conflict when prolonged tends to deteriorate and escalate even beyond the expectations of the parties involved," he added. "In the absence of peace talks, misperception and miscalculation will accumulate. (...) China supports the holding of an international peace conference at the right time" When China first indicated interest in playing a peacemaking role, Washington tepidly endorsed the possibility, but there is little indication that the two countries are willing to work together to end the conflict. In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Sunday that he hopes that Ukraine and Russia can negotiate a cessation of hostilities soon, given the current battlefield dynamics. "On the issue of Ukraine, our view is that both sides have reached the limits of what they can get by war. We think that it is time to start a dialogue for a ceasefire," Fidan said, according to the online Turkish media outlet Duvar. "That doesn't mean recognizing the occupation [by Russia], but issues of sovereignty and ceasefire should be discussed separately." Ankara has remained non-aligned during the conflict, providing Ukraine with some military support but refusing to join Western sanctions on Moscow. On Thursday, the Turkish president's office announced that Zelenksy would visit Istanbul for talks with his counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Friday. — Speaker of the House Mike Johnson (R-La.) maintains that he is in no rush to bring the foreign aid bill that passed the Senate in mid-February to the House floor. There are two discharge petitions, one led by Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Mass.), the other by Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick (R-Pa.), that are looking to collect signatures that could force the bill to the floor over the Speaker's objections. "In the end, this all comes down to trust, which is in short supply in the Capitol right now," according to a report in Punchbowl News. "Can Democratic leadership work with Republican Ukraine hawks on a discharge petition that would force Johnson's hand? Is there any way Johnson and House GOP leaders [can] seek a deal with Democrats on this?"— Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has been unable to forge a political consensus in Ukraine over the recruitment of thousands of new soldiers that he says are necessary to combat Russian attacks, according to The Washington Post. The lack of a clear plan "has fueled deep divisions in Ukraine's parliament and more broadly in Ukrainian society. It has left the military relying on a hodgepodge of recruiting efforts and sown panic among fighting-age men, some of whom have gone into hiding, worried that they will be drafted into an ill-equipped army and sent to certain death given that aid for Ukraine remains stalled in Washington," according to the Post. "The quandary over how to fill the ranks has confronted Zelensky with perhaps the greatest challenge to his leadership since the start of the February 2022 invasion."— A Russian missile struck the Ukrainian port city of Odessa while Zelensky was there on Wednesday. The attack hit approximately 500 to 800 meters away from Zelensky, who was visiting Odessa alongside Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, a source told Reuters. "We witnessed the strike today," Zelensky told reporters following the strike. "You see who we're dealing with; they don't care where to hit. I know that today there were victims, I don't know all the details yet, but I know that there are dead, there are wounded." U.S. State Department news:State Department spokesman Matthew Miller was asked about the attack on Odessa during a press briefing on Wednesday. "I think the strike is yet another reminder of how Russia continues to strike Ukraine every single day, and it's a reminder of Ukraine's need for air defense interceptors, and it's a reminder that the United States Congress needs to take action, as we have called on them to do, to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression," Miller said.

"You've got to leave the country, Jamal. You've got to get out before they arrest you too," I told my friend, Jamal Khashoggi, just a few months before his fateful decision to leave his homeland in 2017. Little did we know that rather than find safety in Washington D.C., Mohamed bin Salman and his henchmen would trick him into visiting the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, where they brutally tortured and murdered him. Little did we expect that five years after his shocking murder, the Biden administration would be potentially rewarding MBS with an unprecedented security guarantee for his monarchical dictatorship.As a human rights advocate, this was not the first time I had urged someone to flee from an Arab regime, but the others were prominent activists long in conflict with their governments. Khashoggi was a long-time government insider, acting as spokesman for the Saudi embassy in Washington D.C., where we first met, before returning to serve as a journalist and editor in the Saudi media. We remained in touch over the years, and I saw his evolution during the Arab Uprisings of 2011, when he came to the firm conclusion that only democracy and the rule of law would secure stability and peace for the Middle East.With the rise of King Salman and his son, Mohamed bin Salman (MBS), then merely the deputy crown prince, in 2015, repression in the country escalated dramatically. By 2017, they carried out mass arrests of the Kingdom's leading reformers, religious leaders, journalists, and activists, even before the roundup and shakedown of hundreds of the country's business and royal family leaders. After Khashoggi penned an article critiquing then-President Trump, MBS ordered him to stop writing and remain quiet.Khashoggi faced a terrible choice: remain in the country effectively as a prisoner or flee. Initially, he refused to leave, sending me pictures of his grandchildren to explain why leaving the country would be too great a pain for him to bear. I argued and tried to persuade him: he could just take a temporary break, until things calmed down. Perhaps the King and MBS would relent in their repression, confident their rule was secure. Perhaps they would release those they had imprisoned, many of them Khashoggi's friends. But remaining in the country at that moment would be too great a danger. So Khashoggi finally relented and came to the United States, hoping that he would, indeed, one day return.Khashoggi soon found himself with a global audience, and able to express his true voice in his writings for the Washington Post, where his columns provided the only independent Saudi counterpoint to the unfolding disasters under the country's new rules, not just domestically but in MBS's catastrophic war in Yemen. MBS and his cronies tried hard to persuade him to come back, promising to lavishly fund a center for him back in Riyadh. We laughed at the ham-handed pleading texts from Saud al-Qahtani, MBS's top henchman, who would later go on to be the principal engineer of Khashoggi's murder.By 2018, Khashoggi knew he could never return so long as King Salman and MBS remained in power. He grieved his loss but understood that his principles required that he speak out, remarking, "I have left my home, my family, and my job, and I am raising my voice. To do otherwise would betray those who languish in prison. I can speak when so many cannot."He told me about his plans to launch a new organization in Washington D.C., Democracy for the Arab World Now, because he understood the outsized role that the United States played in protecting and enabling the region's dictatorships. He dreamed of a group that would challenge continued U.S. support for them. In June of 2018, he showed me his new business card as the Executive Director of DAWN. On October 2, 2018, MBS executed his plan to murder Khashoggi, hoping to silence him once and for all.Following the global uproar over Khashoggi's murder, the United States and Western governments around the world strongly condemned the murder, suspended arms sales to Saudi Arabia and promised to hold the perpetrators accountable. Businesses ended their ties to the Kingdom, canceling contracts and returning Saudi government investments. Many believed that Khashoggi's death would not be in vain, because at last, it would trigger a recalibration of Western protection for the violent, sociopathic Saudi leadership. Such was the change in mood Khashoggi's death triggered that Congress voted on three occasions to end arms sales to Saudi Arabia, and President Biden campaigned on a pledge to hold Saudi Arabia accountable for the murder, to make them "pay the price, and make them the pariah that they are," arguing that there was "very little social redeeming value in the present government in Saudi Arabia."Five years since Khashoggi's murder, however, the United States and other Western governments are falling over themselves to woo Saudi Arabia and MBS. The twin sirens of Saudi's billions in buying power — including the world's largest arms purchases — and control over oil prices are too great to resist, and MBS has understood that the best way to bring the West to heel is to threaten closer ties to China. In a remarkable turn of fate, the once globally reviled MBS finds himself lauded with awards in Pakistan, feted in Paris by President Macron, and invited for a state visit in London. Most dangerous of all, President Biden is now reportedly offering MBS the ultimate prize: a treaty-level security guarantee that commits American troops to protecting his dictatorship, purportedly as his reward for normalizing with Israel.What's so painful and disturbing about these developments isn't just the failure of Western governments to stay true to their promises to hold MBS accountable for the murder of Khashoggi, or the murder of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis, who continue to endure a Saudi blockade of their country. It's their willingness to sell our values for short-term economic and political returns, whatever the costs to those who face increasing attacks by not just the Saudi government, but copy-cats like India. With expanded Saudi acquisitions of Western businesses, cultural and sporting institutions, and even hundreds of former political and military officials, the message MBS is sending is that he can buy our democracies too.Perhaps Western political leaders will come to their senses and understand the cost of acquiescing to tyrants like MBS is simply too high, not just tainting and humiliating our nations as we knowingly capitulate to a tyrant's demands, but undermining the true our competitive edge — our freedoms and our rights. But the onus will rest, as it always must in our democracies, on the citizens of our countries to demand that we do better, for the people of the Middle East and the people of our own region.

Sarajevo's contested position at the intersection of geopolitical 'tectonic plates' – situated between Rome and Byzantium, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the Western and Eastern Bloc, de-colonization and re-colonization – resulted in both fertile periods of exchange and moments of devastating conflicts. This inbetweenness has contributed to the (dis)continuous cityscape, characterized by a diversity of spatial productions and radical urban transformations. Therefore, Sarajevo represents an urban laboratory for social and spatial transformation processes. The ETHZ/UTT 'Urban Toolbox' provided a cross-scalar methodological approach for examining the physical typology, program, and actors of Sarajevo's urbanism, spanning from spatial and stakeholder analyses synthesized through critical mapping to the identification of strategic scenarios and the use of digital media. This dissertation zooms both in and out on three time periods between 1945 and 2014, defined by three distinct revolutionary moments. The central theme of this project is the examination of the transformative processes with the focus on the district of Marijin Dvor in New Sarajevo. Previously a peripheral zone, it became a central operational laboratory of the new Sarajevo to test the effects of major geopolitical shifts on the 'heart' and 'brain' of the city. While investigating multiple spatial crystallization points, one building epitomized the correlation between geopolitical power and space – the Museum of the Revolution – a living symbol of the three periods of construction, destruction and fragmentation. The proclamation of Tito's communist revolution in 1945 and the establishment of a socialist Yugoslav federation, created pressing spatial demands for the new urban proletariat. The industrialization and rural-urban migration gave birth to the city's first strategic urbanistic model, enabled by proclaiming the collectivization of land as a common good. The City Planning Institute developed the first General Urban Plan (GUP-Generalni Urbanistički Plan) in 1961. This large-scale urban planning instrument was enabled by the Yugoslav decentralized model of self-management that also included the 'Mjesne Zajednice' (MZs), the local communities. These new societal postulates were decisive for the construction of the flagship project for Sarajevo and its nucleus, Marijin Dvor, as a cultural, educational and industrial hub of BiH, one of Yugoslavia's most ethnically diverse and rural regions. Architects and urbanists were tasked with planning, designing and building a New Sarajevo as a socialist utopia. Buildings, such as the Museum of the Revolution, were constructed as monuments to celebrate both the victory of the partisans over Nazi Germany and the new state design ideology: functionalist modernism. The construction of Marijin Dvor was catalyzed by the Winter Olympic Games, hosted by Sarajevo in 1984 as a result of Yugoslavia's non-aligned foreign policy and the city's status as 'terra neutral`. Later in 1992, as socialist Yugoslavia began to crumble after the geopolitical vacuum of post-1989 Europe, Marijin Dvor became the site of the fruitless peace protests. The city was put under military siege and New Sarajevo was divided along a frontline. Under wartime conditions, the urban utopia was de-urbanized. The collapse of urban infrastructure and the destruction of the human habitat, characterized in Bogdan Bogdanović's description of urbicide, reached its peak in Sarajevo. During this period, Marijin Dvor went through a radical transformation: public spaces became graveyards or urban-agricultural zones for survival. The Museum of the Revolution found itself at the frontline and was bombed as the symbol of a common Yugoslav past. Nevertheless, in acts of popular resistance, destroyed buildings became temporary art spaces. Derelict parks turned into agricultural zones. This attracted a wave of global solidarity as intellectuals visited Sarajevo, including the architect Lebbeus Woods, and formed a vital part of the antiwar movement, analyzing the destruction and proposing both small adaptations and radical post-war reconstruction visions. However, these visions did not adhere to the post-socialist and post-war realities of the newly ethnically divided Sarajevo resulting from the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. Common properties had been converted into state ones, which were then auctioned off in a massive privatization wave. These policies fell in line with the country's market liberalization. Within these new realities, MZs maintained the same level of legal status, but under the extreme pressure by neoliberal urban development. New economic and urban mechanisms led to aggressive development driven by investments from across the geopolitical spectrum, which disregarded already destroyed public space in favor of monocultures of generic commercial architecture. Marijin Dvor became a high-density node of real estate speculations and a symbol of socio-economic segregation and spatial fragmentation. The refugia of public space were found in administrative grey-zones of the post-war constitutional changes. Politically contaminated and left out of the legal system and with a new name and no program as a consequence, the Historical Museum, once the Museum of the Revolution, became a host to civic engagements, inviting citizens to figure as curators. This new system and its accompanying urban model revealed ruptures in 2014, symbolized through violent mass protests of the so-called 'Bosnian Spring'. Impoverished and unemployed, Sarajevans turned their anger and desperation against the city's governmental buildings. The dissertation includes 'Reactivate Sarajevo', an activist experiment of spatial agency that connects theory and practice by engaging in-situ. Influenced by both the pioneers of reflective practice, Donald Schön and Kurt Lewin, and the ETHZ/UTT concept of the activist architect, 'Reactivate Sarajevo' exposes the dissertation's work-in-progress to the public. This discourse was initiated through the organization of expert symposia, stakeholder workshops and open discussions with the general public. The production of discourse, curation of performances and reflection of these actions mutually nurtured the theoretical chapters. These acts spawned critical mapping and alternative design concepts, presented through an interactive digital platform, as well as a strategy of inversion to represent Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2016 at the International Architecture Biennale in Venice for the first time in the country's history. The exhibition showcased not only critical research, but also alternative design concepts amplifying civic action as a basis for the integrated and inclusive development of Marijin Dvor. The insights were then transferred back to Sarajevo back via the 'Balkan route' and the exhibition was installed in the Historical Museum. The Experiment contributed to the creation of a network of formal and informal partnerships locally and laid the groundwork for a future urban design and planning project concerning the future planning of Marijin Dvor and Sarajevo. This approach of action research resonated throughout the Balkans and other regions through workshops, lectures and consultancies and formed the basis for the extrapolation and application of the insights to other cities.

