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The article analyses the transformations of political divisions of the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea – Cyprus (with an area of only 9285 km2). In almost all historical periods, the island's political unity was rare, and its territorial divisions are almost the norm. One can also observe the deepening process of territorial diversifi cation of Cyprus, which, paradoxically, has reached its apogee nowadays. Currently, it is possible to distinguish as many as 17 separate territorial fragments with different international status on the island.In Cyprus, there are currently two states and two colonial territories (Great Britain) and an internationalised area, as well as one territory with unknown status (Varoşa). No political unit in Cyprus has territorial continuity. One of these countries is a full member of the European Union and so the other territories are therefore in special relations with this organisation. The process of the political and territorial unification of the island, which has been going on for several decades, is suspended in practice and the hopes that are stirred up every few years that it will reach the final this time always turn out to be premature.

Kant, who is one of the contractarian theorists in political philosophy, positions the person who has the right to vote and participates in the legislative process as a citizen. This positioning is directly related to Kant's attribution of citizenship to the independence precondition. For Kant, independence means that a person possesses a certain amount of ownership which enables him to sustain his life on his own. The person who owns a certain quantity of property is the master of himself as he will not receive orders from the others and will not need the protection of others. Positioning an independent person as an active citizen with political rights, Kant considers persons who are non-owners as passive citizens because they cannot meet the prerequisite for independence. Passive citizens who are deprived of all political rights are merely citizens of the state. According to Kant's argument, women can never move up to the active citizenship status, although the republic has cleared the way for the possibility that every member of the republic could eventually move up to the active citizenship status. The status of being man of property, which is a prerequisite for the independence criterion, loses all its functions when women are in question. Even if a woman is a property owner, this is still considered insufficient for the independence criterion. Kant bases this idea of him on the assumption of women's nature and the prenuptial agreement.

AbstractWhat happens when we focus primarily on violence as a central question—either within the gender regime approach or by making violence regime an approach in itself? The article first interrogates gender regimes theoretically and empirically through a focus on violence, and then develops violence regimes as a fruitful approach, conceptualizing violence as inequality in its own right, and a means to deepen the analysis of gender relations, gender domination, and policy. The article is a contribution to ongoing debate, which specifically and critically engages with the gender regime framework.