Suchergebnisse

Economic, strategic and cultural connections to Japan have never been stronger and more students across the breadth of our education system, primary through to tertiary, continue to be interested in studying Japanese. But what, beyond Demon Slayer and Pokemon, motivates them and how can that knowledge help universities to build effective and engaging language programs? Japanese is one of the most popular Asian languages taught at tertiary institutions around the world. According to the Survey Report on Japanese-language Education Abroad 2018 (Japan Foundation, 2020), the number of learners outside Japan reached 3,851,774, the second highest on record, and the number of institutions and teachers was the highest since the Foundation's 1979 survey. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, enrolment in Japanese language subjects has remained relatively strong, even in 2021. Oceania (the majority from Australia and New Zealand) has the highest number of learners per 100,000 population globally. However, as the authors of this article, we have become increasingly concerned about the sustainability of advanced Japanese language programs in our region—specifically Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. Language education policies (at the governmental and institutional level) and diminishing investment into language education in the higher education sector have put many Japanese Studies/language programs under strain. Advanced-level subjects generally have lower enrolment numbers than beginner- and intermediate-level subjects, and so are most at risk of being merged, cut back or dropped altogether. According to the US Foreign Services Institute (FSI), Japanese is considered to be one of the 'super-hard languages' that require English native speakers three times as long as French or Italian to attain 'professional working proficiency'. This means that without students' long-term commitment (retention to advanced levels) and well supported, quality education, there can be no sustainable future for Japanese language programs producing highly advanced users of Japanese in those nations. Against this backdrop, we recently launched the Network for Teaching Advanced Japanese Project (上級日本語Network), supported by a Japan Foundation Sakura Mini Grant 2020. This project provides a platform to collect data through surveys and interviews to better understand the current state of advanced Japanese language programs at university level in Australia, New Zealand and Singapore, and advocate for communities of practice and ongoing support across the sector. This collaboration involves countries that are members of the Commonwealth. Not only are their universities' medium of instruction English, but they also share similar program structures. The Network for Teaching Advanced Japanese Project approached colleagues from universities in Australia, New Zealand and Singapore in 2020, gathering data on Japanese language programs at 25 institutions in total (Australia 19, New Zealand four, Singapore two). In total, 76 participants responded to the survey and among those respondents, 38 teachers (34 from Australia, two from New Zeland and two from Singapore) participated in online interviews between December 2020 and January 2021. Our survey results show that the 'advanced' level was broadly defined by: the stage of progression at the institution, a proficiency level equivalent to external criteria such as the Japanese Language Proficiency Test or the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages; and the demonstration of specific skills through engagement with types of learning activities or resources (eg progression through language textbooks). What emerged from this is that there is a disparity in what is categorised as constituting the 'advanced level' within different institutional frameworks. Although this may seem merely a comparison with European languages these definitions have significant impact on institutional support for Japanese language. If institutions only support languages through to what we as teachers define as intermediate then it becomes harder for us to graduate advanced users of Japanese. We found that there are subjects with similar content and resources (for example the same textbook) that are called 'advanced' by some universities and 'intermediate' by others. It is common practice that in a three-year university degree program, students who start as beginners can progress to an 'advanced' level in their final year of study, but in many cases, realistically speaking, this 'advanced' level of study is nevertheless perceived as an 'intermediate' level of language acquisition by tertiary teachers of Japanese. The majority of students from the institutions we surveyed usually have three to four hours of class per week (five to six hours at most) during the semester or term. This gives them an average of around 100 class hours per year, and a total of around 300 over their three-year university degree program. It is clear this is insufficient when compared with 2,200 class hours deemed necessary to reach 'professional working proficiency' for Japanese in the aforementioned FSI estimate (for French and Spanish 600-700 and for German 900 class hours). It should be noted that 'class hours' here may assume that language learning does not occur beyond the classroom. Thus, the need to take account of the fact that tertiary students in Australia, New Zealand and Singapore increasingly engage in language learning outside the classroom, for example doing online tasks as part of a blended-learning curriculum, watching Japanese dramas or participating in in-country studies. Our project also found that there is a tendency for the teaching of Asian languages to be adapted to the framework used in the teaching of European languages. It is for example, common practice for universities to offer Levels 1 – 6 in each language with Levels 5 – 6 defined as 'advanced'. This ignores the fact that students progress differently in different languages. The proficiency level reached by students in Japanese language programs at the official 'advanced' level may well be behind those in European language programs. All three countries involved in this project—Australia, New Zealand and Singapore—operate in an English-speaking context associated with the UK tradition of language education which may explain why European languages (which share the Roman alphabet based writing system with English) tend to be privileged in the institutional frameworks. There has been enthusiastic promotion of Asian language education (including Japanese) by the Australian and New Zealand governments since late 1990s, and the ongoing social commitment to multiculturalism. Australia, for example, has released several strategic plans such as the National Asian Language Studies in Australian Schools Strategy (NALSAS, 1995-2002) and recommendations on Asian language studies in the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper (2012). The New Zealand government implemented the Asian Language Learning in Schools (ALLiS) program in 2014, and have committed to a total of $10 million over five years, aiming to support schools by setting up new Asian language learning programs, or strengthening existing ones. In Singapore, mainly in response to industrial demand, the Ministry of Education established their Foreign Language Centre in 1978 to offer couses of French, German and Japanese for secondary school students (the Centre expanded to Ministry of Education Language Centre to offer language couses in wider age groups). Universities and polytechnics in Singapore also established Japanese language programs from the1980s. The development of Asian literacy can be better supported with a less Eurocentric and less English-monolingual mindset. A recent report (May 30, 2021) on the current state of school language programs and assessment in the Australian state of New South Wales suggests European languages such as French are advantaged over Japanese and Arabic, pointing to just such a bias. Further, the dominance of English in the global arena is creating a societal apathy for learning languages other than English. Despite acknowledgement that languages provide a key pathway to fostering 'generalised national multilingualism, social harmony, and economic prosperity' as noted by scholars Shannon Mason and John Hajek, representations of language education in the media can often exacerbate the precarious position of language education in Australia by presenting only superficial, narrow and negative editorial debate.

Göçmen ve Mülteci Kadınlar için Fiziksel Aktivite Rehberi, Hacettepe Üniversitesi Bilimsel Araştırma Projeleri Koordinasyon Birimi tarafından desteklenen "Türkiye'de Yaşayan Suriyeli Göçmen Kadınların Güçlenmelerinde ve Toplumsal Entegrasyonunda Bir Sosyal Politika Aracı Olarak Fiziksel Aktivitenin Kullanılması" isimli araştırma projesi kapsamında hazırlanmıştır. Projede, mülteci kadınların güçlenmelerinde ve sosyal uyumun sağlanmasında fiziksel aktivite bir araç olarak kullanılmıştır. Projenin birinci basamağında Suriyeli mülteci kadınların fiziksel aktivite düzeyi kültürleşme bağlamında incelenmiştir. Projenin ikinci basamağında, Suriyeli, Afganistanlı, Iraklı ve Türkiyeli kadınlardan oluşan 25 kişilik bir grupla 12 haftalık fiziksel aktivite programı uygulanmıştır. Sosyal uyumu hedefleyen bu uygulama sonrasında elde edilen bulgular ve deneyimler doğrultusunda, mülteci kadınlar için geliştirilecek bir fiziksel aktivite programının kavramsal çerçevesini, hedeflerini ve pedagojik ilkelerini içeren bir rehber kitap hazırlanmıştır. Geçtiğimiz on yılda artan göç oranları, birçok göç edilen ülkede göç ve toplumsal bütünleşme politikaları konusundaki tartışmaları hızlandırmıştır. Dünyada Suriyeli mülteci sayısının en fazla olduğu Türkiye'de, Suriyeli ve son zamanlarda Afganistanlı ve Iraklı mültecilerin sosyal uyumuna yönelik çeşitli araştırma verilerine dayalı politikalar üretilmektir. Bu politikalara dayanak olan bilimsel araştırma verileri, fiziksel aktivite ve sporun göçmen ve mülteci bireylerin yaşamlarına olumlu katkılarını ortaya koyarken, göçmenlerle ve mültecilerle ilgili politikaları geliştiren uluslararası kurumlar tarafından fiziksel aktivite ve sporun birleştirici gücü vurgulanmaktadır. 2016-2018 yılları arasında Avrupa Birliği Komisyonu, Avrupa Birliği üye ülkelerdeki mültecilerin iyi olma hali ve sosyal uyumlarını artırmak için fiziksel aktivite ve spor fırsatları sunan yaklaşık 3 milyon Avro tutarındaki 54 projeyi desteklemiştir. Birleşmiş Milletler 2030 Sürdürülebilir Kalkınma Amaçlarının "Toplumsal Cinsiyet Eşitliği" başlıklı 5. Maddesi kapsamında kadınların her seviyede güçlenmesi ve kadına yönelik her türlü istismarı kapsayan şiddetin ortadan kaldırılması gerekmektedir. Göçmen ve Mülteci Kadınlar İçin Fiziksel Aktivite Rehberi, hedefleri itibariyle Türkiye'de yaşayan mülteci kadınların fiziksel, psikolojik, sosyal ve kültürel güçlenmelerinde bir sosyal politika aracı olarak fiziksel aktivitenin kullanımına örnektir. Kadının güçlenmesini hedefleyen bilimsel araştırmalarda ve sosyal sorumluluk projelerinde yararlanılabilecek nitelikte bir rehberdir. Rehberin Türkçe, Arapça ve İngilizce dillerinde yazılmış olması, bilgilerin doğrudan göçmen ve mülteci kadınlar tarafından erişilebilir olmasını sağlamaktadır. Ayrıca, uluslararası platformlar için de kullanılabilir bir uluslararası rehber niteliği de taşımaktadır. Proje faaliyetlerinin gerçekleştirilmesinde hep birlikte çalıştığımız katılımcılara, eğitmenlere, gönüllülere, kurum çalışanlarına ve yöneticilere çok teşekkür ederiz. Birlikte hareket ettiğimiz, birlikte dans ettiğimiz, farklılıkları ve benzerlikleriyle kültürlerimizi, gündelik yaşamlarımızı paylaştığımız ve birlikte güçlendiğimiz projemizin, benzer hedeflerdeki çalışmalara rehberlik yapabilmesini umuyoruz. ; Physical Activity Program Guide for Migrant and Refugee Women was prepared within the scope of the Project titled "Using Physical Activity as a Social Policy Tool in the Empowerment and Social Integration of Syrian Migrant Women Living in Turkey", supported by Hacettepe University Scientific Research Projects Coordination Unit. In the project, physical activity is used as a tool in empowering refugee women and ensuring social integration. In the first phase of the project, physical activity levels of Syrian refugee women were investigated with regard to acculturation. In the second phase of the project, a 12-week physical activity program was implemented in a group consisting of 25 Syrian, Afghan, Iraqi and Turkish women. In accordance with the findings and the experiences obtained as a result of this physical activity intervention aimed at social integration, The Physical Activity Guide for Migrant and Refugee Women was developed. Increasing rates of migration in the last decade have accelerated debates about migration and social integration policies in many countries. In Turkey, where the number of Syrian refugees is the highest in the world, policies are being made based on various research data regarding the social integration of Syrian and, more recently, Afghan and Iraqi refugees. Not enough importance has been ascribed to sport and physical activity in these policies yet. However, while data from scientific research exhibit favourable impacts of physical activity and sport on the lives of migrant and refugee individuals, the unifying power of physical activity and sport is emphasised by international organizations. Between 2016 and 2018, the European Commission supported 54 projects, totalling a sum of approximately 3 million Euros, offering physical activity and sport opportunities to improve the well-being and social engagement of refugees in the European Union member states. Within the scope of Article 5 of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, titled "Promoting Gender Equality", it is required to ensure women's empowerment at all levels and to eliminate violence including all forms of abuse against women. The Physical Activity Guide for Migrant and Refugee Women, with regard to its objectives, is a model for the use of physical activity as a social policy tool in the physical, mental and social empowerment of refugee women living in Turkey. It is a guide that can be used in academic studies and social responsibility projects aimed at women's empowerment within the scope of UN Goals. The availability of the guide in Turkish, Arabic, and English languages makes the information directly accessible to migrant and refugee women. Moreover, it features as an international guide available to international platforms. We would like to thank the participants, trainers, volunteers, staff and managers with whom we work together in the realization of project activities. We moved together, danced together, we shared our cultures, our daily lives. We embraced our differences and similarities and became empowered together. We hope that our project will be able to guide work with similar goals. ; ‫"‬ ‫بـ‬ ‫الموسوم‬ ‫البحثي‬ ‫المشروع‬ ‫نطاق‬ ‫ضمن‬ ‫د‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أُع‬ ‫الالجئة‪،‬‬ ‫و‬ ‫المهاجرة‬ ‫للمرأة‬ ‫البدني‬ ‫النشاط‬ ‫دليل‬ ‫إن‬ ‫و‬ ‫المرأة‬ ‫لتمكين‬ ‫اجتماعية‬ ‫سياسة‬ ‫كأداة‬ ‫استعمالها‬ ‫و‬ ‫الالجئة‬ ‫السورية‬ ‫للمرأة‬ ‫البدني‬ ‫النشاط‬ ‫ممارسة‬ ‫هاجات‬ ‫بجامعة‬ ‫العلمية‬ ‫البحثية‬ ‫المشاريع‬ ‫تنسيق‬ ‫قسم‬ ‫قبل‬ ‫من‬ ‫المدعوم‬ ‫و‬ ‫االجتماعي"‬ ‫إندماجها‬ ‫تعزيز‬ ‫االجتماعي‪.‬‬ ‫التماسك‬ ‫ضمان‬ ‫و‬ ‫الالجئات‬ ‫لتعزيز‬ ‫كأداة‬ ‫البدني‬ ‫النشاط‬ ‫استخدام‬ ‫المشروع‪،‬‬ ‫في‬ ‫تم‬ ‫تبة‪.‬‬ ‫في‬ ‫السوريات‬ ‫الالجئات‬ ‫للنساء‬ ‫البدني‬ ‫النشاط‬ ‫مستوى‬ ‫فحص‬ ‫تم‬ ‫المشروع‪،‬‬ ‫من‬ ‫األولى‬ ‫الخطوة‬ ‫في‬ ‫‪12‬‬ ‫لمدة‬ ‫البدني‬ ‫النشاط‬ ‫برنامج‬ ‫تنفيذ‬ ‫تم‬ ‫المشروع‪،‬‬ ‫من‬ ‫الثانية‬ ‫الخطوة‬ ‫في‬ ‫الثقافي‪.‬‬ ‫التمازج‬ ‫سياق‬ ‫و‬ ‫التركية‪.‬‬ ‫كذلك‬ ‫و‬ ‫العراقية‬ ‫األفغانية‪،‬‬ ‫السورية‪،‬‬ ‫القومية‬ ‫من‬ ‫امرأة‬ ‫‪25‬‬ ‫من‬ ‫مؤلفة‬ ‫لمجموعة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫أسبوعا‬ ‫إعداد‬ ‫تم‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫االجتماعي‬ ‫التماسك‬ ‫تستهدف‬ ‫التي‬ ‫الفعالية‬ ‫هذه‬ ‫بعد‬ ‫المكتسبة‬ ‫الخبرات‬ ‫و‬ ‫النتائج‬ ‫مع‬ ‫ً‬ ‫تمشيا‬ ‫البدني‬ ‫النشاط‬ ‫لبرنامج‬ ‫التربوية‬ ‫المبادئ‬ ‫و‬ ‫األهداف‬ ‫و‬ ‫المفاهيمي‬ ‫اإلطار‬ ‫على‬ ‫يحتوي‬ ‫إرشادي‬ ‫دليل‬ ‫الالجئات‬ ‫تلك‬ ‫أجل‬ ‫من‬ ‫تطويره‬ ‫سيتم‬ ‫‪.‬الذي‬ ‫االندماج‬ ‫و‬ ‫الهجرة‬ ‫سياسات‬ ‫حول‬ ‫النقاش‬ ‫تسريع‬ ‫إلى‬ ‫الماضي‬ ‫العقد‬ ‫في‬ ‫المتزايدة‬ ‫الهجرة‬ ‫معدالت‬ ‫أدت‬ ‫عدد‬ ‫أقصى‬ ‫فيها‬ ‫بلغ‬ ‫حيث‬ ‫أيضاً‪،‬‬ ‫تركيا‬ ‫في‬ ‫و‬ ‫العالم‬ ‫ففي‬ ‫المهاجرة‪.‬‬ ‫البلدان‬ ‫من‬ ‫العديد‬ ‫في‬ ‫االجتماعي‬ ‫البحثية‬ ‫البيانات‬ ‫على‬ ‫المبنية‬ ‫المختلفة‬ ‫السياسات‬ ‫من‬ ‫الكثير‬ ‫إعداد‬ ‫يتم‬ ‫العالم‪،‬‬ ‫في‬ ‫السوريين‬ ‫الالجئين‬ ‫من‬ ‫العراق‪.‬‬ ‫من‬ ‫ً‬ ‫مؤخرا‬ ‫و‬ ‫أفغانستان‬ ‫سوريا‪،‬‬ ‫من‬ ‫القادمين‬ ‫الالجئين‬ ‫لهؤالء‬ ‫االجتماعي‬ ‫االندماج‬ ‫تحقيق‬ ‫بغية‬ ‫بيانات‬ ‫تكشف‬ ‫حين‬ ‫في‬ ‫بعد‪.‬‬ ‫البدني‬ ‫والنشاط‬ ‫للرياضة‬ ‫الالزمة‬ ‫األهمية‬ ‫تُعطى‬ ‫لم‬ ‫السياسات‪،‬‬ ‫هذه‬ ‫في‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫الالجئين‬ ‫و‬ ‫المهاجرين‬ ‫حياة‬ ‫في‬ ‫الرياضة‬ ‫و‬ ‫البدني‬ ‫للنشاط‬ ‫اإليجابية‬ ‫المساهمة‬ ‫عن‬ ‫العلمي‬ ‫البحث‬ ‫الترابط‬ ‫قوة‬ ‫على‬ ‫الالجئين‪،‬‬ ‫و‬ ‫للمهاجرين‬ ‫سياسات‬ ‫تطوير‬ ‫على‬ ‫تعمل‬ ‫التي‬ ‫الدولية‬ ‫المؤسسات‬ ‫تؤكد‬ ‫أستراليا‬ ‫و‬ ‫الشمالية‬ ‫أمريكا‬ ‫و‬ ‫األوروبي‬ ‫االتحاد‬ ‫إستثمر‬ ‫المثال‪،‬‬ ‫سبيل‬ ‫على‬ ‫الرياضي‪.‬‬ ‫و‬ ‫البدني‬ ‫للنشاط‬ ‫النشاط‬ ‫في‬ ‫للمشاركة‬ ‫اللجوء‬ ‫طالبي‬ ‫و‬ ‫لالجئين‬ ‫التدخل‬ ‫برامج‬ ‫و‬ ‫الرياضية‬ ‫البرامج‬ ‫في‬ ‫كبير‬ ‫بشكل‬ ‫‪2016‬‬ ‫عامي‬ ‫بين‬ ‫االجتماعية‪.‬‬ ‫األغراض‬ ‫و‬ ‫التأهيل‬ ‫إعادة‬ ‫و‬ ‫الصحة‬ ‫ألغراض‬ ‫الرياضي‬ ‫و‬ ‫البدني‬ ‫أنشطة‬ ‫وفرت‬ ‫حيث‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫يورو‬ ‫ماليين‬ ‫‪3‬‬ ‫بقيمة‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ع‬ ‫مشرو‬ ‫‪54‬‬ ‫األوروبية‬ ‫المفوضية‬ ‫دعمت‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪2018‬‬ ‫و‬ ‫األوروبي‬ ‫االتحاد‬ ‫في‬ ‫األعضاء‬ ‫الدول‬ ‫في‬ ‫اجتماعيًا‬ ‫وإدماجهم‬ ‫الالجئين‬ ‫رفاهية‬ ‫لزيادة‬ ‫رياضية‬ ‫و‬ ‫بدنية‬ ‫‪2019‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫آخرون‬ ‫و‬ ‫‪().‬سبايـج‬ ‫بين‬ ‫المساواة‬ ‫"ضمان‬ ‫بعنوان‬ ‫‪2030‬‬ ‫المتحدة‬ ‫لألمم‬ ‫المستدامة‬ ‫التنمية‬ ‫أهداف‬ ‫من‬ ‫‪5‬‬ ‫المادة‬ ‫نطاق‬ ‫ضمن‬ ‫المستويات‬ ‫جميع‬ ‫على‬ ‫المرأة‬ ‫تمكين‬ ‫ضمان‬ ‫الضروري‬ ‫من‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫الفتيات"‬ ‫و‬ ‫النساء‬ ‫جميع‬ ‫تمكين‬ ‫و‬ ‫الجنسين‬ ‫الالجئات‪،‬‬ ‫و‬ ‫المهاجرات‬ ‫للنساء‬ ‫البدني‬ ‫النشاط‬ ‫دليل‬ ‫إن‬ ‫المرأة‪.‬‬ ‫ضد‬ ‫العنف‬ ‫أشكال‬ ‫جميع‬ ‫على‬ ‫القضاء‬ ‫و‬ ‫االجتماعية‬ ‫للسياسة‬ ‫كأداة‬ ‫تركيا‬ ‫في‬ ‫للالجئات‬ ‫البدني‬ ‫النشاط‬ ‫الستخدام‬ ‫ً‬ ‫جيدا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫نموذجا‬ ‫يعتبر‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫أهدافه‬ ‫بحكم‬ ‫و‬ ‫األكاديمية‬ ‫الدراسات‬ ‫في‬ ‫استخدامه‬ ‫يمكن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫هاما‬ ‫ً‬ ‫مرجعا‬ ‫يعتبر‬ ‫و‬ ‫االجتماعي‪.‬‬ ‫التمكين‬ ‫و‬ ‫النفسية‬ ‫و‬ ‫المتحدة‬ ‫األمم‬ ‫أهداف‬ ‫نطاق‬ ‫في‬ ‫المرأة‬ ‫تمكين‬ ‫إلى‬ ‫تهدف‬ ‫التي‬ ‫االجتماعية‬ ‫المسؤولية‬ ‫‪.‬مشاريع‬ ‫المتاحة‬ ‫المعلومات‬ ‫وصول‬ ‫يضمن‬ ‫اإلنجليزية‬ ‫و‬ ‫العربية‬ ‫و‬ ‫التركية‬ ‫باللغات‬ ‫مكتوب‬ ‫الدليل‬ ‫هذا‬ ‫كون‬ ‫إن‬ ‫المحافل‬ ‫أغلب‬ ‫في‬ ‫استخدامه‬ ‫يمكن‬ ‫دولي‬ ‫دليل‬ ‫فهو‬ ‫ذلك‪،‬‬ ‫على‬ ‫عالوة‬ ‫الالجئات‪.‬‬ ‫و‬ ‫للمهاجرات‬ ‫مباشرة‬ ‫‪.‬الدولية‬