Not Available ; The socio-economic outputs for the Gopalagiri Colony-2 micro-watershed (Basavapur sub-watershed, Gundlupet taluk, Chamarajanagar district) are presented here. Social Indicators;  Male and female ratio is 49 to 51 per cent to the total sample population.  Younger age 18 to 50 years group of population is around 59.1 per cent to the total population.  Literacy population is around 75.6 per cent.  Social groups belong to other backward caste (OBC) among the all sample households.  Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is the source of energy for a cooking among all households.  About 90 per cent of households have a yashaswini health card.  About 20.0 percent of farm households having MGNREGA card for rural employment.  Dependence on ration cards for food grains through public distribution system is around 90.0 per cent. 2  Swach bharath program providing closed toilet facilities among the all sample households.  Institutional participation is only 10.2 per cent of sample households.  Women participation in decisions making are around 60 per cent of households were found. Economic Indicators;  The average land holding is 0.6 ha indicates that majority of farm households are belong to marginal and small farmers. The dry land account for 63.9 % and irrigated land is 36.1 % of total cultivated land of the sample farmers.  Agriculture is the main occupation among 73.4 per cent followed by the agriculture is the main and government service is subsidiary occupation of 2.1 percent of the sample households.  The average value of domestic assets is around Rs.59791 per household. Mobile and television are popular media mass communication.  The average value of farm assets is around Rs. 129479 per household, about 60 per cent of sample farmers are owing plough.  The average value of livestock is around Rs. 19749 per household; all sample household are having livestock.  The average per capita food consumption is around 731.6 grams (1574.2 kilo calories) against national institute of nutrition (NIN) recommendation at 827 gram. Around 70.0 per cent of sample households are consuming less than the NIN recommendation.  The annual average income is around Rs 43153 per household. About 70 per cent of farm households are above poverty line.  The per capita monthly average expenditure is around Rs.1199. Environmental Indicators-Ecosystem Services;  The value of ecosystem service helps to support investment to decision on soil and water conservation and in promoting sustainable land use.  The onsite cost of different soil nutrients lost due to soil erosion is around Rs. 642 per ha/year. The total cost of annual soil nutrients is around Rs. 76428 per year for the total area of 576.5 ha. 3  The average value of ecosystem service for food grain production is around Rs 26640/ha/year. Per hectare food production services is maximum in onion (Rs. 68252) followed by turmeric (Rs. 52922), maize (Rs. 33910), beans (Rs. 30467), ragi (Rs. 13282), horse gram (Rs. 12725) and groundnut is negative returns.  The average value of ecosystem service for fodder production is around Rs. 3474/ ha/year. Per hectare fodder production services is maximum in groundnut (Rs. 5592) followed by maize (Rs. 2608) and ragi (Rs. 2223).  The data on water requirement for producing one quintal of grain is considered for estimating the total value of water required for crop production. The per hectare value of water used and value of water was maximum in beans (Rs.416385) followed by maize (Rs. 57387), turmeric (Rs. 35812), sunflower (Rs. 30236), horse gram (Rs. 22808), onion (Rs. 20155), groundnut (Rs. 19448) and ragi (Rs. 15092). Economic Land Evaluation;  The major cropping pattern is maize (27.7 %) followed by sunflower (25.4 %), turmeric (14.8 %), horse gram (11.4 %), ragi (10.3 %), groundnut (5.1 %) and onion (5.0 %),  In Gopalagiri colony-2 micro-watershed, major soil are soil of Annurkeri (ARK) soils are very deep and well drained soil depth covered around 9.7 % of area. On this soil farmers are presently growing maize. Honnegaudanahalli (HGH) soils are very deep and well drained soil depth cover around 7.7 % of area; the crops are maize (32.6%), ragi (32.6 %) and sunflower (34.6 %). Beemanabeedu (BMB) soils are very deep and moderately well drained, soil depth covered 2.7 % of areas, crop are beans (8.2 %), groundnut (6.7%), horse gram (6.3%), maize (20.9%), onion (6.3%), ragi (6.3%), sunflower (25.8 %) and turmeric (19.0%).  The total cost of cultivation and benefit cost ratio (BCR) in study area for maize ranges between Rs. 39630/ha in HGH soil (with BCR of 2.02) and Rs.27088/ha in BMB soil (with BCR of 2.36).  In sunflower the cost of cultivation range between is Rs.38023/ha in HGH soil (with BCR of 1.08) and Rs.30398/ha in BMB soil (with BCR of 1.32).  In ragi the cost of cultivation range between is Rs.21275/ha (with BCR of 1.87), and Rs.20086/ha in HGH soil (with BCR of 1.84).  In beans the cost of cultivation in BMB soil is Rs 25108/ha (with BCR of 2.40). 4  In groundnut the cost of cultivation in BMB soil Rs. 39793/ha (with BCR of 1.02).  In horse gram cost of cultivation in BMB soil is Rs.16915/ha (with BCR of 1.75).  In onion the cost of cultivation in BMB soil is Rs 79948/ha (with BCR of 1.85) and turmeric the cost of cultivation in BMB soil is Rs.106172/ha (with BCR of 1.51).  The land management practices reported by the farmers are crop rotation, tillage practices, fertilizer application and use of farm yard manure (FYM). Due to higher wages farmer are following labour saving strategies is not prating soil and water conservation measures. Less ownership of livestock limiting application of FYM.  It was observed soil quality influences on the type and intensity of land use. More fertilizer applications on deeper soil to maximize returns. Suggestions;  Involving farmers is watershed planning helps in strengthing institutional participation.  The per capita food consumption and monthly income is very low. Diversifying income generation activities from crop and livestock production in order to reduce risk related to drought and market prices.  Majority of farmers reported that they are not getting timely support/extension services from the concerned development departments.  By strengthing agricultural extension for providing timely advice improved technology there is scope to increase in net income of farm households.  By adopting recommended package of practices by following the soil test fertiliser recommendation, there is scope to increase yield in maize (38.0 to 55.3 %), groundnut (59.1 %), horse gram (24.1 %), onion (69.6 %), ragi (59.5 %), sunflower (45.5 %) and turmeric (7.2 %). ; Karnataka Watershed Development, Under Sujala-III project

This article reviews new aspects of the interplay between fashion and advertising, says that advertising messages through text-description shows image of the advertised product, with marking does not have to link with the signified. The basic expression fashion trends are in advertising.At XXI century advertising is always looking for new forms of expression, it involves in their communicative space of various art trends, cultural studies and public opinion. One of its main sources is a formative fashion.Transformed from a simple craft into a developed industry, fashion is becoming popular and constantly debated phenomenon. An increasing of its value and relevance to modern society, it sets the necessary impression creates the desired image for a particular person or goods. Fashion simultaneously combines the stability of tradition and innovative tricks, such as creativity and commercial benefits. We can state that thanked to advertising and marketing professional, more people follow fashion trends and become "fashion victims".Despite the fact that there are a large number of works on the history of fashion, art and outstanding designers create clothes, marketing in the fashion industry and "fashion philosophy", some questions still left unattended researchers, in particular the problem of interaction of advertising and fashion in terms of post and post-post-culturewhich, in our opinion, needs detailed study.First of all it is worth to mention the work of F. Kotler "Principles of Marketing", which theoretically grounded relationship marketing in the traditional sense of the term, with the global fashion industry. In the theoretical work of T. Hines and M. Bruce "Fashion Marketing" describes the basic techniques of marketing in contemporary fashion, given the statistics. In this work analyzes the activity of representatives of fashion secrets revealed professional artists. Another theoretical work that reveals the direct sphere of modern fashion is a "Fashion world" of French journalist M. Tunheym, which is an actual example of fashion masterpieces.Particular note is the work of French semiotics, the philosopher R. Barthes "fashion system" in which theoretical stresses that modern fashion is the opposition of three systems: "clothes-image (photo or drawing that have only limited symbolic), 2) Clothing-description (text, commenting that image) and 3) real clothing" [1, 9]. The first and third system, by R. Barth, mostly exhausted its denotative message transmission or manual visual image for practical action, while ьsystem-describing saturated clothing connotations; it is located "between things and words". We cannot agree with the theoretical relative that description connects fashion with the outside world, but at the same time and tendentiously distorting the world.A similar opinion was expressed by the modern Swedish researcher L. Svendsen in the "fashion philosophy". The author considers fashion as a phenomenon that, on the one hand, promotes the aesthetic of human life, on the other; affect the identity of the human population, backgrounds. French sociologist and philosopher J. Baudriyar continues the idea R. Barth, and draws attention to the social side of the phenomenon of fashion. For him, in the centres of interest are human simulacra-world signs that are manifested in various spheres of culture – art, fashion, media, technology, sexual relations and others.As noted in our advertising time, as the description text, shapes the fashion, it can transmit not only information about products and services, but also on public opinion in general or the political preferences of the masses. In modern fashion the rules permissible limits and canons of beauty disappear. It is filled with stylistic eclecticism, with all possible variations and combinations simulacra. The most common fashion borders on art, using the principal components of the artistic image – cognitive, regulatory and communicative. Combining data elements, it creates a new dialogue between the thing and its customer, which is dominated by the same thing.To better promote products, specialists in public relations, PR managers developed "special" story of collection that told what had fascinated the designer during creating this collection, inspired and motivated him. This myth has a certain character and it can be both too romantic and compassionate-dramatic. Always available a certain mystery in the message you are composing. Press releases (summary of concepts) often served with a touch of a charitable cause. In some cases, even a fashion filled with mystical meaning, appeal to the "sublime Gothic". This trend can be seen in the collections of local designers, for example, in the same collection Valerie Kovalska called "13".Thus, the hallmark of fashion is its pragmatic direction. The main income is presented as such especially for promotion of a product created by the so-called seasonal "must-have" objects of desire, trends, the hit lists of the month. A limited collection created an illusory uniqueness. Permanent imposing certain image cannot remain indifferent consumer and sooner or later he/she still remembered the advertised product. We introduce a special system of discounts and bonuses which are not always true, for example, the price of the thing to the "sale" and after remain unchanged.The use of a large number of different prints, dominated by vivid images, deep colors with complex graphics are popular. As a starting point "lucky number" are the first letter of proper names or "sacred mantras", which will certainly bring happiness and prosperity. Apply all known kitsch images:, ironic, romantic images of fairy tales (imagine myself Oriental Beauty); optical illusion that the buyer is transferred into the mysterious world of fantasy; surreal prints that are associated with S. Dali masterpieces; drawings and abstract floral patterns, graphic lines and geometric shapes, all of these things come to mind. Nothing can stop contemporary designers to bring their collections.Thus, we can state that the fashion continuously marked clothing and a world. Advertising creates fashion, it predicts the desired information about a product and imposes other people's opinions and preferences. Advertisingcombines the perception of reality and creates its reality by itself. The public mood is formed by the artificial icons. It sets the style which all people must wish. Even if in imitation of a designed image difficulties appear (such as lack of money or social status)but due to the advertising (description text)a consumer still wants to to become the owner of the advertised product. ; В статье рассматриваются современные аспекты взаимодействия моды и рекламы. Отмечается, что в рекламных сообщениях благодаря описанию-тексту эксплицируется образ рекламированного товара, при этом означающее не обязательно имеет связь с означаемым. Наводятся основные проявления модных тенденций в рекламе. ; У статті розглядаються сучасні аспекти взаємодії моди та реклами. Зазначається, що в рекламних повідомленнях завдяки опису-тексту експліціюється образ рекламованого товару, при цьому позначаюче не обов'язково має зв'язок з означуваним. Наводяться основні прояви модних тенденцій у рекламі.

