Suchergebnisse

The case of BRI is evidence that, in a deregulated policy environment, a government-owned agricultural development bank can (a) be transformed into a highly profitable, self-reliant financial intermediary, and (b) turn into a major microfinance provider, offering carefully crafted microsavings and microcredit products to low-income people at market rates of interest. Making good use of government seed money and a World Bank loan during an initial phase, it has now fully substituted savings deposits for external loans as its source of funds. With an outreach to 25.1 million saving accounts and 2.6 million borrowers (July 2000) through a network of 3,700 village units operating as profit centers, BRI covers its costs from the interest rate margin and finances its expansion from its profits. With non-targeted loans from $5 to $5000 at rural market rates of interest and unrestricted deposit services, the BRI Microbanking Division has weathered the Asian financial crisis well, making BRI the only profitable government bank in Indonesia. Several lessons can be drawn from BRI's experience: – Financial sector policies work and are conducive to financial innovations – With attractive savings and credit products, appropriate staff incentives, and an effective system of internal regulation and supervision, rural microfinance can be profitable – The poor can save; rural financial institutions can mobilize their savings cost-effectively – If financial services are offered without a credit bias, demand for savings deposit services exceeds the demand for credit by a wide margin – Incentives for timely repayment work – Outreach of a financial institution to vast numbers of low-income people and financial selfsufficiency (including viability and self-reliance) are compatible – Average transaction costs can be lowered, and both the profitability of a financial institution and the volume of loanable funds can be increased by catering for both the poor and the non-poor with their demands for widely differing deposit and loan sizes Within a six-year period,1984-90, BRI became a model case in Asia of the transformation of an ailing government-owned agricultural development bank into a viable and self-sufficient financial intermediary with ever-increasing financial resources and numbers of customers, competing successfully with an array of other local financial institutions. Further strength was added to BRI?s microfinance operations during the Asian financial crisis: When the Indonesian banking system collapsed, BRI?s Microbanking Division remained profitable, with profits amounting to $150 million in 1999. At the peak of the crisis, 6-8/1998, it attracted 1.29 million new savers during that three-month period alone, while demand for credit, because of perceived uncertainties, stagnated. This has generated excess liquidity of US$1.45 billion (July 2000) – a recurrent challenge during the 100-year history of BRI and its predecessors. Since the onset of the Asian financial crisis, the division?s 12-month loss ratio has been continually dropping to 1.35% (July 2000), substantially below its already low long-term loss ratio of 2.1% (1984-1999). Inspired by the success of BRI and some other institutions in the region, governments and donors may focus their resources on the transformation of agricultural development banks into viable, selfsustained microfinance intermediaries, instead of closing them down.

The countries of the CIS are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Eastern Europe contains Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the countries resulting from the break up of former Yugoslavia.The collapse of the USSR and the communist systems in the late 1980s and early 1990s has had profound social, economic and political consequences for the two regions. The most significant consequence relating to HIV/AIDS is the opening of the region's borders, making it much easier for populations to migrate. Prior to this time, people were restricted within country borders. Available research shows a serious lack of information and awareness about HIV/AIDS in these two regions, particularly in countries of the CIS. Nor is there evidence of coordinated programmes shared between AIDS and STD services within the countries.Labour migration is common in the CIS, but has taken dramatic proportions in countries wracked by armed conflicts such as Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan. The number of CIS refugees and persons in refugee‐like situations was 870,000 between 1989 and 1996 and there are large numbers of "internally displaced people" in places such as in Chechnya (which is de jure part of Russia). Young people form an important part of the migration flow in the CIS.No in‐depth research appears to have been done on the prevalence of HIV/ AIDS among migration populations in the CIS. Among the general populations, however, the number of HIV‐positive cases has increased rapidly since 1995, particularly among the Injecting Drug User (IDU) population. Alarming rises in STD rates, especially in syphilis and gonorrhoea, have also been noted in the region during the 1990s.No written information is available on prevention, diagnostic or counselling services for migrants in the CIS, and there do not seem to be any formal programmes specifically targetting them. Moreover, services available to the general public are not "migrant‐friendly" for a variety of reasons. For instance, Russia's new system of anonymous dermato‐venereology clinics are fee‐based. People without money are still expected to use the old clinics and produce identity papers, thereby risking legal constraints and sanctions if they have an STD.Except for the former Yugoslavia and Romania, the countries of Eastern Europe have been free from wars and disasters during the 1990s and for that reason do not have large mobile populations. Although levels of HIV infection in the general population remain very low in Eastern Europe, testing of pregnant women, blood donors and others shows that the virus is becoming increasingly common in some places. Of equal concern is a dramatic increase in other sexually transmitted diseases, especially syphilis. In all Eastern European countries, treatment of HIV/AIDS cases is expensive. If the patient has no legal status in the country, such as a residence permit, treatment may be refused.Given the lack of knowledge and the potential for rapid escalation of the epidemic among migrant populations (as seen in other parts of the world), epidemiological and quantitative research on HIV/AIDS and migrants is urgently needed in both regions. Qualitative research must also be undertaken in order to better understand the course of the epidemic among different migrant groups. This is necessary because each situation and each community may be different and have unique needs.