Подано інформацію про історію метода лікування кіньми – іпотерапію, її позитивний вплив на здоров'я дорослих і дітей, особливо хворих на дитячий церебральний параліч (ДЦП). Розглянуто необхідні вимоги для створення центрів з лікувальної верхової їзди.Пропонується вважати іпотерапію комплексним багатофункціональним методом реабілітації дітей, де інструментом реабілітації слугують коні, процес верхової їзди і фізичні вправи.Позитивний результат іпотерапії здебільшого залежить від правильного відбору коней та вимог, що до них висуваються (норов, тип конституції, екстер'єр, витривалість та ін.). Розглянуто систему заходів з відбору коней, призначених для іпотерапії, та їх підготовку із врахуванням зоопсихології і взаємодії складових системи «кінь-пацієнт-інструктор-лікар».Робиться висновок, що механізм взаємодії «людина-кінь» потрібно ретельно вивчати, а для збереження здоров'я нації – мати фінансову допомогу держави на розвиток іпотерапії, реабілітаційних центрів та кінного спорту для інвалідів. Positive effects on the health of adults and children are reached with the help of "therapeutic" abilities of pets: cats, dogs, rabbits, guinea pigs, hamsters, and horses. Hippotherapy (ride therapy), a treatment mode based on the interaction of humans and horses specially trained to meet the needs of the patient, is increasingly spreading in the treatment of patients. Today, hippotherapy is used to treat gastrointestinal disorders, diseases and injuries of the musculoskeletal system, cardiovascular disorders, neurological disorders, multiple sclerosis, prostatitis, oligophrenia, infantile cerebral palsy, and others.Medical professionals have proved that communication with a horse calms people well, boosts their self-esteem, gives them a sense of confidence and safety. And the best recovery results are achieved with the use of hippotherapy in the treatment of musculoskeletal disorders and problems with movements' control.During the therapeutic riding, the body swings in three dimensions: left-right, forward-back, and up-down. The affected muscle groups and nervous structures start working. It develops mobility, a sense of balance, and motion coordination in patients suffering from paralysis.In the process of horse riding, all the major groups of body muscles are engaged. This happens at the reflex level, as the rider, moving along with the horse, instinctively seeks to maintain a balance not to fall, thereby inducing both healthy and affected muscles to work actively, without even noticing it. Hippotherapy acts upon the human body in the same way as any other form of physical therapy – under the influence of physical exercises the functions of vegetative systems are enhanced.Hippotherapy has received a well-deserved recognition. Children confined to wheelchair due to their illness, which traditional medicine was powerless to cope with, were up and about again thanks to training with horses. No special simulator has a look in with what a contact with a live horse gives to a child. While the horse is on the move, the rider's body performs the same movements as during their independent walking. Riding a rhythmically moving horse, the rider instinctively seeks to maintain balance. At the same time, all muscles of their body, both healthy and affected by the disease, are engaged. It is achieving the synchrony of the movements of the child and the horse, in other words, creating a unified biological system that is the basis of self-correction of the curved spine.With each hippotherapy session, the patient's back muscles get stronger, and legs muscles and tendons warm up, increasing blood circulation in the limbs and blood supply to the brain. This contributes to the creation of a strong muscle corset around the spine.Positive results in hippotherapy in many respects depend on the correct selection of horses. There are certain requirements to the character, temperament, endurance, type and exterior which the horse that is used for therapeutic riding should meet. In addition, each horse must undergo a special training, which will develop and enhance the necessary qualities, for example, a horse should be able to ease the possible fear of a rider and dampen down their aggression.Therefore, the purpose of the study was to examine the selection parameters for horses intended for hippotherapy and to explore the existing training systems, taking into account the mechanism of "human-horse" interaction.It is hippotherapy and therapeutic (adaptive) horse riding that requires horse's maximum discipline and responsibility, since it's not just about children, but about the children working with whom there is no room for mistake. However, it should be remembered that even a horse with an ideal temper can be spoiled by negligence of an unskilled groom, their rudeness and indifference, harshness of a coach or doctor.In the stables meant for hippotherapy, all those basic humanitarian principles that have been implemented and mastered in the course of many centuries in the relationship between humans and horses must be respected. In view of therapeutic specifics, such relationships are crucial. Horses should have optimal conditions for a full-fledged manifestation of kindness and mercy.Therefore, the most important criterion for selecting a horse is its temperament. Horses used in the therapy should be friendly, trusting, calm, patient and balanced animals. It is important that the horse remains frisky and vigorous, since only such horses may have an appropriate therapeutic step, and it is difficult to work with feeble and apathy animals. Of course, the horses that bite, kick and are aggressive to people cannot be used for the therapy.In hippotherapy, mares and gelded horses are mainly used, which is due to the fact that they have the most appropriate temperament. Stallions, as a rule, are not used, but there are no severe restrictions here. It happens that stallions also work effectively, but in the case there is always a risk factor.Horse's exterior is the next criterion for assessing its suitability. Preferably, it should not be too height (145-160 cm in the withers), as high horses complicate the patient's safeguarding. Being not high, the horse should have a wide and rather long back with well-developed muscles, middle or low withers, and its legs should have the correct position.It has been proved that in view of these characteristics the best breeds are the following: Huzul horses, Arabic horses, Novooleksandrivska Heavy Draft horses and others with a strong balanced type of higher nervous activity. The horses of the elder age (7-10 years old) are selected, mainly gelded horses and mares with a characteristic exterior: short, stretched, with a wide back, with a step at a trot of 80-90 cm, a step of 68-76 cm, with strong limbs, but the main thing is their well-balanced nature.In addition, a horse possessing all the necessary therapeutic qualities should be well prepared for certain exercises during therapy. Therefore, the horse-doctor, whatever happens, should be calm, obedient, and steady, accustomed to be touched everywhere, attentive to the voice of the instructor and to what is happening. Thus, the horse should accept any human action absolutely positively.A comprehensive study of the interaction of all participants of animal-assisted therapy: animals, patients, therapists (instructors, psychologists, doctors) is carried out according to the methodology of animal psychology. Ideally, the instructor and the horse should form a coordinated team, and not only during hippotherapy sessions.Duration of hippotherapy sessions varies depending on the illness and physical fitness of the rider. The loads are given purposefully.It would be wrong to say that horses are recommended only if there is some kind of physical problem. A healthy person will be really amused and delighted after the interaction with these cute and graceful creatures. Taking care of the animal develops a person's communicative skills, helps them overcome emotional barriers, and promotes social rehabilitation.Each horse is a personality. During hippotherapy they are expected to do almost an impossible thing: to become a reliable and safe simulator, to clearly and unconditionally carry out our orders. This can be achieved only if we treat the horse as a partner, with due respect, and give them time and space to satisfy our requirements.Thus, the "human-horse" interaction mechanism needs to be thoroughly investigated, and in order to preserve the health of the nation, the government should provide financial assistance for the development of hippotherapy, rehabilitation centers and equestrian sport for the disabled.

In Canada, translation has been conceptualized within multi-layered and interwoven historical and political processes of nation building. One strand of these processes is the country's language policy, known as "official bilingualism". This national construct is so entrenched that the Federal government has not perceived a need to pair Canada's language laws with any legislation on translation. Despite this void, or perhaps because of it, the professional translation market first emerged as a corollary of official bilingualism, and it remains inflected by its a priori, which have also driven the design of university translator training programs. In giving English and French preferred status over all other "minority" languages that once were (i.e. Indigenous languages) and/or might become (i.e. Ukrainian, Spanish, Chinese, Arabic, Urdu, etc.) vehicular languages in certain regions or cities, public policy, which includes content and funding of university programs, has also restricted translator training to "official languages". This paper presents some preliminary data from a project aimed at proposing models for "post-bilingual" language and translation policies. More precisely, it focuses on one of Canada's most linguistically heterogeneous spaces–Toronto–and its multilingual translation policy. Drawing on González Núñez' adaptation of Spolsky's language planning model, I argue in favour of a new set of language and translation policies that countenance disparate and, at times, contradictory linguistic realities across and within Canada's post-bilingual zones, foregrounding elements that might inform evidence-based policies. Also informed by language rights research (e.g. De Schutter), this paper also serves as a preliminary discussion of language and translation policies that might be the springboard for new models of translator training that would ensure equal access to translation services for speakers of minority languages. ; En Canadá, la conceptualización de la traducción ha estado imbricada en complejos procesos históricos y políticos de construcción de la nación. Una de las vertientes de estos procesos es la política lingüística, conocida en Canadá como el "bilingüismo oficial". Este modelo nacional se ha arraigado a tal punto que el gobierno federal canadiense no ha percibido la necesidad de acompañar las leyes lingüísticas del país con legislación relativa a la traducción. A pesar de este vacío, o quizás incluso a causa del mismo, el mercado de la traducción profesional surgió inicialmente como un corolario del bilingüismo oficial, y sigue estando bajo la influencia de esta relación de origen, la cual ha también orientado el diseño curricular de los programas de formación universitarios. Al otorgarle al francés y al inglés un estatus preferencial con respecto a otras lenguas "minoritarias", algunas de las cuales eran lenguas vehiculares en ciertas regiones o ciudades (tales como las lenguas Indígenas) y otras que podrían serlo (tales como el ucraniano, el español, el chino, el árabe, el urdu, etc.) la política pública, que contempla el contenido y la financiación de los programas universitarios, también ha restringido la formación de traductoras y traductores a las "lenguas oficiales". Este trabajo presenta datos preliminares de un proyecto cuyo objetivo es el de proponer modelos de políticas lingüísticas y de traducción "postbilingües". Específicamente, se centra en Toronto, uno de los espacios canadienses de mayor heterogeneidad lingüística, y en su política de traducción multilíngüe. Con base en la adaptación del modelo de planeación lingüística de Spolsky que realizó González Núñez, el artículo presenta un argumento en favor de políticas lingüísticas y de traducción nuevas que respondan a las realidades lingüísticas marcadamente distintas y en ocasiones incluso contradictorias que se encuentran a lo largo de las zonas postbilingües de Canadá. La propuesta resalta elementos para una política basada en datos empíricos. El artículo parte también de investigaciones sobre derechos linguísticos (tal como el de De Schutter) y busca, desde este punto de vista, servir de base para una discusión preliminar para la creación de políticas lingüísticas y de traducción que sirvan para generar nuevos modelos de formación de traductoras y traductores orientados hacia la igualdad de acceso a servicios de traducción para los hablantes de lenguas minoritarias. ; Au Canada, la traduction est née de processus de construction de la nation, qu'ils fussent historiques ou politiques, imbriqués et multi-couches. Un des volets de ces processus est la politique linguistique du pays, « le bilinguisime officiel ». Cette construction nationale est tellement enracinée que le gouvernement fédéral n'a aucunement ressenti le besoin de conjuguer aux lois linguistiques une législation de la traduction. Malgré ce vide, ou peut-être grâce à lui, le marché professionnel de la traduction est né en réponse au bilinguisme officiel et il reste influencé par ses a priori, qui ont, par là même, conditionné la conception des programmes universitaires de formation des traducteurs. En donnant à l'anglais et au français un statut privilégié par rapport à toutes les autres langues « minoritaires » existant autrefois (les langues autochtones) et/ou les langues véhiculaires (ukrainien, espagnol, chinois, arabe, urdu, etc.) de certaines régions ou villes, les politiques publiques, qui touchent le contenu et le financement des programmes universitaires, ont également restreint les formations en traduction aux « langues officielles ». Cet article présente les données préliminaires d'un projet dont le but est de proposer des modèles de politiques linguistiques post-bilingues et une politique de la traduction. Plus précisément, ce travail s'attache à un des espaces les plus hétérogènes au niveau linguistique au Canada, Toronto, et à sa politique de traduction multilingue. En s'appuyant sur l'adaptation que González Núñez fait du modèle d'aménagement linguistique de Spolsky, je propose un nouvel ensemble de politiques linguistiques et de la traduction qui inclut des réalités linguistiques disparates, et parfois contradictoires, dans les zones post-bilingues au Canada, mettant en avant des éléments qui pourraient façonner des politiques qui seraient fondées sur des informations factuelles. Cet article, également inspiré par la recherche en droits linguistiques (par ex. De Schutter), sert de discussion préliminaire au sujet de politiques linguistiques et de politiques de traduction qui pourraient servir de tremplin pour de nouveaux modèles de formation des traducteurs, lesquels garantiraient un accès égal aux services de traduction pour les locuteurs de langues minoritaires. ; No Canadá, a tradução sempre foi conceituada no seio de processos históricos e politicos multidimensionais e imbricados, ligados à construção da nação. Uma das vertentes destes processos é a política linguística, conhecida como "bilinguismo official". Este construto nacional é tão enraizado, que o Governo Federal não reconhece a necessidade de adequar as leis canadenses relacionadas às línguas com qualquer legislação sobre a tradução. Apesar dessa lacuna – ou, talvez, em decorrência dela – o mercado profissional de tradução surgiu inicialmente como um corolário do bilinguismo official e se mantém determinado por este a priori, o que também orientou a formulação de programas de treinamento de tradutoras nas universidades. Ao privilegiar o inglês e o francês em detrimento de outras línguas "minoritárias" que já foram (ex., línguas indígenas) e/ou podem se tornar (ex. ucraniano, espanhol, chinês, árabe, urdu, etc) veiculares em certas regiões ou cidades, as políticas públicas, que incluem o conteúdo curricular e o financiamento de programas de formação universitária, têm também restringido o treinamento de tradutoras às "línguas oficiais". Este trabalho apresenta dados preliminares de um projeto que propõe modelos para políticas linguísticas pós-bilíngues e relacionadas à tradução. De modo específico, focalizamos Toronto, um dos espaços mais heterogêneos linguisticamente, e sua política de tradução multilíngue. Com base na adaptação do modelo de planejamento linguístico de Spolsky, proposta por González Núñez, defendemos uma série de políticas linguísticas e de tradução para compor as realidades díspares e, não raro, contraditórias nas regiões pós-bilíngues do Canadá, ressaltando os elementos que poderão informar as políticas de base empírica. Com o respaldo de pesquisa no campo dos direitos linguísticos (ex. De Schutter), este trabalho também apresenta uma discussão preliminar sobre políticas linguísticas e de tradução que poderá impulsionar a elaboração de novos modelos de formação para tradutoras, que garantam às falantes de línguas minoritárias acesso igualitário aos serviços de tradução.

[spa] Esta Tesis es la biografía de Simón de Rojas Clemente y Rubio (1777-1827), botánico (naturalista en general) que pertenece a la Ilustración tardía ya rayana con el Romanticismo, pero como buen ilustrado tocó muchos temas: fue profesor de árabe y hebreo en la Universidad, fue un buen conocedor de lenguas modernas, diputado por Valencia en el Trienio Liberal, fue perseguido como afrancesado y la Inquisición le abrió un proceso que finalmente se archivó. Desde el punto de vista académico su grado más alto era el de Doctor en Teología. Otra vertiente de su vida es la de aventurero ya que en 1802 y 1803 estuvo, junto con Domingo Badía (más conocido como Alí Bey), en París y en Londres, viaje sufragado por el gobierno de Manuel Godoy con el fin de preparar una incursión a África de carácter científico, por lo menos en principio, después el asunto tomó un giro claramente político, lo cierto es que el de Titaguas al final no realizó ese viaje. Otros méritos suyos son el haber sido bibliotecario del Jardín Botánico de Madrid y director del mismo, miembro de diversas asociaciones como la Sociedad Linneana de París, el primero en medir el pico del Mulhacén, etc. Todo lo que antecede ha sido desglosado en la Tesis de la manera que sigue. El primer capítulo nos introduce en las raíces del biografiado que no son otras que las de la Ilustración, la cual determinará toda la vida y la obra de Simón de Rojas (sin olvidar el Romanticismo que también imprimió caracteres a algunos escritos y comportamientos suyos). Después, en el capítulo 2, entramos en su infancia y juventud ya en Madrid, desde donde parte su viaje por París y Londres que llena el capítulo 3, y llegamos a Andalucía donde sufre la decepción de haber acabado allí su periplo viajero, pues en principio tenía que haber continuado junto a Alí Bey hasta África (capítulo 4). En Andalucía se queda precisamente para realizar la "Historia natural del Reino de Granada" (publicada como "Viaje a Andalucía") y otros trabajos (capítulo 5); el capítulo siguiente es su vuelta a Madrid como bibliotecario del Jardín Botánico –cargo que nunca abandonará-, y la publicación del "Ensayo sobre las variedades de la vid común que vegetan en Andalucía" (1807). La Guerra de la Independencia lo sorprende en Sanlúcar de Barrameda y su continuación es un continuo ir de un lado a otro (física pero incluso políticamente), y si se me apura de unos a otros pero estando siempre con los mismos: con sus amigos científicos fueran del lado que fueran; es desde este punto de vista desde el que hay que comprender sus vaivenes con respecto a los distintos regímenes que le tocó vivir, desde sus inquebrantables apetitos científicos que nombra en sus memorias, lo que se evidencia no sólo en estos capítulos 7 y 8 sino también en el resto de la Tesis. A la guerra le sucede una etapa florida en cuanto a investigaciones (Ceres hispanica, la Agricultura general de Herrera) pero llena de penurias económicas e ideológicas; fue además cuando pudo tener problemas con la Inquisición (capítulo 9 y 10). En el Trienio Liberal tomó partido por el liberalismo siendo además diputado a Cortes pero con escasa participación; en este tiempo fue acechado por la enfermedad y hasta tuvo que enfrentarse a los involucionistas en su pueblo, lo cual se refleja en el capítulo 11. Y tras ese periodo, en el capítulo 12 se cuenta su obligada partida a Titaguas, su pueblo, a vivir su exilio interior hasta que el rey lo llamó para acabar la "Historia natural del Reino de Granada" siendo elegido director del Jardín Botánico de Madrid, pero donde vivió "acorralado por los enemigos de las luces" en expresión de Godoy; hasta que le llegó la muerte y el cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el testamento y hasta de los deberes morales de unos y de otros, que es el capítulo 13. Después, como es natural, viene la bibliografía utilizada y los apéndices. ; [eng] This thesis is the biography of Simón de Rojas Clemente y Rubio (1777-1827), botanical (naturalist in general) that belongs to the late Enlightenment, already bordering with Romanticism, but as a good illustrated touched many subjects: he was professor of Arabic and Hebrew University, was a connoisseur of modern languages, deputy for Valencia in the Liberal Triennium, was Frenchified and the Inquisition opened a process that finally shelved. From the academic point of view their highest degree was that of Doctor of Theology. Another aspect of his life is adventurous since in 1802 and 1803 was, along with Ali Bey in Paris and London, trip funded by the government of Manuel Godoy in order to prepare a raid Africa scientific, at least in principle, then the issue clearly took a political turn, the fact is that at the end Simón de Rojas not made that trip. His other merits are being librarian of the Botanical Garden of Madrid and director, member of various associations like the Linnean Society of Paris, the first to measure the peak of Mulhacen. The first Chapter introduces us to the roots of the biography which are none other than those of the Enlightenment, which will determine life and work of Simon de Rojas. Then, in Chapter 2, we entered his childhood and youth in Madrid, from where his journey through Paris and London that fills Chapter 3, and came to Andalusia where having suffered the disappointment of his journey ended there, because in principle had to be continued with Ali Bey to Africa (Chapter 4). In Andalusia is precisely for Historia natural del Reino de Granada (published as Viaje a Andalucía) and other work (Chapter 5), the next Chapter is his return to Madrid as librarian of Botanical Garden - position he will never abandon-, and the publication of the Ensayo sobre las variedades de la vid común que vegetan en Andalucía ( 1807). The War of Independence surprises in Sanlucar de Barrameda and then is a continual back and forth of (physical but even politically) but being always the same: with his scientific friends were the side that were, it is from this point of view from which we must understand their ups and downs with respect to the various schemes which he lived, from its unbreakable scientific appetites named in his memoirs, as evidenced not only in these Chapters 7 and 8 but also in the rest of the thesis. After the war happens florida stage in terms of research (Ceres hispánica, Agricultura General de Herrera) but full of economic and ideological hardship; was also when he could have trouble with the Inquisition (Chapter 9 and 10). In the Liberal Triennium sided with liberalism also being Member of Parliament but with limited participation, in this time was stalked by disease and even had to face the regressive in its people, which is reflected in Chapter 11. And after that period, in Chapter 12 has his forced departure to Titaguas, his village, to live his internal exile until the king called to finish the Historia natural del Reino de Granada, being elected director of the Botanical Garden of Madrid, until death came and compliance with the provisions of the will and even the moral duties of one or the other, which is Chapter 13.

The subject deals with the Roman activity(occupation) of the Western Borders of the Maurétanie Caesarian. The territory being vast, we limited him(it), from east to west, from the oued El Mellah to the oued Moulouya, from north to south, of the coast in knotted(tied) her(it) praetentura (south extreme Roman way of occupied territories). The studied historic phases are: the period maurétanienne [XIIth century in 40] and the Roman provincial period until the Arabic conquest [dynasty of Idrissides 40 in 68]. Three sets(groups) studies structured this search(research): a study of sites, a study of the archaeological material(equipment) [registrations(inscriptions) and objects], finally a historical pageant of the military, civil and religious activity(occupation) of the western borders of the Maurétanie Caesarian. ; Le sujet traite de l'occupation romaine des Confins Occidentaux de la Maurétanie Césarienne. Le territoire étant vaste, nous l'avons limité, d'est en ouest, de l'oued El Mellah à l'oued Moulouya, du nord au sud, du littoral à la noua praetentura (voie romaine extrême sud des territoires occupés). Les phases historiques étudiées sont : la période maurétanienne [XIIe siècle à +40] et la période provinciale romaine jusqu'à la conquête arabe [ dynastie des Idrissides +40 à +68]. Trois ensembles d'études ont structuré cette recherche : une étude des sites, une étude du matériel archéologique [inscriptions et objets], enfin une reconstitution historique de l'occupation militaire, civile et religieuse des confins occidentaux de la Maurétanie Césarienne. La première étape indispensable à mon sens fut l'étude géographique des territoires concernés, en vue d'une reconstitution de la géographie antique. Pour cela nous commençons par localiser et identifier tous les sites antiques de ces confins de la Césarienne. La géographie de Ptolémée et l'Itinéraire d'Antonin sont les premières données que nous traitons. Elles sont suivies des informations laissées par les auteurs arabes du moyen âge, dont les deux principaux sont El Bekri et Al Hassan al Wazzân dit Léon l'Africain. Cela ne va pas sans une étude toponymique des sites, basée sur les données des auteurs antiques et des auteurs arabes, visant à comprendre le mode d'occupation romain : militaire et urbain. Nous constatons que ces toponymes sont plus souvent d'origine romaine que d'origine africaine, ce qui révèle le premier mode de l'occupation romaine, à savoir militaire. Cette localisation des sites est suivie d'une étude proprement géographique : géomorphologie, hydrologie, climat et conséquences sur la flore et la faune. La restitution géographique repose également sur les informations des auteurs anciens (grecs et latins) et des auteurs arabes. Nous en venons à une première partie de l'étude historique de ces confins césariens : la période maurétanienne, avec l'étude de la population autochtone ; suivie de la phase de l'occupation militaire romaine. La localisation des tribus est possible à partir des informations laissées en grande partie par Ptolémée, puis d'autres auteurs grecs et latins, enfin par les auteurs arabes du moyen âge dont Ibn Khaldoun. C'est donc à partir de ces données qu'il est possible de dresser une carte des tribus maures (sous réserve de nouvelles donnes). Il s'ensuit une chronique de la période maure, allant de la période libyco-punique à la royauté maurétanienne, jusqu'à l'arrivée des Romains ; enfin les différentes révoltes africaines en réponse à cette occupation romaine. Avec cet ensemble d'informations nous sommes plus disposés à comprendre les témoignages visibles : l'étude archéologique des sites que nous avons répartis en deux groupes selon leur position géographique. Les sites des territoires du littoral sont : Mersa Ben Mehidi [Lemnis ?], Tabarit, Ghazaouet [Ad Fratres], Honaïne [Gypsaria / Artisiga], Rachgoun et Takembrit [Portus Sigensis et Siga], Camérata [Camarata], Aïn Temouchent [Albulae]. Les sites des territoires intérieurs sont : Aïn el Hammam [Tepidae], Damous [Calama ?], Ouled Mimoun [Altava], Tlemcen [Pomaria], Maghnia [Numerus Syrorum], Aïn Reggada. L'étude de chaque site comprend un historique des recherches, les différentes publications, les témoignages des anciens, la position topographique du site, les vestiges visibles, les vestiges probables, les environs du site enfin la chronologie historique du site ; tout cela variant en fonction des données acquises. Le matériel archéologique dont nous avons fait usage pour cette thèse est composé de : - Quatre-vingt seize inscriptions de toutes celles qui furent inventoriées dans le Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, dans l'Année Epigraphique et dans divers articles spécifiques. Nous avons considérés toutes les inscriptions pourvues d'un intérêt historique. Elles sont de cinq natures : politiques, civiles, religieuses, funéraires et militaires. Les sites pour lesquels il fut possible de regrouper de tels documents sont : - Albulae et sa région [23 inscriptions allant, pour celles qui sont datables, de 117/118 à 501], - Siga [2 inscriptions, l'une civile datée entre 218 et 222 et une militaire non datée], - Altava et sa région [39 inscriptions allant, pour celles qui sont datables, de 201/209 à 529], - Pomaria et sa région [12 inscriptions allant, pour celles qui sont datables, de 217/218 au IIIe siècle], - Numerus Syrorum [17 inscriptions allant, pour celles qui sont datables, de 217/218 à 402]. Toutes ces inscriptions sont un support d'étude nous permettant d'analyser le présence humaine des confins occidentaux de la Maurétanie Césarienne, à savoir les différentes occupations romaines, ou influences, dans le cadre militaire, civil et religieux. - Le matériel archéologique en général. Il est davantage le résultat de découvertes fortuites que celui de réelles fouilles. Seule Siga connu de telles investigations. C'est dans ce site que fut découvert le plus grand nombre d'objets remontant à l'époque punique. Quatre catégories d'objets : les céramiques, les lampes, les pierres et marbres, puis les divers : - Siga [le matériel est très important : céramiques, lampes, pierres et divers autres objets pour la plupart découverts dans la nécropole romaine], - Albulae [céramique, lampes, marbres, pierres, bronzes et fer ; les endroits exacts et les conditions de découverte sont souvent inconnus], - Altava [céramique, lampes, pierres, métal, bronzes, argent, fers ; une bonne partie du matériel fut découvert dans les deux nécropoles d'Altava], - Pomaria [une céramique, une lampe, et un cadran solaire], Aïn Reggada [une table d'autel paléochrétien]. Le traitement des données des, différents sites, documents, inscriptions et matériels archéologiques, qu'il me fut possible d'amasser, permet d'établir une reconstitution de l'histoire antique de l'ensemble des confins occidentaux de la Maurétanie Césarienne. L'occupation militaire de ces confins fut la première approche physique des Romains. La question qui se pose alors est de savoir si l'intention première des Romains était une simple exploitation ou une implantation durable. Cette occupation militaire est matérialisée par des postes militaires [Altava, Pomaria, Numerus Syrorum, Aïn Khial, Albulae] recouvrant le territoire de manière à occuper tous le points stratégiques. Les voies romaines sont des impératifs d'organisation stratégique militaire, des obligations d'approvisionnement et des nécessités économiques pour le drainage des marchandises. L'étude de ces voies s'établi à partir des bornes milliaires, des témoignages antiques et témoignages des auteurs arabes. Ces voies recouvrent tout l'espace, du nord au sud [la Noua praetentura limite le sud] et d'est en ouest [la voie de Numerus Syrorum / Siga étant la dernière voie officielle à notre stade de connaissance]. Nous soulevons également le problème de ralliement entre les confins extrêmes ouest de la Césarienne et les confins extrêmes est de la Tingitane. Ce chapitre prend fin avec deux grandes interrogations : le retrait des troupes romaines à la fin du IIIe siècle met-il fin à l'Afrique romaine ? De quelle manière s'est fait le retour de la domination romaine au lendemain du passage des Vandales ? Dans un second temps nous abordons l'organisation civile, en commençant par les structures institutionnelles : la Maurétanie Césarienne, province impériale, le statut administratif des sites de ces confins [du cantonnement militaire au rang de "cité romaine"] ; les structures fiscales et commerciales : l'urbanisme, la ville, le mode fiscale et ses ressources, le monde rural et les exploitations des ressources.