The Urban Millennium, as the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA, 2007)1 terms this century's anticipated mass urbanisation, is well upon us. Yet what is this millennial thing that we enter into or that, more precisely, is settling upon us? The sheer volume of discourses seeking to account for the urban likely point to deeper cultural anxieties about the worth, utility, and even the sense of cities. Worse, the plethora of claims on the evolving value of urban place potentially operate as cover for something far more disconcerting – what Jean-Luc Nancy, recognising a lapse in world-naming and centring (as found in the perenial papal address Urbi et orbi), has referred to as a building "glomicity", a planetary urbanism without urbanity or civility (2007: 37). For Saskia Sassen, cities contribute to a "savage sorting" subsisting with the hyper-financialisation and reduction of the social and public realms worldwide (2014: 4). As such we might wonder at the sheer brutality (nevermind banality) of the commodification unfolding with the network vectors of the urban phenomenon. Further, if we follow Arjun Appadurai and James Holston (2003), cities – with their sorting out of the trustworthy from the suspicious, the haves from the have-nots and the positing of new economic and cultural elites - are at one level antithetical to national territoriality, and at another, are incubators precisely where the tumult of citizenship is worked out against a backdrop of highly contested, sometimes violently contested, identity claims. Henri Lefebvre (2003), rejecting appeals to 'the city' itself as a meaningful measure of post-industrial sociality, has asserted, as early as the 1960s, the irreversable presencing of a global, "urban phenomenon", one problematically fitting out the world according to the socioeconomic and sociopolitical fields of global capitalism. Such a phenomenon, for Lefebvre, testifies to a plethora of far from synchronous logics – of "things (objects) [,…] of play (or sports)", of capital etc. – to the point that "there are faults, voids, and lacunae everywhere" (2003: 86). Consequently, any analysis of the operational levels of the urban phenomenon and its object and spatial fields, reveal a remainder irreducable to the logistics attempting to take hold of it. If for Lefebvre something like a "differential space" - of heterogenous aggregation or accumulation (2003: 125) - defines the urban, and one only operates within it as if in a "blind field", a quest to know the urban phenomenon comes up against a "virtual object" of uncertain ontological basis. If for Lefebvre, in the previous century a metaphilosophy of the urban was demanded (2003: 64-65) , what contra-philosophy might be aposite for this urban millennium? With this in mind, we invite you to contribute your own projects and thoughts on an urban metaphilosophy in the forthcoming issue of Interstices, Journal of Architecture and Related Arts titled "The Urban Thing". For Bruno Latour (reading Martin Heidegger), the etymology of the word 'thing' reveals beneath our now routine association of it with mute objects and brute materiality, a cluster of older associations centred on public assembly and political convening. Taking things themselves to be indicative of complex assemblies, Latour calls for a substitution of a Realpolitik - itself underwritten by a human/nonhuman division - by a Dingpolitik, a new attendance on the articulatory, conjoining agency of things themselves. What might a Dingpolitik of the urban that resists or is richer in intimacy than commodity culture offer? What ontological frameworks might counter older logics of expulsion? Might the new object ontologies centred on the autonomy of things offer renewed vantage - Karen Barad's "material-discursive practices" (2007: 146), Graham Harman's (2005) "object orientated philosophy" or Katherine Hayles' (2013) speculative aesthetics for instance? Are there as yet unrecognised complexities harboured by our culture of ubiquitous things as suggested in Bill Brown's "thing theory" (2004)? Or might today's exclusionary logic directed to peoples and biosphere draw on Giorgio Agamben's (2007) thinking through of the cultic drive underwriting capitalist profanation? Do Tonino Griffero's (2014) atmospheric "quasi-objects" or Latour's "phantom public" provide better expositional tools for apprehending the urban phenomenon today? Indeed, what do we get at all by thinking about phenomena and things themselves as 'urban things'? Please submit full papers for the Interstices 16 journal issue to Dr Susan Hedges (shedges@aut.ac.nz) by 19 June 2015. Interstices accepts both academic and practice-oriented, fully written as well as visual, contributions that engage with the issue theme. For the double blind refereed section of the journal, we welcome submission of 5000 word papers and visual submissions with an accompanying text of approximately 500 words. For the non-refereed section, we welcome papers up to 2500 words and project reports and reviews of up to 1000 words. Visit our website to view the Guidelines for Submissions for details about the reviewing process, copyright issues and formatting: http://interstices.ac.nz/information-for-contributors/guidelines-for-submissions/. We look forward to your contribution! Issue Editors: Andrew Douglas & Hannah Hopewell References: Agamben, G. (2007). Profanations (J. Fort, Trans.). New York, NY: Zone Books. Appadurai, A. & Holston, J. (2003). Cities and citizenship. In N. Brenner, B. Jessop. M. Jones, G. MacLeod (Eds.), State/space: A reader (pp. 296-308). Malden, MA: Blackwell. Barad, K. (2007). Meeting the universe halfway: Quantum Physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. Durham, NC & London, England: Duke University Press. Brown, B. (2004). Thing theory. In Brown, B. (Ed.), Things (pp. 1-22). Chicago, Ill & London, England: The University of Chicago Press. Griffero, T. (2014). Atmospheres: Aesthetics of emotional space (S. De Sanctis, Trans.). Farnham, England & Burlington, VT: Ashgate Press. Harman, G. (2005). Guerrilla metaphysics: Phenomenology and the carpentry of things. Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing. Hayles, N. K. (2014). Speculative aesthetics and object orientated inquiry (OOI). Speculations: A journal of speculative realism, 158-179. Latour, B. (1993). We have never been modern (C. Porter, Trans.). Cambridge, MA & London, England: Harvard University Press. Latour, B. (2005). From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik, or how to make things public. In, Making things public – atmospheres of democracy, exhibition catalogue, March-August 2005, ZKM Centre for Art and Media, Karslruhe. Lefebvre, H. (2003). The urban revolution (R. Bononno, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN & London, England: University of Minnesota Press. Nancy, J.-L. (2007). Urbis et Orbi (F. Raffoul & D. Pettigrew, Trans.). In The Creation of the world or Globalization (pp. 31-56). New York, NY: Suny Press. Sassen, S. (2014). Expulsions: Brutality and complexity in the Global Economy. Cambridge, MA & London, England: Harvard University Press.

The period between the end of 19th century – the first half of the 20th century had been very important for Lithuanians and Latvians as a time, when the rights of the national language and culture had been strengthened and fortified. The rich sociocultural context, which appears in the children's periodicals of that time, allows to evaluate the efforts of the nation in order to define and keep the borders of traditional culture. The investigation of children's periodicals also helps to reconstruct the field of national literature of that time. The aim of the paper is to investigate, what changes of the traditional culture appear in the Lithuanian and Latvian children's periodicals, published before 1940. Some aspects of the nation's location in the time and space are being stressed, such as: marking of the nation's culture and territory borders, institutionalization of the national calendar and construction of the historical memory. The investigation is based on the comparative analysis of the main Lithuanian and Latvian children's periodicals, which were published before 1940: Lithuanian – "Šaltinėlis" ('a little spring', 1906–1914; 1928–1940), "Žiburėlis" ('a little torch', 1920–1944), "Žvaigždutė" ('a little star', 1923–1940), "Kregždutė" ('a little swallow', 1934–1940), "Vyturys" ('a lark' 1931, 1935–1940); Latvian – "Bērnu Pastnieks" ('children's postman', 1866–1869), "Jaunības Draugs" ('the friend of the youth', 1901–1904), "Jaunības Tekas" ('the paths of the youth', 1910–1915; 1920–1930), "Bitīte" ('a little bee', 1912–1916), "Latvijas Jaunatne" ('the youth of Latvia', 1924–1940), "Cīrulītis" ('a little lark', 1923–1940), "Jaunais Cīrulītis" ('the new little lark', 1926–1934). Due to the confessional and some historical similarities between Lithuanians and Latgalians, there are also two Catholic Latgalian magazines –"Sauleite" ('the little sun', 1926–1940) and "Katōļu Dzeive" ('the life of Catholics', 1926–1940) – analyzed, despite the fact, that they were aimed at both children and youth. The theoretical background of the research is based on the works of sociologists and anthropologists of culture (Benedict Anderson, Anthony D. Smith, Orvar Löfgren), as well as on some theories of media (Denis McQuail, Herbert Marshall McLuhan). The binary opposition of the the self and the other (Löfgren 1991: 105, Smith 1994: 20–22) is being used as a border marker of the traditional culture in the texts of children's periodicals. The borders of traditional culture in the children's periodicals change depending on the fact, who and when is talking in the name of the nation – priests, teachers, supporters of the different ideological or confessional camps. As a result of the individually made or institutionary censored editorial selection of textual material, the national culture is being institutionalized and subordinated for the realization of different purposes. The language of the ethnic group is the first thing the national press institutionalizes, and that helps the community to imagine itself (Anderson 1999). The symbolic value of the language is absent in such Latvian children's magazines as "Bērnu Pastnieks" and "Bitīte", which were edited by the priests of German origin and were published only for the purpose of religious education. The language, as well as nation's territorial location, had mostly been emphasized in the Lithuanian children's periodicals. The declarative tendency of self-defining (names of periodicals, maps, lists of the readers', collective photos of the children, explanations about nationality and the state) indicates the existing mechanism of the nation's territory and culture defense. The defensive politics in Lithuania was established as a result of the traumatic experience of the long-lasting repressive actions (Lithuanian press ban (1864–1904), the occupation of Vilnius district by Polish nationalists (1919–1939) etc.). The Latvian language as the national symbol was presented in the Latvian children's magazines "Jaunības Draugs", "Jaunības Tekas" and "Cīrulītis", but its symbolic capital was being increased by the actualization of traditional culture (folklore), native literature and national historic memory (the biographies of distinguished Latvians, nation's relations with antiquity, nobles or saints). The periodicity and cyclic recurrence of the periodicals had institutionalized the time and the rhythm of the readers' life. In the context of nation's efforts of self- determination in time and space, the changes of the traditional culture borders are best seen in the traditions of commemoration of the dead. The interpretations of the commemoration of the dead depend on, what is being emphasized – the end of the individual person's life or the death in the context of nations history. The discourse of death and the commemoration of the dead have been actualized mostly in the issues of children's periodicals, published during the period between October and December. This period according to folkloristic Baltic tradition was called as a period of souls and was celebrated with the rituals of soul-feeding and gratitude to the souls of forefathers. The Christian liturgical day of the Commemoration of All the Faithful Departed (in Catholic tradition) or the Day of all Souls (in the Protestant tradition) were not directly included in the calendar of children's periodicals until 1918. But there were a lot of published texts, actualizing the theme of orphans as well as a lot of traditional genres, which were characteristic to that period of the year, e. g., tales about orphans and beggars, mythological stories about roaming souls etc. In the independent Latvia the traditional mood of the period in Latvian children's periodicals was covered by the celebration of proclamation of the state (November 18) and the commemoration of the perished in the battles for independence. In Lithuanian and Latgalian periodicals of that time ("Šaltinėlis", "Žvaigždutė", "Kregždutė", "Sauleite") the Catholic liturgical celebration of Commemoration of All the Faithful Departed was institutionalized (the very name of it appeared in the titles of publications, children were asked to pray for the souls of the dead relatives, etc.), which helped to keep the traditional themes and genres. The necessity to construct historical memory of the children and to educate them in patriotic mood widened the meaning of the commemoration day (children were asked to pray for national heroes and to look after graves of buried soldiers). The tendency to organize official ceremonial commemoration of the dead had influenced traditions in the private field – in the middle of the 30s the children are encouraged not only to pray for the souls of their dead relatives, but also to look after their graves and to take part in the mass celebrations – all that indicated the nations efforts to inscribe history of individuals in the history of the nation. The representation and explanation of the national traditions and rituals in the children's periodicals not only constructed the national identity of the young readers, but also strengthened their place in the national community and supplemented the understanding of the nation's whole, its history and future. Children in the periodicals of the time were shown as ones, who inherit and pass on the traditions to the future generations.