Bibliography: leaves 76-77. ; Given the striking inequality of access to tertiary education in South Africa, a National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) is of great importance. Since the present NSFAS has insufficient funds and lacks a long-term plan, the objective of this study is to contribute to the development of proposals for a comprehensive, sustainable NSFAS. More specifically, the aims are to: ( 1) throw light on the current status of student financial aid at universities and technikons; (2) highlight implications for the NSFAS; and (3) consider the future role of institution-based schemes. The paper begins by drawing lessons from a selection of international literature. The main body of the text is based on responses to a survey questionnaire which included both multiple-choice and open-ended questions. All twenty-one universities and twelve out of fifteen technikons submitted written replies. The paper presents and analyses quantitative and qualitative data describing financial and administrative aspects of institutions' schemes for assisting undergraduate/pre-diplomate, full-time students. The survey revealed that half of the total resources available for financial aid came from the Tertiary Education Fund of South Africa and a quarter from institutions' general operating budgets. The remaining contributions came from various donors including Provincial Governments, non-governmental organisations, international agencies and South African private sector firms. Bursaries, and to a lessor extent loans, are the main types of financial aid received by needy students. Scholarships and sports awards are allocated according to merit rather than financial need. Differences (such as sources and types of aid) are identified between the financial aid schemes of universities and technikons, and of historically black and historically white institutions. Comparisons of aggregate data with figures presented by the National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE) showed similarities in some instances, but the NCHE's projection of gross student needs in 1996 was far greater than the resources reportedly available to institutions from all sources. Institution-based schemes do not always comply with the lessons from international experience: the aggregate bursary/loan mix is favourable; the degree of cost recovery is inconclusive; targeting of needy students is sound in theory but difficult in practice; and mortgage-type loans, rather than internationally recommended income-contingent loans, are the norm, and they have substantial hidden subsidies. Implications for the NSFAS include the following: standardisation of the means test and the definition of "legitimate" study costs is desirable on equity grounds; administrative difficulties experienced by financial aid bureaux impact on the NSF AS and therefore more resources are required in this area. With regard to the future role of institution-based schemes: a levelling of the playing fields with respect to the contributions by institutions themselves to financial aid is suggested; institution-based loan schemes may be viewed as complementary to the NSFAS (in that they target students with different characteristics), which provides a theoretical reason for the creation of a centralised mortgage-type loan scheme to harness private sector capital. Such decisions need to be based on detailed assessments of efficiency which are beyond the scope of this paper.