International audience ; El Magrib apareix com un soci permanent de França i dels països del Mediterrani occidental, notablement Espanya i Catalunya. El que passa aquí des de fa segles i el que podria succeir aviat té un gran interès per a historiadors, antropòlegs, lingüistes i polítics.Quins mecanismes específics de creació de les identitats socials, culturals i lingüístiques podem identificar? Com es va establir aquesta part del món en una «francophonie» sovint apassionada però de vegades rebutjada?En aquest treball, s'esmenten regularment els espais occità, català i espanyol per tal de comprendre millor la dinàmica històrica dels contactes en un espai geo-històric situat entre el golf del Lleó i el nord d'Àfrica. De la mateixa manera, un moment d'observació de la llengua maltesa és necessari i això permet entendre com es formen i es transmeten les identitats i les pràctiques lingüístiques en aquesta part del món. ; Der Maghreb (oder Nordafrika) ist ein ständiger Partner Frankreichs und der Anrainerstaaten des westlichen Mittelmeers. Was hier seit Jahrhunderten passiert und was bald passieren könnte, ist von großem Interesse für Historiker, Anthropologen, Linguisten und Politiker.Welche spezifischen Mechanismen zur Schaffung sozialer, kultureller und sprachlicher Identitäten können wir identifizieren? Wie hat sich dieser Teil der Welt in einer «Frankophonie» etabliert, die oft leidenschaftlich, aber manchmal abgelehnt wird?Auf jeden Fall enthüllt dieser Subkontinent sehr alte Kontakte, die uns viel darüber lehren, wie Sprachidentitäten gebildet und weitergegeben werden.Aus diesem Grund werden regelmäßig die okzitanischen, katalanischen und spanischen Räume erwähnt, um die historische Dynamik der Kontakte in einem Raum zwischen dem Golf von Lion und Nordafrika besser zu verstehen. In diesem Zusammenhang erhält die maltesische Sprache auch einen strategischen und heuristischen Platz. ; Just a stone's throw from Europe, the Maghreb (or North-Africa) has been a permanent partner of France, Spain and Italy. What ...

Das Buch Futūḥ aš-Šām, das üblicherweise in der Wissenschaft dem bekannten Historiker des 8. und Anfang des 9. Jh. Muḥammad b. ʿUmar al-Wāqidī (g. 207/823) zugeschrieben wird, gilt seit zwei Jahrhunderten als ein gefälschtes Buch, das in einer späteren Zeit (Zeit der Kreuzzüge) verfasst und al-Wāqidī zugeschrieben wurde. Es wurde in dieser Dissertation anhand der Ergebnisse der Untersuchung der Struktur, des Inhalts und der Isnāde des Futūḥ aš-Šām die These aufstellt, dass dieses Werk im Kern das ursprüngliche Futūḥ aš-Šām al-Wāqidīs ist, das nach dessen Lebenszeit eine Veränderung seiner Form und seines Inhalts erlebt hat. Im Folgenden werden die Ergebnisse sowie die Thesen der Arbeit vorgestellt: Es wurde durch die Analyse der Struktur des Futūḥ aš-Šām gezeigt, dass das Narrativ dieses Werkes ein homogenes Narrativ ist, das eine lückenfreie Struktur aufzeigt. Deswegen scheint die vorgenommene Veränderung eine systematische Redaktion des ursprünglichen Futūḥ aš-Šām gewesen zu sein. Diese Redaktionsarbeit besteht scheinbar aus den zwei folgenden Änderungen: Erstens: Die Berichte des ursprünglichen Futūḥ aš-Šām al-Wāqidīs wurden zusammengelegt und seine Isnāde wurden verkürzt bzw. gelöscht, um eine im größeren Maße ununterbrochene fließende Berichtserstattung in Form einer Erzählung herzustellen; Zweitens: religiöse Details und Elemente wurden zum Narrativ des ursprünglichen Futūḥ aš-Šām hinzugefügt, anscheinend um die Rolle der Religion zu verstärken, ein idealisiertes Bild des Islams und der Muslime aus der Zeit der Eroberungen zu vermitteln und den Islam gegenüber dem Christentum zu verherrlichen. Zu der Frage nach der Verfassungszeit wurde festgestellt, dass diese Redaktion vermutlich zwischen dem 12. und 13. Jh. vorgenommen wurde, denn zum einen sind direkte Zitate aus dem ursprünglichen Futūḥ aš-Šām in Ibn ʿAsākirs Taʾrīḫ madīnat Dimašq nachzuweisen, die formale und zum Teil inhaltliche Unterschiede zum al-Wāqidī zugeschriebenen Futūḥ aš-Šām aufzeigen. Das bedeutet, dass zur Lebenszeit Ibn ʿAsākirs (499/1106–571/1175) das ursprüngliche Futūḥ aš-Šām vorhanden war und immer noch seine ursprüngliche Form und Inhalt hatte. Zum anderen ist die älteste bekannte Handschrift des Futūḥ aš-Šām (Saray Ahmet III 2886), d. h. die älteste bekannte Version dieses Werkes, im Jahr 678/1279 verfasst worden. So wurde für den Zeitraum zwischen dem 12 und 13. Jh. als Entstehungszeit des Futūḥ aš-Šām argumentiert. Ein weiteres Indiz für diese These war, dass die angeblichen direkten Zitate aus dem ursprünglichen Futūḥ aš-Šām aus dem 14 Jh. eine sehr deutliche Ähnlichkeit mit dem Inhalt des Futūḥ aš-Šām aufzeigen, während die Zitate Ibn ʿAsākirs aus dem 12. Jh. nur gewisse inhaltliche Ähnlichkeit mit dem Inhalt dieses Werkes nachweisen. Zur Frage nach der Authentizität des Futūḥ aš-Šām wurde festgestellt, dass aufgrund der Hinzufügung von Inhalten im Redaktionsprozess nicht alle Inhalte dieses Werks al-Wāqidī zugeschrieben werden können. Die vorgeschlagene Zeit zur Verfassung des Futūḥ aš-Šām (zwischen dem 12. und 13. Jh.) fällt in die Zeit der Kreuzzüge im Nahen Osten. Es ist in der Forschung zum Futūḥ aš-Šām bereits gezeigt worden, dass einige in diesem Werk auftauchende Begriffe aus der Zeit der Kreuzzüge stammen können (wie z. B. afranǧ und al-muḥammadīyūn). Aus diesem Grund ist es vorstellbar, dass dieses Werk beim Redaktionsprozess Inhalte aus dieser Zeit übernommen habe. Es sieht so aus, dass vor allem die Betonung der religiösen Elemente, die auf die Verherrlichung des Islam gegenüber dem Christentum abzielen, zum Teil aus dieser Zeit stammt. Deswegen könnte man die These aufstellen, dass diese Redaktion hauptsächlich aus religiösen Gründen vorgenommen worden ist. Darüber hinaus, da im Futūḥ aš-Šām eine Neigung zur Herstellung einer fließenden und lückenlosen Erzählung beobachtet werden kann, sieht es so aus, dass man diese Redaktion ursprünglich als eine Erzählung für ein breiteres Publikum angefertigt hat. Wir wissen, dass bereits im 10 und 11. Jh. futūḥ-Werke (angeblich in den arabischsprachigen Regionen der islamischen Welt) einem breiteren Publikum vorgelesen wurden. Aus diesem Grund ist es durchaus vorstellbar, dass diese Redaktion vorgenommen wurde, um einem breiteren muslimischen Publikum während der Kreuzzüge die Superiorität ihrer Religion einzuprägen. Bezüglich der Frage, wo das Futūḥ aš-Šām redigiert worden sein könnte, gibt der Text keinen Hinweis darauf. Man könnte argumentieren, dass der Redaktionsprozess in einer Region stattgefunden haben müsse, die von den Kreuzzügen betroffen war, weil dieses Werk Hinweise auf diese beinhaltet. Dies könnte entweder Ägypten oder Syrien sein. Zwischen dem 12. und 13. Jh. haben die Ayyubiden (reg. 1174-1260) in Ägypten und Syrien regiert, die u. a. von religiösen Gedanken als ein Element zur Vereinigung der muslimischen Welt gegen die Kreuzfahrer profitiert haben. Man könnte also vermuten, dass die Redaktion des ursprünglichen Futūḥ aš-Šām al-Wāqidīs in diesem Kontext in Auftrag gegeben worden sei, so dass die Leserschaft nicht nur eine politische sondern auch eine religiöse Wahrnehmung von den Kreuzzügen erhält. Darüber hinaus wissen wir, dass gegen Ende des 12. Jh. und in der frühen Ayyubidenzeit eine Wiederbelebung der Geschichtsschreibug beobachtet werden kann, die dann unter den Mamluken weiter fortgesetzt wird. Man könnte die Aussage treffen, dass auch dieser Kontext zur Herstellung von zahlreichen Geschichtswerken zur Rehabilitierung des Futūḥ aš-Šām al-Wāqidīs in Form einer Redaktion dieses Werkes, was uns heute unter dem Namen al-Wāqidī zugeschriebenen Futūḥ aš-Šām vorliegt, beigetragen habe. ; The book Futūḥ al-Shām which is commonly ascribed in the scholarship to the distinguished historian of the 8th and early 9th centuries Muḥammad b. 'Umar al-Wāqidī (d. 207/823), has been considered for more than two centuries as a forged work, which was compiled in a later period (time of the Crusades) and was attributed to al-Wāqidī. Based on the results of an analysis of the structure, the content and the isnāds of the Futūḥ al-Shām, the thesis was suggested in this dissertation, that this work is essentially the original Futūḥ al-Shām of al-Wāqidī, whose form and content, however, was modified after al-Wāqidīs lifetime. In the following the results of the research as well as the theses of the dissertation are presented: By the analysis of the structure of the Futūḥ al-Shām, it was shown that the narrative of this work is a homogeneous narrative, which demonstrates a complete and gap-free structure. Therefore, the undertaken alteration in the original Futūḥ al-Shām seems to have been a systematic editorial work on this work. This redaction consists apparently of the following two types of modifications: firstly, the reports contained in the original Futūḥ al-Šām have been merged and the isnāds have been shortened or deleted, apparently in order to produce a larger uninterrupted fluent narrative than the original narrative of the work; secondly, religious details and elements have been added to the narrative of the original Futūḥ al-Shām, seemingly to enhance the role of religion, to convey an idealized image of Islam and Muslims from the time of the conquests, and to glorify Islam over Christianity. On the question of the time of the editorship, it was proposed that it was probably made between the 12th and 13th centuries, since on the one hand, direct quotations from the original Futūḥ al-Shām in Ibn'Asākirs Ta'rīkh madīnat Dimashq are in terms of form and to some extent content at difference with relevant places in the present Futūḥ al-Shām attributed to al-Wāqidī. This means that during the lifetime of Ibn 'Asākir (499/1106 - 571/1175) the original Futūḥ al-Shām existed and had still its original form and content. On the other hand, the oldest known manuscript of the present Futūḥ al-Shām (Saray Ahmet III 2886), i. e. the oldest known version of this work, has been written in 678/1279. Hence, it was argued for the period between the 12th and 13th centuries as the date of the development of the present Futūḥ al-Shām. An additional indication which speaks for this thesis was that the alleged direct quotes from the original Futūḥ al-Shām in 14th centry display a clear resemblance to the content of the present Futūḥ al-Shām, while the 12th-century quotes by Ibn'Asākirs show only a certain similarity. Regarding the question of the authenticity of this work, it was suggested that due to the addition of contents in the editorial process, not all of the contents of this work can be attributed to al-Wāqidī. The proposed period for the development of the present Futūḥ al-Shām (between the 12th and 13th centuries) falls into the time of the Crusades in the Middle East. It has already been shown in the scholarship on the present Futūḥ al-Shām that some of the terms appearing in this work can originate from the time of the Crusades (such as "afranj" and "al-muḥammadīyūn"). For this reason it is conceivable that contents from this period was adopted in this work in the editorial process. It seems that, above all, the emphasis on religious elements, which are aimed at the glorification of Islam against Christianity, comes partly from this period. Hence, one could suggest the thesis that this editorial work has had mainly a religious agenda. In addition, since the present Futūḥ al-Shām has a tendency to produce a fluid and complete narrative, it seems that this redaction was made, also to serve as a narrative for a wider Muslim audience. We know that in the 10th and 11th centuries, futuḥ works (supposedly in the Arabic-speaking regions of the Islamic world) were read to a wider audience. Therefore, it is conceivable that this editorial work was done to memorialize the superiority of Islam over Christianity to a wider Muslim audience during the Crusades. Regarding the question, where the present Futūḥ al-Shām was developed, this work provides no clue. It could be argued that the editorial process must have taken place in a region affected by the crusades, since the work contains indications to it. Given its content, it could be either Egypt or Syria. Between the 12th and 13th century, the Ayyubids (reigned 1174-1260) ruled Egypt and Syria and have benefited from religious thoughts as a strong element to unite the Muslim world against the crusaders. It could therefore be assumed that the editor(s) of the original Futūḥ al-Shām were commissioned in this context to undertake the redaction, so that the readership receives not only a political but also a religious perception of the crusades. Moreover, we know that in the late 12th and early Ayyubid periods, a revival of the historical writing can be observed, which then continues under the Mamluks. It could be suggested that this context of the production of numerous historical works also contributed to the rehabilitation of the original Futūḥ al-Shām of al-Wāqidī in the form of a redaction of this work.