The research opens a new chapter about the studies conducted until now on the traditional architecture of the smaller towns in Sardinia, which I have been part from 2007 to 2010 and has been completed with the editing of Manuals Retrieval of the historical centers of Sardinia. The research started from a socio-anthropological knowledge of the characters, urban and technological centers and from the study of the traditional Sardinian architecture. Furthermore, having the opportunity to meet the Mediterranean architecture on the same viewpoints, the research investigates the archetypal elements of traditional architecture under the aspect of composition. It looks at the ways in which the contemporary design strategies, released by ideological references, take them over elaborating them, comparing with the memory of places, beyond of every stylistic affiliation. Belonging to minimalist positions, regionalist or post-modern resuming solutions, contextualizing and reinterpreting them in a practical and empirical way, even trying to see which characters and modes could be identified as typical and recurrent. This kind of research, which specifically aims to verify the composition and some elements of the experience of this project, needs to be based on the knowledge of the culture and the debate which marked the activity of designers in the near past, from the first modernity trying to recognize which characters were conditioners, which continue to influence the present and which are typical and original in the actuality. For this reason, the research has an introductory part which incorporates some emblematic moments of the debate on the architecture of the twentieth century, referring to reality and figures of the Mediterranean. One is the myth of modernity celebrated from the first rationalism, especially in Italy and Spain, the other one is the debate about the historical centers of the late twentieth century, still typical of our country: in the first season the traditional Mediterranean architecture is transformed into a progressive ideal used to specify shapes and intentions of the new architecture, especially in its character of anonymity and puristic reduction. The first part of the research, introduces the relationship between modern architecture and Mediterranean inspiration and deepens in a critical manner, the weakness of the concept of Mediterranean, founded on one hand in a sham and on the other on how rationalism looks at the historical landscape searching for a radical overhaul of the style of architecture. The Mediterranean myth in the Italian architecture is mainly influenced by the idea of the correspondence of the formal themes of modernity and is used for political reasons in order to find a place of modern Italian positions within the regime. The Mediterranean architecture is not, therefore, re-interpreted conservatively, but revised into a new paradigm, a new way of imagining the architecture. In the second part, by the pre-war myth, still literary and idealized, we move to a more critical and accurate knowledge to the empirical verification and philological sort order, losing the progressive tension of the first season and building a system of strict preservation rules, revealed, too deterministic and inhibitory. The weakness of the rationalist positions, reveals the architecture of the Second World War, who looked to the Mediterranean, devoid by now, of the ideal tension during the rationalism: it is less parallelism between cutting-edge research and charm of the Mediterranean landscape and the question begins to focus more on the relationship with the towns, with the existing environment, and for a certain range of the debate, with the preservation of historic centers, up to produce more and become part of the theories of critical regionalism, political manifesto, as Frampton says, of resistance towards globalization. The enhancement of local realities is no longer specific to the Mediterranean, but is extended: it is as if the great architecture of Mediterranean figures lost part of the universal value, which instead is recognized during rationalism. In the present, after the crisis of the great paradigms interpretive, the debate about relationship between new and old loses strength and becomes eccentric compared to issues considered preeminent. Some great works receive media attention representing particular methodologies, these are exceptional circumstances, related to charismatic personalities who avoid to define a strong theory. This research select a field of attentive investigation to the works of medium size on which you can recognize an empirical approach (not programmatic), which could be recognized as typical of this period. An approach that addresses issues that in the past were strongly ideological - the relation between modernity and tradition and continuity and rupture with the figures of history - out of those programmatic intentions and norms: in this way many architects of the younger generation, active in the Mediterranean territories, they built a sensitive and imaginative dialogue between the elements inherited from the context and strategies - even radical - of contemporary design, defining a fertile scene and interesting to build new methodologies and practices of intervention. Currently there is no attention to the great paradigm, but an open and practical approach. I will approach the scope of this study as part of the Mediterranean, in order to understand the outcome of discussions which are the current approaches and isolating a specific subject of the tradition, one of the most characteristic, trying to figure out how the projects chosen take up and rework the issue. The modulation of the light, treated according to the manner in which you relate to some elements of tradition: the dematerialization of the building mass, the dimming systems, gaps in the patio and courtyard and places of shade. Each of the examples treated, shows that there is a traditional way to control the light that has characterized the Mediterranean architecture of the past and that has been expressed by the categories identified. I prove that there are contemporary projects which reflect those solutions contextualizing and reinterpreting them in an empirical and practical way: this is very interesting because it demonstrates the vitality of the relationship between contemporary architecture and history and how certain paradigms of the Mediterranean tradition have survived as a cultural and architectural legacy, in the attempt to offer a possible answer to the complexity of the problems posed by the existing historic and how have been reinterpreted. Beyond each "nuovismo", as well as the obsession of memory, which often gave rise to an analytical mummification that carries with it the nostalgic for the unachievable quality of the ancient city and the assurance of the absence of quality of the city modern-contemporary, can be an alternative based on the careful study of places to go back to the essential qualities that the architectures are realized in it.

This study outlines the initial challenge presented by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, describes Djibouti's response, reviews the results achieved and the enabling factors in curbing the spread of the epidemic, and identifies remaining challenges. Between 2002 and 2008, HIV prevalence among young pregnant women aged 15-24 was reduced from 2.7 percent to 1.9 percent and among sentinel surveillance groups from 2.5 percent to 1.9 percent. HIV prevalence among tuberculosis patients was reduced from an estimated 22 percent to 12 percent. Condom use during last intercourse outside marriage increased from 27 percent to 55 percent and reached 95 percent among sex workers. Among the general population, awareness of HIV/AIDS increased to 95 percent and knowledge about transmission and prevention rose to 50 percent. Political commitment, engagement of community and religious leaders, rigorous communication, social marketing and the provision of an integrated package of medical and social services, and donor harmonization were among the key factors that contributed to the achievement of these results. Despite these impressive results in a relatively short period, Djibouti still has to address several challenges and consolidate program gains, but most importantly, funds are being mobilized from government resources to sustain the national AIDS control program.

The incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods and reduce poverty vary across countries. Even in democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents and private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in political markets that are greater in some countries than in others. This article reviews the theory and evidence on the impact on political incentives of incomplete information for voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and social polarization. The analysis has implications for policy and for reforms to improve public goods provision and reduce poverty.

2010/2011 ; Sommario Il principio di legalità nel diritto penale sembra avere subito in tempi recenti quello che può definirsi il processo di eterogenesi dei fini. Quanto più esso ha trovato riconoscimento incontestato tra gi studiosi, affannati ad espungere le fonti secondarie, tanto più la fonte primaria ha smarrito i connotati che ne conclamavano il valore: per un verso, in attuazione del principio di uguaglianza, la generalità e l'astrattezza; per un altro verso, in attuazione del principio di garanzia statuito a vantaggio dei destinatari della norma, la descrizione precisa e pregnante del fatto illecito e delle conseguenze punitive. Se ben deve riconoscersi, come insegnato già da Aristotele, che spetta alla legge determinare "tutto quanto è possibile", restringendo il campo della libertà ai giudici soprattutto "perché il giudizio del legislatore non è particolare, ma riguarda il futuro e l'universale, mentre il componente dell'assemblea e il giudice giocano ogni volta su casi presenti e determinati", incorrendo così il rischio per "amicizia, odio o utilità particolare di non vedere sufficientemente la verità, ma il piacere o il dispiacere personale", allora è evidente come e quanto la fonte legislativa tenda attualmente a distaccarsi dai suoi fondamenti. Da un lato, la perdita di autorevolezza del legislatore determina un calo generalizzato della fiducia nella legge, vista come incapace di risolvere i nodi cruciali del diritto penale; dall'altro la giurisprudenza, "approfittando" di tale situazione, tende ad affermare la sua autorità mediante la correzione in via interpretativa dei supposti errori e delle lacune dei prodotti legislativi. Questi fattori determinano dubbi in ordine al valore oggi da attribuire alla legge, la cui supremazia dovrebbe derivare, non solo formalmente dall'organo rappresentativo che la emana, ma anche sostanzialmente da alcune peculiarità che dovrebbero caratterizzarla, quali generalità, astrattezza, stabilità, determinatezza, precisione, chiarezza, imperatività e razionalità. Tutte caratteristiche queste che sono state viste consuetamente come dirette a realizzare i valori di libertà, uguaglianza e sicurezza collettiva, di cui lo Stato si è fatto garante assoluto. Inoltre, la diluizione formale e sostanziale della sovranità, determinata, sul piano esterno, dalla moltiplicazione dei vincoli internazionali e comunitari e, su quello interno, dalla tendenza a sostituire, a livello di tecnica di regolazione giuridica, il precetto autoritario col metodo della negoziazione e del bilanciamento degli interessi dei rappresentanti dei poteri socialmente forti, solleva ulteriori perplessità sulla validità del principio di stretta legalità nel campo penale. Da non dimenticare, poi, come l'erosione del dogma, sempre alla base della legalità, della rigida sottoposizione del giudice alla legge, abbia favorito l'accrescersi dello spazio interpretativo lasciato alla giurisdizione. Procedendo con ordine, occorre subito rammentare che il senso più pregnante della garanzia apprestata dalla riserva di legge, come garantita dall'art. 25 Cost., nei confronti del c.d. potere punitivo non è solo quello della possibilità data all'individuo di regolare il proprio comportamento su una previa regola generale e astratta, ma è anche e soprattutto quello derivante dalla democraticità, che appunto individua nel procedimento legislativo il migliore sistema con cui prendere decisioni politiche. La crisi della riserva di legge consegue ad una crescente incapacità della stessa di dispiegare il suo ruolo di garanzia su entrambi i piani. Tralasciando i contorni davvero fittizi che ha assunto la garanzia della libertà di autodeterminazione offerta dalla legge al cittadino, ciò che qui rileva è la qualità della legge e della legislazione, pregiudicata dalla produzione quantitativamente inflazionistica e qualitativamente sciatta da rendere nulla più che una finzione la possibilità per il cittadino di orientare il proprio comportamento sulla base di una norma sufficientemente chiara. Ma l'aspetto che più preme è quello della garanzia recata della legge in ragione della sua democraticità, definibile come contenutistica. Su questo piano tre paiono le linee di caduta della legalità: la perdita di consistenza dello stesso principio democratico tradizionale; la trasformazione del sistema delle fonti e la loro proliferazione a scapito della legge; l'alterazione dell'originario equilibrio tra la legge e il potere giudiziario. Quanto al primo aspetto ci si interroga su quali siano i reali vettori che conducono la volontà popolare a trovare espressione nella legge, se i meccanismi della rappresentanza parlamentare o non, piuttosto, le interpretazioni che di tale volontà forniscono le concentrazioni massmediatiche e più in generale i potenti gruppi economici con la loro attività lobbistica; nel campo penale poi il carattere spesso emotivamente coinvolgente delle materie oggetto di disciplina penale finisce per accrescere il ruolo dei mass media nella formazione del necessario consenso sociale. Per quanto riguarda poi le conseguenze del passaggio al sistema maggioritario, è facile constatare come all'accentuato potere della maggioranza in sede parlamentare e governativa faccia riscontro la tendenza a protrarre il processo di formazione normativa presso gli organi di garanzia, quali Corte costituzionale e Presidente della Repubblica. Il fatto è poi che la democrazia non costituisce più l'unico asse su cui si regge il sistema istituzionale. In primo luogo si assiste al diffondersi dell'opera interpretativa dei giudici, per non parlare delle decisioni della Corte Costituzionale. Infatti, sebbene la Corte Costituzionale abbia consolidato un rigoroso self restreint quanto alle questioni di costituzionalità in malam partem, ciò non ha evitato, da parte della stessa, manipolazioni di disciplina talvolta davvero innovative e creative, con effetti favorevoli per il reo. Basti all'uopo pensare alle c.d. sentenze additive di principio, con cui la Corte dichiara l'incostituzionalità di una omissione legislativa: esse, enunciando anche il principio a cui dovrà ispirarsi il legislatore se e quando deciderà di provvedere, implicano, per un verso, forti limiti al quomodo dell'eventuale disciplina legislativa e, per altro verso, conferiscono da subito al giudice il potere-dovere di tradurre sul piano operativo il principio affermato. In secondo luogo, non è possibile non prendere d'atto che alla volontà e certezza alla base della legalità di stampo illuminista, in grado quindi di controllare previamente il conflitto di interessi, si è sostituita l'idea del diritto come strumento di governance dei plurimi interessi in gioco. Alla volontà unitaria del precetto penale si sostituiscono, più che le volontà dei giudici e delle parti chiamati a confrontarsi con la fattispecie, le valutazioni che essi opereranno per rendere la disciplina coerente con gli obiettivi strategici del sistema; dunque, governance al posto di volontà prescrittiva. Questo mutamento comporta nella pratica che alla rigidità descrittiva della fattispecie penale si sostituisca l'indicazione legislativa di parametri, criteri e obiettivi di disciplina; alla certezza della decisione