SUMMARY The problem of 'world hunger' as it is conventionally understood in fact involves a number of related problems. A weakness of the North's response is its failure to recognise interrelationships between these problems, which often fall within the portfolios of different agencies. The EEC's agricultural production and trade policies, for example, have a major impact on the Third World food situation, but are normally regarded as a constant; hence, European attempts to help alleviate the 'world hunger problem' tend to focus exclusively on development assistance. Within these narrow confines, there are a number of policy changes that could benefit developing countries. These include an extension to the Stabex scheme to take account of food import costs, as well as major improvement in the Community's food aid programme to establish greater coordination with other donors and between the Community's programme and other elements of the recipients' food strategies.RESUMEN Pespuestas de la Comunidad Europea al 'problema del hambre mundial':ayuda alimenticia, seguridad alimenticia, estrategias alimenticias, etc.El problema del 'hambre mundial', como se entiende convencionalmente, involucra de hecho problemas interrelacionados. Una debilidad de la respuesta del Norte deriva de no reconocer estas interrelaciones, las que, a menudo, aparecen en las carteras de diversas agencias. Por ejemplo, las políticas de producción y comercio agrícolas tienen mayor impacto en la situación alimenticia del Tercer Mundo, pero normalmente se consideran como una constante. En consecuencia, los intentos europeos para ayudar a aliviar el 'problema del hambre mundial' tienden a concentrarse exclusivamente en la asistencia al desarrollo. Dentro de estos estrechos límites, hay algunos cambios de política que podrían beneficiar a los países en desarrollo. Estos incluyen una extensión del programa Stabex para considerar los costos de importación de alimentos, así como un importante mejoramiento en el programa de ayuda alimenticia de la Comunidad, tanto para establecer mayor coordinación con otros donantes, como entre el programa de ésta y otros elementos de las estrategias de los receptores de alimentos.RÉSUMÉ Les réponses de la Communauté Européenne au 'probleème de la faim dans le monde': assistance alimentaire, sécurité alimentaire, stratégies alimentaires et tout ce qui s'en suitLe problème de la 'faim dans le monde' auquel on se réfère habituellement comprend en fait un nombre de problèmes apparentés. Une faiblesse de la réponse du Nord est son incapacité à reconnaître la corrélation entre ces problèmes, qui souvent font partie de portefeuilles d'organismes différents. La politique de la CEE sur le commerce et la production agricole, par exemple, a un impact majeur sur la situation alimentaire dans le Tiers‐Monde, mais est normalement considérée comme une constante; de ce fait, les tentatives européennes d'aide à la réduction du 'problème de la faim dans le monde' tendent à se concentrer exclusivement dans une assistance au développement. Dans ces limites réduites, il y a un certain nombre de changements de ligne d'action qui pourraient profiter aux pays en voie de développement. Ils comprennent une extension du projet Stabex en vue de prendre en compte le coût de l'importation de denrées alimentaires, ainsi qu'une amélioration majeure dans le programme d'assistance alimentaire de la Communauté pour établir une coordination plus grande avec les autres donateurs et entre le programme de la Communauté et d'autres éléments des bénéficiames des stratégies alimentaires.

In the last decades, we have assisted to an important expansion of the number of indicators for measuring the development of a country− from the GDP per capita, households' consumption indicators, demographic and medical indicators, schooling rates to governance indexes. This has produced in a first time the development of composite indicators to explain and synthesise the spatial and temporal changes of these different indicators− the Human Development Index (HDI) and its adjusted versions, Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), or the Water Poverty Index (WPI), to provide policy makers simple figures to help them in their decisions. The main difficulty faced by the researchers was to explain complex behaviours through single indicators. This research develops a framework to explain and contribute to the better understanding of the relationships between the existing single and complex indicators in the domain of Water Supply and Sanitation (WSS) in Developing Countries. This framework is based on the Bayesian Networks modelling method (Castelletti & Soncini-Sessa, 2007a), (Giné Garriga et al., 2009), (Dondeynaz et al., 2013). In addition to building this analytical framework, this research also aims at measuring and analysing the distribution and the influence of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in recipient countries. The approach chosen is global, targeting cross-countries analysis and comparison to capture the principal key variables of water supply and sanitation coverage expansion and its benefits for the country development. Therefore, this research proposes a methodological framework using Bayesian models for analysing water supply and sanitation access levels together with governance, human development (education, health, and income), water resources, the uses of these resources and the ODA. The research outputs could support national decision making and/or donors' strategies, in particular