The Situation In The Middle East Letter Dated 1 February 2018 From The Secretary-General Addressed To The President Of The Security Council (S/2018/84) ; United Nations S/PV.8174 Security Council Seventy-third year 8174th meeting Monday, 5 February 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East Letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/84) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-03099 (E) *1803099* S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 2/17 18-03099 The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m. Expression of thanks to the outgoing President The President (spoke in Arabic): As this is the first public meeting of the Security Council for the month of February, I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to His Excellency Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan, for his service as President of the Council for the month of January. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Ambassador Umarov and his team for the great diplomatic skill with which they conducted the Council's business last month. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/84) The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2018/84, which contains the text of a letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. I now give the floor to Ms. Nakamitsu. Ms. Nakamitsu: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council once again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical-weapons programme. I remain in regular contact with the Director- General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to discuss matters related to this issue; I spoke to him last week. In addition, I met with the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations this past Friday. At the time of my previous briefing, planning was under way with regard to the destruction of the remaining two stationary above-ground facilities of the 27 declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. I am informed that the OPCW, working with the United Nations Office for Project Services, is currently at the stage of finalizing a contract with a private company to carry out the destruction, which I understand could be completed within two months. There have been some developments on the issues related to Syria's initial declaration and subsequent amendments. The translation and analysis of documents that were provided to the OPCW by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in November have been completed. The OPCW has indicated that this information provided clarifications on some issues. However, the OPCW is continuing to follow up with the Government of Syria on the remaining gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies. The Director- General will submit a report in that regard to the next session of the OPCW Executive Council, which will take place in March. Further to its routine inspections in Syria, samples taken by the OPCW team during its second inspection at the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre are currently being analysed by two OPCW-designated laboratories. The Executive Council will be informed of the results of the inspection via a separate note from the Director-General to the next session of the Executive Council. The OPCW Fact-finding Mission continues to look into all allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the majority of which involve the use of toxic chemicals, such a chlorine, in areas not under the control of the Government. The Fact-finding Mission expects to submit a report on the allegations very soon. In addition, another Fact-finding Mission team has been looking into allegations of the use of chemical weapons brought to the attention of the OPCW by the Government of Syria. At the time of our previous briefing, a Fact-finding Mission team was in Damascus, at the invitation of the Government, to look into several of those allegations. I am informed that a report in that regard is also pending. 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 3/17 There is still work to do before resolution 2118 (2013) can be considered to have been fully implemented, and for the international community to have shared confidence that the chemical-weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic has been fully eliminated. Moreover, allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria have continued, including just this past weekend in the town of Saraqeb. That makes abundantly clear our continuing and collective responsibility to ensure that those responsible are held to account. New reports by the Fact-finding Mission are pending. Should they conclude that there has been the use, or likely use, of chemical weapons in any of those alleged incidents, our obligation to enact a meaningful response will be further intensified. It is my hope, and the hope of the Secretary-General, that such a response will favour unity, not impunity. As always, the Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can. The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her briefing. I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): The news out of Syria this morning is following a troubling pattern. There are reports of yet another chemical-weapon attack on Sunday. Victims of what appears to be chlorine gas are pouring into hospitals. Few things have horrified my country and the world as much as the Al-Assad regime's use of chemical weapons against its people. The Security Council has been outspoken on ending Syria's use of chemical weapons, and yet they continue. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 2118 (2013), the Al-Assad regime's obligations are clear: it must immediately stop using all chemical weapons. It must address the gaps and inconsistencies in its Chemical Weapons Convention declaration. And it must destroy all of its remaining chemical weapons under the supervision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). These are worthy goals. These are urgent goals. Yet we spent much of last year in the Council watching one country protect the Al-Assad regime's use of chemical weapons by refusing to hold them responsible. What do the American people see? What do people of all countries see? They see a Council that cannot agree to take action, even after the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, created by the Council, found that the Al-Assad regime used chemical weapons. Now we have reports that the Al-Assad regime has used chlorine gas against its people multiple times in recent weeks, including just yesterday. There is obvious evidence from dozens of victims, and therefore we proposed a draft press statement by the Security Council condemning these attacks. So far, Russia has delayed the adoption of the draft statement — a simple condemnation of Syrian children being suffocated by chlorine gas. I hope Russia takes the appropriate step to adopt the draft text, thus showing that the Council is unified in condemning chemical-weapon attacks. Accountability is a fundamental principle, but it is just the first step. Our goal must be to end the use of these evil, unjustifiable weapons. When actions have consequences — when perpetrators are identified and punished — we come closer to reaching our goal. But if we cannot even take the first step of establishing accountability for the use of chemical weapons, we have to seriously ask ourselves why we are here. The requirements for establishing accountability for the use of chemical weapons have not changed since the Council voted unanimously to create the Joint Investigative Mechanism, in 2015. They have not changed since Russia acted alone to kill the Mechanism last year. Such a mechanism must be independent and impartial. It must be free of politics. It must be controlled by experts, not politicians or diplomats. And it must be definitive. The latest Russian draft resolution does not meet any of those criteria. Russia's draft resolution completely ignores the findings of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, which was an investigation that Russia supported until the investigators found the Al-Assad regime to be responsible. That should already be enough to make us sceptical. However, there are other deep problems. For their new investigation, Russia wants to be able to cherry-pick the investigators. It wants to insert unnecessary and arbitrary investigative standards. And it wants the Security Council to be able to review all the findings of this investigation and decide what makes it into the final report. That is not an impartial mechanism; it is a way to whitewash the findings of the last investigation that Russia desperately wants to bury. No one should believe that the draft resolution is a good basis for discussion, when it is designed to undermine our core principles on chemical weapons. We cannot S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 4/17 18-03099 hope to end the use of chemical weapons if those who use them escape the consequences of their actions. Therefore, while we regret the need for its creation, we applaud the efforts of France to launch the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons. That is yet another way to hold accountable the Al-Assad regime and any group that uses chemical weapons. The United States has also announced that we will contribute to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. The United States strongly supports the Mechanism as a valuable tool to hold the Al-Assad regime accountable for its atrocities, including its repeated and ongoing use of chemical weapons. It is a true tragedy that Russia has sent us back to square one in the effort to end the use of chemical weapons in Syria. But we will not cease in our efforts to know the truth of the Al-Assad regime — and ensure that the truth is known and acted on by the international community. That is why we hosted all 15 members of the Council at the United States Holocaust Museum last week. The exhibit was called "Syria: Please Don't Forget Us". All of us saw undeniable evidence of the Al-Assad regime's atrocities and human rights violations. We cannot, and should not, forget the Syrian people. The United States will not forget them. While the Council has not yet been able to act to provide real accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the United States will not give up on the responsibility to do so. That is the sincere wish of the American people, and I know that it is shared by many on the Council. We are not motivated by score-settling, payback or power politics. We are motivated by the urgent need to end the unique and horrible suffering that chemical weapons have inflicted on innocent men, women and children in Syria. The Syrian people are counting on us. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I would like to thank High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing. We are holding this meeting in the open Chamber today after reports of a series of chemical attacks in eastern Ghouta within the past month, as the Al-Assad regime continues its merciless bombing and killing of civilians. Over the weekend, there were further allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Idlib, as well as air strikes by pro-regime forces that reportedly hit three hospitals, leaving doctors scrambling to remove premature babies from their incubators in order to move them. I cannot say that they were moving them to safety, because the reality is that for the citizens of Idlib and eastern Ghouta, nowhere is safe. We are appalled by this violence and the reports of deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, and we call on all parties to the conflict to uphold international humanitarian law and protect civilians. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is already investigating reports of the use of chemical weapons in recent weeks, but establishing who is responsible for that use will be much more difficult, because Russia has vetoed the continuation of the independent, expert OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) three times, in order to protect the Al-Assad regime. We would welcome any serious attempt to re-establish a properly independent investigative and attribution mechanism for continuing the JIM's meticulous work. Sadly, we do not yet see that in the Russian proposal. Any successor investigation must be empowered to investigate all use of chemical weapons, whoever the perpetrator may be. Yet the Russian proposal focuses only on non-State actors. We have repeatedly condemned Da'esh for its use of chemical weapons, which the JIM clearly reported. But given Al-Assad's track record of chemical-weapon use and its failure to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention, it is imperative to ensure that any new mechanism also investigates the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. A second objection is the proposal that experts would merely gather evidence, leaving the Council to decide what it meant. No other United Nations expert panel that I know of is specifically prohibited from reaching conclusions and reporting to the Council on its findings on what has happened. We are not specialists on chemical weapons around this table. We rely on independent, United Nations-selected expert panels. The entire purpose of the JIM was that an independent panel would reach conclusions on the basis of the evidence, taking the issue out of the hands of us, the Member States and Council members, because we have been unable to agree. Russia's proposal looks as if it is designed to avoid the political embarrassment of having to use its veto power to defend the indefensible when independent bodies report on what has truly happened. The underlying intent seems to be to ensure that there are no clear conclusions in future reports. 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 5/17 Thirdly, we object to the proposal's demands that the standard of proof should be beyond reasonable doubt. That standard has not been used in any other comparable past or current United Nations investigation. It is used in relation to criminal prosecutions in courts of law, which have significantly greater investigative powers and independence than those envisaged in Russia's text. Finally, the proposal insists on site visits, despite the explicit provision in the Chemical Weapons Convention for other ways to gather relevant evidence, recognizing the difficulty of safe and timely visits. There is no scientific basis for this proposal. It is simply an attempt to hamstring future investigations and discredit the JIM. Of course, Russia made much of the lack of a site visit to Khan Shaykhun, despite the fact that the Al-Assad regime handed over to the United Nations samples from the site that contained chemical signatures unique to regime sarin, obviating the need for such a visit. It is for those reasons that the current text is unacceptable. The JIM set a high standard of impartiality and expertise. We expect that standard from any future mechanism. The Syrian regime, of course, claims not to have used chemical weapons. Yet over the years two separate reports from the JIM, under separate leadership panels, drawing on a broad range of respected independent international experts, concluded that the regime had used chlorine at least three times — in Talmenes in April 2014 and in Sarmin and Qmenas in March 2015 — and had used sarin to attack Khan Shaykhun in April 2017. We should also remember the infamous attack in eastern Ghouta in August 2013, when a separate United Nations investigation found that sarin was used to kill hundreds and injure thousands. That attack brought near-universal international condemnation, and following our concerted international pressure, Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. Syria promised, as it was legally obliged to do, to destroy and abandon its chemical-weapon programme. Yet it has been unable to satisfy inspectors that it has done so. We have to ask ourselves why that is. In 2013 Russia promised to act as a guarantor for the Al-Assad regime's compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Yet month after month we all sit here and hear that Al-Assad has not done so. Why does Russia not compel the Syrian regime to comply with its obligations and make it impossible for it to use chemical weapons? Tragically, for the people of Syria, the regime continues to use chemical weapons with impunity. If it is confirmed that Al-Assad has again used chemical weapons on his own people, it would not only be another entry in the catalogue of his war crimes, it would also be another attack on us all, Members of the United Nations who have worked for decades — in the words of the Chemical Weapons Convention, for the sake of all mankind — to completely exclude the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. Throughout history, our peoples have said "never again" — among others, starting with the First World War battlefields, in Ethiopia, in Manchuria and in Saddam Hussein's attacks on Iran and on Iraqi Kurds. Let us, the members of the Council, stand up for the peoples of the United Nations, determined that such abhorrent chemical weapons should never be used. Let us stand up for the people of Syria and give them a real investigation into those responsible for the use of chemical weapons — an investigation that pursues justice for the horrific crimes committed against them. Let us signal our determination to pursue accountability by all means available, even if one member of the Security Council is currently preventing us from taking action here. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I would first like to congratulate Kuwait through you, Mr. President, on the start of its presidency of the Security Council. You can rely on France's support in the month to come. I would also like to thank Izumi Nakamitsu for her usual very informative briefing. This is the second time we have met in less than two weeks after reports of four new cases of the use of chlorine against Syria's civilian population, some of them in Idlib province, which is a de-escalation zone. We are examining the information that is available and waiting for the conclusions of the investigative mechanism, but the reality is that resorting to toxic substances as weapons has never ended in Syria. I would like to remind the Council that the Syrian regime has already been identified as the perpetrator in four such cases, one of which involved the use of sarin, in violation of international humanitarian law and the obligations that Syria assumed when it acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The challenges go beyond the Syrian issue. A century after the end of the First World War, in which mustard gas was used on a massive scale against civilians, what we are seeing is shocking. These weapons, which we had thought were a thing of the past, are once again being used methodically and systematically by the Syrian regime against its own people. Furthermore, there is a real threat of such S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 6/17 18-03099 weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. The threat is all the greater given the fact that the dismantling of the Syrian chemical-weapon programme remains at a deadlock. The cooperation of the Syrian regime with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has for months taken place in a piecemeal manner, and suspicions remain about the status of Syrian stockpiles. I would recall that OPCW expert teams have repeatedly found at Syrian sites indicators of undeclared substances, without any convincing explanation being provided by the country. Given that chemical weapons continue to be used, it seems that Syria has lied and maintained clandestine capacities. The situation is aggravating regional instability, undermining the non-proliferation regime and weakening the international security architecture, as well as jeopardizing the security of each of our States. It represents a violation of the law and flouts the most fundamental principles of humanity. The international community cannot downplay the situation and allow the perpetrators of these heinous crimes to remain unpunished. It is the responsibility of the Security Council to prevent this; it is our shared responsibility. The criminals who chose to design and use these barbaric weapons must be punished. At stake is the future of our collective security system; no one can be allowed to undermine its foundations without facing consequences. The hindrances and obstructions facing the international community's initiatives within existing bodies contribute to promoting impunity, and this we cannot accept. For that reason, France launched in Paris an open, pragmatic partnership that brings together States that reject impunity for individuals involved in chemical-weapon attacks or in the development of chemical-weapon programmes. It brings together all the States concerned about the threat of erosion of the non-proliferation regime and of strategic stability. It was designed to support all international bodies and investigative mechanisms in their efforts. This universal partnership applies to all instances of the use of such weapons throughout the world by all perpetrators, be they State or non-State actors. The partnership is open, and States that embrace these principles are invited to join. Like everyone else here, we hope that a mechanism for the identification of those responsible will be recreated as soon as possible. However, any sincere and credible effort to that end must align with the basic standards of independence, impartiality and professionalism that underpinned the Joint Investigative Mechanism, as the very reason for the establishment of such a regime is to determine the truth. Within the Council, France will be very vigilant with respect to the principles listed and will not accept a lesser mechanism. Impunity in Syria is not an option. The perpetrators of all of the crimes committed in Syria will be held accountable, sooner or later. The International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria, which we support, is a part of that process. That is the only way to ensure lasting peace in Syria, and this can come about only in the framework of an inclusive political solution in Geneva, in line with resolution 2254 (2015), which more than ever before represents our shared compass. The repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria has been proved. We cannot turn a blind eye to this, for no one can now say that they did not know. Denial or hypocrisy, or a combination of of the two, cannot be presented as a strategy. The persistent use of chemical weapons in Syria represents a violation of the universal conscience as well as the most fundamental principles of international law. It also poses a potentially lethal threat to the sustainability of the international non-proliferation regime, which is the most comprehensive and successful of all of the international non-proliferation regimes. To allow it to be undermined without any response would be to accept the erosion of the entire international regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that we have built together, stone by stone, over the course of decades and which constitutes the very backbone of the international security architecture as well as one of the paramount gains of multilateralism. On behalf of France, I call on all members of the Security Council to shift their attitudes and adjust their focus. The heavy responsibility that we all bear requires that we join together and take action. Mr. Llorenty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation wishes to congratulate you once again, Sir, as well as the Permanent Mission of Kuwait, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. We are also grateful for the briefing provided by the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu. We also 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 7/17 wish to acknowledge the letter sent by the Secretary- General (S/2018/84) concerning the periodic report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Bolivia believes that there can be no justification for the use of chemical weapons, regardless of circumstances and by whomsoever committed, as such use is a serious violation of international law and poses a grave threat to international peace and security. We therefore categorically condemn the use of chemical weapons or substances as weapons, as we deem this an unjustifiable and criminal act, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed. In that context, we express our grave concern about the ongoing reports of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, especially in eastern Ghouta. If that is confirmed, the Council should remain united in order to ensure that the perpetrators are held accountable and brought to justice, so that there is no impunity for their actions. We commend the coordination between the OPCW and the United Nations Office for Project Services in all of the arrangements aimed at making possible the destruction of the two remaining facilities as well as the preparedness of the Syrian Government to achieve this end. We call on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with the OPCW on this initiative, as well as during the second inspection of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre. We encourage the Fact-finding Mission to continue its investigation so that, in accordance with its mandate, it can investigate, in the most objective, methodical and technical manner, reports of the use of chemicals weapons on Syrian territory. In that regard, we highlight the latest visit to the city of Damascus during January, and we will await the results thereof. We call on all parties involved to cooperate fully as well as to provide viable and reliable information, so that an effective investigation of all of the ongoing cases can be conducted as soon as possible. Concerned about the reports of the use of chemical weapons, we deem it essential to establish as soon as possible an independent, impartial and representative mechanism to carry out a full, reliable and conclusive investigation of the cases referred by the Fact-finding Mission that will make it possible to identify those responsible for such acts. Nevertheless, if we want to create a new, transparent accountability mechanism, we have the major challenge and the responsibility of not instrumentalizing the Security Council for political ends. In that vein, we view the Russian proposal as a new and positive opportunity to reach this goal. We therefore call on the members of the Council to commit themselves to a process of purposeful negotiation, and we echo the words of the Secretary-General in his letter transmitting the current report, calling on the Security Council to demonstrate unity on this issue, which is so vital for the international community. Finally, we reiterate that the only option for resolving the conflict in Syria and prevent more people from becoming victims is through an inclusive political transition led by and benefiting the Syrian people that respects their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Since this is the first public meeting of the Security Council for the month of February, I would like to congratulate the delegation of Kuwait on the commencement of its presidency and wish it great success in implementing its ambitious programme of work. I am grateful to High Representative Nakamitsu for her informative briefing. Our position on this issue remains unchanged. We strongly condemn any use of chemical weapons and advocate that such threats must be eliminated in the future. We firmly believe that there must be accountability for perpetrators of such crimes. Today I would like to concentrate on three major points. First, we support the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as reflected in its fifty-second report (S/2018/84, annex). The speedy destruction, probably in two months, of the remaining chemical-weapon production facilities and resolving all outstanding issues relating to the declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic are of the utmost importance. That would help to dispel all existing doubts on many principal issues and to comprehend the real situation in the country. It is commendable that, during the inspection of Barzah and Jamrayah, all samples were sealed, packaged and shipped to OPCW's laboratory and were received there in the presence of the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, observing all established rules. We look forward to the follow-up to the OPCW's work, and we will also await the results S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 8/17 18-03099 of a thorough analysis of the documents submitted by Syria by the Declaration Assessment Team. Secondly, the continuing reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria are extremely alarming. But the most alarming fact is that the Council has not yet restored its investigative potential to properly respond to such cases. I recall the words of the Secretary-General, who pointed to the serious gap that had arisen at the end of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which leaves one with the feeling that impunity will continue without any strict monitoring. Thirdly, and lastly, considering the current developments, it is also most critical that a new mechanism be established as soon as possible. We here in the Council are not experts on chemical weapons — neither to judge or blame anyone — but must act on the basis of credible evidence provided to us by an independent, impartial and representative investigative body we can all trust. In that regard, we support the ongoing consultations on creating a new investigative instrument, in order to prevent any further use of chemical weapons and to bring perpetrators to justice. We are ready to participate actively and contribute to the earliest revival and ultimate realization of our investigative potential. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We join others in congratulating your delegation, Sir, on having assumed the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. We support you in discharging your tasks, which we are sure you will do in full. We welcome the holding of this meeting and thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu for her valuable briefing on this topic. Peru condemns the use of chemical weapons by any actor, in any place and under any circumstance. Their use against the civilian population in Syria is a war crime and a flagrant violation of international law, international humanitarian law and the non-proliferation regimes. In that regard, Peru believes it is essential for the international community, and in particular the Security Council, to remain resolute and united in its support for the non-proliferation regime and in ensuring that those responsible for these atrocious crimes — which are also threats to international peace and security — be held accountable. We must continue to demand that the Syrian Government fulfil its commitment to cooperate with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the elimination of all of its chemical weapons. We take note of some recent progress, such as the imminent destruction of the last two declared chemical-weapon production facilities, as verified preliminarily by the OPCW last November, and the allocation of new financial resources to that end. Nevertheless, we are concerned that key points of the Syrian Government's declaration have yet to be verified, more than four years after its accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. We hope that the 19 recently translated documents that were provided to the OPCW will help rectify errors and omissions and clear up discrepancies. We reaffirm our commitment and support to the OPCW, whose Executive Council Peru is honoured to be a member of. In the face of new reports of chemical-weapon attacks in eastern Ghouta and Idlib, Peru expresses its solidarity with the victims and reiterates the urgent need to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of such atrocities. Like a majority of Council members, we believe that accountability is essential to safeguarding the international non-proliferation regimes. Preventing this threat requires a credible deterrent. With that goal in mind, we believe it is urgent to establish an attributive mechanism with the highest standards of professionalism, objectivity, transparency and, primarily, independence in order to fill the gap left by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. My delegation will continue to work constructively to create a new mechanism that addresses the legitimate concerns of all Council members and of the international community. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I also want to congratulate you, Mr. President, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I also thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing today. In recent weeks there have been new, alarming reports of alleged chemical-weapon attacks in Syria. The most recent allegation was this weekend in Idlib. These reported attacks must be immediately investigated by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission, to which we offer our full and unreserved support. We reiterate our strongest condemnation of the use of chemical weapons. It is a serious violation 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 9/17 of international law and it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Their use in armed conflict amounts to a war crime. Perpetrators of such crimes must be held accountable. We cannot accept impunity. That is why Sweden joined the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, initiated by France. As a member of the Security Council and of the OPCW Executive Council, we support all international efforts to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State and non-State actors alike anywhere in the world. We count on this initiative to complement and support our collective work in multilateral forums, as well as the existing multilateral mechanisms to achieve unity around those important goals. That also includes the Human Rights Council's Commission of Inquiry and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, both of which have important mandates in collecting information. I again thank High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing today. She reminded us that work remains on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013). The outstanding issues relating to Syria's initial declaration must be resolved without further delay. We again call upon the Syrian authorities to fully cooperate with the OPCW in that regard. As the Secretary-General has stated, the continuing allegations highlight yet again our shared obligation to identify and hold to account those responsible for the use chemical weapons on Syria. We need to heed his call, come together and act. That is why Sweden has engaged in the negotiations on establishing a new independent and impartial attributive mechanism. The Council has a responsibility to protect the international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and for ensuring accountability. Negotiations need to be in good faith, but with the objective of establishing a truly independent, impartial and effective mechanism for accountability. Ms. Wronecka (Poland) (spoke in Arabic): I would like to take this opportunity to wish the delegation of Kuwait every success in implementing the programme of work for this month. (spoke in English) Let me thank High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu for her informative briefing. We appreciate the ongoing work of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Fact-finding Mission. We welcome the cooperation between the secretariat and the United Nations Office for Project Services, which facilitated the destruction of the two remaining chemical-weapon production facilities. We look forward to the results of the analysis by the Declaration Assessment Team of a set of documents and declarations submitted by Syria. Chemical weapons continue to pose a threat to the people of Syria. Repeated allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, including the recent ones, serve to underline the fact that there is still a challenge to international peace and security, as well as to the credibility of the Chemical Weapons Convention regime. In that context, there is a genuine need for a clear message that impunity for perpetrators is not an option. We have clearly stated in various forums that the use of chemical weapons by anyone — State and non-State actors alike — anywhere and under any circumstances must be rigorously condemned and those responsible for such acts must be held accountable. We agree that the Security Council needs to take steps in order to establish a credible, professional and independent investigative mechanism. We have therefore engaged in the discussions to find the best solution for the future mechanism. I would like to focus on three points. First, Poland has supported the work of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and continues to support the establishment of an independent and credible investigative mechanism aimed at holding accountable the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. However, a future mechanism will not operate in a void. The instrument must build on the Joint Investigative Mechanism. Not only should it build on the significant achievements of the JIM, but its mandate must not deviate from resolution 2235 (2015). Secondly, the mandate of the mechanism should be balanced. There is a need to identify not only the individuals, entities and groups but also the Governments responsible for any use of chemicals as weapons. Thirdly, one of the most important elements of the mandate must be to ensure that the mechanism is independent in its proceedings and conclusions and S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 10/17 18-03099 free from the pressure of political verification of its conclusions by the Council. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): Allow me once again to congratulate you, Mr. President, and the State of Kuwait on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I wish you every success and assure you of our full support. Allow me also to express my congratulations and appreciation to Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and her team for the presentation of the comprehensive and detailed briefing on the current political and humanitarian situation with regard to chemical weapons in Syria. The political — and in particular the humanitarian — crisis in Syria is reaching alarming proportions. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea expresses its solidarity with the families of the countless victims, as well as with the thousands of displaced people trapped by the hostilities and the more than 13 million people who currently need humanitarian assistance as a result of the continuing conflict. I would like to take this opportunity to condemn the loss of numerous civilian lives in this conflict, and I call on all parties to comply with international law on the protection of civilians and to distinguish between military and civilian objectives and refrain from firing rocket launchers into populated areas, as is being reported in eastern Ghouta. Equatorial Guinea can only express its satisfaction at the destruction of almost all the chemical-weapon production facilities declared by the Syrian Arab Republic thanks to the technical assistance of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, while we welcome the cooperation between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW, it is necessary to be vigilant and to continue to condemn in the strongest terms any possible use, development, acquisition or manufacture of chemical weapons in the country or transfers of such weapons to other States or non-State actors. In that regard, we vigorously condemn the recent use of toxic chemical weapons by whomsoever. The perpetrators of such horrendous acts must be brought to justice and sentenced appropriately. For seven years already, Syria has been a war scenario that crystallizes internal, regional and, even, international divisions. The primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security bestowed upon the Security Council by the Charter of the United Nations should lead the 15 member countries of this principal organ of the United Nations to overcome their differences regarding the situation in Syria and to renounce their political and strategic interests in favour of the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people to achieve well-being and prosperity. In that regard, it is appropriate that, as Russia has already proposed, another mechanism be established to replace the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism so that it can carry out the necessary investigations on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and thereby arrive at a result that garners consensus among the members of the Council in order to again unify our criteria for an objective examination of the situation. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, at the beginning of your presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I wish you every success. We also thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her briefing. We trust that, with the assistance of the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the two remaining above-ground Syrian chemical-weapon facilities will be promptly destroyed. The Syrian side has repeatedly demonstrated its interest in that. The pending issues related to the initial declarations should be dealt with as part of the dialogue between the OPCW and the Syrian Government. We welcome such cooperation, by which Syria, as a conscientious party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, provides the necessary assistance, complies with its obligations and facilitates access to the relevant documents. Many people have raised false issues that should now be closed and put aside. Syria's chemical-weapon capacity was destroyed under the oversight of the OPCW. However, it seems that there are some who wish to contrive to fan the flames on the issue. The Syrians have provided exhaustive explanations. However, issues are being raised and questions are being asked in a endless cycle. The Syrian side consistently reports to the international community, including the Security Council, about the detection of toxic chemical substances in areas liberated from the terrorists. There 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 11/17 are reports from Syria about possible provocations that may be used by representatives of foreign intelligence services. All such reports must be investigated immediately by the experts of the OPCW. However, we note that, in general, tremendous efforts are necessary for The Hague to duly respond to the important message. There are numerous pretexts being put forward not to travel there and decisions are being delayed. In the light of last year's story of Khan Shaykhun and the Shayrat air base, such conduct suggests deliberate sabotage. However, the statements today have left us with the impression that it is not Syria that some delegations are interested in. The United States and the United Kingdom have used today's meeting to slander Russia, and it is quite clear why that is happening. Someone cannot tolerate the success of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi and the prospects it offers for injecting new momentum into the political process in Syria. That requires launching a major campaign of slander against Russia in order to try, not for the first time, to cast doubt on Russia's role in the Syrian political settlement. As always, the statements of these representatives contain a grain of truth mixed with mountains of lies. Russia has never contested the use of sarin in Khan Shaykhun. But who it was used by is still a mystery, because the absurd conclusions of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) have not convinced us. In the past few days there has been general uproar about alleged incidents involving the use of chlorine in some Damascus suburbs. There has already been talk of the use of sarin. Where? When? By whom? The outlines of this propaganda campaign are not new. The terrorists, through the social associations that are closely linked to them, foremost among them the notorious White Helmets, spread rumours via social networks. These are instantly picked up by the Western press, and then we get representatives speechifying in the Security Council, making unproved accusations about the so-called Syrian regime and spreading slander about Russia. I have said it before and I will say it again: has anyone thought to ask the basic question as to why the Syrian Government needs to use chemical weapons? What do we suppose that could do for it? The first thing we should do, and various speakers today, particularly the representative of Sweden, have discussed this, is to send an OPCW fact-finding mission to those areas to investigate. Where is the presumption of innocence? The speakers are blaming the so-called regime for everything in advance, before any investigation. What do they want an independent investigative mechanism for? Surely at least they know that an investigation has to precede any conclusions. But apparently they do not need one. In my opinion, it should be completely clear to everyone that that the capitals that these representatives represent in the Council have absolutely no interest in any investigation. They do not need facts or precise evidence. They need to see a political order carried out. On 23 January, Russia announced the launch in the Security Council of expert efforts to draft a resolution establishing a new investigative entity for incidents involving the use of chemical weapons to replace the defunct OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which was killed by the United States and its allies when they blocked the draft resolution (S/2017/968) that we proposed, together with China and Bolivia, designed to ensure that the Mechanism could be genuinely independent and professional. Not only do they not recall that episode, they have made strenuous attempts to convince the Security Council and the world community of the opposite. It has become clear that some of our partners are not prepared to consider this possibility. They want a second JIM that would continue to rubber-stamp the scientifically and technically ridiculous anti-Damascus conclusions on the basis of disinformation generously supplied by militant groups. They have long had a persistent allergy to the pressing need to pay close attention to the activities of terrorist groups, both in Syria and beyond its borders, in the context of manipulating toxic substances. In the realization that we will not allow the now entirely discredited JIM to be revived, Syria's opponents are now attempting to take alternative routes, cobbling together narrow groups of like-minded people. However, they are forgetting that in doing that they are undermining the authority of international bodies, particularly the United Nations and the OPCW, and destroying the international architecture on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Any initiatives in the context of the use of chemical weapons that circumvent the OPCW would be illegitimate. We certainly hope that the leadership of the United Nations Secretariat and the OPCW Technical Secretariat will make a firm show of will and distance themselves from such dubious projects. S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 12/17 18-03099 We are ready to accept a press statement on the Syrian chemical issue, but not the one proposed by its sponsors, because in its current form its purpose is quite clearly to blame the Government of Syria for what is so far the unproved use of chemical weapons. Somehow the draft statement does not say anything about the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, but the reference to Article 7 of the Charter of the United Nations leaves no doubt as to its essence. We cannot accept any still unconfirmed references to the use of chemical weapons without a credible investigation, nor can we accept any threats to a sovereign State for unproved actions. For some reason, eastern Ghouta has been dragged into the statement. I would like to remind the Council that last week we were prepared to accept an agreed-on draft presidential statement on the humanitarian situation in Syria. But our partners preferred to reject it. We are ready to accept a press statement, but not as it is proposed by our colleagues. We have proposed amendments to it that we are ready to circulate and agree on in that form. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): I would like to congratulate Kuwait through you, Mr. President, on its accession to the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February, to wish it every success and assure it of Côte d'Ivoire's cooperation. I would also like to thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for her excellent briefing. My delegation commends the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons through its Fact-finding Mission with regard to the dismantling of Syria's chemical-weapon stocks. We encourage the Syrian Government to comply with decisions regarding the destruction of its chemical arsenal. My delegation is seriously concerned about the reports in the past week once again alleging the possible use of chemical weapons in the conflict in Syria, particularly in eastern Ghouta, where 21 cases of suffocation have been reported. They represent a significant reversal in our efforts to combat impunity with regard to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. The suffering inflicted on the Syrian people is intolerable and must be ended. In that regard, my country calls for continued efforts to implement resolution 2118 (2013), which provides for the complete dismantling of the Syrian chemical-weapons arsenal. These new allegations of the use of chemical weapons once again call into question the Council's responsibility, particularly in terms of putting an end to these acts as soon as possible and of clearly identifying the perpetrators of such criminal acts. In its latest statement on the issue of chemical weapons in Syria (see S/PV.8164), my delegation warned against the Council's failure to act, which could be interpreted by those involved in the use of such weapons in Syria as a weakness of this organ and licence to act with impunity. Clearly, those who commit these despicable acts will continue to do so as long as the Council remains divided about the need to set up a consensus-based framework capable of identifying perpetrators and bringing them to justice. My delegation therefore encourages all ongoing initiatives that support the establishment of an accountability mechanism acceptable to all. In conclusion, Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons in Syria and calls upon the relevant United Nations mechanisms to shed light on the new allegations of the use of such weapons. My delegation eagerly awaits the conclusions of the report that will be submitted after the second round of inspections conducted at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre in Syria. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China congratulates Kuwait on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the current month. We also commend Kazakhstan for its accomplishments during its presidency last month. I wish to thank the High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing. China welcomes the progress achieved in the verification and destruction of the two remaining chemical-weapon facilities within Syria's borders. We support the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in continuing its coordination and cooperation with the Syrian Government so as to properly settle all the questions revolving around the initial declarations of chemical weapons by Syria through the OPCW platform. China expresses its deepest sympathy to the Syrian people for their suffering as the result of chemical weapons. No use of chemical weapons will be tolerated. Lately, there have been some media reports of suspected use of chlorine and other poisonous chemicals as weapons within Syria's borders, over which China wishes to register its deepest concern. It is hoped that 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 13/17 the parties will carry out verification of the related incidents as soon as possible. When it comes to the question of chemical weapons, China's position is as clear cut as it is consistent. We stand firmly against the use of chemical weapons by any country, organization or individual for whatever purpose and under any circumstances. China supports conducting comprehensive, objective and impartial investigations into any alleged use of chemical weapons within Syrian borders so as to come up with results that withstand the test of time, square with the facts and help bring the perpetrators to justice. Establishing a new chemical-weapon investigative mechanism is critical to getting to the bottom of the chemical-weapon incidents as well as warding off any future recurrences in Syria. All Council parties should work together to that end. China supports the efforts on the part of Russia to promote the establishment of a new investigative mechanism into the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We hope that the members of the Council will continue to engage in constructive consultations so as to achieve consensus at an early date. The chemical-weapon issue in Syria is closely related to a political settlement to the Syrian situation. Major achievements have been made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, held recently in Sochi, which played a positive role in advancing the Syrian political process, while lending impetus to relaunching the Geneva talks. It is China's hope that relevant parties will support the Security Council and the OPCW in continuing to act as the main channel for tackling the Syrian chemical-weapon issue, adopt a constructive attitude, seek proper solutions through consultation, maintain the unity of the Council and work with the United Nations and with the relevant parties in advancing the political process in Syria. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): As this is the first time that I take the floor under the Kuwaiti presidency of the Security Council, I would like to congratulate and honour Kuwait's assumption of the presidency by trying to offer my thanks in Arabic: (spoke in Arabic) Thank you, Mr. President. (spoke in English) I would also like to thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her comprehensive and clear briefing. I will address three issues today: first, reports of the renewed use of chemical weapons in Syria; secondly, the need for accountability; and, thirdly, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) report at hand (S/2018/84, annex). With respect to the renewed use of chemical weapons in the past weeks, the Kingdom of the Netherlands is shocked at the recent reports of chemical attacks in Syria, including this weekend and last night. We are outraged. In Douma, in eastern Ghouta, and last night in Saraqeb, in Idlib, innocent civilians, including children, have become victims once again of horrible chemical-weapon attacks. Such attacks deserve the strongest condemnation of the Security Council as violations of international law. Furthermore, recent OPCW laboratory tests show that samples of the chemical attack on Ghouta in August 2013 correspond to the chemical-weapons arsenal declared by the Syrian regime in 2014 and the Khan Shaykun attack in 2017. This confirms once again that the Al-Assad regime uses chemical weapons against its own population. We pay tribute to the work of the White Helmets, who have saved more a 100,000 civilians from the rubble of the Syrian war. The use of chemical weapons should never go unpunished. Impunity erodes the important prohibition against the use of chemical weapons. It is inconceivable that impunity now reigns, which brings me to my second point, namely, the need for accountability. As others have said, we had a well-functioning and professional mechanism to ensure accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). The JIM repeatedly determined the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime and by Da'esh. It had a strong mandate to investigate and identify perpetrators independently from the politics of the Security Council. And it did so accordingly, but the renewal of its mandate fell victim to the repeated use of the veto. However, that does not mean that we now need to settle for less. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is prepared to work together on any proposal that strengthens accountability and the international rule of law. But let me emphasize that a weak accountability mechanism is not an option. For us, the fundamental characteristics of any accountability mechanism are the principles of impartiality, independence, comprehensiveness and effectiveness. S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 14/17 18-03099 In order to uphold those principles, a mechanism should at least meet the following requirements. First, it should operate independently from the Security Council, including when it comes to the attribution of guilt. It should be impartial. The separation of powers is necessary to prevent undue politicization. Secondly, the mechanism should be effective; it should independently decide how it will conduct its investigations, including when it comes to analysing facts and assessing the quality of evidence. Lastly, it should be comprehensive and investigate and identify perpetrators among all parties to the armed conflict — both State and non-State actors. The draft resolution that is currently being discussed has not yet met those important principles. That brings me to my third point, namely, the fifty-second OPCW report (S/2018/84, annex), which the High Representative presented very clearly in her briefing. The report points out that, unfortunately, too little progress has been made by the Syrian authorities in addressing the outstanding questions that the OPCW posed about the declaration of the Syrian authorities. It is essential that the Syrian authorities cooperate seriously with the OPCW. The Kingdom of the Netherlands supports the continuation of the work of OPCW Fact-finding Mission. We call on all States to ensure that the Fact-finding Mission can continue its work independently. In conclusion, we stand ready to adopt the draft press statement, as circulated before. We are convinced that the Security Council cannot allow the continued use of chemical weapons to go unpunished. Impunity is a curse; accountability is a must. The Council has to act. As long as the Council is blocked from achieving accountability by the use of the veto, we will also continue our efforts outside the Council. We therefore strongly support other accountability initiatives for Syria, such as the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic and the Human Rights Council's Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. We also support the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, which was just highlighted by our French colleague. However, let me repeat what I have said in the Chamber before, the Council should refer the situation in Syria, especially the mass atrocities committed in the conflict, to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We are very pleased to see you, Mr. President, assuming responsibility for the presidency. I wish to thank High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing, which, as always, we found to be balanced, and therefore useful. We are in need of that kind of approach. Frankly speaking, we need that very desperately. During times such as this, when we seem to be so deeply divided, the role of United Nations officials like her becomes all the more critical. We thank her. We remain deeply concerned by the continued reports on the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons by any actor, State and non-State alike, in Syria or anywhere else. As we have stated repeatedly, the use of chemical weapons is totally unjustifiable under any circumstances. It constitutes a threat to international peace and security and undermines the international non-proliferation architecture. We cannot agree more with what the Secretary-General stated in the concluding paragraph of his letter of 1 February: "The fact of these continuing allegations again highlights the shared obligation to identify and hold to account those responsible for the use of chemical weapons." That is why the unity of the Council is absolutely important. Without it, the Council's ability to respond to grave threats to international peace and security, such as the use of chemicals as weapons, will be seriously hampered. In that regard, what High Representative Nakamitsu said a while ago is most relevant: "unity, not impunity". Let me say that we regret that the Council was not able to renew the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. If we are not able to address this institutional gap by drawing lessons from last year and forge the necessary unity and compromise, we will be sending the wrong message and encouraging impunity. The fact that chemical-weapon attacks have continued as recently as yesterday worries us very much. That is why it is so critical that we seek an independent way of establishing accountability. We appreciate the initiative taken by the Russian Federation to propose a draft resolution on the establishment of a new mechanism, which has been the basis for discussion in recent days. This is a conversation that we welcome. As we continue to discuss this very important matter, our consultations should be constructive and forward-looking. Of course, 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 15/17 we are not naive; we have no illusions about how matters are becoming more and more complicated by the day. However, we still hope that the Council will restore its unity to reach common ground and create an independent, impartial and professional mechanism that will be able to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, based on robust evidence. We welcome that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has continued to assist the Syrian Government in destroying the remaining stationary above-ground facilities. As the High Representative stated, we hope the facilities will be totally eliminated in the coming month. We have just heard a very encouraging statement from the High Representative. We note that the OPCW has translated and finalized its analysis of the 19 documents submitted by the Syrian Government. While we look forward to the final report, we encourage continued cooperation and meaningful communication between the Syrian Government and the OPCW that leads to tangible results to address the outstanding issues. We also note that its Fact-finding Mission has continued its investigation related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We look forward to its reports. Let me conclude by again reiterating, at the risk of sounding naive, how the unity of the Council is vital to ensuring accountability and deterring and stopping the use of chemical weapons in Syria and elsewhere. We only hope that the challenge we face in this area is not a reflection of the growing lack of trust that characterizes international relations today, making joint action in most critical areas more complicated than it should be. The President (spoke in Arabic): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Kuwait. At the outset, I would like to thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, for the briefing she gave at the beginning of this meeting. We had hoped that the Security Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), in September 2013 following the first incident involving the use of chemical weapons in Syria, would have resolved this matter, since the Council had demonstrated unity and determination in confronting that crime with a view to ensuring that it not be repeated and that its perpetrators be held accountable. Consequently, we regret the substantial regression in addressing the chemical-weapon issue in Syria, which is a result of the divisions among Council members after the Council was unable to extend the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in Syria, which we feel carried out its tasks in a very professional, impartial and independent manner. We express our deep concern about the allegations of the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria, most recently during the attack in Douma, in eastern Ghouta, last week and during the attack that took place in Saraqeb, in Idlib, yesterday. This is the third such attack during the past few weeks, which means that the perpetrators of those crimes will go unpunished and that there is no guarantee that they, or anyone else, who commits such crimes in the future will be held accountable, after we lost the Joint Investigative Mechanism. The position of the State of Kuwait is a principled and steadfast one that strongly condemns any use of chemical weapons, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as this is considered a grave violation of international law. We reiterate the need to hold accountable those responsible for such use, be they individuals, entities, non-State groups or Governments. In that context, we condemn the use of heavy and destructive weapons as well as the targeting civilians and residential areas killing dozens of innocent victims. These weapons target health facilities and civilian locations in eastern Ghouta, Idlib and other areas. We therefore support the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria in its quest to gather evidence and investigate the crimes committed against civilians in order to hold the perpetrators accountable. The State of Kuwait will support any alternative or mechanism that enjoys the consensus of all members of the Security Council and ensures the independence, neutrality and professionalism of any new future mechanism. In that regard, we reaffirm that the primary responsibility of any mechanism must be to determine the identity of those using chemical weapons in Syria, provided that the Security Council would then play its role and hold the perpetrators accountable, in implementation of the principle of ending impunity and of resolution 2118 (2013), which undoubtedly stipulates the imperative need for, and importance of, holding accountable those responsible for the use of chemical S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 16/17 18-03099 weapons in Syria. We also look forward to receiving the report that will soon be submitted by the Fact-finding Mission, as mentioned by Ms. Nakamitsu in her earlier briefing on the most recent incidents, as well as her reports on the use of chlorine gas in Saraqib. In conclusion, we reiterate our full readiness to take part in any efforts that are aimed at reaching consensus among Security Council members and at holding accountable the perpetrators of such internationally prohibited crimes. We assert that a political solution in Syria is the only way to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the crisis, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I disagree with a lot of what my Russian colleague said, but I will not stretch my colleagues' patience. But I do feel compelled briefly to respond to several of the points that he made. The first point is to say that this is not political for us. Preventing the use of these abhorrent weapons should transcend political disagreements. We do not oppose Russia's important role in Syria at all. We noted the outcomes of Sochi, and we look forward to the proposal for a constitutional committee returning to the next round of Geneva talks, with the full participation of Russia and the Syrian authorities, as was laid out in resolution 2254 (2015). The second point I would simply make is that the notion that it was anyone other than Russia that ended the Joint Investigative Mechanism is absurd. The voting records of the Council are clear and are available to all. Russia vetoed three different proposals for the extension of the Mechanism, the last of which simply extended it for a short period and requested the Secretary-General to make recommendations, but even that was unacceptable. Finally, on a note of agreement, I just want, like my Dutch colleague, to praise the incredible work of the White Helmets, who risk their own lives on a daily basis to save thousands of Syrians civilians. The President (spoke in Arabic): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): My country condemns and rejects in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons or of any other weapon of mass destruction, as this constitutes a crime against humanity and an unethical and unjustifiable act, under any circumstances. The real target of such weapons is the Syrian people, who remain the primary victims of the crimes committed by armed terrorist groups, which have not hesitated to use chemical weapons against them. I reaffirm before the Security Council that my country has sought, and continues to seek, to identify the real perpetrators responsible for the use of chemical weapons in my country, Syria. Based on those steadfast principles, my Government joined the Chemical Weapons Convention and has honoured all of its commitments thereunder. My country achieved an unprecedented and definitive feat in the history of the Organization by ending the Syrian chemical-weapons programme in record time. That was corroborated in the report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism to the Council in June 2014. My country is the party most desirous of uncovering the truth. We have always supported, and will continue to support, in principle any initiative by the Council whose aim is to establish the truth, identify those who are really trading in the blood of the Syrian people and using toxic chemical substances against Syrian civilians, including armed terrorist groups, as well as levelling false accusations against the Syrian Government. In that regard, on behalf of the Government of my country, I once again reiterate our condemnation of all American and Western allegations accusing us of committing chemical-weapon attacks in our country. I reaffirm that those accusations are groundless and cheap lies. International public opinion and the majority of United Nations Members now know that this is but standard procedure for the United States and its allies in the Council each and every time they learn that the armed terrorist groups that they finance, arm and support on the ground in Syria are at an impasse and losing ground to the advancing Syrian army and its allies. The latter are today waging a war, on behalf of the entire world, against terrorism, which, unfortunately, is being supported by certain Governments that have no interest 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 17/17 in ensuring international peace and security and are solely seeking to advance their own political agendas. My Government reaffirms once again that the United States, the United Kingdom and France are fully responsible for the paralysis of international investigative mechanisms concerning the use of toxic chemical substances, as the Governments of those States are seeking to shield the armed terrorist groups that they support. We recall before all present here that it is Syria that originally called for an investigation into instances of the use of toxic gas by armed terrorist groups. False accusations against my Government of using toxic chemical substances are attempts to cover up its efforts to reveal to the world that certain armed terrorist groups and their sponsors have continued to perpetrate crimes against innocent civilians through the use, more than once, of toxic substances. The Syrian Government has provided the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) with evidence that proves that such groups possess banned toxic substances. We have repeatedly called for the carrying out of investigations to corroborate such evidence. However, our calls have been ignored. All of my colleagues here recall that the United States and its allies destroyed the JIM. Through their practices here in the Council, they put an end to the Mechanism. They brought pressure to bear on its Chair and its members by pressuring them to refuse to visit Khan Shaykhun. Rather than conduct a field visit to collect real evidence, they merely sought to level accusations and offered up evidence trumped up by Western countries to undermine Syria, to support terrorist groups and to cover up their responsibility for this incident. That occurred after the United States and its partners rejected the call by the Russian Federation to stop the politicization of the work of the JIM and to rectify its methodology by refraining from using false evidence and, instead, limiting itself to scientific and legally sound and reasonable proof. My country continues to honour all of its commitments — the ones we assumed when we joined the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. We shall persevere in our fight against terrorism — a war that we will wage despite any political or media blackmail or any exploitation of the blood of innocent civilians in Syria. The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic will today circulate a letter of the National Committee for the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in response to the United States allegations vis-à-vis the work of the JIM and the Fact-finding Mission of the OPCW. The letter proves with scientific and legal evidence that the accusations against my country are false and that Syria has never used such chemicals, and will we ever use them, because we do not possess them. Let us recall that those who level such false accusations against Syria are the Governments of the same States with a dark history of using such internationally prohibited weapons against millions of innocent people — in Viet Nam, Cambodia, Algeria and the list goes on. Finally, on behalf of my Government, I would like to extend our gratitude to the Russian Federation and to friendly countries in the Council, countries that seek to establish truth based on their awareness about the pernicious aims behind the false accusations. They have demonstrated their commitment to the supremacy of the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their conviction that such abnormal practices undermine the credibility of international actions and institutions and jeopardize international peace and security. The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