giuridica, sintomo di onnipotenza del diritto, è subentrato l'equilibrio che è, invece, il risultato di un diritto che riconosce la molteplicità delle forze e la conseguente difficoltà delle scelte decisionali e per questo vi appresta degli strumenti per arrivarvi. In terzo luogo, non si può non osservare come la realtà, sempre più pervasa dalla tecnologia, abbia determinato lo spostamento del baricentro normativo dall'organo parlamentare all'apparato amministrativo, con tutta la fioritura di autorità indipendenti e organi tecnici dotati di specifiche competenze comprensive di poteri normativi. Quanto al secondo piano del discorso attinente alle fonti, si può osservare come la maggior parte degli atti parlamentari aventi un contenuto provvedimentale sono quelli elaborati all'esterno attraverso la c.d. contrattualizzazione del processo di formazione della decisione normativa, mentre le poche leggi di principio spesso assumono valore simbolico o si limitano a comporre il conflitto ideologico che sta alla loro base solo grazie a formulazioni ambigue e indeterminate, tali cioè da esprimere solo in apparenza una volontà parlamentare, rimettendo, nella realtà, la decisione agli organi dell'applicazione. Ma ciò che segna la crisi della legge penale è, come noto, l'incremento delle fonti primarie di origine governativa: dopo l'alt dato dalla Corte Costituzionale all'abuso del decreto legge, si è aperta la stagione del decreto delegato. I requisiti costituzionali della delegazione legislativa hanno subito un progressivo allentamento nella prassi, ma è soprattutto con l'invenzione dei decreti delegati correttivi che si è ottenuto il risultato di un prolungamento della delega che tende a stabilizzare nel Governo il potere di normazione primaria. In questo quadro si inserisce anche il procedimento di attuazione delle direttive comunitarie, affidato appunto ad un meccanismo che fa congiuntamente ricorso alla delegazione legislativa e alla delegificazione. In ogni caso, data la quantità di direttive che ormai condizionano la fisionomia attuale dell'ordinamento, ne risulta per questa via potenziato il ruolo delle fonti primarie di origine governativa. Naturalmente si potrebbe osservare, non senza fondamento, che la crisi della legge riguarda l'ordinamento nel suo complesso, mentre il diritto penale dovrebbe esserne immune stante la riserva di legge costituzionalmente sancita in materia. Ma è altrettanto vero che il diritto penale non può ritenersi avulso dalla realtà, condividendo, in misura maggiore o minore, le sorti dell'intero ordinamento, sollecitato com'è, anch'esso, ad aprirsi al pluralismo delle fonti da fattori sia interni che esterni. Invero, se il quadro sopra descritto concerne i fattori interni della crisi del principio della riserva di legge, non si può fare a meno di notare come elementi di minaccia promanino anche dall'esterno; all'uopo occorre distinguere tra diritto comunitario e quello internazionale. Nello scenario mondiale domina ancora lo strumento convenzionale, il quale fa salva la sovranità nazionale e il ruolo del Parlamento, chiamato ad autorizzare la ratifica delle sempre più numerose convenzioni internazionali multilaterali. Tuttavia la libertà dell'organo parlamentare appare piuttosto limitata: da un lato, le convenzioni concernenti la materia penale paiono sempre più dettagliate, perché si spingono non solo a formulare modelli minuziosi di fattispecie ma, non di rado, vincolano gli Stati anche a livello del trattamento sanzionatorio; dall'altro, l'oggetto di tali atti normativi è sempre più spesso tale da imporre obblighi sempre più difficilmente eludibili dagli Stati. Si assiste pertanto ad un fenomeno di grande interesse sul piano delle fonti, caratterizzato dalla riduzione del margine di discrezionalità del legislatore nazionale di fronte ad atti convenzionali e di fatto cogenti, i quali per un verso traggono origine da organi privi di legittimazione democratica e per altro verso si rivelano dotati di una particolare autorevolezza derivante da una legittimazione fattuale fondata sulla capacità di soddisfare bisogni di tutela ovunque condivisi. Passando all'ordinamento comunitario si assiste, oltre al già menzionato meccanismo di recepimento predisposto dalla legge comunitaria annuale, sia all'estensione della competenza penale dell'Unione europea ad opera del Trattato di Lisbona, che al sempre più ampio ricorso a direttive, a loro volta sempre più stringenti e dettagliate, anche riguardo al profilo sanzionatorio, così che anche qui il ruolo della volontà parlamentare nella produzione del diritto penale risulta ridotta. Il descritto stato di crisi del principio di legalità è costretto, altresì, a fare i conti con il diffondersi, nel nostro ordinamento, di un nuovo fenomeno di natura esogena: il (o anche la) soft law, locuzione traducibile in italiano come diritto leggero, ovvero morbido, ovvero soffice, ovvero attenuato. Con tale espressione si intende far riferimento ad una moltitudine variegata di atti latu sensu normativi, accomunati dall'assenza del requisito della forza cogente, che, appunto, sembrava essere l'essenza della nozione di norma giuridica. Alla luce di tale definizione risulta allora evidente come affrontare la tematica della soft law significhi affrontare un paradosso. Innanzitutto perché all'interno di tale categoria vengono ricompresi una congerie di atti che, seppur privi di efficacia obbligatoria, dispiegano comunque degli effetti giuridici. Secondariamente, ma non certo per importanza, tale ambiguità emerge, con immediatezza dall'accostamento dell'aggettivo soft al termine law: il diritto è, infatti, per tradizione considerato hard, ossia obbligatorio. Secondo l'impostazione maggioritaria, infatti, un soft law privo di effetti legali non è law, laddove un soft law fornito di essi è sicuramente hard law. Nonostante tale posizione tradizionale prevalente, alcuni studiosi, a partire dagli anni Settanta del secolo scorso hanno cominciato, nell'ambito del diritto internazionale, a prospettare la possibilità di immaginare l'esistenza di un tertium genus di fonte di produzione del diritto, nascente in risposta alla complessità giuridica della globalizzazione. Lo sviluppo del diritto soffice testimonierebbe, in tal senso, la possibilità di ingresso nel circuito della giuridicità di soggetti nuovi, non sempre formalmente titolari delle competenze necessarie per produrre un diritto "a denominazione di origine controllata". Ciò implica anche la creazione di un circuito giuridico che attiva logiche e processi che superano il criterio essenziale dell'obbedienza. In pratica, non si tratta solo di un percorso di perdita del carattere verticale del diritto, ma anche in un certo senso di un rimodellamento del suo criterio di legittimazione, che non è più affidato alla forma, ma piuttosto ad un contenuto o a delle modalità che sappiano riscuotere l'adesione dei destinatari, indipendentemente dalla previsione di sanzioni. Alla luce delle descritte peculiarità della normativa attenuata, tutto il sistema penale, hard law per eccellenza, sembra muoversi in una direzione antitetica a quella della soft law. In particolare, questa antinomia si appalesa in tutta la sua chiarezza ove si mettano a confronto alcune caratteristiche fondamentali delle due normative: se l'unico organo di produzione abilitato in campo penale è, ai sensi dell'art. 25 Cost., il Parlamento, in quello attenuato gli enti legittimati sono plurimi e non sono solo statali, substatali o sovranazionali, ma anche espressivi di poteri non necessariamente a carattere territoriale; mentre le norme soffici possono anche limitarsi a porre degli obiettivi, quelle penali devono essere formulate quanto più possibile in modo chiaro e preciso, indicando inequivocabilmente i comportamenti vietati; laddove i destinatari delle norme attenuate coincidono spesso con i soggetti produttori delle stesse e si indirizzano solitamente a categorie ben individuate di soggetti, le norme penali generalmente si rivolgono in maniera indifferenziata a tutti gli individui presenti sul territorio statale; se il diritto debole costituisce un diritto meramente esortativo, diretto a persuadere più che ad obbligare, risultando pertanto privo di sanzioni, all'opposto il diritto penale è il ramo dell'ordinamento giuridico più di ogni altro vincolante; la normativa leggera prescinde dal tradizionale modello delle fonti kelseniano di tipo piramidale, su cui il sistema penale si fonda, per collocarsi all'interno di un modello improntato ad una logica reticolare, senza gerarchie; la soft law è per definizione destinata ad operare in ogni ambito, da quello angusto di una singola impresa a quello sconfinato del mercato globale, mentre il diritto penale è la branca meno universalizzabile, perché simbolizza la sovranità nazionale e la cultura di ciascun popolo; infine, se il diritto penale si caratterizza per un elevato tasso di rigidità e stabilità, dati i beni giuridici che va a tutelare, all'opposto il diritto morbido si esprime con strumenti non solo flessibili, ma anche mutevoli, per meglio rispondere alla rapida evoluzione della società. Tale insanabile antinomia tra diritto soffice e diritto penale pare però, ad un'attenta analisi del panorama giuridico attuale, più astratta che reale, ove solo si consideri quanto detto in apertura sulla crisi dei principi di legalità e della riserva di legge e sulla progressiva alterazione di alcuni tratti peculiari del diritto penale. ; XXIV Ciclo ; 1984

The subject of this study – The Youth in Croatia and the European Integration – is the relationship of youth toward the European integration process, including the Croatian accession to the European Union, as well as their sociopolitical readiness for integration into a united Europe. The analysis is based on a section of data gathered in early 2004, on the entire Croatian territory, and conducted within the scientific and research project Youth and the European Integration Process. The basic sample of youth, aged 15 to 29, consisted of 2000 examinees, and the control sample of persons older than 30 consisted of 1000 examinees. The obtained findings on youth have been systematically compared to results from the previous research project, The Value System of Youth and Social Changes in Croatia, conducted in early 1999, on an identically structured sample of 1700 young examinees. Data on Croatian youth has also been compared to the corresponding findings of several European researches. European integration is a dynamic and multidimensional process, and in this research, the accent was on the political and normative dimensions of integration. The genesis of the political development of European Union has indicated that, in spite of the oscillations in the process of integration, there is a recognizable progress toward the construction of a Europe of values, where all the included countries meet with equally high democratic demands. The existing research into the European integration process has undoubtedly shown that the relationship of citizens toward the EU varies as a function of time, and depends on the specific situation in certain countries or societies. Croatia is a transitional country that has stepped into the process of democratic consolidation, and after the year 2000, it had also stepped out of a certain kind of international isolation. Today, Croatia is a country trying to join the united Europe, which has managed to obtain the status of a candidate country for accession into the EU, albeit with an uncertain date for accession negotiations. Even though the main obstacle for the start of negotiations is supposedly the lack of satisfaction of the EU with the Croatian cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, the existing tendencies and events in the country indicate that Croatia is not adequately prepared to join the Union: not at the political, nor the social, and especially not at the economic plain. The indicated findings are also the starting points in the research of the relationship of Croatian youth toward the European integration process. A valid analysis of this relationship demands a previous insight into some aspects of the political readiness of youth for European integration of Croatia. With that in mind, special attention was dedicated to political values, attitudes and participation of youth, whose longitudinal monitoring enables a detection of changes that took place during the past five years. The data comparison showed that during the observed period of time, the young people' s otherwise relatively high acceptance of almost all the constitutional values, as well as the harmonious perception of politics and institutional trust have increased, while the lack of hard work, discipline and responsibility are now perceived as a social problem to a greater extent than before. The recent data also indicates that today' s youth perceive the existence of educational, gender and age inequalities in the Croatian society to a larger degree, as well as the worsening of political representation of all marginal groups. On the other hand, the understanding of conflicts and democratic rules (especially the role of the opposition) has weakened, the perception of crime in ownership conversion and privatization as a problem has decreased, there is also a weaker perception of the existence of social and religious inequalities, the social activism and political participation have decreased, and the attitude about inclusion into youth organizations of political parties and the establishment of independent youth parties as forms of activities that might contribute to a more active participation of youth in the society has decreased. From hence comes the conclusion that certain changes tend to lead to further social, most of all political, (self)passivization and marginalization of young people. The continuity of tendencies established in the previous research projects, confirm the finding that the young are not a monolithic group when it comes to acceptance of political values, expression of political attitudes and the level of political participation. The greatest differentiation is present regarding the not so present tolerance toward most observed social phenomena and groups, the perception of unemployment as the most important social problem and the cause of existing difficulties, the perception of existence of political inequalities and the stated interest in politics, as well as the perception of the role of the " diaspora" in the Croatian political life. When these results are observed integrally, it is obvious that the young are mostly differentiated by the level of obtained knowledge and their socio-professional status, then party identification, social origin and the phase of maturity. All the mentioned differentiations of youth can simply be summarized by outlining two large, relatively polarized groups: one consists of socially more competent youth, inclined to the ideological and political options of the left center, and the other consists of a socially inferior youth, inclined toward the right pole of the ideological-political spectrum. The socially more competent youth is more liberal, more critical toward the social reality and the political actors, they manifest a greater respect for democratic institutions and procedures, which is an indicator of the importance of favorable circumstances in the process of political socialization. The recent data enabled us to establish the existence of inter-generational differences, which are not enormous but are significant. The comparative analysis of the attitudes of both the young and the older examinees, demonstrated that the young state a higher degree of trust in the media than the older examinees, that they are more tolerant toward a number of social phenomena and groups, which cause dispute both in the Croatian and the European public opinion arena, as well as more sensitive regarding ethnic inequalities. The young perceive war as the main cause of current difficulties to a greater extent than the elders, they have considerably more trust in their own generation as a social force that could initiate positive trends, they express a greater readiness for inclusion in different civil society activities, and believe more that television and youth