Suchergebnisse

For a decade we have been living through a period of great turbulence in the commodity markets. Rising and sometimes highly volatile prices, strong geological and market concentration, and state intervention in the commodity markets all stoke fears of future supply bottlenecks and an expectation of ensuing international tension and violent confrontation. The list of recent incidents is long: the gas dispute between Russia, Ukraine and the EU; food revolts in Haiti, Tunisia and Algeria; China's trade conflict with the United States and the EU over export restrictions imposed on many metals; and the confrontation between China and Japan over China's export ban on rare earths to name just a few. Without doubt, increasing competition for natural resources poses considerable conflict potential. It can further destabilise already fragile countries and regions or inject tension into otherwise cooperative inter-state relations, so conflict risks are found at different levels: within the producing and consuming countries and in relations between them. But the phenomenon of competition leading directly to conflict is not observed in every case. Sometimes new patterns of cooperation emerge. The central questions of the study 'Resource Scarcity - A Global Security Threat?' are therefore: Under what circumstances does resource scarcity lead to conflicts? And how can latent and acute conflicts over scarce resources be contained and regulated?

As the coronavirus pandemic fuels technological and geopolitical competition among the great powers, Europe's relations with China and Russia are facing new challenges and risks. Still, the reconfiguration of power in Eurasia also brings unexpected opportunities for European actors in the area of connectivity. To seize them, the EU needs to reconcile its aspiration to be a globally accepted "normative-regulatory" power with both its limited financial means and its more assertive attitude to geopolitics.

"Ist Hillary Clinton die Nominierung als demokratischer Präsidentschaftskandidat noch zu nehmen? In den landesweiten Umfragen führt sie mit 25 Prozentpunkten vor ihren schärfsten Rivalen, den Senatoren Obama und Edwards, und im Vorwahlkampf ist ihr noch kein Fehler unterlaufen. Unter den Demokraten kann die ehemalige First Lady auf die schlagkräftigste Wahlkampforganisation, das beste Netzwerk und die meisten Spendengelder zurückgreifen. Zusätzlich verleiht ihr Ehemann ihrer Wahlkampagne staatsmännische Glaubwürdigkeit. Doch anders als Obama und Edwards schafft es Hillary Clinton nicht, die Herzen ihrer Anhänger zu begeistern: sie wird respektiert, nicht aber geliebt. Weil Clinton so stark polarisiert, ist sie zudem die Wunschgegnerin vieler Republikaner. Nichts motiviert konservative Wähler so sehr wie der Name Clinton auf dem Stimmzettel, und so könnte von ihrer Nominierung am Ende ein anderer profitieren: ihr bislang größter Konkurrent im republikanischen Lager, der ehemalige New Yorker Bürgermeister Rudy Giuliani." (Autorenreferat)

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the EU brought conditionality to the fore of the reviewed
European Neighbourhood Policy. This paper examines the substance and application of
conditionality based on the example of the recent elections in the Eastern Partnership countries.
It is contended that the new approach offers more clarity with regard to the application of
conditionality. The analysis of the EU's response shows stronger conditionality as positive election
assessments are rewarded with additional fi nancial assistance and facilitation of the Association
Agreements' negotiations (including trade and visa liberalisation). However, even though 'free and
fair elections' now constitute the most concrete benchmark of democratisation, there is still a lack
of coherent methodology to assess election performance in this respect. In the fi nal section, the
authors present recommendations for the EU's approach to election performance in the countries
of the Eastern Partnership.

Decentralisation is assumed to benefit subnational government by increasing its autonomy from central government. This paper challenges this assumption by arguing that decentralisation can have mixed effects on vertical intergovernmental relations (national-subnational). Some decentralisation policies may result in greater subnational autonomy from national government, while some decentralisation policies may paradoxically increase a subnational unit's dependence on national government. By deconstructing decentralisation into its administrative, fiscal and political nature, and by identifying different patterns of fiscal and administrative decentralisation, the paper examines decentralisation policies in Mexico and Brazil. Although both countries have undergone decentralisation, its nature and patterns were very different and explain the different intergovernmental relations that resulted in each country. Brazil's decentralisation led to increased subnational autonomy, while Mexico's preserved or even increased federal executive power. ; Decentralizacija je reformi proces u okviru kojega se odgovornosti, sredstva ili ovlasti prenose sa središnje na subnacionalnu razinu vlast. Zbog prijenosa ovlasti s jedne na drugu razinu vlasti decentralizacija utječe na vertikalne odnose unutar upravnog sustava. Kao često očekivani ishod decentralizacije navodi se rast subnacionalne autonomije, no detaljniji uvid u decentralizacijske politike svjedoči da do toga ne dolazi uvijek. Decentralizacija može imati miješane posljedice na nacionalno (centralno) – subnacionalne (lokalne) odnose. Razdvajanje pojma decentralizacije u upravnu, fiskalnu i političku prema tumačenju T. Falletija (2005) te analiza načina provođenja decentralizacije otkriva kako neke vrste decentralizacijskih reformi mogu čak dovesti do smanjenja ovlasti na subnacionalnoj razini. Analiza decentralizacijskih politika u Brazilu i Meksiku otkriva kako se ravnoteža moći premješta na stranu subnacionalne razine kada se radi o kombinaciji upravne, fiskalne i političke decentralizacije. Ako je upravna decentralizacija popraćena devolucijom ovlasti nad kreiranjem politika i dodijeljenim sredstvima, razina subnacionalne autonomije raste. Isti učinak imat će i fiskalna decentralizacija popraćena prijenosom ovlasti nad prikupljanjem prihoda sa središnje na subnacionalnu razinu, što je vidljivo iz decentralizacijskih politika Brazila. S druge strane, ako se radi samo o upravnoj decentralizaciji, a da istovremeno ne dolazi do devolucije ovlasti nad odlučivanjem ili dodjelom sredstava, to će vjerojatno imati suprotan učinak na centralno-lokalne odnose te će subnacionalna razina vlasti u većoj mjeri ovisiti o federalnoj (centralnoj) vlasti čija će moć nad kreiranjem politika na subnacionalnoj razini također biti veća. Fiskalna decentralizacija koja podrazumijeva samu decentralizaciju troškova bez prijenosa ovlasti nad prikupljanjem prihoda također može rezultirati povećanom ovisnošću subnacionalne razine o federalnim sredstvima, pogotovo ako subnacionalna vlast nema pravo odučivanja o trošenju sredstava, kao što je vidljivo iz decentralizacijskih reformi u Meksiku.