Introductions The breeding Saker Falcon (Falco cherrug) population on the mountain ridges of eastern Kazakhstan has been monitored since 2000, The monitoring program has revealed an overall population decline over the nine years of study from an estimated 66 breeding pairs in 2000 to 22 in 2008 (75.8%). Methods Eastern Kazakhstan has several large and many small mountain ridges that provide a large area of suitable Saker Falcon nesting habitat. The Saker Falcon breeding population of eastern Kazakhstan was monitored in the Tarbagatai Mountains, including its southern foothills of Arkaly and Karabas Mountains, and in the Manrak Mountains, which are situated to the north of the Tarbagatai range. The study areas were chosen because relatively high Saker Falcon densities were previously recorded in these regions and human activity is curtailed in this border zone. Survey routes were covered by 4WD vehicle UAZ 452 over a period of three months from the beginning of April, when most clutches are laid, until the end of June, when chicks have fledged. Nest locations were recorded with a Garmin GPS unit and recorded in an electronic database which also included a description of the nest site. Nest locations were then plotted on computerized maps and satellite images. Nest contents were recorded wherever possible, though in recent years we have avoided disturbing sitting birds during incubation. The breeding population of the region was estimated from the survey data obtained from 92 territories that had evidence of occupation in at least one year from 2000-08. For logistic reasons, it was not possible to visit every territory each year and the number of territories checked ranged from 10 in 2000 to 76 in 2007. Territories were classified as occupied if: there was an active nest, one or more adults were seen in the territory or signs of recent occupation such as fresh prey remains and mutes were found. Breeding was confirmed within occupied territories if eggs or young were seen in the nest. In order to estimate the number of breeding pairs at territories that were not visited it was necessary to multiply the number of unvisited territories by the proportion of confirmed breeding attempts at checked territories. This estimate was then added to the number of confirmed breeders to produce an overall population estimate for the 92 territories in the survey area. Distribution and Number The first Saker survey in eastern Kazakhstan was made in 1997 by Mark Watson, a British biologist who worked in closely with zoologists from Kazakhstan (Watson, 1997). This was the first time that nests had been recorded in Dzhungarsky Alatau, Tarbagatai and the Manrak Mountains. Since 1999 the study area has been expanded to include a considerable area of Tarbagatai Mountains including its southern and northern foothills as well as the Saur ridge, Kalbinsky Altai Mountains, Altai Mountains (Kurchumsky and the Narymsky ridges). For the first time in 50 years the largest of eastern Kazakhstan's forests were explored with the aim of locating raptor nests. The study located 25 Saker Falcon nests and 49 nests of the Imperial Eagle (Aquila heliaca), whose disused nests are the main source of nesting sites for Sakers (Karyakin et al., 2005; Levin et al., 2007). The foothills of the Kalba Mountains were surveyed in 2006 by a Kazakhstan-Russian team; three Saker Falcon breeding territories were recorded there (Smelansky et al., 2006). Before the 1960's the Saker was regarded as common, occupying almost all the mountain ridges and long cliffs of Kazakhstan (Korelov, 1962) and it is believed that this status remained the same up to the 1990's. Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the number of Saker Falcons in the wild began to decline sharply in parts of Kazakstan, primarily due to uncontrolled exploitation of the species for the Arabic falconry market with the greatest decline reported in the south-east of the country (Levin, 2001; 2003). Over nine years, from 2000-08 inclusive, a total of 92 Saker Falcon breeding territories were recorded in the eastern region of Kazakhstan. In Tarbagatai as well as other large mountain ridges, the density of Saker Falcon nests is low. Two attempts were made to find Saker nests in the montane zone of the Tarbagatai Mountains in 2006 and 2007 but no nests were found and only one Saker was seen in the area. Most breeding Sakers were located on the periphery of the main Tarbagatai Mountain range i.e., in the foothills. High breeding densities were recorded in the Arkaly and Karabas Mountains, located close to the Chinese border. A comparatively high density of nests was also observed in the Manrak Mountains, which are located to the north of the Tarbagatai Mountain range. Long-term monitoring of the Saker Falcon breeding population has allowed us to estimate the number of breeding pairs in our survey area over the period 2000-2008 (table 1). Our data indicates that over this 9-year period the breeding population has declined by 65% (fig. 4). In line with this decline the proportion of territories that are occupied by non-breeding birds has increased. Single males were found at over half the occupied territories where at least one Saker was observed but there was no evidence of breeding. Breeding Biology The nesting distribution of Sakers in the surveyed area of Eastern Kazakhstan revealed that the highest breeding densities are found in the foothills of the mountain ranges of the region, which is no doubt related to the availability of mammalian prey such as Great Gerbils (Rhomhomys opimus), Red-cheeked Sousliks (Spermophilus inlermedius) and Long-tailed Sousliks (Spermophilus undulatus), as well as the availability of suitable nesting sites. All Saker nests in Eastern Kazakhstan are located on open cliffs, under overhanging peaks and occasionally partly in niches. The main nest producers for the Saker Falcon in Eastern Kazakhstan are the Long-Legged and the Upland Buzzards (Buteo rufinus and B. hemilasius). Of 86 instances of Saker Falcon nesting, birds used nests of the Golden Eagle (Aquila chrysaetos) in two occasions, the Steppe Eagle (A. nipalensis) two occasions and Raven (Corvus corax) also in two. One clutch was found in a nest of the Eastern Imperial Eagle. In all the other instances the Saker used Buzzard nests. In the mountains of Eastern Kazakhstan Sakers start egg-laying from the middle of March and most pairs have completed clutches by the end of April, with a peak period in the third ten-day period of March. The mean and modal clutch size of 31 clutches was 3.9 eggs (range 3 to 6 eggs). The mean and modal size of 156 broods was 3.7 and 4 chicks respectively (range 1 to 6 chicks). There was no decline in brood size at successful nests over the study period (fig. 8). The number of breeding pairs was highest in 2002, which coincided with a peak in the number of Red-cheeked Soushks across the region. Discussion There being no apparent change to the habitat and no perceptible reduction in food supply the breeding population has steadily declined over the study period and the proportion of non-breeding territory holders has increased over the same period. This current breeding population decline in Eastern Kazakhstan mirrors the decline of the breeding Saker population in Southern Kazakhstan over the last decade of the 20th Century, which coincided with the illegal trapping for the falconry trade. We do not know the cause (or causes) of the current decline in eastern Kazakhstan but it is unlikely to be as a result of local factors in the breeding area. The breeding area is afforded some protection from human interference because of the restrictions on human access due to its close proximity to the Chinese border. Consequently, nest disturbance and trapping of breeding adults in the region is relatively low. However, after the breeding season young Sakers and most of the adult birds move from the Tarbagatai foothills and, around the same time, Sakers arrive in the flat, southern region of the Zaysan Valley where there are the colonies of Yellow Lemming (Lagurus luteus), and in the Balkhash-Alakol depression where there are high densities of Great Gerbil. Falcon trappers from Syria and other countries (including Kazakhstan) operate in these regions and catch Sakers from late June to December. Unfortunately, due to its illegality there is no data on the number, age profile or natal origin of the Sakers trapped in these regions, so it is not possible to gauge its impact on the population of eastern Kazakhstan, but with a rapidly declining regional breeding population the illegal trapping and trade of Sakers is certainly not helping the species. Whilst excessive illegal trapping of birds outside the breeding/natal area is a possible (if not probable) cause of the regional decline of Sakers in eastern Kazakhstan, there are other potential factors that could be implicated such as a decline in food availability in the breeding and/or wintering areas and increased mortality through electrocution on power lines. Conclusion In 2007 a reintroduction programme was initiated by the Government in response to the severe decline in the breeding population of southeast Kazakhstan. Under the framework of this program 60 Sakers (30 female, 30 male) were taken on July from «Sunkar» Falcon Facility, Almaty to the Sugary Valley. In 2008 another 50 birds were released and this programme is planned to continue for several years. ; Introductions The breeding Saker Falcon (Falco cherrug) population on the mountain ridges of eastern Kazakhstan has been monitored since 2000, The monitoring program has revealed an overall population decline over the nine years of study from an estimated 66 breeding pairs in 2000 to 22 in 2008 (75.8%). Methods Eastern Kazakhstan has several large and many small mountain ridges that provide a large area of suitable Saker Falcon nesting habitat. The Saker Falcon breeding population of eastern Kazakhstan was monitored in the Tarbagatai Mountains, including its southern foothills of Arkaly and Karabas Mountains, and in the Manrak Mountains, which are situated to the north of the Tarbagatai range. The study areas were chosen because relatively high Saker Falcon densities were previously recorded in these regions and human activity is curtailed in this border zone. Survey routes were covered by 4WD vehicle UAZ 452 over a period of three months from the beginning of April, when most clutches are laid, until the end of June, when chicks have fledged. Nest locations were recorded with a Garmin GPS unit and recorded in an electronic database which also included a description of the nest site. Nest locations were then plotted on computerized maps and satellite images. Nest contents were recorded wherever possible, though in recent years we have avoided disturbing sitting birds during incubation. The breeding population of the region was estimated from the survey data obtained from 92 territories that had evidence of occupation in at least one year from 2000-08. For logistic reasons, it was not possible to visit every territory each year and the number of territories checked ranged from 10 in 2000 to 76 in 2007. Territories were classified as occupied if: there was an active nest, one or more adults were seen in the territory or signs of recent occupation such as fresh prey remains and mutes were found. Breeding was confirmed within occupied territories if eggs or young were seen in the nest. In order to estimate the number of breeding pairs at territories that were not visited it was necessary to multiply the number of unvisited territories by the proportion of confirmed breeding attempts at checked territories. This estimate was then added to the number of confirmed breeders to produce an overall population estimate for the 92 territories in the survey area. Distribution and Number The first Saker survey in eastern Kazakhstan was made in 1997 by Mark Watson, a British biologist who worked in closely with zoologists from Kazakhstan (Watson, 1997). This was the first time that nests had been recorded in Dzhungarsky Alatau, Tarbagatai and the Manrak Mountains. Since 1999 the study area has been expanded to include a considerable area of Tarbagatai Mountains including its southern and northern foothills as well as the Saur ridge, Kalbinsky Altai Mountains, Altai Mountains (Kurchumsky and the Narymsky ridges). For the first time in 50 years the largest of eastern Kazakhstan's forests were explored with the aim of locating raptor nests. The study located 25 Saker Falcon nests and 49 nests of the Imperial Eagle (Aquila heliaca), whose disused nests are the main source of nesting sites for Sakers (Karyakin et al., 2005; Levin et al., 2007). The foothills of the Kalba Mountains were surveyed in 2006 by a Kazakhstan-Russian team; three Saker Falcon breeding territories were recorded there (Smelansky et al., 2006). Before the 1960's the Saker was regarded as common, occupying almost all the mountain ridges and long cliffs of Kazakhstan (Korelov, 1962) and it is believed that this status remained the same up to the 1990's. Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the number of Saker Falcons in the wild began to decline sharply in parts of Kazakstan, primarily due to uncontrolled exploitation of the species for the Arabic falconry market with the greatest decline reported in the south-east of the country (Levin, 2001; 2003). Over nine years, from 2000-08 inclusive, a total of 92 Saker Falcon breeding territories were recorded in the eastern region of Kazakhstan. In Tarbagatai as well as other large mountain ridges, the density of Saker Falcon nests is low. Two attempts were made to find Saker nests in the montane zone of the Tarbagatai Mountains in 2006 and 2007 but no nests were found and only one Saker was seen in the area. Most breeding Sakers were located on the periphery of the main Tarbagatai Mountain range i.e., in the foothills. High breeding densities were recorded in the Arkaly and Karabas Mountains, located close to the Chinese border. A comparatively high density of nests was also observed in the Manrak Mountains, which are located to the north of the Tarbagatai Mountain range. Long-term monitoring of the Saker Falcon breeding population has allowed us to estimate the number of breeding pairs in our survey area over the period 2000-2008 (table 1). Our data indicates that over this 9-year period the breeding population has declined by 65% (fig. 4). In line with this decline the proportion of territories that are occupied by non-breeding birds has increased. Single males were found at over half the occupied territories where at least one Saker was observed but there was no evidence of breeding. Breeding Biology The nesting distribution of Sakers in the surveyed area of Eastern Kazakhstan revealed that the highest breeding densities are found in the foothills of the mountain ranges of the region, which is no doubt related to the availability of mammalian prey such as Great Gerbils (Rhomhomys opimus), Red-cheeked Sousliks (Spermophilus inlermedius) and Long-tailed Sousliks (Spermophilus undulatus), as well as the availability of suitable nesting sites. All Saker nests in Eastern Kazakhstan are located on open cliffs, under overhanging peaks and occasionally partly in niches. The main nest producers for the Saker Falcon in Eastern Kazakhstan are the Long-Legged and the Upland Buzzards (Buteo rufinus and B. hemilasius). Of 86 instances of Saker Falcon nesting, birds used nests of the Golden Eagle (Aquila chrysaetos) in two occasions, the Steppe Eagle (A. nipalensis) two occasions and Raven (Corvus corax) also in two. One clutch was found in a nest of the Eastern Imperial Eagle. In all the other instances the Saker used Buzzard nests. In the mountains of Eastern Kazakhstan Sakers start egg-laying from the middle of March and most pairs have completed clutches by the end of April, with a peak period in the third ten-day period of March. The mean and modal clutch size of 31 clutches was 3.9 eggs (range 3 to 6 eggs). The mean and modal size of 156 broods was 3.7 and 4 chicks respectively (range 1 to 6 chicks). There was no decline in brood size at successful nests over the study period (fig. 8). The number of breeding pairs was highest in 2002, which coincided with a peak in the number of Red-cheeked Soushks across the region. Discussion There being no apparent change to the habitat and no perceptible reduction in food supply the breeding population has steadily declined over the study period and the proportion of non-breeding territory holders has increased over the same period. This current breeding population decline in Eastern Kazakhstan mirrors the decline of the breeding Saker population in Southern Kazakhstan over the last decade of the 20th Century, which coincided with the illegal trapping for the falconry trade. We do not know the cause (or causes) of the current decline in eastern Kazakhstan but it is unlikely to be as a result of local factors in the breeding area. The breeding area is afforded some protection from human interference because of the restrictions on human access due to its close proximity to the Chinese border. Consequently, nest disturbance and trapping of breeding adults in the region is relatively low. However, after the breeding season young Sakers and most of the adult birds move from the Tarbagatai foothills and, around the same time, Sakers arrive in the flat, southern region of the Zaysan Valley where there are the colonies of Yellow Lemming (Lagurus luteus), and in the Balkhash-Alakol depression where there are high densities of Great Gerbil. Falcon trappers from Syria and other countries (including Kazakhstan) operate in these regions and catch Sakers from late June to December. Unfortunately, due to its illegality there is no data on the number, age profile or natal origin of the Sakers trapped in these regions, so it is not possible to gauge its impact on the population of eastern Kazakhstan, but with a rapidly declining regional breeding population the illegal trapping and trade of Sakers is certainly not helping the species. Whilst excessive illegal trapping of birds outside the breeding/natal area is a possible (if not probable) cause of the regional decline of Sakers in eastern Kazakhstan, there are other potential factors that could be implicated such as a decline in food availability in the breeding and/or wintering areas and increased mortality through electrocution on power lines. Conclusion In 2007 a reintroduction programme was initiated by the Government in response to the severe decline in the breeding population of southeast Kazakhstan. Under the framework of this program 60 Sakers (30 female, 30 male) were taken on July from «Sunkar» Falcon Facility, Almaty to the Sugary Valley. In 2008 another 50 birds were released and this programme is planned to continue for several years.