organizations could mobilize them into active participation in social affairs. At the same time, the young are slower than the older examinees to accept the value of a democratic order, however, they are also less prone to have a harmonious understanding of politics, they are less socially sensitive, they express less trust in the institutions of power, the socioeconomic goals and the preservation of tradition are less often among their political priorities, they less often think immorality and criminal activities in the privatization process are the cause of current problems, they perceive a smaller level of corruption in all areas of social life (aside from education), they believe less in the positive contribution of experts and entrepreneurs to overcoming the trends of crisis, they are less interested in politics and participate less in political parties, and they have a smaller level of faith in the mobilization role of education for democracy, volunteer work, political parties and non-governmental organizations, as well as the contribution of the family and education system in the stimulation of the young people' s social engagement. The established inter-generational differentiation can be explained through the life cycle theory, meaning the mentioned differences are mostly the effect of differing social statuses and the complete experiences of the young and the older examinees. That means that most young people have not assumed some of the permanent social roles, and that their immediate experiences are limited only to some social areas among which politics do not have a prominent place. The existing inter-generational differences are also the result of the fact that most older examinees draw on their experience gained in a different social and political regime, which to a certain measure forms their existing system of political values that is, in certain elements, especially those related to the social dimension, different than the youth' s system of political values. On the other hand, the congruence of the young and older examinees is contributed to by a common experience of an era, that is, life in a specific socio-historic period. The absence of deep inter-generational ambiguities also indicates that, in spite of the radical changes that have appeared through the decomposition of the old and the set-up of a new social and political order, the mechanism for transposing political values from the older generations to the young ones, functions to a considerable degree, along with the transfer of the shortcomings that exist in the structured political awareness of the older generation. Even though it was established that the youth in Croatia accept the traditional values to a smaller degree compared to the elders, the young are at the same time somewhat more conservative in certain areas than their European counterparts. Pointing to this finding is the greater orientation of the Croatian youth toward the family and a smaller extent of tolerance of certain phenomena and groups in the contemporary society. At that, the social participation of the Croatian young generation is at a lower level than the participation of their European peers. The attitude toward human rights is also one of the indicators of political preparedness of Croatian youth for integration into a democratic Europe, which promotes high standards in the protection of human rights and freedoms. The research results about the evaluation of individual human rights and freedoms, show that the youth accept the right to an education, the right to work and personal security, the right to privacy, the social protection of the elderly and those in other precarious situations, the equality before the law, the rights of women and the right to ownership the most. The analysis has shown that the preference of individual human rights and freedoms is not caused by the observed socio-demographic and socio-structural characteristics of the young, aside from education, which points to the significance of the education system as an agent of improvement of the state of human rights. Approximately a third of the young examinees were not satisfied with the respect for human rights in Croatia today nor were they satisfied five years ago, the percentage of the undecided has decreased in that period of time, and the number of those that think human rights in Croatia are mostly or completely respected has increased. The results of the analysis of social attributes of youth indicate that the ability of assessment and a higher degree of criticism toward the status of human rights in Croatia is related to life in economically more prosperous regions, a left ideological-political orientation as well as the female gender. The comparison of the evaluation of the contribution of institutions, organizations and significant individuals in the population of youth in 1999 and in 2004, established that the generation of youth today perceives a higher level of contribution of all observed participants (except for the opposition) to the protection of human rights and freedoms in Croatia. More precisely, most of the young assess that all the participants, completely or mostly, contribute to the realization of human rights in Croatia, which especially refers to the perception of the contribution of the highest institutions of power. The perception of the status of human rights in Croatia and the contribution of the observed actors to the realization of those rights, are considerably highly influenced by regional affiliation and party identification, followed by their social background, their gender and the religious self-identification of the young. The comparison of acceptance of the observed human rights and freedoms of the populations of young and older examinees in Croatia, indicates that the elders accept most individual human rights and freedoms more than the young, and that they also express less criticism toward today' s respect for those rights and freedoms in Croatia, while validating the contribution of all the observed actors to a higher degree. To summarize, the analysis has shown that the young accept human rights and freedoms very highly at the level of principle, but that there is a certain disagreement when it comes to concrete rights and practices in Croatia. Even though the degree of acceptance of the value of human rights and freedoms is high among the young, there are also deviations indicating an increased need for additional engagement of certain agents of socialization, especially the education system and the political actors. The national affiliation of youth is another indicator relevant to its relationship toward the European integration. The research has shown that the attitude most represented with the youth is one of moderate national identification, then the ones signifying an openness toward the world, while ethno-centric statements are at the back of the obtained hierarchy. The attitude that had demonstrated the highest representation of national identification is for the first time at the top of the rank in all our research projects, just as it is evident that nationally tinted attitudes, both moderate and extreme, are more represented now than in 1986 or in 1999. Such an increase of the national affiliation of the young can be interpreted by the fact that there is more emphasis on existential problems and that there is a higher uncertainty regarding the future, then the increase of differences between the rich and the poor, as well as a smaller degree of trust in the political leadership. The immediate confrontation with this type of social instability, results in a search for safer modes of relationships with other people, the society as a whole and some of its parts, where the nation represents one of the safe havens, much like family and church. However, it is necessary to emphasize that the attitudes of openness toward the world are quite stabile, and that they are often complementary instead of being opposite to attitudes of national identification. At the same time, this points to the complexity of the problem of national affiliation and the fact that it does not have to be exclusive, but can actually coexist with attitudes that enhance the process of European association. Regarding their national affiliation the young are, of course, not homogenous. The results of the analysis have shown that the nationally oriented youth is significantly more religious than the others, they prefer the conservative parties, live in Dalmatia, Central and Eastern Croatia, they originate more often from rural areas and families, where the father has a lower degree of education, they personally have a lower level of education and, within the youth sample, they belong to the youngest age cohort (age 15 to 19), and the groups of pupils and the unemployed. On the other hand, a significantly lower national affiliation is expressed by youth coming from the Istrian, Zagreb and Northern Croatia provenience, those indecisive about religion or atheists, youth of urban background and a higher family and personal education status. However, regarding cosmopolitism, the young demonstrate significantly more homogenous results. It is especially indicative that the more ethno-centric examinees and, to a smaller degree, those with a pronounced national identification, more often have a negative perception of the European Union, while the nationally more exclusive examinees refuse to even support the accession of Croatia into the European Union. The examination of the social (ethnic) distance toward certain nations has demonstrated that the young have put members of the former Yugoslav federation and Russians at the back of the scale, while, with an under-average evaluation, the center of the scale is occupied by members of certain Central and Eastern European nations (the Czech and the Hungarian). Inhabitants of the European Western and Southwestern territories, especially the Italians, which occupy the first position after form the Croats, and the Germans, demonstrate satisfactory results just by being evaluated by average grades. However, the degree of social closeness that the young citizens of Croatia feel toward other Croatian men and women, indicates a certain dose of self-criticism, because approximately one third of the young do not feel an especially high level of affinity toward, for the most part, their own nationals. The older examinees differ from the young in that they more pronouncedly represent attitudes at the center of the national affiliation scale, as well as indicate a higher ethnical distance on average. However, the fact is that, in spite of the existence of inter-generational differences when it comes to national affiliation where the older examinees dominate, there are also inter-generational differences that indicate a better position of the youngest examinees in our sample (aged 15 to 19). This phenomenon has already been described in literature by the so-called U-curve, which vividly illustrates a higher national affiliation of individuals at their earlier and later periods of life. Thus, the greater national affiliation, on the one hand, seems to appear as an expression of an adolescent transitional crisis, and on the other, as a consequence of a long-term perseverance of the perception and production of (most probably) negative experiences with a specific out-group. The relationship of the examinees toward the European integration and the European Union has been investigated via numerous indicators, where the emphasis was on the perception of the possible consequences of Croatian accession to the EU. However, other aspects of the relationship toward Europe and the EU have been the object of research, presenting a wider context for understanding the perception of consequences of joining the Union. The obtained results demonstrated that most of the young and of the older examinees in Croatia actually had a neutral image of the EU, even though those with a positive image exceed those that perceive the EU negatively. Actually, nine tenths of the examinees have in the beginning of 2004, supported the Croatian integration into the Union, but among those examinees, there is a highest number of euro-skeptics, that is, those that believe that too much is expected from the accession. At the same time, there were considerably less euro-enthusiasts (those that expect all-around benefits from the integration) and euro-realists (who believe that integration is inevitable for the survival of small countries). As for the difficulties standing in the way of the Croatian road to a united Europe, the examinees had equally addressed them to both Croatia and the European Union, however, the number of young emphasizing the accountability of the EU has increased from 1999 to 2004, and the number of those accenting Croatia' s responsibility has, in the same period of time, decreased. The finding that the young expect significantly more positive than negative consequences after the Croatian accession into the European Union, is especially important. However, in this regard, there has been a mild decrease in the expectation of the positive, and an increase of the negative consequences among the young during the last five years. The highest positive expectations have been registered at the individual and the socio-cultural planes, while the optimism regarding the socio-economic progress has decreased. Indeed, the lack of socio-economic preparedness of Croatia for the entrance into the developed European surrounding is expected to yield the most negative consequences. The research of the expected development of the EU in the coming ten years, has shown that only the possibility of easier travel, work, study and life in Europe is expected by most of the examinees, especially the young ones. The young are quite fearful of the costs Croatia might have from the integration and of the worsening position of the agricultural population. The negative conesquences expecting their own country are, however, less perceived by the youth in Croatia, than by their counterparts in Europe. Related to the fears from the construction of a united Europe and European Union, we have established that the youth in Croatia is most afraid of the abolition of the Croatian currency and the increase of crime, and its smallest fear has to do with the potential loss of social privileges. The fears of examinees in the enlarged Europe are somewhat different – the most expressed fear is that of labor transfer into other countries, the increase of crime and drug trade, the difficulties expecting the farmers and the price their country has to pay due to the development of the EU. Both the young and the old examinees in Croatia are less worried about the loss of national identity, language and their social privileges than the European examinees. All our examinees emphasize the multiple benefits of the EU enlargement, followed by the positive effects of that enlargement for Croatia, while the efforts of the Croatian government, regarding the accession to the Union, are valued quite poorly. The potential accession of Croatia into the European Union shall also signify a change in the decision-making process, meaning that some of those decisions will be reached at the national level, and some jointly with the EU. Our examinees have, in this regard, demonstrated a high level of readiness for integration, because more than half of them believes that four fifths of the observed areas should be the object of joint decision-making by the EU and Croatia. The only areas in which, in the opinion of the young examinees, Croatia should decide autonomously are the acceptance of refugees, the judiciary, culture, agriculture, fisheries and the police. The Europeans differ in their opinions on these issues from the Croats, and believe two thirds of the observed affairs should be decided on jointly by their country and the EU, while their country should be autonomous in deciding about education, basic rules about the media, health and social care and unemployment. Different social groups have, based on the perception of youth, been grouped into potential losers of the integration (farmers, the retired, workers, the unemployed), potential winners of the integration