the European Union. Variables and data are collected at national country scale for 101 developing countries observations in a new database (WatSan4dev) for year 2004. Five country profiles are identified and ranged around five main thematic axes using multivariate and clustering analyses. The countries from profiles 4 and 5 were the least favoured in terms of development and access to WSS, therefore should benefit from ODA support. However, countries from profile 5 received rather low ODA inputs in 2004, possibly as shown from the models because of their relative instability and poor governance. The modelling approach is led by the principles of robustness and replicability and took into account data availability and nature using Bayesian Networks. It is found that WSS access is strongly associated to country development (+35 % probability change) that is first sensitive, as expected, to the income level. The urbanisation level is the second strong factor associated to development with the limit of slums development. Health care and advanced governance complete these key factors. Lastly, WSS is sensitive to ODA CI where high-level ODA is estimate to benefit first to poor (45%) and middle (34%) development countries at 79% probability. This modelling allowed, in addition, running probabilistic scenarios to test hypotheses and measure the probable changes on WSS and the development. The methodological process, the outputs of multivariate analysis, the five countries profiles, the Bayesian modelling as well as examples of scenarios are described and analysed. The reference date is first 2004. The analytical and modelling process is then applied to the 2000-2008 period.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam committed to bring its laws, regulations and administrative procedures into conformity with the WTO rules-based trading agreements and to honour its obligations with respect to development of the rule of law. This study examines the areas of friction that Vietnam is likely to encounter as it implements the WTO legal regime. It hypothesised that a smooth transfer and adaptation of the Western-based customs regime requires Vietnamese recipients to understand and support principles of transparency and liberalisation of the WTO that differ from socialist principles underlying the Vietnameselegal system. Having adopted a social construction view, this study of national interpretation assumed that state actors of Vietnam were not passive receivers of the WTO customs rules but rather constructed the meaning given to the global rules. Discourse analysis was proved as the suitable methodology since Party and State's understandings about the WTO customs regime were largely generated through communicative processes.The three streams of discourse modes, interpretive communities and discursive strategies were tested to assess the WTO-related regulatory conversations within and amongst groups of domestic implementers at different state levels: the Party and State's high policy making, customs lawmaking central level, and the law implementation local level. The principal conclusion reached was that the transfer of WTO principal rules in Vietnam is difficult because political leaders, lawmakers and government officials at different state levels did not fully understand and interpret the WTO basic objectives. The domestic reforms toward the Western rule of law revealed the biggest complication of the prevailing socialist constraints of party leadership and power concentration.These political contradictions prevent the Party and State leaders to interpret the WTO principles of economic law and the liberalisation objectives that presented a slow shift from the Soviet-originated thinking of state economic management to the Western thinking of free market access. Another conclusion was that the Party and State's interpretations of the WTO objectives shaped the Customs' cognitive assumptions and allowed customs lawmakers and regulators to reinterpret and reformulate the WTO customs rules. The repetitive customs law making discourse did not result in a smooth transfer of the WTO-WCO customs rules because of the incompatible high political level thinking and the Customs' reinterpretations and reformulation. The results also revealed that power structures and cognitive assumptions in Customs shaped the implementation of the imported customs regimes, especially when the WTO valuations rules were reinterpreted by customs regulators for the daily application. Though customs administrators and judges wanted to promote an effective and efficient customs administration to approach the WTO objectives, there still existed discrepancies in the administrative and judiciary interpretations of the WTO legality requirements

The thesis focuses on certain characteristics of the state and of state formation in Malawi, with particular emphasis on the effects of development aid. The methodological and theoretical approach draws primarily on social anthropology. Empirical research included multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork in Malawi during 2009. The thesis consists of three papers for publication in journals, each focusing on different aspects of the state and state formation, and an introductory discussion. The first paper – Chiefs and everyday governance: Parallel state organisations in Malawi – looks at the institutional set-up of the state. In Malawi, this includes not only the formal institutions, but also the chiefs: the paper sees the chiefs as not primarily "traditional" leaders, but as an integral part of the state. The paper discusses some implications of the fact that two seemingly incompatible state institutions, often filling the same or similar functions, exist in parallel and are available both for subjects/citizens and for public offices. People are thus subject to parallel rule: they are simultaneously subjects under a state-enforced chieftaincy, and citizens of a modern state. The position of the chiefs in Malawi has been strengthened and expanded during the last two decades. Ironically, this has been possible due partly to policy choices that have been promoted or introduced by donors, but that have paved the way for the strengthening of an institution incompatible with the liberal democratic values emphasised by the same donors. The second paper – Performing good governance: the aesthetics of bureaucratic practice in Malawi – focuses on bureaucratic practice. In the case observed – agricultural subsidy distribution – the policy of the government (and its donors), of targeting only the poorest farmers, contrasts with local norms for more equal sharing. The public office does not have the authority to overrule local norms, and the targeting procedures therefore fail completely to achieve what they were designed for. Nonetheless, they are carried out with enthusiasm. This may be because of the "aesthetic" qualities of those procedures: they create an image, albeit temporary, of a well-functioning state and a well-organised population. The case is used as basis for a discussion of the role of aesthetics in bureaucratic practice and in state formation, and the role of bureaucrats as mediators between incompatible norms and worldviews: by carrying out the stipulated procedures even when they "fail" – but with primacy to the aesthetic aspects rather than the instrumental effects – the bureaucrats make possible the continuation of the subsidy programme, in the interests of all those involved. The third paper – Making and shaping poor Malawians: Citizenship below the poverty line – explores some observed and some potential consequences of the poverty line. The idea of distinguishing between individuals and households according to a "poverty line" has been introduced in Malawi only recently, partly in connection with the UN Millennium Development Goals. The poverty line as it is applied in Malawi – the national response to the global poverty line known as one dollar a day – in most cases has no local equivalent. But when it is used to identify the intended beneficiaries of development interventions, it becomes of increasing economic, social and political relevance. Those classified as "below" the poverty line have exclusive access to certain state resources. But in practice, by the way poverty interventions are organised, these beneficiaries are also subjected to particular forms of governance, including more intense attempts to reform their rationality and behaviour than what is the case for those "above" the line. By the tendency to organise beneficiaries in groups they also tend to interact with government less as autonomous individuals than those who are classified as above the line. In effect, the poverty line serves to distinguish between two types of citizens – perhaps in contrast to policy objectives of including the poorest as equal citizens. The three papers refer to different academic debates, but they all point to aspects of state formation associated with aid and development. This is discussed in the introductory chapters. The main argument here is that all papers demonstrate some forms of dissonance: here used as a metaphor for the difference between how social phenomena appear when seen through the logic of the state, and how social life is experienced in actual, local, daily interactions. Such dissonance is well known in all states, but seems particularly evident in states receiving development aid. The introductory paper discusses aspects of aid and development that can explain this, building on recent critical studies of aid and development in social anthropology. It points to features that are inherent in all aid, but have become increasingly relevant with the recent changes in development discourse that seem to produce dissonance. Aid can therefore increase the dissonance inherent in all states between reality as it is seen in a state logic, and reality as it is experienced locally. ; Den norske tittelen er Bistand, utvikling og statsdannelse i Malawi. Avhandlingen er basert på antropologisk feltarbeid i Malawi og omhandler ulike sider ved stat og styring, med vekt på hvordan staten påvirkes av bistand og utvikling. Avhandlingen består av tre artikler. Den første artikkelen omhandler høvdingenes rolle. I Malawi er høvdingene en integrert del av statsapparatet. Folk på bygda forholder seg oftest til sin høvding som mellomledd til staten, men kan også ha direkte kontakt med offentlige institusjoner. Det fører til at staten består av to parallelle strukturer som i noen grad overlapper, og artikkelen diskuterer enkelte konsekvenser av dette. Videre viser artikkelen til at høvdingene har fått mer makt de siste to tiår. Det har i stor grad skjedd som følge av politikk som er fremmet gjennom vestlig bistand: For det første har høvdingene fått en relativt sett mye sterkere posisjon fordi andre statlige makthavere er blitt svekket. Det skyldes både introduksjon av flerpartidemokratiet (som reduserte partiapparatets makt) og reduksjon i offentlig sektor samt nye former for samhandling mellom offentlige kontorer og