Western media never had any problem with health statistics from Gaza — until Israel was accused of bombing a hospital there. For years, English-speaking journalists straightforwardly cited reports from the "Palestinian health ministry in Gaza," using its official name. But after the October 17 attack on Al-Ahli Baptist Hospital, media outlets began portraying the ministry as an arm of the rebel force Hamas.Foreign journalists had struggled to make sense of the carnage on October 17, and whether Israeli or Palestinian forces were to blame. The New York Times edited its headline several times, and initially reports may have overstated how many hundreds died. The Israeli army and U.S. President Joe Biden took advantage of the confusion to cast doubt on the truthfulness of Gaza's medical authorities.The stakes are critical. The health ministry has reported over 11,000 Palestinian deaths, nearly half a percent of Gaza's entire population, including thousands of children. Even though U.S. officials have come to accept the accuracy of those numbers, the damage to the health ministry's credibility is done.Meanwhile, the Israeli military has moved from attacking the health authorities' claims to marking them as military targets. Israeli forces raided Al-Shifa Hospital, the health ministry's headquarters, on Wednesday. Hundreds of doctors, patients, and displaced people have evacuated since. The health ministry has reported severe difficulties updating the death toll due to Israeli attacks, communications blackouts, and the sheer volume of casualties.Israeli and U.S. attempts to change the conversation have largely succeeded. Before the current war, and even before the Ahli hospital bombing, descriptions like "Hamas-run," "Hamas-controlled," or "Hamas-affiliated" for the Palestinian health ministry were virtually non-existent, according to the News on the Web Corpus, a database of newspapers and magazines from 21 countries.Most Western English language media simply referred to the "Palestinian health ministry." Since the October 17 hospital attack, however, it is now more common to see the health ministry labeled as some variation of "Hamas-run" than "Palestinian."

The actual relationship between Gaza's health ministry and Hamas is complicated. Hamas took over as the governing authority in Gaza in the chaos around a 2007 coup d'etat attempt, splitting Palestinian ministries between staffers loyal to Hamas in Gaza and staffers loyal to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.But the Gazan branch of the health ministry is not completely disconnected from the broader Palestinian medical system, or even the Israeli government. Officials in both the West Bank and Gaza report births and deaths to the same Israeli-controlled population registry. In response to Biden casting doubt on its statistics, the Palestinian health ministry released the name and ID number of every single identifiable person allegedly killed by the fighting.The current war began on October 7, when Hamas launched an unprecedented attack on Israeli villages, killing 1,200 people and taking around 240 hostages. The Israeli army released a video on Sunday purporting to show two wounded hostages being taken to Al-Shifa. Hamas itself released a video last month claiming to show an Israeli hostage being treated in a Palestinian hospital, but denied keeping any hostages in hospitals for non-medical reasons. The doubt surrounding the health ministry's objectivity only began after the Ahli hospital attack. On October 17, an explosion ripped through the courtyard of the hospital, where hundreds of displaced people had been sheltering. Health ministry officials held a press conference surrounded by corpses and accused Israel of committing a massacre.Israel claimed that a misfired Palestinian rocket had struck Al-Ahli, and presented several contradictory pieces of evidence for that scenario. (Outside investigations have been inconclusive so far, ruling out an Israeli aerial bomb but leaving open the possibility of some other type of Israeli or Palestinian weapon.) Israeli military spokesman Daniel Hagari complained the next day that "many media outlets immediately reported the unverified claims by Hamas, the lies by Hamas."Biden jumped in a week later, stating that he "had no notion that the Palestinians are telling the truth about how many people are killed." He also privately complained about the New York Times' headlines on Al-Ahli during a meeting with Wall Street bankers, Semafor reported."We all know that the Gazan ministry of health is just a front for Hamas. It's run by Hamas, a terrorist organization," U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told reporters on October 26. "We can't take anything coming out of Hamas, including the so-called 'ministry of health,' at face value."The political pushback seems to have changed the overall tone of American news coverage. In the weeks after the Ahli attack, many English-language reporters appeared to hedge any Palestinian health ministry claims by noting Hamas's alleged control of the ministry.

The Associated Press, widely considered the gold standard in English-language reporting, used the term "Hamas-run health ministry" only five times before October 2023. During previous wars, the Associated Press often cited statistics from "the Palestinian Health Ministry in Gaza."AP newswires have not used the phrase "Palestinian Health Ministry in Gaza" since the Ahli hospital bombing, instead referring to the "Hamas-run Health Ministry" or the "Health Ministry in Hamas-run Gaza." It is unclear whether the change was a matter of policy, or simply an ad hoc decision by editors.The AP press office did not answer an email request for comment. Neither did the New York Times foreign desk, the Reuters newswire service, or the cable news station CNN.Some journalists have pushed back hard against the notion that Gaza's health authorities are a Hamas propaganda arm. The Washington Post ran a column on October 24 defending the accuracy of statistics from the Palestinian health ministry.In the meantime, Israeli forces have escalated their attacks on Palestinian health infrastructure. On November 3, the Israeli army bombed a Palestinian ambulance outside of Al-Shifa. On November 13, an Israeli bulldozer destroyed the Swedish Clinic in Al-Shati Refugee Camp, which had been bombed and overrun by Israeli forces the day before. A day later, the Israeli army shelled Al-Shifa and falsely claimed that misfired Palestinian rockets were to blame.Israel accuses Hamas of hiding fighters and holding Israeli hostages inside of hospitals. The White House has backed Israeli claims. Kirby, the U.S. spokesman, said on Tuesday that the United States has intelligence about Hamas's use of hospitals, including a "command and control node" under Al-Shifa. Biden echoed those claims after the Israeli raid on the hospital.Hagari, the Israeli army spokesman, brought foreign reporters to the basement of the abandoned Rantisi Hospital on Monday to view alleged proof of Hamas's presence. Israeli forces displayed weapons and explosives that they claimed to have found in the hospital, as well as a bullet-ridden motorcycle.Journalists were shown a chair with a woman's gown, a length of rope, and a baby bottle nearby. Hagari promised to test them for DNA evidence of hostages. Health ministry official Muhammad Zarqout told CNN that Palestinian women and children, not Israeli hostages or Hamas fighters, had been staying in the basement.Hagari also pointed to a chart on a wall, claiming that it was a "guarding list, every terrorist has his own shift." In fact, the chart was just a calendar with the days of the week written in Arabic. CNN aired Hagari's claim without pushing back. The Israeli army later chalked it up to a translation error, and CNN quietly removed that segment from videos posted online, according to the Huffington Post.After Wednesday's raid on Al-Shifa, the Israeli military shared images of its booty from the supposed Hamas stronghold: fifteen rifles, some grenades, and assorted body armor. "It's a hospital. There shouldn't be any assault rifles at a hospital," Kirby told reporters on Thursday, smirking.However, Human Rights Watch stated that the Israeli evidence was not sufficient to attack the hospitals. According to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the presence of "sick or wounded members of the armed forces" does not make a hospital a military target, even if those patients brought along "small arms and ammunition" with them.CNN and BBC reporters both found that Israeli troops may have tampered with the evidence at Al-Shifa Hospital, a claim that Hagari denies.Two days after the raid, The Economist reported that "Israeli intelligence officials do not believe that Hamas currently has its main headquarters—to the extent that such a thing exists—below the hospital. These, they say, have probably moved to Khan Younis" south of Gaza City.Meanwhile, U.S. officials have come around to accepting that Palestinians were telling the truth about their deaths — and may have actually understated the numbers."In this period of conflict and conditions of war, it is very difficult for any of us to assess what the rate of casualties are," Barbara Leaf, assistant U.S. secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, told Congress last week. "We think they're very high, frankly, and it could be that they're even higher than are being cited."