process (such as the inhabitants of the capital and certain regions, the young, as well as the Croatian population as a whole), and certain winners of the process of integration, which are also the best prepared for Croatian accession into the EU (experts, foreign language speakers, the political elite, managers, large companies). Actually, it was shown that the young consider the social groups which are in a relatively better position in the Croatian society today to be the greatest winners of EU integration, and those whose current status is unenviable, who are in the greatest need of a better future, were perceived as those that will potentially gain the least. The only encouraging fact is that the young are seeing themselves as the potential winners, meaning they believe the existing abilities and potentials of the young generation only need optimal circumstances in order to reach their peak. However, the data about the knowledge of foreign languages in Croatia are not very exhilarating, especially compared to the knowledge of foreign languages of the youth in the European Union countries. Within this research, we have also found that approximately three quarters of our examinees are proud of being Croatian citizens, while around half of the young, and somewhat less of the elders are proud to be European. The young are the ones to be more critical toward their national identity, and at the same time they lead in the positive validation of their European identity. However, the most interesting finding concerns the fact that all the Croatian examinees feel less national pride than the inhabitants of the European Union, while it is understandable that the examinees in the EU emphasize their pride of being European more. The answers of the examinees regarding the question about the contents of the concept " being a citizen of the European Union" indicate that neither the young, nor the older examinees posses a coherent understanding of the EU citizenship. Still, the right to work, live and study in any EU member, represents the key element for the understanding of EU citizenship, both with the young people in Croatia and with the youth in the Union. The young and the older Croatian examinees believe that active suffrage is the least important, regardless of whether the elections in question include the European Parliament, the national or the local representative bodies. Only one out of four Croatian examinees believes the Croatian membership in the EU might benefit them personally, while almost half of all the young and a third of the older examinees do not posses a defined opinion on this issue. It is clear that this feeling is closely related to the question of the personal meaning the European Union holds for the examinees, where neither the young nor the elders have a homogenous perception of the meaning of the EU. A single response appeared in an above-average number of cases – the EU is a way of creating a better future for the young – while the claim that the EU signifies a sort of " European government" , superimposed to the national states which are members of the Union, received a small level of support. Unlike that, the young from the Union countries emphasize the freedom of movement most often, while in time, the very concept of " European government" became more pronounced in the attitudes of the European youth. The young people in Croatia, as well as in the EU, express an equally small level of fear of the euro-bureaucracy, the loss of cultural diversity and the utopian idea of Europe. Considering the readiness of the young to live outside of Croatian borders, we have found that almost two fifths of them would like to live (and work and study) abroad for a while, while a quarter of the Croatian youth would like to leave the country forever. The older examinees, on the other hand, demonstrate a higher level of conservativeness toward the possible departure of their children into one of the countries of the Union, but they are, however, ready to accept their possible studying and training in the EU, while only one out of seven examinees would like his/her children to permanently live or spend their entire working life in one of the countries, which are members of the European Union. The analysis of the differentiation of the young in their relationship toward the European integration and the EU, has indicated that the used social characteristics have a limited influence. In other words, the young are relatively homogenous in their perception of a united Europe and the expectations from the Croatian accession to the European Union. However, certain differences do exist, and they are mostly caused by party identification, socio-professional status, regional affiliation and religious self-identification. This means that the most influential attributes, when it comes to attitudes toward the European integration process, are the ones consisting of ideological-political attitudes and the current social status along with the specifics of the wider environment. Thus, we have found that the sympathizers of parties that belong to the left center, then pupils and students, the inhabitants of the more developed regions and the non-religious examinees are more inclined toward the EU and the integration process, and at that, they emphasize the positive consequences and the potential gains from the Croatian accession into the Union, more than they express their concerns with the negative consequences. Hence, the concise conclusion would be that the greater social competence of the young is reflected in the establishment of a stable and more consistent pro-European orientation. Otherwise, the young differ from their older counterparts in their higher expectance of positive effects from the Croatian integration into the EU and, at the same time, in the lower perception of expected problems and undesirable consequences. Considering information sources and the level of information of the young in Croatia, the results show that the young follow the news in all the media outlets relatively often, but that they do lag behind the older examinees, and the examinees coming from the former EU candidate countries. This finding does not apply only to the use of the Internet as a source of information, where the young people are far superior to the older examinees. With that in mind, it is interesting that the young differ the most among each other, in the use of Internet and the reading of daily newspapers, where the socially more qualified young examinees (the more educated, coming from an urban environment and richer regions and averagely older ones) are the ones that use both media for obtaining information more often. As for the contents the examinees look for in the media, it is visible that the young are much more interested in events from the social and cultural life, and much less in issues related to politics. A comparison with the examinees from 13 countries that were EU candidates, demonstrated that they are far more interested in all the contents (aside from sports) than the Croatian examinees. Regarding the assessment of their own level of information about the EU, somewhat more than half of the young have stated that they are well informed about the European Union and events in it, compared to two thirds of the older examinees believing they are well informed. On the other hand, the results of both the young and the older examinees are surprisingly high, compared to the data on the level of information of the inhabitants in the 25 countries of the European Union, where three quarters of the examinees thought they were poorly informed about the issue. Closely related to the question of the level of information about the European Union itself, is the question about the general level of information about the Croatian accession to that association. The results demonstrate a somewhat different trend than the previous finding. In this case, less than half of the young consider themselves to be well informed about the process. It is interesting that the identically gathered data on this issue, from the former EU candidate countries, yielded a much lower evaluation by the examinees on their own level of information. Regarding issues and problems related to the EU that the examinees would like more information on, we have established that both the youth in Croatia and the examinees from the former EU candidate countries, find issues related to the Union' s policy on youth and education to be the most interesting, followed by the economy and social policy. Along with that, the issues regarding the enlargement of the EU, the cultural policy, the international relations, the regional policy and the EU budget are the ones the young find to be the least interesting. The manner in which the examinees gather information on the European Union mostly include the mass media outlets (the press, the television and the radio), and only then other forms of information gathering, such as discussions with their families and friends, surfing the Internet, specialized books and other published material, and the activities of non-governmental organizations. There are no significant differences in the use of the stated sources of information between the young and the older examinees, except in the case of the Internet. Considering the examinees from the 25 EU member countries, they use all of the observed sources as a way of getting information about the European Union, its policies and institutions, in a smaller amount. The examination of the objective knowledge of the examinees on specific issues related to the European Union has yielded devastating results. Thus, when asked about the phase Croatia was in, regarding the accession process into the EU, at the moment the research was being conducted, the correct answer was given by only a third of both the young and the older examinees. The second question asked, dealt with the familiarity of certain institutions of the European Union. The young and the older examinees do not differ very much from each other regarding their knowledge of this issue: the most familiar institution to both of them is the European Parliament, followed by the European Commission, then the EU Council of Ministers, then the European Central Bank, while all the other institutions were familiar to less than two fifths of the Croatian examinees. The examined citizens of the European Union are, understandably, more familiar with each of the observed institutions. The social attributes of the young, causing the greatest differences regarding their level of information, are mostly the ones connected to their level of socio-cultural qualifications (the socio-professional status and the level of education), followed by gender, and then provenience, regional affiliation and the age of the examinees. The highest level of information and knowledge belongs to men from the oldest age cohort of youth, those born and living in large cities, the inhabitants of the most developed regions, students and the employed examinees, as well as those with a higher education degree, the non-religious and examinees preferring liberal and left-wing parties. Along with all that, it is important to stress that a better level of knowledge and information about the European Union, its policies, institutions and enlargement process, correlates to positive attitudes about the different aspects of the European Union (the image of the EU, the following of issues related to it, the support for the Croatian accession to the Union, and so on), which, most probably, means that they are mutually determined. The inter-generational comparison has, on the other hand, indicated that the older examinees are more interested in most issues appearing in the media, especially politics, and that they assess their level of information to be better than do the young examinees. To put it shortly, the results of the research on the information level and knowledge of the Croatian citizens – both young and old – about the European Union, have indicated that they are not that interested in the European Union issues, as much as their level of presence in the media and the political agenda might imply, and the examinee' s knowledge about the relationship of Croatia and the EU is at an even lower level. Henceforth, it is necessary to conduct a strong and comprehensive public campaign directed precisely at the increase of the level of information and knowledge of the citizens about the European Union and what it represents, so that when the issue comes to the agenda, the Croatian inhabitants might make an educated decision about their country' s accession to that community of European states. The research results presented above may be summarized into a number of tendencies and statements of a wider nature. The political culture of the young testifies, in a number of aspects, to an approximation to the desirable democratic standards – especially regarding the acceptance of basic liberal-democratic values and the readiness for social engagement, at lease in principle – however, their social power and social capital are at a low level. At that, the young are aware of their own social and political marginalization, and recognize an entire plethora of measures that might help them gain a certain measure of power and become active citizens, as is desirable in a democratic society, but they do not use sufficiently the channels of social and political promotion, which are at their disposal. Today' s generation of youth expresses a lower level of social sensitivity and is more oriented toward individual efforts and family resources in the realization of life goals. At that, it seems that the young are not aware of the fact that an unequal access to existing social resources of the young generation today will have generated an unequal social status when they come of age. Hence, we can expect a widening and deepening of the process of social decomposition, that should be corrected through mechanisms that are supposed to ensure the highest possible equality of chances in the access to social resources (most of all, education). What we mean to say is that human capital is what Croatia, as a small and an insufficiently developed country, should deal with very thoughtfully. This, at the same time, signifies a maximum of investment into the development of human potentials, where the young generation certainly comes first. The inter-generational differences regarding the readiness of Croatia for accession into the European Union, and the relationship toward the European integration, are not of such a type and scale that there could be any mention of a generational gap, however, they are indicative. The most visible fact is that the young have demonstrated a more liberal, tolerant and flexible disposition, that they have a higher belief in the potentials of their own generation, and that they are consistent in their pro-European orientation, where they see their own generation as one of the certain winners of the Croatian accession into a united Europe. These trends suggest that the potentials of the young are a resource to be seriously reckoned with on the Croatian road into the EU. The process of the Croatian accession into the European Union is linked to different difficulties that affect the attitudes of citizens about the importance of Croatian entrance into the EU. Through this research, we have clearly detected that, unlike the Croatian political elite, both the young and the older citizens do not consider the Croatian integration into EU, to be the most important political goal. The political priorities of the citizens seem to be quite different, and their support to the project of European integration is weakening. It is, then, realistic to expect this trend to continue if the problematic events in the European Union persist, just as the difficulties in the relationship of Croatia and the EU, as well as the unfavorable economic and social trends in Croatia itself. This is why there are two equally important political tasks facing the ruling political elite: the initiation of the development of Croatia and an well-argumented explanation to the Croatian citizens why the country' s integration in the united Europe is purposeful.