enkeltmennesker (mer mindre tvang og mer rettighetsbasert samhandling). For det andre insisterer donorene ofte på at utviklingstiltak skal være lokalsamfunnsbasert og organiseres lokalt på måter som gjør at man blir helt avhengig av høvdingen for å kunne gjennomføre tiltakene. Paradoksalt nok har altså slike donor-interesser ført til en styrking av høvdingene, som er en instisjon helt inkompatibel med de liberale, demokratiske verdiene som bistanden ellers forsøker å fremme. Den andre artikkelen ser på byråkratisk praksis. Den er basert på et case-studie av et statlig, donorstøttet progam for distribusjon av landbrukssubsidier, og ser særlig på prosedyrene som skal sørge for at subsidierte såfrø og kunstgjødsel bare gis til de fattigste bøndene. Artikkelen viser hvordan prosedyrene ikke lykkes i dette fordi landsbyene, under høvdingens ledelse, re distribuerer de subsidierte varene etter kriterier for mer lik fordeling. Men prosedyrene er meningsfulle selv om de "mislykkes". Det kan forstås ved å se dem som estetiske uttrykk framfor som instrumentelle handlinger. De skaper et slags bilde av et velorganisert samfunn og en velfungerende stat, som gir mening selv om det ikke gjenspeiler virkeligheten. Men prosedyrene har også noen praktiske konsekvenser: Det er i praksis ikke mulig å gjennomføre regjeringens (og donorenes) krav til fordeling av subsidier så lenge disse er inkompatible med lokale normer, fordi regjeringen har ikke kapasitet og autoritet nok til å tvinge gjennom sin egen politikk. Ved å gjennomføre prosedyrene likevel, tilfredsstiller man regjeringens og donorenes krav til målretting av landbrukssubsidier. Byråkratene kan (uten å lyve) dokumentere til regjeringen og donorer at subsidiene er blitt distrubert til utvalgte mottakere, og landsbyene kan omfordele i forhold til lokale normer like etterpå. Paradoksalt nok er det nettopp ved å "mislykkes" – og ved at prosedyrene derfor blir mer estetisk enn praktisk relevante – at prosedyrene gjør det mulig å gjennomføre subsidieprogrammet til fordel for alle involverte. Den tredje artikkelen ser på hvordan staten kategoriserer og klassifiserer enkeltmennesker og organiserer statlige tjenester etter dette. Fokuset er på den såkalte fattigdomslinjen, en malawisk tilpasning til den globale fattigdomsdefinisjonen kjent som "en dollar per dag". En slik definisjon samsvarer ikke med noen lokale skillelinjer i Malawi, men når den brukes til å peke ut mottakere av statlige tjenester, blir den både politisk, økonomisk og sosialt relevant. De som ligger "under" fattigdomslinjen får eksklusiv tilgang til noen statlige ressurser, men samtidig utsettes de for andre typer styring. Det er fordi de statlige tjenestene vanligvis kombineres med spesielle måter å organisere folk på, sammen med forsøk på å endre mottakernes måte å tenke og handle på. Det er en naturlig strategi dersom man antar at årsaken til fattigdom ikke er materielle eller eksterne sosiale og politiske forhold, men skyldes noe ved de fattiges egen oppførsel. I sin konsekvens kan man si at fattigsomslinjen etablerer et skille mellom to typer borgere: De som er "fattige nok" til å få hjelp av staten, og de andre som forventes å klare seg selv i markedet. Målet med fattigdomstiltak blir da å omskape de fattigste til gode, markedsvennlige borgere som klarer seg selv uten videre statlig inngripen. I praksis er det ofte liten økonomisk forskjell på de som er "under" og "over" fattigdomslinjen, men de blir gjenstand for forskjellige former for statlig styring. De tre artiklene representerer dermed ganske forskjellige perspektiver på stat og styring, både praktisk og teoretisk. Men de har til felles at de viser til noen endringer når det gjelder stat og styring, som synes å være påvirket av bistand og utviklingspolitikk. Dette diskuteres i avhandlingens innledende del. Denne diskusjonen tar utgangspunkt i at alle artiklene viser til noe som kan kalles "dissonans". Dissonans brukes som metafor på forskjellen mellom statlige måter å forstå og organisere virkeligheten på, og hvordan virkelighet erfares for folk lokalt. Det gjelder på ulike måter i de tre artiklene: I forholdet mellom høvdingstyre og den formelle statsapparatet, i byråkratiske prosedyrer som synes å mislykkes, men likevel har en funksjon, og i et statlig forsøk på å organisere en befolkning etter kriterier som ikke samsvarer med noen lokale måter å se lokalsamfunnet på. Slik dissonans synes å øke som følge av bistand og utvikling, og diskusjonen tar opp noen sider ved bistand som kan forklare dette. Et hovedargument er at de som jobber med bistand – særlig statsansatte i mottakerlandene – må forholde seg til abstrakte ideer i internasjonal utviklingstenking, som ikke passer sammen med lokale forhold. De kan velge ulike strategier for å løse dette problemet, men alle de mest relevante strategiene synes å føre til en økning i forskjellen mellom en "statlig" virkelighet og lokale erfaringer. Disse sidene ved bistand er blitt større med tiden som følge av to forhold. For det første legger de fleste bistandsaktørene stadig mer vekt på å reformere mottakeren, som representerer bredere og mer kompliserte utviklingsmål enn om hovedvekten er å overføre ressurser. For det andre har man nå mer fokus på spesifikke kategorier av enkeltmennesker framfor å se på fattige land og samfunn under ett. Begge disse utviklingstrekk fører til økt behov for å jobbe med aggregert, abstrakt informasjon, framfor spesifikk kunnskap om mottakerne og deres omgivelser. Det gjør at avstanden mellom abstrakte ideer og opplevd virkelighet blir større.

More than two decades after 9/11, with a staggering price tag of $8 trillion and the tragic loss of nearly 5 million lives, the horror of the events and its aftermath continue to haunt. While the overt conflicts of the "Global War on Terror" have receded with the U.S.'s departure from Iraq and Afghanistan, many of today's tensions and political unrest can be directly traced to the forces set in motion during the NATO-led global war.
Anti-terror funding continues to flow with few checks and balances, supercharging security forces and the global military industry. West Africa's ongoing surge in coups highlight the pitfall of Western aid bolstering military institutions at the expense of civil governance.In the Global North, anti-terrorism experts, having rebranded themselves as holistic security pundits, advocate a more hawkish confrontational approach toward China and Russia. Similarly, in Central Asia, global networks and organizations have concocted a developmental aid industry not always in line with the needs of people on the ground, but the buzzwords of "terrorism" and "security" are music to international donors' ears. Meanwhile, in places as varied as Nepal, the ripples of the GWOT can be felt first-hand with the revival of Gurkha training institutes, once used by coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, but now at the disposal of the private security industry. The vast resources and networks mobilized by war do not simply dissipate, but forge new channels, continually reshaping the global landscape.
Beyond its military footprint, the GWOT has spawned a draconian wave of securitized logics and invasive legal frameworks. From the United Kingdom and France to India and Indonesia, nations have invoked their own "9/11 moments" in the wake of domestic terror incidents, unrolling a cascade of repressive laws still in operation. These edicts have authorized prolonged detentions without trial, and wide-ranging privacy infringements demanding compromise on liberty for security. Leaders in Central Asia and the Middle East, despite their authoritarian credentials, have reinvented themselves as indispensable to a U.S.-led security architecture, leveraging the GWOT's prevailing ethos to quell internal opposition. Even in Latin America, seemingly distant from the 9/11 epicenter, governments have weaponized these legal tools against a broader spectrum of perceived adversaries, including civil society and grassroots organizations. A hyper-securitized world is now our new normal.
Muslims worldwide remain in the crosshairs, even as the echoes of 9/11 grow fainter. In China, age-old frictions between the central authority and its peripheries have been repackaged, using the GWOT narrative to amplify oppression against the Uyghur minority. Muslims in the diaspora, especially in the West, find themselves walking a tightrope — compelled to constantly justify their "anti-Taliban" convictions and reassert their fidelity to liberal ideals. Across media platforms, hackneyed stereotypes of Muslims persist. Even well-intentioned gestures, like the CBS sitcom about an Afghan interpreter for the U.S. military and Marvel's recent embrace of Muslim characters, can end up ensnared in the familiar and limiting motifs of the GWOT. But many Muslim communities refuse to be silent. In Northwest Pakistan, for example, opposition to drone bombing sparked a grassroots political movement that has united people against both imperialism and extremism.
Young adults today may view 9/11 as distant history. The COVID pandemic, climate disasters, and the war in Ukraine dominate their global purview, not the drone-strikes, surveillance apparatus, and aftershocks of the Global War on Terror. But just as the repercussions of World War II dictated the contours of global dynamics for decades, the ongoing legacies of the GWOT continue to sculpt our world in both overt and insidious ways. They demand remembering, archiving, and vigilant attention.