ReCLes.pt – the Association of Language Centres in Higher Education in Portugal – was honoured to host the ReCLes.pt 2014 International Conference on Languages and the Market: Competitiveness and Employability at the Estoril Higher Institute for Tourism and Hotel Studies (ESHTE – Escola Superior de Hotelaria e Turismo de Portugal). This topic is pivotal for the development and improvement of specific language skills that serve different areas in the labour market. Indeed, according to the report Languages for Jobs: Providing multilingual communication skills for the labour market, a report set up under the Education and Training 2020 framework, language learning should be "better geared to professional contexts and the needs" of the job market since doing so will then benefit not only learners but also "those seeking to employ people who are well-trained and properly qualified to assume their professional responsibilities" (2011: 4). Although the working group did include representatives from Italy and Ireland, it did not include Spain or Portugal, meaning that only two of the five most troubled countries in terms of their employment and economic situations contributed to the final report. This lack of representation motivated, in part, the conference theme for the ReCLes.pt 2014 International Conference, with the dual need for ever-improving research results for language teaching and the increasing relevance of language learning at a time of staggering austerity and rising rates of youth unemployment. Indeed, the ability to speak a number of foreign languages not only generates economic benefits and fosters employability but also promotes the mobility of professionals and diverse business activities, enabling companies to perform successfully on the global stage. From the confluence of educators, researchers and representatives from the business world debating languages as competitive assets in professional contexts, a selection of authors were invited to publish their papers in this volume. The collection comprises eleven relevant papers in Portuguese and in English divided in five topics: Languages, Culture and Employability; Languages and Technology; Languages and New Technologies; Languages for Tourism Purposes; and Content and Language Integrated Learning (CLIL). On the topic of Languages, Culture and Employability, Monika Hrebackova's article on "Intercultural Communicative Competence and the Management Dimension of Culture" explores the impact of intercultural contexts on communication competencies in a foreign language, specifically English. The author describes the clear competitive advantage of intercultural competence in the corporate sector, covering perceptions of stereotypes, time and negotiating as well as issues of hierarchy, individualism and indulgency, among others. She brings her personal experience as a Czech to her outline of Czech cultural values to determine sources of cultural clashes and suggest some strategies for applying intercultural competence in management situations. On the same topic, Abdelaziz Kesbi's "Foreign Language Mastery and Glocal Employability" reflects on the linguistic map of Morocco and the functional specializations of each language of the country's patent multilingualism to determine the economic relevance of teaching their various foreign languages for the global market. This analysis is made within the context Moroccan language planning policies, concerning Arabization, Arabic and Amazigh as well as the status of French and English. Kesbi concludes with the proposal of English as a lingua franca to support the country's most recent progressive free trade agreements. On the topic Languages and Technologies, the volume offers five articles, the first of which is "The Status of EFL Teaching in Moroccan Vocational Schools: A case study at the Meknès School of Technology", Mohamed El Kandoussi argues the inadequacy of the linguistic competence of recent graduates and their challenges in the labour market. His research is based on a case study of local English language courses to ascertain the compatibility of the course content with the students' vocational orientations while uncovering teachers' attitudes and opinions towards a number of pedagogical practices, including the corporate culture of their school, course material, the students' needs for English for Specific Purposes (ESP) versus general English and the perceived need for further teacher training. In line with technical concerns for future Engineers, Milan Smutny's article on "The Language of Science and Technology: Linguistics as a part of a multidisciplinary study program" examines terminology, especially the formation of adjectives using premodification to effectively and precisely communicate within a specific discourse community. The author provides examples of the shared profession knowledge as part of the language of Science and Technology so that English language teachers can better understand the ways specific terminology is created as a precise description of reality in the daily professional lives of Electrical Engineers. Another contribution involving new technologies is by Maria de Lurdes Martins, Gillian Moreira and António Moreira on "Aprendizagem dialógica, dialética e autêntica da língua inglesa com recurso à Web 2.0", where the authors discuss the open, participatory and social nature of Web 2.0 and the challenges it brings to foreign language classes. This paper, which describes the design and implementation of an action research project in English language courses, focuses on the interactional tasks that were implemented using Web 2.0 tools and their results, which led to the creation and maintenance of dialogic processes for the production of collaborative outputs through an active involvement of students in solving authentic activities, while developing their capabilities to manage individual and collaborative learning processes. Luisa Salvati and Luana Cosenza's article on "Teaching Foreign Languages for Specific Purposes in Mobile Learning for the Internationalization of SMEs" reflects on the role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) as enablers of foreign language learning and facilitators of internationalization. Their paper focuses specifically on the results of LSECON, a project that dealt with the implementation of language courses to support SMEs in the Tuscany region of Italy. To conclude the technologies section, the volume offers the results of a joint project that has dealt with working across cultures in tandem-learning situations albeit in a readily available online source, presented in Regina Mügge and María del Carmen Arau Ribeiro's article on "Language Learning with the SEAGULL Tandem Database", which delves into this rich European Union-funded project, an acronym for Smart Educational Autonomy by Guided Language Learning. The result of collaboration between 18 partner institutes from 11 countries, SEAGULL provides language learning material for 13 languages with a number of special online features. This tool for tandem partners who aim to continue working together after their first exchange offers linguistic support, suggested issues for discussion and a myriad of cultural information about the countries involved in the SEAGULL project. The authors provide a guided visit of the wealth of material available at http://SEAGULL-tandem.eu/ that can be easily accessed by teachers and students alike. On the topic of Languages for Tourism Purposes, Gisela Soares and Teresa Pataco examine the specificities of language learning in the hospitality sector, namely in the areas of catering and restaurant service. In "'Eu nem sei o que é um badejo em Português!': um projeto de desenvolvimento de vocabulário específico em língua inglesa para a indústria hoteleira", the authors reflect on the teaching methodologies and results of an interdisciplinary project developed by higher education students in TV Cooking Show, an English language course that aims to develop the specific vocabulary of students through research and task-based activities which enhance learner autonomy. In the following article by María del Carmen Arau Ribeiro and Florbela Rodrigues, these researchers consider the plethora of materials available from Tourism Marketing as an authentic source for teaching English, Spanish, Portuguese and French in higher education, drawing on commercial goods and promotional material on the respective countries to enhance intercultural awareness and to practice language skills based on maximizing communication and theories of visualization. The relevant and timely teaching strategies in their article, "Making Tourism Marketing Work for You in the FL Classroom" cover, among others, the value of fostering positive attitudes toward error in foreign language use, problem-centeredness, and motivation. The authors find that, while simultaneously promoting student strategies for developing skills in global effectiveness in their future professions, discerning teachers can take steps to ensure that language users are immersed in a graphic and semiotic richness of cultural and linguistic messages. The final topic in the volume is dedicated to Content and Language Integrated Learning (CLIL), beginning with an article by Margarida Coelho on "Scaffolding Strategies in CLIL Classes – supporting learners towards autonomy", in which she deftly attributes scaffolding and scaffolding strategies the key roles in CLIL teaching. She presents a brief overview of the origin of the concept as a teaching strategy, focusing on some recent studies, and systematizes the most relevant approaches and conceptual frameworks to scaffolding presented in those studies. As a conclusion, she argues for a broader, more extensive, continuous and innovative use of different scaffolding strategies in CLIL classes as an effective means to foster learner autonomy and progressively build their confidence in using a FL language for effectively dealing with content. The volume then concludes with "The State of the ReCLes.pt CLIL Training Project", by María del Carmen Arau Ribeiro, Ana Gonçalves, Manuel Moreira da Silva, Margarida Morgado and Margarida Coelho, which provides an update to the developments in research and publications in the national project, from a collaboratively written book to numerous articles, presentations and posters, culminating in first place at the friendly competition in the strand From research to practice at the XIV CercleS International Conference on Enhancing Learners' Creative and Critical Thinking: The Role of University Language Centres in September 2016. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Guinea-Bissau (S/2018/110) ; United Nations S/PV.8188 Security Council Seventy-third year 8188th meeting Saturday, 24 February 2018, noon New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Hickey United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-05017 (E) *1805017* S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 2/14 18-05017 The meeting was called to order at 2.10 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2018/146, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. I now give the floor to members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): Sweden and Kuwait earlier this week put forward a draft resolution to respond to the desperate calls of the United Nations and the humanitarian community in Syria for a cessation of hostilities for an initial period of 30 days, in order to allow for much-needed humanitarian relief. We have been working intensely with all Council members to operationalize the concrete requests of the United Nations, the humanitarian community and, above, all the civilian population on the ground. We have done our utmost to accommodate Council members' concerns. It is now time for the Council to unanimously shoulder its responsibility and show that meaningful action is possible. The key components in our draft resolution are a nationwide cessation of hostilities for at least 30 days, weekly United Nations humanitarian aid convoys to all areas in need, and immediate emergency medical evacuations. The United Nations convoys and evacuation teams are ready to go. The draft resolution also calls for the immediate lifting of sieges of populated areas, including eastern Ghouta. It reiterates its demand, reminding in particular the Syrian authorities that all parties have an obligation to act in accordance with international law to protect civilians and hospitals and other medical facilities. The draft makes an exception for military operations directed against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaida, the Al-Nusra Front and other terrorist groups designated by the Security Council. This in no way relieves the parties to the conflict in Syria from upholding their obligations under international law at all times, including the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. The draft resolution is not a comprehensive peace deal on Syria; its aim is purely humanitarian. There are already ceasefire agreements in force for the areas where fighting has escalated the most. They need to be complied with. There are existing monitoring mechanisms that can be utilized. The role of the Council is to push the parties to the conflict to comply with the proposed cessation of hostilities in order to urgently enable needed alleviation of suffering for the people of Syria. If the draft resolution is adopted today, it can de-escalate violence, save lives, alleviate suffering and break the deadlock on humanitarian access and sieges. Since the first call for a cessation of hostilities, the situation has gotten dramatically worse, particularly in eastern Ghouta, as we have heard from the Secretary- General and from Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock. After seven years of war, the situation for innocent civilians in Syria has never been worse. But we have an opportunity to turn things around today to avert the disaster unfolding before our eyes. The draft resolution before the Council represents a resolute and very urgent attempt for the Council to take decisive and meaningful action. Today, we count on each and every member to do the right thing. The President (spoke in Arabic): The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America The President (spoke in Arabic): The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2401 (2018). 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 3/14 I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Kuwait. I associate myself with the statement just made by the Permanent Representative of Sweden on our behalf. The unanimous adoption today of resolution 2401 (2018), following lengthy and intensive negotiations, demonstrates that the penholders, Kuwait and Sweden, are keen to ensure unanimity on this important humanitarian resolution. The resolution renews hope in the Security Council's ability to be unified and speak in one voice, sending a clear and explicit message that it rejects any violations of the Charter of the United Nations. I wish to thank all Member States that voted in favour of the resolution, which includes key and specific demands in response to the appeals of the international community, the most important of which are as follows. First, it demands that all parties cease fire without delay throughout Syria for a minimum of 30 days. Secondly, it allows the United Nations and its partners to immediately undertake medical evacuations safely and unconditionally. Thirdly, it requires all parties to ensure the unimpeded and safe access of all humanitarian and medical workers. Fourthly, it calls on all parties to lift the siege of populated areas, including eastern Ghouta. We are totally convinced that, while the resolution may not end the humanitarian suffering in Syria at once, it is a positive message that the Council today is solidary and united to end this humanitarian suffering and hostilities right away. The biggest task now is to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the resolution in order to save civilian lives in Syria and deliver their humanitarian needs immediately. The Security Council still has a great deal to do so as to end this tragic crisis in Syria, which is about to complete its seventh year. The resolution that we have adopted today is only an interim solution, as a political solution in Syria is the only way to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the crisis and meet the aspirations of the brotherly Syrian people, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, especially resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). The State of Kuwait stresses the importance of reaching an agreement among Council members to prevent any attempt to obstruct a draft resolution aimed at stopping flagrant violations of human rights. Kuwait supports the code of conduct proposed by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group, whereby Council members would pledge not to obstruct draft resolutions that address crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. We also support the Mexican-French initiative calling on restraint in the use of the veto in the event of serious violations of human rights, based on our commitments to abide by the four Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, international humanitarian law and the outcomes of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. We call for engagement on general humanitarian issues, such as the delivery of humanitarian aid, the evacuation of the sick and injured, and humanitarian truce, as procedural issues. In order to prevent the recurrence of such tragedies and the great suffering of humankind, the veto must not be used in such instances. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. I give the floor to the other members of the Council that wish to make statements. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I want to thank the penholders, Sweden and Kuwait, for their work, their sacrifice and their time in the negotiations. As we look at the negotiations, I think it is also important that we bring the Council some of the voices of the Syrian people in eastern Ghouta, who have suffered so much while waiting for the Security Council to act. A doctor treating patients in a makeshift hospital described the conditions she is facing: "We are mental and emotional wrecks. There is nothing more we can do. We are bled dry." In a haunting video, the doctor walks into a room with a crying mother as she says, "I am waiting for my son to die. At least he will be free of pain. I was just making bread for him when the roof fell in. He is going straight to heaven. At least in heaven there is food." Another message we received yesterday which I think was relayed to Council members in the closed consultations, but which I think it is important to repeat again — was an emergency call from a doctor in eastern Ghouta, who said: "We have a horrible situation here. We are being targeted with all kinds of weapons, non-stop. We lack everything: water, food, medical supplies, S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 4/14 18-05017 shelter. This is a disaster. Everyone is just waiting to die." Today, the Security Council finally took a step towards addressing these devastating levels of human suffering in Syria. The United States wants nothing more than to see the ceasefire in resolution 2401 (2018) implemented immediately across the country. It is critical that the Al-Assad regime and its allies comply with our demand to stop the assault on eastern Ghouta and immediately allow food and medicine to reach everyone who needs it. All of us on the Council must do our part to press the Al-Assad regime as hard as we can to comply. But we are late to respond to this crisis — very late. On Wednesday, the Secretary-General made an emotional plea for an immediate ceasefire in Syria to allow the very basic necessities to get to the people. Kuwait and Sweden had a version of the resolution ready to go for a vote, but Russia called for a delay. On Thursday, in an effort to stall, Russia called for an open meeting on the humanitarian situation in Syria. At that meeting (S/PV.8186), 14 members of the Council were ready to impose a ceasefire, but Russia obstructed the vote again. And then yesterday, the Council sat around for hours, ready to vote, only to have Russia delay it again. Every minute the Council waited on Russia, the human suffering grew. Getting to a vote became a moral responsibility for everyone, but not for Russia, not for Syria, and not for Iran. I have to ask: why? At least 19 health facilities have been bombed since Sunday. As they dragged out the negotiations, the bombs from Al-Assad's fighter jets continued to fall. In the three days it took us to adopt the resolution, how many mothers lost their kids to the bombing and the shelling? How many more images did we need to see of fathers holding their dead children? All for nothing, because here we are voting for a ceasefire that could have saved lives days ago. And after all of this time, hardly anything has changed in the resolution except a few words and some commas. The Syrian people should not have to die waiting for Russia to organize its instructions from Moscow or to discuss them with the Syrians. Why did the Council allow this? There is no good reason we should not have done this Wednesday, or Thursday, or Friday. We may not know the faces that we are talking about. We may not know their names, or these people, but they know us. And we all failed them this week. I guess there is unity in that. Today, Russia has belatedly decided to join the international consensus and accept the need to call for a ceasefire, but only after trying every possible way to avoid it. The resolution marks a moment of Council unity that we must seize and maintain beyond the 30-day timeframe. We hope that the resolution will be a turning point, where Russia will join us in pushing for a political settlement to this conflict and take action to re-establish real accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Progress starts by adhering to the ceasefire with no excuses. After so many years of defying the Council's demands, the Al-Assad regime must change course. None of us should be so naïve as to accept that the Al-Assad regime can continue indiscriminately bombing schools, hospitals and homes under the fake excuse of "counter-terrorism". Al-Assad's bombing must stop. The ceasefire must be given a chance to work. We look to the Al-Assad regime's backers, especially Russia and Iran, to address what the Secretary-General rightly called a "hell on Earth". All eyes will now be on the Syrian regime, Iran and Russia. Our goal with this resolution is clear. The Al-Assad regime needs to stop its military activities around eastern Ghouta, and for once allow humanitarian access to all of those who need it. We are deeply skeptical that the regime will comply, but we supported the resolution because we must demand nothing less. We owe that to the innocent people of Syria begging for help. In the days to come, our resolve to stand by our demands in the resolution will be tested. All of us must rise to the challenge of maintaining this ceasefire, just as we came together today. All of us must do everything we can to make the demands of the resolution a reality. That is the only way to restore the credibility of the Council. The Syrian people have been waiting long enough. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Following lengthy consultations, during which the overwhelming majority of delegations demonstrated a sincere focus on seeking joint solutions — for which we thank them — the Security Council has unanimously adopted the humanitarian resolution 2401 (2018), on Syria. I wish to particularly thank the penholders, the Permanent Representatives of Kuwait and Sweden, for their tireless efforts 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 5/14 and resolve to reach a compromise up until the very last moment. Russia supports the resolution because it encourages the Syrian parties to work as quickly as possible to bring a halt to the hostilities, comply with previous agreed-on decisions in that regard, engage in negotiations on a general de-escalation and establish extended humanitarian pauses throughout the country. The reason it took us so long to reach agreement on the resolution was because we did not support the directives it included for an immediate cessation of hostilities for a relatively long period, and the reason for that was simply because it was unachievable in that form. A ceasefire would not have happened if we had adopted the directives without any concrete agreement between the warring parties, and any approach so removed from reality would definitely not help to address the pressing humanitarian problems in Syria. It will be crucial to ensure that the Security Council's demands are reinforced by concrete agreements on the ground. It would be naive to think that any of these complicated issues can be resolved overnight. We trust that all the external stakeholders with influence will work to bring that about. We can see that some foreign sponsors of the illegal armed groups have either fallen very short in that regard or have been deliberately flouting their obligations. Russia is working with all the parties to the conflict and doing everything possible to normalize the situation and actively assist the humanitarian efforts. Iran and Turkey, our partners in the Astana process, have taken on a major part of the work, and we are preparing for an important meeting in the Astana format next month. In the southern de-escalation zone a fairly decent level of cooperation has been established with Jordan and the United States, although we have been seeing tension rising in some areas owing to activity by armed groups. The resolution clearly states that it does not apply to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Jabhat Al-Nusra, other Al-Qaida-affiliated organizations and various groups that the Security Council has recognized as terrorists. That struggle that will continue. We call on international stakeholders to coordinate closely on this issue, including with the Syrian authorities, and in strict compliance with international law and with respect for Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The goal of combating terrorism must not become a pretext for solving this or that geopolitical issue of dubious legitimacy, which is exactly what the United States is doing in Syria. Instead of being drowned in rhetoric about Russia — and by the way, next time I am going to count the number of times Ambassador Haley mentions my country — what we are insisting on is a prompt end to the occupation-style efforts of the so-called coalition, which, among other things, would have a definite humanitarian impact, enabling the Syrian Government to address the issue of restoring normal life in all the areas that have been liberated from terrorists, including in the north and the east of the country. Closing the coalition's Al-Tanf military base would solve the problem of the internally displaced persons in the Rukban camp. In that connection, we would also like to point out that every effort should be made to deliver aid via the most direct routes, as provided for in the humanitarian resolutions on Syria. It is important that today's resolution calls for speeding up the immediate deployment of humanitarian mine-clearing operations throughout Syria. It also reiterates the demand that all parties demilitarize medical facilities, schools and other civilian infrastructure and refrain from establishing military positions in residential areas, something that the illegal armed groups have frequently been guilty of. The conflict's flashpoints are more clearly identified, and are not limited to eastern Ghouta and Idlib, and that includes Raqqa, which the coalition has laid waste. It also expresses indignation at the militias' shelling of Damascus, in which our Embassy has been hit several times. We know that the humanitarian situation in Syria is dire and in urgent need of effective measures, but we can see perfectly well that the propagandistic picture being painted of eastern Ghouta is identical to the loud campaign in late 2016 during the counter-terrorist operation to liberate eastern Aleppo. We must engage not just with eastern Ghouta, but with Raqqa, Rukban, Foah, Kefraya and Yarmouk. Every area of Syria should get help. The resolution emphasizes the importance of supporting the restoration of stability in the areas that civilians are returning to, which in our view sends an unambiguous message to those capitals that continue to make restoration assistance conditional on a specific transitional direction in the political process. It stipulates that the humanitarian priorities for Syria in 2018 are not limited to Under-Secretary-General Lowcock's five requests. The agenda is far broader. We S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 6/14 18-05017 hope in particular that the specialized United Nations agencies and their partners will be sensitive to requests from the Syrian authorities. In conclusion, I would like to express my deep concern about the public statements by certain United States officials threatening aggression against Syria, a sovereign country. This is a warning that we will not countenance any arbitrary interpretation of the resolution that has just been adopted. We demand an end to this irresponsible and hateful rhetoric. Rather, there should be joint efforts to settle the conflict in Syria on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015). Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): France welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which demands that a cessation of hostilities be established without delay throughout Syria, in order to enable humanitarian personnel to evacuate the wounded and to gain access to the population. The negotiations were arduous. However, despite their differences in approach, the members of the Security Council managed to prevail in the name of the humanitarian imperative. The resolution is vital in the true meaning of that word, since halting the shelling and evacuating the wounded are matters of life and death for thousands of Syrian people, especially in eastern Ghouta, which has been under siege by the Damascus regime for days. I would like to thank the delegations of Kuwait and Sweden — which introduced the resolution, with our support — for their efforts, perseverance and outstanding work in arriving at a robust text. As by President Macron and the Secretary-General forcefully recalled last Wednesday, it is imperative and urgent to end the shelling of eastern Ghouta, Idlib and the whole of Syrian territory immediately. That was the thrust of yesterday's joint call by President Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel to President Putin during their demanding and close conversation on the issue. It is also the reason for our vote today. The resolution is the outcome of our concerted efforts, as well as a belated response to the violence unleashed against civilians in eastern Ghouta and elsewhere. Let us make no mistake: a cessation of hostilities for an initial 30 days to enable humanitarian access to meet vital urgent needs is only the very first step. It is the minimal response to the repeated demands of both the United Nations and humanitarian actors, which have been conveyed for months by Council members, in particular by France. It is now up to the regime's supporters to ensure full compliance with the cessation of hostilities without delay and to respond to all requests for access to humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations in accordance with the text we have just adopted. We specifically call on the guarantors of the Astana process to assume their responsibilities and effectively ensure that the Syrian regime immediately cease its hostilities and ensure respect for the basic principles and rules of international humanitarian law and human rights law. It is urgent that humanitarian assistance reach without delay the people who need it. Every minute counts because every minute can lead to the loss of lives. Nothing would be worse than to see this resolution remain a dead letter. That is why France will be extremely vigilant on all those points over the coming hours and days. We all know that a return to stability in Syria is the only way to put a definitive end to the humanitarian crisis, for which a political solution is required. More than ever, therefore, we must redouble our efforts to establish a neutral environment that will enable a credible political process and elections to be held in Syria, as part of the Geneva process and resolution 2254 (2015). France is ready to continue working tirelessly with its partners to that end. As we said yesterday in this forum, the elements for a regional and potentially major international confrontation have coalesced today. That is a risk that must be taken very seriously. We must therefore come together, as we have done today, to put an end to the humanitarian catastrophe under way, prevent a spillover of the conflict and seek an inclusive political solution in Syria. These are three indissociable priorities, and our generation will be judged on whether or not we are able to put an end to the Syrian tragedy. This text is a potentially important step, but it is obviously not the end of the road. Let us be frank: the hardest part has yet to be done. Therefore, on behalf of France, I would like to launch a two-pronged appeal. The first is a call for the resolution to be fully and immediately implemented. We are all aware that pitfalls and obstacles abound. This is a reflection of the extent to which resolute and coordinated engagement by all members of the Security Council is crucial to ensuring that the provisions we have just adopted are implemented on the ground without delay. To put it even more clearly: if we do not put all our resources 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 7/14 and energy behind the full implementation of this resolution, we know that it will not work. Above all, that applies to Russia and the Astana guarantors. The second call is to use this truce as leverage to put an end to the spiral of violence in the Syrian tragedy and create positive momentum towards an inclusive political settlement in Syria. That must be our common ambition. There is a glimmer of hope today in that regard. Let us seize this fragile moment to begin to reverse the course of events, despite the magnitude of the difficulties ahead. As the Council knows, France is fully committed to that goal. Mr. Hickey (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom welcomes the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). In particular, we applaud your work, Mr. President, together with Sweden, as co-penholders. But this is not a moment for self-congratulation. It has taken us far too long to agree this resolution. While we have been arguing over commas, Al-Assad's planes have been killing more civilians in their homes and in their hospitals, imposing unbearable suffering. Despite the amount of time we have spent in this Chamber over many years discussing the devastating humanitarian crisis, we have still not been able to achieve the peace and security that the Syrian people so desperately need. As the conflict enters its eighth year, the situation in eastern Ghouta and elsewhere in the country is far worse than we ever thought imaginable. The barbarity and depravity of the Al-Assad regime shows no limits. We must never lose sight of the fact that the pictures we see and the stories we hear from this comfortable Chamber are the agonizing reality for hundreds of thousands of civilians — for men, women and children who are being forced to eke out an existence underground to avoid being killed by a regime that commits daily atrocities against its own people. I have heard some say that the information about the situation in eastern Ghouta is propaganda. A doctor in eastern Ghouta, having heard such comments, said this morning: "Amid the chaos and the bombs, it is the not being believed that almost hurts the most. We are dying here every day. And when people say that they do not believe us, that is pain upon pain." This is not propaganda. It is a living hell for hundreds of thousands of residents of eastern Ghouta. As we have repeated many times, the intentional and systematic targeting of civilians and civilian objects not only violates international humanitarian law, it is a war crime. The United Kingdom will be unrelenting in our campaign to ensure accountability. By having voted in favour of the resolution today, we are standing up and saying that we will not stand by and let this happen. In the face of escalating violence, devastation and suffering, we must all now take practical steps to improve the situation for those living and dying in a hell of one man's making. The resolution demonstrates our resolve to put a stop to the brutal violence. It demands that all parties cease hostilities without delay. That means right now, immediately. The role and responsibility of the Council does not end with the adoption of this resolution, quite the opposite. All States Members of the United Nations, but particularly Council members, must now take responsibility for ensuring that the resolution is implemented in full, without delay. The resolution calls for the Council to review its implementation within 15 days, but we must all be active in supporting and monitoring implementation from the moment we step out of the Chamber. If we see any of the parties violating the terms of the resolution, we must bring it back to the Council immediately. Those with any influence over the Syrian regime — Russia, Iran — have a particular responsibility to ensure that the ceasefire is respected in full and without delay, that all sieges are ended and that humanitarian aid is delivered. This is the absolute minimum that the people of Syria deserve. As much as we welcome the adoption of this resolution today, it is only a small step. Just as one aid convoy in three months to a besieged area cannot even begin to address the humanitarian crisis, one resolution alone cannot solve the situation in Syria. We must do everything in our collective power to ensure that this resolution is effective in delivering for those whom we have failed to date. We must all send a clear message to the Al-Assad regime: abandon your attempt to pursue a military strategy, stop fighting and engage seriously in United Nations-led political talks in Geneva. In conclusion, let me reiterate the words of my Foreign Secretary. The entire world is looking at the Al-Assad regime, Russia and Iran. They hold the keys not only to the end of this obscene conflict, but to the safety, humanitarian aid and basic medical treatment S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 8/14 18-05017 that is being denied to millions of people right now in Syria. For the mother giving birth underground in eastern Ghouta, for the child unable to learn as schools are closed for yet another day, for the doctor battling air strikes to treat patients in Idlib — all of us sitting here today owe it to the people of Syria to work together with renewed and unyielding energy to achieve a political solution that will bring peace to the Syrian people. Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): The recent escalation of conflict in the affected areas of Syria has caught the attention of the international community. We acutely feel the suffering of the Syrian people as if it were inflicted upon us. China condemns all acts of violence that target civilians and civilian property and destroy innocent lives. China welcomes the Security Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which is the result of Council members' patient consultation and hard work to find consensus. The resolution includes positive elements such as calling for respect for Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity; demanding a cessation of hostilities by all parties; easing the humanitarian situation in Syria; supporting mine action throughout Syria; and continuing to combat terrorism. As an active party to the consultation process, China made unflagging efforts and played a constructive role in facilitating consensus-building in the Council. China appreciates that, thanks to the concerted efforts of all parties concerned, the Council arrived at a solution that reflects the broadest possible consensus among Council members. I would like in particular to thank Kuwait and Sweden, as co-penholders of the resolution, for their tireless efforts. By speaking with one voice on the humanitarian situation in Syria, the Security Council is helping to alleviate the situation as a whole, helping to consolidate the momentum towards a ceasefire, contributing to counter-terrorism efforts in the country and serving the overarching objective of arriving at a political settlement of the Syrian issue. Going forward, the international community should work together to ensure the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), so that it can play a positive role in improving the humanitarian situation in Syria. The only way to fundamentally improve the humanitarian situation in Syria and to lift the people of Syria out of their suffering is to find a political settlement. The international community should support the Syrian parties in seeking a swift solution that is acceptable to all parties in the context of a United Nations mediation through a Syrian-owned and -led political process in order to end the suffering of the Syrian people as soon as possible. China is keen for the Council to remain united and forge consensus on the Syrian issue. The Council must push the Syrian parties to consolidate the momentum towards a ceasefire, strengthen cooperation on combating terrorist groups, advance the process towards a political settlement and play a constructive role in maintaining peace and security in Syria and across the region. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): The delegation of Kazakhstan voted in favour of resolution 2401 (2018), on the cessation of hostilities in Syria. I express my gratitude to the co-penholders — Sweden and Kuwait — for their determined efforts to find common ground among the Security Council members. I also thank the members of the Council for their constructive approach towards the resolution, which has many significant provisions. The position of Kazakhstan is very consistent — that stability in the Middle East can be achieved by reducing violence for peaceful means and avoiding the emergence of new tensions. In the past few days, Heads of State and Government from around the world have called on the Syrian Government to observe human rights and on both sides to exercise restraint. Simultaneously, external incitement that fuels tension should stop immediately so that it does not endanger regional security. We see a Security Council united today in demanding that all parties cease hostilities without delay. We now expect all countries that exercise influence on the ground and conduct military campaigns against international terrorist groups in Syria to interact and find common ground for fighting terrorism jointly, while taking practical steps to implement the resolution. Kazakhstan calls on all forces that support an early settlement of the Syrian conflict, including the Government of Syria and the armed opposition, to fully comply with the ceasefire regime and the resolution. All the parties must ensure safe and unhindered access for humanitarian assistance to reach the affected areas, as well as the evacuation of people in need of medical assistance. The Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan hopes that his colleagues — the Foreign Ministers of the guarantor States of the Astana process — will take additional constructive steps to strictly implement the 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 9/14 ceasefire agreements and support the de-escalation zones in Syria, at the meeting scheduled to take place in the capital of Kazakhstan in mid-March or earlier, if need be. These were difficult, but successful, deliberations. We should all work collectively to find a peaceful solution. The unity shown today in the Security Council should continue, since we have yet a lot to accomplish in Syria and elsewhere. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): On Wednesday, during the high-level debate on the Charter of the United Nations, I quoted one of the founding fathers of the United Nations, Ambassador Stettinius (see S/PV.8185). He said that the members of the Security Council had the obligation to agree so that the Council may be able to act and act effectively. Today we finally managed to agree to end the atrocious violence in eastern Ghouta; to end attacks against hospitals; and to end the killing of innocent civilians, including women and children. The Kingdom of the Netherlands welcomes the unanimous adoption of this crucial resolution — resolution 2401 (2018). Let me thank the co-penholders in particular — Kuwait and Sweden — for their tireless efforts and skilled diplomatic work. We pay tribute to them. Today we have a resolution, now we need to see action on the ground. All United Nations States Members have an obligation to make sure that the words of the resolution are implemented without delay. The Syrian authorities in particular have a specific responsibility towards their own people. The resolution means that all parties must cease hostilities without delay. All parties must engage immediately for a sustainable and durable humanitarian pause of at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria to enable the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services and to enable medical evacuations of the critically sick and wounded, in accordance with applicable international law. The implementation of the resolution means the cessation of hostilities, the delivery of humanitarian aid and urgent medical evacuations. It is a first step in the right direction, but much more is needed — a political solution, accountability and the return of refugees. The Council should remain seized of the matter and closely monitor the implementation of the resolution, starting today. The Council should reconvene without delay if the situation demands it. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): We highly commend the work of Sweden and Kuwait as co-penholders on the humanitarian resolution for Syria — resolution 2401 (2018) — who did their best to accommodate the concerns of all Security Council members. On Wednesday I stressed that it is the Council's responsibility to not fail in stopping the ongoing human tragedy in Syria, and in eastern Ghouta in particular (see S/PV.8185). Today we have managed to reach compromise and adopt the resolution by consensus. I would like to thank all my colleagues for their very constructive attitude. However, the innocent people of Syria have waited far too long for that. Now, all of the parties, especially those with influence on the ground, must make every effort to implement it. In that context, we reiterate our call on all sides to comply with international humanitarian law, cease all hostilities against civilians and allow for free humanitarian access. In conclusion, it is not only our legal obligation to act now, but also our moral duty. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): Following the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), I take the floor on behalf of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, whose Government closely followed the whole process leading up to its successful conclusion with the unanimous adoption of this humanitarian resolution. At the outset, I pay a well-deserved tribute to the penholders, Kuwait and Sweden, for all their efforts, patience and dedication to the goal of drafting a resolution that was ultimately deserving of a favourable vote. We commend the unanimous support of the elected members for the penholders throughout the duration of that process. In Spanish, it is often said that "it is never too late if the outcome is good". This positive outcome is the result of the contributions of all members of the Council, to which we extend our gratitude and commend for the fruitful end. What lies ahead now is the effective implementation of the provisions of the resolution with a view to achieving the objective the Security Council has set out to achieve, namely, an immediate ceasefire throughout Syria in order to facilitate the safe, unhindered and sustainable delivery S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 10/14 18-05017 of humanitarian aid, services and medical evacuations of all severely injured and ill persons. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea energetically calls on all parties, the United Nations and those involved in the devastating conflict to do everything possible towards the noble end of saving human lives and alleviating the suffering that has been endured far too long by the people. The adoption of the resolution partially spares all members of the Security Council from embarrassment. We will save ourselves completely from that shame if the ceasefire takes effect in the next few hours and if humanitarian aid and medical care begin to reach the affected persons over the upcoming days. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): Seven years have elapsed since the beginning of this war, and the suffering of the Syrian people continues to worsen. The numerous human lives lost in recent weeks add to the more than 500,000 lost since the beginning of the conflict. We believe that while military tactics prevail over a political solution, there can be no lasting peace, and consequently it will be civilians, especially women and children, who will continue to be subjected to unnecessary suffering. For that reason, we commend the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), and hope that its timely and effective implementation will help to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. My delegation underscores and commends the arduous work undertaken by the penholders. The delegations of Sweden and Kuwait have demonstrated strong leadership and resolve up to the very last moment to reach an agreement. Similarly, we wish to acknowledge the effort and commitment shown by the Russian Federation and the parties involved, as well as all members of the Security Council during the negotiation process. In recent days, my delegation has expressed its position on the matter at hand, and today we do so once again. Consensus and unity within the Security Council are pivotal if we are to improve the humanitarian situation in Syria, which is why we commend the consensus reached today. We reiterate that there can be no military solution to the situation and that the only way forward is through inclusive political dialogue. We thefaffirm our support for the Geneva process and the achievements made in Astana, of which the agreements must be upheld by all parties. Moreover, we have high expectations that the various forums of dialogue, such as the Sochi dialogue, can contribute to the achievement of a final and lasting peace. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We welcome the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on the humanitarian situation in Syria. We voted in favour because we believe that the resolution can make a positive difference on the ground in the alleviation of the continued tragedy of the Syrians. Having discussed the severe humanitarian crisis in Syria almost weekly, it was clear that what was required from the Council was concrete and collective action that would contribute to alleviating the intolerable suffering of Syrians in all areas of the country. We are pleased that the Council has acted and sent the right message to bring about a cessation of hostilities that will allow the United Nations and its humanitarian partners to have safe, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access to deliver the much-needed humanitarian assistance to all Syrians in need. I wish to express our sincere appreciation to the delegations of Kuwait and Sweden, which effectively and efficiently led the process of negotiations. We all know that it was not an easy task, but they did excellent work in accommodating the concerns of all delegations with a high sense of responsibility and patience. We also thank all delegations for their flexibility during the negotiation process. We hope that the positive spirit that led the Council to adopt the resolution will prevail, not only in ensuring its effective implementation, but also in laying the bases for greater mutual understanding among all those with enormous influence over developments in Syria, whether in the humanitarian or political and security domains. We know, given the realities, that this is a tall order. One matter needs to be stressed on this occasion. The security situation in Syria is perhaps more complicated today than it has ever been over the past few years. We should not overlook the fact that the source of the humanitarian tragedy that we see today is the result of the difficult political and security situation in the country. We trust that all those, including those whom Ambassador Delattre referred to, will continue to play a role in contributing to the creation of the basis for progress in the peace process. That is extremely critical for ensuring that the humanitarian tragedy is Syria is brought to an end. We can only hope that what the Council has achieved today will lay the basis for averting an even greater humanitarian tragedy in Syria. 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 11/14 Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We wish to thank you, Mr. President, and your team, as well as the Permanent Representative of Sweden and his team, for the tireless efforts made to achieve this important consensus, and we also thank the members of the Council for their flexibility. This commitment will allow for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Syria and the urgent and necessary provision of humanitarian assistance. We underscore the need to maintain unity within the Council in terms of its responsibilities to protect the civilian population, in accordance with international law and international humanitarian law. Peru, a sponsor of resolution 2401 (2017), which we have just adopted, will closely monitor its urgent implementation and compliance therewith by all parties involved. We wish to express our sorrow concerning and solidarity with the victims of the conflict in Syria, and our support and admiration for the United Nations humanitarian workers and those of other agencies deployed on the ground. We hope that the important step that we have taken today will help to achieve a lasting solution to the Syrian conflict in line with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Côte d'Ivoire, as a sponsor of resolution 2401 (2017), which we have just adopted and which is purely humanitarian in nature, commends its initiators, namely, your country, Mr. President, and Sweden. It welcomes the adoption of the resolution, which demands the cessation without delay of hostilities. This demand on the part of the Council must be upheld by all actors on every battlefield in Syria. Côte d'Ivoire also welcomes the efforts undertaken by all parties to arrive at a consensus within the Council. It thanks in particular the Russian Federation for its spirit of compromise. The contribution made by all parties to the adoption of the resolution is aimed at saving the Syrian people from the horrific war plaguing that country, which is imperilling the lives of thousands of human beings, specifically civilians, including women and children. Côte d'Ivoire remains convinced that only a definitive end to the Syrian conflict through negotiations can enable all Syrians to restore peace, achieve reconciliation and rebuild their country, with a view to relaunching its economic and social development. We hope that the 30-day truce demanded by the Council will be the beginning of a process that will bring peace to Syria on the basis of the relevant conclusions and recommendations of all negotiations held in Astana, Sochi and Geneva concerning the country. The President (spoke in Arabic): I now call on the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): Over the past two days, 10 of the thousands of missiles that have fallen on the Syrian capital landed on the headquarters of the Red Crescent in Damascus, the main headquarters of the Syrian Red Crescent, in the Abu Ramani neighbourhood of Damascus. Those missiles were launched by the moderate armed groups in Al-Ghouta. Thousands of people died, including Dr. Hassan, a professor at the Technological Health Institute in Damascus. A French colleague and friend, Thierry Mariani, said: (spoke in French) "Like hundreds of others over the past five years, Dr. Hassan Haj Hassan was killed by shells fired from Ghouta on Damascus by these moderate rebels. Those dead and are not entitled to media compassion; they are on the wrong side of history. When will there be balanced coverage?" (spoke in Arabic) This French citizen accurately described the suffering of the Syrian people as a result of the launching by terrorists of missiles against Damascus. He had visited Aleppo in 2017, and as he was leaving Free Syrian Army gangs fired rockets at the airport. Luckily he was not hurt, but since then the Aleppo airport has been closed because it is unsafe. Also. the head of the Syrian Red Crescent in Idlib, Dr. Muhammad Al-Waty, was kidnapped by moderate armed groups. My colleague the Permanent Representative of France said that we must observe a truce, and I agree with him. However, I think that we also need to implement the 29 other Security Council resolutions on the situation in Syria, of which 13 relate to the fight against terrorism. We need not only a month-long cessation of hostilities; we also need to see the implementation of the 29 other resolutions that the Council has adopted. My colleague the British Ambassador told us horrific stories that he heard from other people. Perhaps S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 12/14 18-05017 he has not heard about what the British forces have done in Iraq, Palestine and Libya. The British Government went to the Malvinas and fought Argentina for an island that it does not own and that is situated tens of thousands of kilometres away from the United Kingdom. However, I say to my British colleague that his Government — and I am not using the term "regime", because I respect international law — is preventing us from countering terrorism in our own territories. We are not going thousands of kilometres away, we have not been fighting in other countries. It is in our own territories that we are combating terrorism — terrorism that is supported by the Government of the United Kingdom. During the meeting on Thursday (see S/PV.8186), I explained the reality of what is happening in Syria — the suffering of civilians as a result of the actions of armed terrorist groups. I assure members once again that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has taken all the de-escalation initiatives seriously and has observed them so as to protect the lives of its citizens and to stop those who have been trading in their pain and blood. In that regard, I note that the Syrian Government has complied with the Astana agreement on establishing de-escalation zones and stipulated a number of commitments, including compelling the signatory armed groups to sever any ties they have with terrorist organizations, especially the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Al-Nusra Front and all other affiliated groups. At the same time, the Astana agreement gave the Syrian Government the right to respond in case of any violations by those armed groups. It was not at all surprising to us that those terrorist armed groups would not comply with any of those initiatives, but would use them as an opportunity to reorganize their forces and their terrorist fighters, acquire more arms, military equipment, human and logistical support and perpetuate their crimes against the Syrian people. They are receiving instructions from certain States members of the Council, as well as regional actors that are practicing State terrorism to ensure the obstruction and failure of those initiatives and agreements. Since the signing of the agreement on the establishment of de-escalation zones, these armed groups have systematically violated it. In responding to the violations, the Syrian Government has exercised extreme self-restraint to protect the lives of civilians and salvage the agreement that terrorist armed groups and the countries that sponsor them have been trying to obstruct since the moment of signing it. However, these violations have become repeated and serious and have affected the lives of 8 million civilians living in the capital, Damascus, and its suburbs. Attacks have been waged by launching rockets and missiles and using car bombs, with Syrian military sites being targeted. All this has led to an unbearable situation that we cannot condone. As a State, we bear a responsibility towards our citizens and we have a sovereign right to counter terrorism. We are also receiving repeated appeals from Syrian citizens for protection — their families, their children, their schools — from the acts of these terrorist armed groups In the light of these violations and terrorist acts, the Syrian Government has had to take the necessary steps to protect its citizens. We exercised our legitimate right to defend them. At the same time, we have taken all the steps necessary to ensure the safety of the civilians who have been taken hostage by these groups and used as human shields inside eastern Ghouta. In cooperation with our Russian friends, we also ensured the safe passage of civilians out of danger from 4 to 14 February. We have provided shelter and food and necessary medical care. The Government has paid for all that assistance. We have called upon armed groups to lay down their weapons and stop their terrorism from residential places and neighbourhoods, and instead engage in national reconciliation initiatives. Of course, the appeals of 8 million Syrians do not reach the Secretariat or the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, although they receive appeals from their proxies — terrorist armed groups and White Helmet terrorists, the new legitimate representative of the Al-Nusra Front. It seems that these countries decided today to replace the black flags of ISIL and Al-Qaida with white flags in Iraq and the White Helmets in Syria. We are therefore done with using the black colour; we are using the white colour now, white flags in Iraq and White Helmets in Syria. According to General Assembly resolution 46/182, which we all negotiated and reached consensus on, the basic principle that governs the delivery of humanitarian aid is respect for the sovereignty of the country concerned as well as coordinating with it fully in any activity in which the United Nations is engaged on the territory of the country in question. However, such principles lose all value when they are 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 13/14 subject to the political whims and double standards of the Secretariat and some more influential countries, particularly when it comes to implementing them in Syria. How else can we explain that some countries submit draft resolutions on the situation in Syria and negotiate them for many weeks with all actors, but excluding the country concerned? This is what I asked the day before yesterday. How do we explain that the Resident Coordinator in Damascus sends a note to the Syrian Foreign Ministry on 14 February stressing that the aid convoys reached 2.3 million Syrians in the so-called besieged and hard-to-reach areas in 2017, while the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs presented completely false figures yesterday to tarnish the image of the Syrian Government and to give Western countries in the Security Council justification for targeting the Syrian Government and its partners? The Resident Coordinator said that aid had reached 2.3 million Syrians. But just two days ago, Mr. Lowcock said that aid had reached only 20,000 people. Along with some members of the Council, we have said repeatedly over the past seven years that to end the suffering of civilians in Syria we do not need non-consensual draft resolutions, nor do we need to adopt new resolutions or hold regular or emergency meetings. We do not need to deplete United Nations resources to prepare periodic reports that rely on unreliable sources. We do not need to establish a committee here and a body there. We need to implement the 29 — now 30 — Security Council resolutions that have been adopted; it is quite a coincidence that by adopting resolution 2401 (2018) today we have reached 30 resolutions. These resolutions should be implemented. The Governments of some countries should stop spending billions of dollars to support and finance armed terrorist groups and provide them with arms. The latest we have heard is that the United States of America has allocated $4 billion to ublically fund the terrorists in Syria. Those countries must stop opening their borders and airports to facilitate the flow of terrorist fighters to Syria. They must allow the Syrian people to shape its future and restore its security and stability without any foreign interference. You said, Mr. President, that the Council rejects anything that violates the purposes and principles of the Charter. Yes, this is very precise. You called also for the implementation of today's resolution in all parts of Syria, which is how we interpret this resolution in Damascus. Resolution 2401 (2018) must be implemented in all parts of Syria, including Afrin, United States-occupied areas and the Golan. In addition, let me make it clear that the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France and their enablers in the region should stop holding meetings in Washington, D.C., Paris and London, establishing groups, bodies or forums and devising what they refer to as strategic plans reminiscent of colonial times. Following a meeting in Washington, D.C., they announced that they had drafted a plan to divide Syria within a year — I am just recounting what they said. The strategic plans contained in the document adopted in Washington, D.C., are aimed at dividing Syria, changing its political system by force, spreading terrorism and maintaining an illegitimate military presence in our territories. I say to my colleague the Permanent Representative of the United States, who threatened us here at the Council a while ago and no one has responded to her, that none of the plans will succeed; they will backfire sooner or later. According to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, my country has the right to defend itself with all of the legal tools available. A United States occupying military presence exists in our territories, and we have the right to resist it. The representative of the United States has threatened us. We, in turn, give her a warning from this Chamber because, according to Article 51 of the Charter, we have the right to defend ourselves. We again stress that double standards will continue to mar international efforts to counter terrorism as long as there is a partial approach to addressing the threat of armed groups in Syria. Some members of the Council claim that they are concerned about an area controlled by terrorist armed groups in eastern Ghouta. The size of that area is 50 square kilometres. They continue to ignore three illegally occupied Syrian territories covering 50,000 square kilometres. They focus on 50 square kilometres and ignore an area of 50,000 square kilometres, of American, Turkish and Israeli occupation. That simple comparison reflects the political hypocrisy of some Member States, and the inaction of the Security Council and of other bodies of the United Nations, as the Organization succumbs to the political and financial polarization that has become the main feature of its working methods. S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 14/14 18-05017 In conclusion, we will continue, with the support our allies, to counter terrorism regardless of where it exists in Syria — I repeat, regardless of where it exists in Syria. We are exercising our sovereign right of self-defence and a constitutional right in our territory and within our national borders. We do not send forces to conquer areas thousands of kilometres away, as the so-called illegitimate international coalition does in my country, Syria, today. We do not follow the example of French forces in Mali, the Niger and other African countries, or of the United States and United Kingdom in Afghanistan, Libya today and Iraq previously. We defend ourselves and counter terrorism within our borders. We did not go to Mali, the Niger or the Malvinas. We need serious commitment from Governments that issue instructions to armed terrorist groups. The groups should be given orders to immediately stop targeting civilians and perpetrating terrorist acts — I repeat immediately and without delay, as the resolution stipulates. I stress that the Syrian Government will reserve the right to respond as it deems appropriate if such groups target civilians in any part of Syria with even a single missile. I take it that we all understand that paragraph 1 of resolution 2401 (2018) also applies to the aggression of Turkish forces in Afrin and the repeated acts of aggression by the international coalition against my country's sovereignty and territories. Of course, resolution 2401 (2018) applies also to the continuous violations by Israeli occupation forces against Syria's sovereignty, by supporting terrorist factions in the occupied Syrian Golan. That is how we interpret the resolution just adopted by the Council. The meeting rose at 3.35 p.m.