The module was administered as a post-election interview. The resulting data are provided along with voting, demographic, district and macro variables in a single dataset. CSES Variable List The list of variables is being provided on the CSES Website to help in understanding what content is available from CSES, and to compare the content available in each module. Themes: MICRO-LEVEL DATA: Identification and study administration variables: weighting factors; election type; date of election 1st and 2nd round; study timing (post-election study, pre-election and post-election study, between rounds of majoritarian election); mode of interview; gender of interviewer; date questionnaire administered; primary electoral district of respondent; number of days the interview was conducted after the election; language of questionnaire. Demography: year and month of birth; gender; education; marital status; union membership; union membership of others in household; business association membership, farmers´ association membership; professional association membership; current employment status; main occupation; socio economic status; employment type - public or private; industrial sector; current employment status, occupation, socio economic status, employment type - public or private, and industrial sector of spouse; household income; number of persons in household; number of children in household under the age of 18; number of children in household under the age of 6; attendance at religious services; religiosity; religious denomination; language usually spoken at home; region of residence; race; ethnicity; rural or urban residence; primary electoral district; country of birth; year arrived in current country. Survey variables: perception of public expenditure on health, education, unemployment benefits, defense, old-age pensions, business and industry, police and law enforcement, welfare benefits; perception of improving individual standard of living, state of economy, government's action on income inequality; respondent cast a ballot at the current and the previous election; vote choice (presidential, lower house and upper house elections) at the current and the previous election; respondent cast candidate preference vote at the current and the previous election; difference who is in power and who people vote for; sympathy scale for selected parties and political leaders; assessment of parties on the left-right-scale and/or an alternative scale; self-assessment on a left-right-scale and an optional scale; satisfaction with democracy; party identification; intensity of party identification, institutional and personal contact in the electoral campaigning, in person, by mail, phone, text message, email or social networks, institutional contact by whom; political information questions; expected development of household income in the next twelve month; ownership of residence, business or property or farm or livestock, stocks or bonds, savings; likelihood to find another job within the next twelve month; spouse likelihood to find another job within the next twelve month. DISTRICT-LEVEL DATA: number of seats contested in electoral district; number of candidates; number of party lists; percent vote of different parties; official voter turnout in electoral district. MACRO-LEVEL DATA: election outcomes by parties in current (lower house/upper house) legislative election; percent of seats in lower house received by parties in current lower house/upper house election; percent of seats in upper house received by parties in current lower house/upper house election; percent of votes received by presidential candidate of parties in current elections; electoral turnout; party of the president and the prime minister before and after the election; number of portfolios held by each party in cabinet, prior to and after the most recent election; size of the cabinet after the most recent election; number of parties participating in election; ideological families of parties; left-right position of parties assigned by experts and alternative dimensions; most salient factors in the election; fairness of the election; formal complaints against national level results; election irregularities reported; scheduled and held date of election; irregularities of election date; extent of election violence and post-election violence; geographic concentration of violence; post-election protest; electoral alliances permitted during the election campaign; existing electoral alliances; requirements for joint party lists; possibility of apparentement and types of apparentement agreements; multi-party endorsements on ballot; votes cast; voting procedure; voting rounds; party lists close, open, or flexible; transferable votes; cumulated votes if more than one can be cast; compulsory voting; party threshold; unit for the threshold; freedom house rating; democracy-autocracy polity IV rating; age of the current regime; regime: type of executive; number of months since last lower house and last presidential election; electoral formula for presidential elections; electoral formula in all electoral tiers (majoritarian, proportional or mixed); for lower and upper houses was coded: number of electoral segments; linked electoral segments; dependent formulae in mixed systems; subtypes of mixed electoral systems; district magnitude (number of members elected from each district); number of secondary and tertiary electoral districts; fused vote; size of the lower house; GDP growth (annual percent); GDP per capita; inflation, GDP Deflator (annual percent); Human development index; total population; total unemployment; TI corruption perception index; international migrant stock and net migration rate; general government final consumption expenditure; public spending on education; health expenditure; military expenditure; central government debt; Gini index; internet users per 100 inhabitants; mobile phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants; fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants; daily newspapers; constitutional federal structure; number of legislative chambers; electoral results data available; effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties.

Not Available ; The land resource inventory of Adavalli-4 microwatershed was conducted using village cadastral maps and IRS satellite imagery on 1:7920 scale. The false colour composites of IRS imagery were interpreted for physiography and these physiographic delineations were used as base for mapping soils. The soils were studied in several transects and a soil map was prepared with phases of soil series as mapping units. Random checks were made all over the area outside the transects to confirm and validate the soil map unit boundaries. The soil map shows the geographic distribution and extent, characteristics, classification, behaviour and use potentials of the soils in the microwatershed. The present study covers an area of 474 ha in Koppal taluk and district, Karnataka. The climate is semiarid and categorized as drought - prone with an average annual rainfall of 662 mm, of which about 424 mm is received during south –west monsoon, 161 mm during north-east and the remaining 77 mm during the rest of the year. An area of about 98 per cent is covered by soils, two per cent by water bodies, settlements and others. The salient findings from the land resource inventory are summarized briefly below.  The soils belong to 8 soil series and 11 soil phases (management units) and 5 land use classes.  The length of crop growing period is 150 cm).  Entire area has clayey soils at the surface.  About 70 per cent of the area has non-gravelly soils, 26 per cent gravelly soils (15-35 % gravel) and 2 per cent extremely gravelly (60- 80% gravel) soils.  About 27 per cent of the area has very low (200mm/m) available water capacity.  Entire area has very gently sloping (1-3%) lands.  Entire area has moderately eroded (e2) lands.  An area of about 28 per cent has soils that are strongly alkaline (pH 8.4-9.0) and 69 per cent very strongly alkaline (pH>9.0).  The Electrical Conductivity (EC) of the soils are dominantly 0.75%) in organic carbon.  Available phosphorus is low (10 ppm).  Available boron is low (0.5 ppm) in about 56 per cent area, medium (0.5-1.0 ppm) in 2 per cent and 40 per cent is high (>1.0 ppm).  Available iron is sufficient (>4.5 ppm) in the entire area.  Available zinc is deficient (<0.6 ppm) in the entire area.  Available manganese and copper are sufficient in all the soils.  The land suitability for 24 major crops grown in the microwatershed was assessed and the areas that are highly suitable (S1) and moderately suitable (S2) are given below. It is however to be noted that a given soil may be suitable for various crops but what specific crop to be grown may be decided by the farmer looking to his capacity to invest on various inputs, marketing infrastructure, market price, price and finally the demand and supply position. Land suitability for various crops in the microwatershed Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Sorghum 260 (55) 91 (19) Sapota - - Maize - - Jackfruit - - Bajra - - Jamun - 139 (29) Groundnut - 26 (6) Musambi 139 (29) 187 (39) Sunflower 139 (29) 187 (39) Lime 139 (29) 187 (39) Chilli - - Cashew - - Tomato - - Custard apple 260 (55) 91 (19) Drumstick - 326 (69) Amla - 351 (74) Mulbery 351 (74) Tamarind - 139 (29) Pomegranate - 326 (69) Marigold - 351 (74) Guava - - Chrysanthemum - 351 (74) Mango - - Jasmine - 26 (6) Apart from the individual crop suitability, a proposed crop plan has been prepared for the 5 identified LUCs by considering only the highly and moderately suitable lands for different crops and cropping systems with food, fodder, fibre and other horticulture crops.  Maintaining soil-health is vital to crop production and conserve soil and land resource base for maintaining ecological balance and to mitigate climate change. For this, several ameliorative measures have been suggested to these problematic soils like saline/alkali, highly eroded, sandy soils etc.,  Soil and water conservation treatment plan has been prepared that would help in identifying the sites to be treated and also the type of structures required.  As part of the greening programme, several tree species have been suggested to be planted in marginal and submarginal lands, field bunds and also in the hillocks, mounds and ridges. That would help in supplementing the farm income, provide fodder and fuel, and generate lot of biomass which inturn would help in maintaining the ecological balance and contributes to mitigating the climate change. Baseline socioeconomic characterisation is prerequisite to prepare action plan for program implementation and to assess the project performance before making any changes in the watershed development program. The baseline provides appropriate policy direction for enhancing productivity and sustainability in agriculture. Methodology: The Adavalli-4 micro-watershed (Koppal taluk and district) is located in between 15019' – 15021' North latitudes and 75055' – 75057' East longitudes, covering an area of about 473.70 ha, bounded by Kavalura village and Yelburga taluk. It falls under Agro Ecological Region (AER)–3: (Deccan plateau, hot arid ecosubregion) Karnataka Plateau (Rayalseema as inclusion), hot arid ESR with deep loamy and clayey mixed red and black soils, low to medium AWC and LGP 60-90 days We used soil resource map as basis for sampling farm households to test the hypothesis that soil quality influence crop selection, and conservation investment of farm households. The level of technology adoption and productivity gaps and livelihood patterns were analyses. The cost of soil degradation and ecosystem services were quantified for each watershed. Results: We found that Social Indicators;  Male and female ratio is 51 to 49 per cent to the total sample population  Younger age groups of population is around 64 per cent to the total population  Literacy population is around 75per cent  Wood is the source of energy for a cooking among 89 per cent.  Around 33 % of farmers have taken yeshaswini health cards  Majority of farm households (89 %) are having MGNREGA card for rural employments  Dependence on ration cards through public distribution system is around 89 per cent  Swach bharath program providing closed toilet facilities around 11 per cent of sample households.  Institutional participation is only 14 per cent of sample households.  Women participation is decision making is found. Economic Indicators;  The average land holding is 2.47 ha indicates that majority of farm households are belong to marginal and small farmers.  Agriculture is the main occupation only among 32 per cent and agricultural labours is predominant subsidiary occupation for 59 per cent of sample households. 2  The average value of domestic assets is around Rs 8091 per household. Mobile and television are mass popular mass communication media.  The average farm assets values is around 5 lakhs, about 11 per cent of sample farmers are owing tractors.  The average livestock values are around Rs 16917 per livestock. The average milk produced is 1680 litter per lactation per animal.  The average fodder availability is 1044 kg/ha on season for the livestock feeding.  The average per capita food consumption is around 584 grams (1628.7 kilo calories) against national institute of nutrition recommendation at 827 gram. Around 100 per cent of sample farmers are consuming less than the NIN recommendation.  The annual average income is around Rs 98238 per household. About 56 per cent of farm households are below poverty line.  The per capita monthly expenditure is around Rs 715 per household. Environmental Indicators-Ecosystem services;  The value of ecosystem service helps to support investment to decision on soil and water conservation and in promoting sustainable land use.  The onsite cost of different soil nutrients lost due to soil erosion is around Rs 7004 per ha/year. The total cost of annual soil nutrients is around Rs 3309315 per year for the total area of 473.7 ha.  The average value of ecosystem service for food production is around Rs 10177/ ha/year. Per ha food production services is maximum in Red gram (Rs 26171/ha) followed by Sorghum (Rs 13486/ha), Green gram (Rs. 9269/ha), sunflower (Rs. 8763), Bengal gram (Rs. 2578) and Maize (Rs. 1525).  The average value of ecosystem service for fodder production is around Rs 1805/ ha/year. Per ha a fodder production service is maximum in maize (Rs 2947) and followed by Sorghum (Rs. 663)  The data on water requirement for producing one quintal of grain is considered for estimating the total value of water required for crop production. The per hectare value of water used and value of water was maximum in Red gram (Rs 67233) followed by green gram (Rs 51173), bengal gram (Rs 45488), sorghum (Rs. 36719), sunflower (Rs 26257) and maize (Rs 998). Economic Land Evaluation;  The major cropping pattern is sunflower (29.97 %) followed by sorghum (20.64 %), Bengal gram (20.44 %), green gram (15.33 %), Maize (8.51 %) and red gram (5.11 %).  In Adavalli-4 Microwatershed, soil major soil series is Muttal (MTL) soil series are having shallow soil depth cover around 22 per cent of area. On this soil farmers are presently growing is sunflower. Handrala (HDL) soil series are 3 having deep soil depth cover around 7 per cent of area, major crop grown are bengal gram (50 %), Red gram (25 %) and Green gram (25 %). Bardur (BDR) soil series are very deep soil depth cover around 18 per cent area, crop grown are maize (53 %) and Sunflower (47 %). Narasapura (NSP) and Dambarahalli (DRL) soils series moderately deep soil depth cover around 27 % and 14 % of area respectively. The major crop grown is Sorghum, Sunflower, Bengal gram and Green gram.  The total cost of cultivation in study area for sunflower ranges between Rs. 21372/ha in MTL soil (with BCR of 1.69) and Rs. 12514/ha in DRL soil (with BCR of 1.11).  In green gram the cost of cultivation range between Rs. 27561/ha in HDL soils (with BCR of 1.08) and Rs. 19249/ ha in NSP soil (with BCR of 1.62).  In bengal gram the cost of cultivation range between Rs. 30120/ha in HDL soil (with BCR of 1.03) and Rs. 23566 /ha in NSP soils (with BCR of 1.03).  In sorghum the cost of cultivation range between Rs Rs. 14565/ha in DRL soils is (with BCR of 1.66) and Rs. 11171/ha in HDL soils (with BCR of 1.7).  In red gram the cost of cultivation in HDL soil is Rs 19857/ha (with BCR of 2.24) and maize cultivation in BDR soils of Rs. 17224/ha with BCR of (1.13). Suggestions;  Involving farmers is watershed planning helps in strengthing institutional participation.  The per capita food consumption and monthly income is very low. Diversifying income generation activities from crop and livestock production in order to reduce risk related to drought and market prices.  Majority of farmers reported that they are not getting timely support/extension services from the concerned development departments.  By strengthing agricultural extension for providing timely advice improved technology there is scope to increase in net income of farm households.  By adopting recommended package of practices by following the soil test fertiliser recommendation, there is scope to increase yield in Sunflower (8.9 %), bengal gram (16.7 to 35. %), maize (85.6 %), red gram (9.1 %), sorghum (20 to 50.5 %) and sunflower (44.4 to 57.1 %). ; Watershed Development Department, Government of Karnataka (World Bank Funded) Sujala –III Project