On Saturday, an alleged Israeli airstrike killed five senior members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps in Damascus. On the same day, an Iraqi Shi'a militia affiliated with Iran launched a salvo of ballistic missiles at Al-Asad base in Iraq, housing U.S. forces, resulting in injuries to U.S. personnel. Normally Iraqi militias use drones or rockets, not the ballistic missiles preferred by the Islamic Republic. These attacks occur at an inflection point for Iran.From Jan. 15 to Jan. 16, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted military strikes in Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan, primarily in retaliation for an attack within its borders on Jan. 3. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and its branch in Afghanistan, claimed responsibility for the inciting explosions, which killed close to 90 people in Kerman, Iran, in one of the deadliest terrorist strikes in the Islamic Republic since 1979.Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, vowed the "terrorist attack" would be met with a "harsh response." Yet Iran targeted alleged bases of Kurdish and Baluch separatists in Iraq and Pakistan, respectively, and ISIS remnants in Syria, not Afghanistan. This demonstrates that Tehran feels emboldened to strike any group it deems a threat, using the Jan. 3 attack as a cover. Iran previously showed more restraint responding to domestic terror attacks from 2017 to 2020.An analysis of the string of events that led to Iran's recent retaliation demonstrates that a regional war is erupting in the Middle East after the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, even beyond the recent U.S. and UK strikes in Yemen. While the U.S. has yet to acknowledge this fact, the history of terrorist attacks within Iran demonstrates why it believes the fighting is linked to other events and sheds light on how Tehran will lash out.When terrorist attacks occur in Iran, they rarely generate media coverage, showing an unfortunate indifference to Iranian lives. However, Iran too wages its own war on terrorism. An examination of past attacks and how Iran responded demonstrates that the Islamic Republic's "harsh response" — its own counter-terrorism strategy — is an attempt to establish deterrence, as the U.S. and Israel seek to do the same in the region.The spiral of violence in January 2024On Dec. 25, 2023, an Israeli strike killed Iranian general Seyed Razi Mousavi in Damascus. At the same time, the U.S. targeted the Iraqi militia Kataib Hizballah, which cooperates with the Islamic Republic, in retaliation for allegedly launching drones at U.S. forces in Erbil.On Jan. 1, 2024, the U.S. sunk three attacking speedboats in the Red Sea, killing 10 Houthis. On Jan. 2, an Israeli drone strike killed Hamas's deputy leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut. On Jan. 3, the ISIS attack in Iran occurred. On Jan. 4, the U.S. assassinated "Abu Taqwa," a mid-level leader of the Iraqi militia Harakat al-Nujaba in a drone strike in Baghdad, for his role in attacks on American targets in the region, allegedly at the behest of the Islamic Republic. Then the U.S. and UK launched air strikes on Jan. 11 and 17th on Houthi targets all over Yemen, a militia allied with Iran, followed three days later with the Israeli attack in Damascus. The Islamic Republic will see the timing of these attacks as intrinsically linked. The ISIS terrorist attacks occurred near the tomb of General Qassem Soleimani, in his hometown, targeting mourners who had congregated there for the fourth anniversary of his assassination. Soleimani, who headed the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) Quds Force, was killed in the early hours of Jan. 3, 2020, by a U.S. drone strike. There had been speculation about the various actors who may have conducted the attack. From the Islamic Republic's perspective, its enemies are ISIS and its branch in Afghanistan; Arab, Kurdish, and Baluchi separatists; the Iranian exile Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK) Organization; as well as Israel and/or the U.S. Iran might very well blame all of those actors for working in unison. The attack in Kerman bore the hallmarks of an ISIS operation and was claimed by the terrorist group. Ethnic separatists usually chose Iranian military targets. Israel tends to conduct targeted assassinations of Iranian scientists, or recently an Iranian general in Syria. But Islamic State's attacks are indiscriminate, and Soleimani did organize the Iraqi militias to combat the terrorist group in Iraq, giving ISIS a reason to retaliate.Between exiles, ethnic rebellions, and ISISAfter 1979, the nascent Islamic Republic had to deal with two problems in its western Kurdistan Province, which has a significant Kurdish population, and its southern Khuzestan province, which has a significant Arab population. Both areas proved problematic as the Iranian state sought to overcome ethnic differences between Persian nationalism and Kurdish and Arab aspirations by reconciling them under the banner of an Islamic Republic.There were a few bouts of violence in the early 1980s, particularly with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I), but the provinces remained quiet until 2003, when the Bush administration was allegedly responsible for stoking Iranian ethnic rebellions during its War on Terror. An ethnic Sunni Baluch rebellion erupted in addition to dissent in Kurdistan, Khuzestan, and among Iran's ethnic Azerbaijani population, which is larger than the population of the republic of Azerbaijan itself.Al-Qaida never struck in Iran, but ISIS, with its virulent anti-Shi'i ideology, attacked the majority Shi'a nation. In June 2017, four ISIS terrorists launched a brazen assault on Iran's parliament, killing 18.Iran's ballistic counter-terrorism strategyIn retaliation, on 18 June, 2017, the IRGC launched six domestically-produced Zolfaghar ballistic missiles, with a range of over 400 miles, against Islamic State targets in Syria's eastern province of Deir Ezzor.While the target may have been ISIS, the strike sent a signal to Riyadh in the aftermath of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's statement that Saudi Arabia would take its "battle" with the Islamic Republic inside of Iranian territory, made at the height of the Saudi-Iranian cold war in the Middle East. The missiles, after all, also had the range to strike Riyadh.The IRGC again launched missiles in early September 2018 against the KDP-I, exiled in bases in Iraq, in retaliation for their alleged attacks on Iranian military forces. In the most recent attack in January, the IRGC launched a dozen ballistic missiles and suicide drones at targets in northern Iraq, claiming it targeted a Mossad base there that was used to organize the Jan. 3 Kerman bombings, killing at least four people. In reality, Iran most likely sought to deter the KDP-I from future attacks.Back in 2018, ISIS attacked an Iranian military parade on Sept. 22 in Ahvaz ("Ahwaz" in Arabic). The al-Ahwaz National Resistance, an umbrella movement for Arab separatist groups, also claimed responsibility for that attack. However, the Ahvaz group had never conducted such a brazen attack before, preferring to sabotage Iran's pipeline facilities, usually at night. ISIS, on the other hand, had attacked Iran's parliament in 2017 in broad daylight.Furthermore, for reasons of domestic consumption, it was more convenient that ISIS was the culprit for the 2018 Ahvaz attack. If Tehran were to blame the Ahvaz group, it would serve as an admission of the government's failure to address the depressed conditions in the Khuzestan province as well as in Kurdistan and Baluchistan — conditions that have led to grievances and pushed some locals to adopt terrorism. Second, the Ahvaz group did not have any military bases outside of Iran to retaliate against.Iran retaliated with ballistic missiles to strike the ISIS-held town of Hajin in eastern Syria. When it lost all of its territory in the east of Syria, ISIS allegedly kept some networks alive in the rebel-held Idlib. Even though the Jan. 3 attack was claimed by the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) the IRGC justified attacking Syria instead of Afghanistan by claiming that ISKP terrorists receive training in Idlib from ISIS and are then transferred to Afghanistan by the U.S. In reality, an attack on Afghan soil would have disrupted already tense relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan.In the restive Sistan-Baluchestan province, bordering Pakistan, Iranian military forces were targeted twice in domestic terrorist attacks in 2019. The first hit a base of the Basij, the paramilitary force affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, coinciding with the Islamic Republic's celebration of the 40th anniversary of the revolution that brought down the shah. Another attack followed, killing 20 Revolutionary Guards in a suicide bomb operation. Both were claimed by the Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), formed in 2012 to fight on behalf of Baluchi Sunnis, who complained of discrimination by the Shi'a government. The Islamic Republic did not respond to those attacks since this Baluch group operates clandestinely within the Sistan-Baluchistan province and out of the Baluchistan province in Pakistan. At that point, Iran did not want to violate the sovereignty of its neighbor. However, last week it did retaliate for a different set of attacks in mid-December, when the Baluch group attacked an Iranian police station in the town of Rask, killing at least 11 officers.The year 2020 witnessed two major losses for Iran. After Soleimani's death in January 2020, Iran launched 22 Fateh ballistic missiles at two Iraqi bases housing American forces. In December 2020, Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated in his car by a sophisticated machine gun contraption controlled remotely. Israel and its alleged ally the MeK rarely take credit for the string of assassinations that have targeted Iran's nuclear scientists, with Iran issuing condemnations, but little more. The fact that Iranian allies in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Yemen have struck Israel or its interests since Oct. 7 serves as an indirect retaliation in their regional conflict.The Islamic Republic has sought to mollify domestic audiences by demonstrating that it retaliated for recent attacks on Iranian soil and will consider its mission accomplished. Further retaliation would jeopardize its gains. Iran has already won a regional conflict by reviving its Hamas-Hezbollah-Houthi "Axis of Resistance" since October. Yet the people of Iran endured a loss.Nevertheless, the recent events have demonstrated the interconnected and interdependent nature of the Middle East, and how a set of attacks in Iran are related to the ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea.