The article surveys the study of Latin American business politics, focusing on three main areas: The structure of business, the preferences of business, and its power in the political process. The structure of businesses in Latin America is distinct, with a larger share of small and informal firms, comparatively small large firms, and a dominant role of multinational corporations (MNCs) and economic groups. We argue that these structures are reflected in business preferences. MNCs' preferences depend on their strategic orientation, whether they invest in Latin America in order to gain access to resources, to new markets, or to enhance their global productivity. Business groups are often particularly strong in non-competitive industries – resources, oligopolistic non-tradables etc. - and are highly flexible due to hierarchical management and large cash reserves. As a result, they are well equipped to deal with a rapidly changing businesses environment and were, surprisingly to many observers, unlikely to oppose the external liberalization policies of the 1990s. Small firms have little political cloud, but since many of them are informal, they do not play an important part as a voice for flexibilization, especially of labor markets, the way they do in many advanced industrialized countries. Large firms have various avenues to influence political processes in Latin America. Business leaders are well represented in governments and are often included in advisory councils which can play crucial roles in affecting policy. The formal structure of political systems – Presidential systems with proportional representation in parliaments – further enhance the power of business, as individual legislators are often targeted for legislative deal-making. The region's expensive political campaigns, funded by a small number of large donors, are yet another source for business power of the political process. Looking ahead, we argue that many of these features of Latin American businesses and business politics are likely to be quite stable and if anything increase in intensity. Keywords: Latin America; business politics; business power; economic groups; multinational corporations; small firms; literature review. ; Este artículo examina el estudio de la política de las empresas latinoamericanas, centrándose en tres áreas principales: la estructura de las empresas, las preferencias de las empresas y su poder en el proceso político. La estructura de las empresas en Latinoamérica es singular, con una proporción mayor de firmas pequeñas e informales, la presencia, en términos comparativos, de firmas grandes de menor tamaño y un rol dominante de las corporaciones multinacionales (CMN) y los grupos económicos. Sostenemos que estas estructuras se reflejan en las preferencias de las empresas. Las preferencias de las CMN dependen de su orientación estratégica, ya sea que inviertan en Latinoamérica con el fin de lograr el acceso a recursos, a nuevos mercados o para aumentar su productividad global. Los grupos empresariales con frecuencia son particularmente fuertes en las industrias no-competitivas —recursos, no-transables oligopólicas, etc.— y son altamente flexibles debido a la gerencia jerárquica y las grandes reservas de liquidez. Como resultado, están bien equipados para afrontar un ambiente empresarial rápidamente cambiante y estuvieron, para sorpresa de muchos observadores, propensos a no oponerse a las políticas externas de liberalización de los años 1990. Las firmas pequeñas tienen poca masa política, pero puesto que muchas de ellas son informales, no juegan un papel importante como una voz para la flexibilización, especialmente de los mercados laborales, como sucede en muchos países industrializados avanzados. Las grandes firmas tienen varias vías para influir en los procesos políticos en Latinoamérica. Los líderes empresariales están bien representados en los gobiernos y con frecuencia son incluidos en comités asesores, los cuales pueden jugar roles cruciales en la definición de políticas. La estructura formal de los sistemas políticos —sistemas presidenciales con representaciones proporcionales en los parlamentos— incrementa aun más el poder empresarial, en la medida en que los legisladores individuales con frecuencia son puestos en la mira para negociar acuerdos legislativos. Las costosas campañas políticas de la región, financiadas por un pequeño grupo de grandes donantes, son una fuente adicional del poder empresarial en el proceso político. Mirando hacia adelante, sostenemos que muchas de estas características de las empresas latinoamericanas y de la política de las empresas es probable que sean bastante estables y, si hay algún cambio, será un incremento en intensidad.
It stands to reason that at the early stage of independence the five republics in the Central Asian region-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-previously closely linked to the Soviet economic and political systems, faced a number of challenges, most of which were inherited from the Czarist-Soviet regimes. Coping with the challenges posed by the transition period required foreign support, and all the republics, except Turkmenistan, have been engaged in active cooperation with global powers such as the U.S. Considering the main features of the Western powers' involvement in the post-Soviet arena, we can agree with Gertrude Schroeder, who defined the first years since 1991 as a period of "mutual learning." On the one hand, the leaders of the newly independent states have learned from their experience of establishing a market economy at the speed and with the specifics permitted by domestic reality. While on the other hand, international organizations and countries have obviously contributed enormously to this learning processand, through investment and bilateral assistance programs, also learned much about dealing with a previously unknown environment. Schroeder refers to this process as follows: "They [international organizations and countries] now have much more in-depth knowledge about physical and behavioral legacies from the old Soviet order, legacies that differ significantly among the post-Soviet states. They have learned that changing the habits and mind-sets of employees in the numerous government bureaucracies with which they must deal is a slow, painful, and frustrating business. They have learned that the specifics of reform policies and programs are usually highly controversial among domestic participants, even though consensus may exist on the desired goals and long-run outcomes. They now perceive that general 'textbook' solutions or those based directly on 'another country's' experience may require modification to take into account the peculiarities of the communist legacy in each state. Finally, they have learned, hopefully, to avoid some of the inevitable mistakes of the initial years of involvement. For instance, the perceived failure of donors, especially of technical aid, to involve the recipient country's experts in all phases of project development has been a frequent complaint, especially from local intellectuals." We will note the quite distinctive nature of American policy in Central Asia. In December 1991, Secretary of State James Baker announced that the U.S. "will work with those republics and any common entity which commit to responsible security policies, democratic political practices, and free market economies." Baker specified that some republics (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan) seemed more prepared to take this course. Kazakhstan, like Russia and Ukraine, on this list was given priority in U.S. policy because it possessed nuclear weapons. While recognizing the sovereign status of all twelve former Soviet republics in 1991, the U.S. administration established diplomatic contacts with only five of the former states, plus Belarus, while omitting the Muslim republics of Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan from the list, "even though they had not been excluded for that reason [of being Muslim republics]." Even the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Kazakh and Kyrgyz sides does not signify immediate involvement of the U.S. As Olcott stated, it was rather "show than substance in these bilateral relationships." Actual interest grew considerably under George W. Bush with the announcement of the "war on terror" in 2001. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were among the most actively involved players in military cooperation with the U.S. by allowing the use of their airbases in Bishkek and Khanabad, respectively. On the American side, the U.S. Department of Defense has been among the most active players in defining the priorities and channeling huge military assistance to the region, which peaked in 2002-2003. It is important to specify an essential feature of American aid-conditionality. Particularly in the cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the allocation of American aid (aid in Foreign Military Financing [FMF] and International Military Education and Training [IMET]) was linked to progress in the area of human rights. This paper focuses on analyzing the special features of U.S. Central Asian policy, especially regarding regional security and cooperation issues. I divide my analysis into two periods: the first period covers the years of early sovereignty between 1991 and 2001; and the second period starts from U.S. involvement after the 9/11 events until early 2010, including the policy of the Obama administration.
The article surveys the study of Latin American business politics, focusing on three main areas: The structure of business, the preferences of business, and its power in the political process. The structure of businesses in Latin America is distinct, with a larger share of small and informal firms, comparatively small large firms, and a dominant role of multinational corporations (MNCs) and economic groups. We argue that these structures are reflected in business preferences. MNCs' preferences depend on their strategic orientation, whether they invest in Latin America in order to gain access to resources, to new markets, or to enhance their global productivity. Business groups are often particularly strong in non-competitive industries – resources, oligopolistic non-tradables etc. - and are highly flexible due to hierarchical management and large cash reserves. As a result, they are well equipped to deal with a rapidly changing businesses environment and were, surprisingly to many observers, unlikely to oppose the external liberalization policies of the 1990s. Small firms have little political cloud, but since many of them are informal, they do not play an important part as a voice for flexibilization, especially of labor markets, the way they do in many advanced industrialized countries. Large firms have various avenues to influence political processes in Latin America. Business leaders are well represented in governments and are often included in advisory councils which can play crucial roles in affecting policy. The formal structure of political systems – Presidential systems with proportional representation in parliaments – further enhance the power of business, as individual legislators are often targeted for legislative deal-making. The region's expensive political campaigns, funded by a small number of large donors, are yet another source for business power of the political process. Looking ahead, we argue that many of these features of Latin American businesses and business politics are likely to be quite stable and if anything increase in intensity. Keywords: Latin America; business politics; business power; economic groups; multinational corporations; small firms; literature review. ; Este artículo examina el estudio de la política de las empresas latinoamericanas, centrándose en tres áreas principales: la estructura de las empresas, las preferencias de las empresas y su poder en el proceso político. La estructura de las empresas en Latinoamérica es singular, con una proporción mayor de firmas pequeñas e informales, la presencia, en términos comparativos, de firmas grandes de menor tamaño y un rol dominante de las corporaciones multinacionales (CMN) y los grupos económicos. Sostenemos que estas estructuras se reflejan en las preferencias de las empresas. Las preferencias de las CMN dependen de su orientación estratégica, ya sea que inviertan en Latinoamérica con el fin de lograr el acceso a recursos, a nuevos mercados o para aumentar su productividad global. Los grupos empresariales con frecuencia son particularmente fuertes en las industrias no-competitivas —recursos, no-transables oligopólicas, etc.— y son altamente flexibles debido a la gerencia jerárquica y las grandes reservas de liquidez. Como resultado, están bien equipados para afrontar un ambiente empresarial rápidamente cambiante y estuvieron, para sorpresa de muchos observadores, propensos a no oponerse a las políticas externas de liberalización de los años 1990. Las firmas pequeñas tienen poca masa política, pero puesto que muchas de ellas son informales, no juegan un papel importante como una voz para la flexibilización, especialmente de los mercados laborales, como sucede en muchos países industrializados avanzados. Las grandes firmas tienen varias vías para influir en los procesos políticos en Latinoamérica. Los líderes empresariales están bien representados en los gobiernos y con frecuencia son incluidos en comités asesores, los cuales pueden jugar roles cruciales en la definición de políticas. La estructura formal de los sistemas políticos —sistemas presidenciales con representaciones proporcionales en los parlamentos— incrementa aun más el poder empresarial, en la medida en que los legisladores individuales con frecuencia son puestos en la mira para negociar acuerdos legislativos. Las costosas campañas políticas de la región, financiadas por un pequeño grupo de grandes donantes, son una fuente adicional del poder empresarial en el proceso político. Mirando hacia adelante, sostenemos que muchas de estas características de las empresas latinoamericanas y de la política de las empresas es probable que sean bastante estables y, si hay algún cambio, será un incremento en intensidad.
The article surveys the study of Latin American business politics, focusing on three main areas: The structure of business, the preferences of business, and its power in the political process. The structure of businesses in Latin America is distinct, with a larger share of small and informal firms, comparatively small large firms, and a dominant role of multinational corporations (MNCs) and economic groups. We argue that these structures are reflected in business preferences. MNCs' preferences depend on their strategic orientation, whether they invest in Latin America in order to gain access to resources, to new markets, or to enhance their global productivity. Business groups are often particularly strong in non-competitive industries – resources, oligopolistic non-tradables etc. - and are highly flexible due to hierarchical management and large cash reserves. As a result, they are well equipped to deal with a rapidly changing businesses environment and were, surprisingly to many observers, unlikely to oppose the external liberalization policies of the 1990s. Small firms have little political cloud, but since many of them are informal, they do not play an important part as a voice for flexibilization, especially of labor markets, the way they do in many advanced industrialized countries. Large firms have various avenues to influence political processes in Latin America. Business leaders are well represented in governments and are often included in advisory councils which can play crucial roles in affecting policy. The formal structure of political systems – Presidential systems with proportional representation in parliaments – further enhance the power of business, as individual legislators are often targeted for legislative deal-making. The region's expensive political campaigns, funded by a small number of large donors, are yet another source for business power of the political process. Looking ahead, we argue that many of these features of Latin American businesses and business politics are likely to be quite stable and if anything increase in intensity. Keywords: Latin America; business politics; business power; economic groups; multinational corporations; small firms; literature review. ; Este artículo examina el estudio de la política de las empresas latinoamericanas, centrándose en tres áreas principales: la estructura de las empresas, las preferencias de las empresas y su poder en el proceso político. La estructura de las empresas en Latinoamérica es singular, con una proporción mayor de firmas pequeñas e informales, la presencia, en términos comparativos, de firmas grandes de menor tamaño y un rol dominante de las corporaciones multinacionales (CMN) y los grupos económicos. Sostenemos que estas estructuras se reflejan en las preferencias de las empresas. Las preferencias de las CMN dependen de su orientación estratégica, ya sea que inviertan en Latinoamérica con el fin de lograr el acceso a recursos, a nuevos mercados o para aumentar su productividad global. Los grupos empresariales con frecuencia son particularmente fuertes en las industrias no-competitivas —recursos, no-transables oligopólicas, etc.— y son altamente flexibles debido a la gerencia jerárquica y las grandes reservas de liquidez. Como resultado, están bien equipados para afrontar un ambiente empresarial rápidamente cambiante y estuvieron, para sorpresa de muchos observadores, propensos a no oponerse a las políticas externas de liberalización de los años 1990. Las firmas pequeñas tienen poca masa política, pero puesto que muchas de ellas son informales, no juegan un papel importante como una voz para la flexibilización, especialmente de los mercados laborales, como sucede en muchos países industrializados avanzados. Las grandes firmas tienen varias vías para influir en los procesos políticos en Latinoamérica. Los líderes empresariales están bien representados en los gobiernos y con frecuencia son incluidos en comités asesores, los cuales pueden jugar roles cruciales en la definición de políticas. La estructura formal de los sistemas políticos —sistemas presidenciales con representaciones proporcionales en los parlamentos— incrementa aun más el poder empresarial, en la medida en que los legisladores individuales con frecuencia son puestos en la mira para negociar acuerdos legislativos. Las costosas campañas políticas de la región, financiadas por un pequeño grupo de grandes donantes, son una fuente adicional del poder empresarial en el proceso político. Mirando hacia adelante, sostenemos que muchas de estas características de las empresas latinoamericanas y de la política de las empresas es probable que sean bastante estables y, si hay algún cambio, será un incremento en intensidad.
El presente artículo evalúa la falacia de la estabilización de precios, estabilidad que anhelan las autoridades monetarias, quienes desean mantener el monopolio estatal de la emisión primaria. Los daños causados por la intervención estatal en los asuntos monetarios y los nefastos efectos causados por aquellas políticas monetarias que pretenden reducir la tasa de interés e incrementar la actividad del mercado mediante la expansión monetaria inorgánica generaron en la población el deseo de "estabilización". Se comprende la aparición de esta errónea idea y el atractivo que encierra para la gente al considerar las arbitrariedades padecidas por la moneda y el crédito. Los precios de mercado son hechos históricos, resultado de una constelación de circunstancias registradas en cierto momento del irreversible proceso histórico. En el campo económico, el concepto de medición tiene poco sentido. En el mundo real de incesante cambio no hay puntos, objetos, cualidades o relaciones fijas que permitan medir las variaciones ocurridas. El funcionamiento del cálculo económico solo necesita de un sistema monetario inmune a la ingerencia estatal. Cuando el BCR incrementa la cantidad de dinero para ampliar la capacidad adquisitiva del gobierno o bajar temporalmente la tasa de interés, desarticulan todas las relaciones monetarias y perturban el cálculo económico. El objetivo que persigue una sana política monetaria es impedir al gobernante hacer inflación e inducir la expansión crediticia de la banca privada. La idea de estabilizar el poder adquisitivo del dinero la generó el deseo de crear un mundo inmune al incesante fluir de las cosas de la gente, un mundo ajeno al continuo devenir histórico. Las rentas destinadas a atender perpetuamente las necesidades de fundaciones religiosas o instituciones de caridad; se reflejaron en esos terrenos, más tarde establecieron anualidades monetarias. Los donantes y beneficiarios suponían que las rentas representadas por una cierta cantidad de dinero no pueden ser afectadas por los cambios económicos; sin embargo, tales esperanzas resultaron fallidas. Las sucesivas generaciones pudieron comprobar cómo fracasaban los planes más cuidadosamente trazados por los difuntos empresarios. Golpeadas por dicha experiencia, la gente comenzó a razonar en torno a si habría alguna fórmula que permitiera alcanzar tan deseados objetivos. Por ello, los economistas se lanzaron a especular en torno a las variaciones del poder adquisitivo del dinero, pretendiendo hallar fórmulas que permitieran eliminar esas variaciones. ; This article evaluates the fallacy of price stabilization, stability they crave the monetary authorities who wish to maintain the monopoly of the monetary base. Damage caused by government intervention in monetary affairs, and the harmful effects caused by those monetary policies that aim to: reduce interest rates and increased market activity through monetary expansion inorganic; made people want stabilization. It includes the development of this erroneous idea and the appeal it holds for people, if we consider the arbitrary suffered by the currency and credit. Market prices are historical facts, the result of a constellation of circumstances recorded, at one point, the irreversible historical process. In the economic field, the concept of measurement has little meaning. In the real world of constant change there is no points, objects, qualities or relations fixed to measure the changes occurred. The operation of economic calculation only needs a monetary system immune from state interference. When the BCR increases the amount of money to expand the purchasing power of government or temporarily lower the interest rate; disarticulate all relations disturb the monetary and economic calculation. The objective of a sound monetary policy is to prevent the ruling to induce inflation and credit expansion private banks. The idea of stabilizing the purchasing power of money was generated by the desire to create: a world immune to the incessant flow of people's things, a world alien to continuous historical process. Income perpetually designed to meet the needs of religious foundations or charities, are reflected in these fields. Later established monetary annuities. Donors and recipients is assumed that das income for a certain amount of money can not be affected by economic changes. However, such hopes were unsuccessful. Successive generations were able to see how they failed most carefully laid plans for the deceased entrepreneurs. Battered by the experience, people began to think about whether there would be some formula that would achieve such desired objectives. So, economists took to speculate on changes in the purchasing power of money, trying to find formulas that allow to eliminate these variations.
In 2009 an estimated 52,000 tonnes of precious wood from ca. 100,000 rosewood and ebony trees was logged in north - east Madagascar, one third originating from Marojejy National Park and its environs, the remainder from in and around Masoala National Park. At least 500,000 additional trees and many miles of vines were cut to make rafts to transport the heavy ebony and rosewood logs. Approximately 36,700 tonnes were shipped in 1,187 containers, almost all to China, for a total export sale price estimated at $ US 220 million. In the SAVA region, members of the timber syndicate pocketed 76 % of this whereas the State collected just $ US 15.3 million. Of the three main companies that transported rosewood from Vohemar, Delmas benefited most; three banks also facilitated the illegal timber trade. Fraud is perpetrated by the syndicate and government administrators along every step in Madagascar's precious timber trade in a coordinated effort to maximize profit and minimize taxes and fines. Poor governance and a lack of clarity in forest regulation have facilitated timber trafficking and undermined judicial control; during at least three periods (1992, 2006 and 2009 - 2010) escalation of rosewood exportation has been facilitated by government decrees issued prior to elections or during difficult political times, in each instance accompanied by 'exceptional' government orders allowing a few powerful operators to export massive quantities of wood – all part of a carefully orchestrated cycle. The near-silence of donors and NGOs is linked to their loss of influence following suspension of all but humanitarian aid since 17 March 2009. RÉSUMÉLa campagne 2009 de bois précieux à Madagascar représente au minimum 52 000 tonnes de bois précieux abattu, venant de 100 000 arbres de bois de rose et d'ébène dont plus de 60 000 situés dans les aires protégées, ce qui représente au minimum 4 000 hectares de parc et 10 000 hectares de forêt intacte non - classée ayant fait l'objet d'une coupe sélective. Le bois de rose provient de la région du Marojejy pour un tiers, et de celle du Masoala pour les deux autres tiers. Plus de 500 000 autres arbres et des dizaines de milliers de lianes ont été coupées pour faciliter le transport du bois précieux. Environ 36 700 tonnes de bois précieux ont été exportées dans 1 187 conteneurs à destination de la Chine (50 tonnes d'ébène vers l'Allemagne) pour un prix de vente estimé à 220 millions de dollars, dont près de la moitié est réalisée à l'exportation au départ de Vohémar dans la SAVA. Les 22 exportateurs ont réalisé 76% de bénéfice sur ce chiffre. Le premier bénéficiaire individuel de ces exportations est l'État malgache (15,3 millions de dollars de recettes). La fraude pour l'ensemble de la filière est évaluée à 4,6 millions de dollars. Le montant des devises non rapatriées pourrait s'élever à 52 millions de dollars. Alors que la réglementation prévoyait 13 exportateurs agréés, 23 ont exporté. Des trois compagnies maritimes qui ont participé à cette activité, Delmas est celle qui en a le plus profité. Trois banques ont soutenu les exportations. À au moins trois reprises (1992, 2006 et 2009 - 2010), l'exploitation du bois de rose a été facilitée par le pouvoir peu avant des élections importantes. L'impact sur les aires protégées est un amoindrissement de leur biodiversité, une fragilisation du milieu aux atteintes naturelles ou humaines. La campagne de coupe de bois de rose est en partie responsable du recul de la fréquentation touristique (-56 % ) en 2009. Cette filière est un commerce inéquitable : la partie chinoise touche 25 fois plus que la partie malgache et 357 fois plus que les villageois de la forêt. Le chaos de la réglementation forestière a facilité ce trafic. La responsabilité de la classe dirigeante dans la campagne 2009 est totale. Le quasi - silence des bailleurs de fonds est la conséquence de la suspension de toute aide autre qu'humanitaire après le 17 mars 2009, ce qui leur a enlevé toute influence. Depuis l'interdiction de coupe sur le territoire chinois, en 1998, les importations de bois en provenance des pays tropicaux et tempérés ont été multipliées par six. La Chine protège donc ses propres forêts en « exportant de la déforestation ».
Background: Diarrhoeal diseases constitute a major disease burden on children in low- and middle-income countries (LMC), with an estimated 2 million 0-4 years old dying annually due to diarrhoea. Dehydration is the main cause of these deaths. An oral remedy based on glucose and sodium to treat dehydration was developed in the 1960s. Significant efforts have since been made to promote the use of Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT). Adoption of ORT has lead to significant child mortality reductions. Meanwhile, little change in diarrhoea morbidity in low- and middle-income countries has been reported. Main aim: The main aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to improved child health in low- and middleincome countries by enhancing knowledge on diarrhoeal diseases control, especially on case management and morbidity reductions. Methods: The first two studies were conducted in Northeastern (NE) Brazil, a region of 9 states and a population of 51 million. The first study evaluated diarrhoea case management through a household cluster survey of 6 524 children 0-4 years old. The second study used a health facility survey to assess quality of diarrhoea child care in 78 randomly selected primary care facilities. The third study was methodological and analysed paired results from two types of household surveys in eight countries to assess their validity. In the fourth study, diarrhoea management in LMC from 1986 to 2003 was analysed for four variables from up to 107 cross-sectional surveys. In the fifth study three indicators of diarrhoea morbidity in the state of Ceará in NE Brazil were assessed for trends 1998-2005 and the association between determinants and morbidity studied. Results: The household survey in NE Brazil showed that 982 children (15%) had suffered from diarrhoea during 15 days preceding the interview. ORT was given to 24%. 95% of the caretakers knew about rehydration solutions, but only 18% prepared them correctly, the most common error being the use of insufficient water. The health facility survey in NE Brazil showed that case management based on ORT was established in health services but also pointed to deficiencies in management. Utensils for administration of ORT were available in only half of the facilities. Health workers showed deficiencies in history taking, examination and communication to parents. Still, in 84% of 75 observed child visits ORT was prescribed. In the study on results from comparable surveys, around half of the survey pairs showed a statistically significant variation, rejecting a hypothesis of no difference. This pointed to the possibility of systematic errors in data collection in household surveys. The study of data on case management from household surveys showed limited progress in diarrhoea management in LMC 1986–2003. Achievements in ORT use were far below global targets set at the beginning of the 1990s. An estimated 307 million children did not get ORT and 356 million did not get more to drink during diarrhoea at the beginning of the 21st century. The study in Ceará, Brazil provided some evidence that diarrhoea morbidity went down slightly 1998-2005. The decline was strongest for diarrhoea admissions. Few determinants of morbidity could be associated with the three indicators of diarrhoea morbidity. Conclusions: This thesis has pointed to achievements and problems in diarrhoeal diseases control from 1986 to 2005. ORT became well known in that period. At the same time, unsatisfactory adoption and application of ORT in the late 1980s documented from Brazil persisted in most LMC over the 1990s. Also, diarrhoea case management was found to meet logistical and managerial problems in primary health services, contributing to inadequate utilization of ORT. Much more research is needed on how to improve diarrhoea case management in LMC. Findings from Ceará, Brazil in the thesis support other studies that have shown limited decline in diarrhoea morbidity in LMC. More research is needed on the interaction between morbidity, case management and mortality for proper understanding of priority setting in diarrhoea control. Efforts to reduce diarrhoea morbidity should be further strengthened, especially among the poorest. The thesis has also documented the need for further research on how to strengthen the methodology of household surveys, a key instrument in impact evaluation. The thesis highlights that there is little time for complacency in strengthening diarrhoeal diseases control. Around 300 million children in the LMC appear not to get Oral Rehydration Therapy, the treatment that is essential for prevention of death from diarrhoea. This fact should lead international organisations, donors and national governments to again give high priority to diarrhoeal diseases, especially in low-income countries where diarrhoea is a daily life-threatening condition to many children.
Successful implementation of MHP projects in Ethiopia and subsequently a broader dissemination of the technology require an interdisciplinary approach. Based on the analyses of present hindrances in Ethiopia, crucial aspects are identified. Even though an adequate hydrological potential and electricity requirements are provided for at numerous sites, special attention must be directed to competing technologies, such as a diesel generator system or the connection to an existing grid, to investment and operating costs, profitability, financing instruments, financing partners, organisation forms, legal and political boundary conditions, tariff systems and paying modalities. All these relevant aspects are analysed individually and with regard to their causal interrelationships. The whole study provides the basis for the development of a decision support system. By means of a regionalisation method, regression equations are developed which facilitate the estimation of the hydrological potential at a site with lacking runoff measurements. The evaluation of existing methods to forecast electricity consumption showed that usual specific consumption figures cannot be applied without taking into account the number of households per official connection and the effect of measures which stimulate market penetration and specific consumption. For example, incentives to purchase electrical appliances are one measure to promote the consumption. Simultaneously, an appropriate tariff system must optimise temporal balancing of loads by truncating peaks and filling of load gaps. Additionally it should help to adopt the continuously growing demand function to the stepwise increase of supply capacity. Selling of capacities in kilowatt instead of energy in kilowatt hours aligns with these objectives. Since profitability of MHP systems in Ethiopia revealed to be marginal and access to loans is limited due to the required collateral, mixed financing with different project partners is recommended. Firstly, some non- or less-profit oriented equity capital donors such as customers, development banks and NGO's and secondly, venture capitalists with significant equity capital for the provision of collateral and enforcing successful management should be involved. Thirdly, banks with loan capital are required to increase the ROE for the highly profit oriented investors due to a positive leverage effect. Some of the problems incurred can be solved by the issuance of juissance rights. They facilitate the participation of customers as co-financiers and allow dividend payment in kW's or kWh's. They reduce the risk of electricity sales, and delayed payments. They accommodate access to "cheap" quasi-equity capital from customers and thus ease the access to loans. In return, they offer the advantage of reduced monthly electricity expenses to the customer who, in case of a fixed rate of dividend, receives energy units unaffected by inflation. Juissance rights do not require a stock market and are permitted within the framework of several organisational forms. Since they do not confer any ownership rights, the management control remains with the (more) liable project partners. The participating partners, their number and liability, control aspects, the type of financing and finally the total investment volume decide on the favoured organisational form. A limited partnership is useful in case of investors with different liabilities, supplemented by consumers with juissance rights. A modern co-operative requires a well funded community, independent from big investors and banks. With regard to legal requirements, the investment licence turned out to be of primary importance, but can only be acquired for projects of a fixed minimum volume. The licence facilitates access to the one-stop-shop and thus to other requirements like operating licence, working permits, registration of the business organisation and the allocation of land and water rights. In order to perspicuously illustrate the theoretical results all mentioned aspects together with the investigations on technical design, investment and operating costs are applied to two fictitious case studies of capacities of 50 and 150 kW. The analysis of prospects for international financing support with regard to the Flexible Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, the Global Environmental Fund and others proved that these instruments can contribute to implement either barrier removal projects or concrete MHP pilot projects. In view of the collected information, the potential and the limits of a DSS tool are reviewed. Finally conclusions and recommendations on concrete measures, such as investment incentives, redemption from customs duties and improvement of loan conditions are given.
Looking back on the second year of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) Strategic Plan 2010-2012, the scales are balanced between significant achievements on the one side and, on the other, some disappointing setbacks. Success in India was the most remarkable milestone, deemed "magnificent" by the Independent Monitoring Board (IMB) of the GPEI. Long considered one of the most challenging countries in which to eradicate polio, India accomplished what the IMB called the "systematic enforcement of best practice" to reach over 98% of children with polio vaccine. The country freed itself of endemic polio and finally laid to rest the question of whether polio eradication is technically feasible. Globally, polio cases fell to half the level of the previous year. In two of the four countries with re-established transmission of polio, no cases have been reported in the Republic of South Sudan and in Angola since June 2009 and July 2011, respectively. In the other two, Chad geographically restricted polio in the second half of the year and cases plummeted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, after aggressive response to extensive outbreaks in early 2011. All of the eight outbreaks recorded in previously polio-free countries were successfully stopped, all but one within six months. On the other side of the scales, the three remaining endemic countries witnessed an unexpected and serious upsurge of polio. In Nigeria and Pakistan, the continued circulation of two wild poliovirus serotypes - and a vaccine- derived poliovirus in the former - had the ripple effect of international spread to two neighbours. In Afghanistan, the number of cases also increased, with the national programme unable to reach enough children to stop outbreaks in the insecure Southern Region. At the end of 2011, the three endemic countries were off-track for eradicating polio. The Independent Monitoring Board (IMB) warned in October 2011 that polio eradication would not be achieved on the programme's current trajectory. In November, an alarmed Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on immunization (SAGE) warned that failure to eradicate polio would constitute a failure of public health. By January 2012, the World Health Organization's (WHO) Executive Board had called for polio eradication to be declared a programmatic emergency for global health. Completing polio eradication is now a global emergency because of the clear - and, as stated by SAGE - "unacceptable" consequences of failure. The children of Nigeria, Pakistan and Afghanistan bear the brunt of current polio transmission, but the consequences reach much farther. In recent years, the international spread of polio has become deadlier. Recent outbreaks on three continents -Tajikistan, Congo and China, all far from polioendemic areas - paralysed mostly adults. In some of these outbreaks, half the affected adults died. When the virus affects adults who have grown up in previously polio-free countries and have received little or no vaccination, it kills far more frequently. These consequences have triggered emergency actions among countries and the international polio partners. The Global Polio Emergency Action Plan 2012_2013, and the revised national emergency action plans that underpin it, capture the fundamental changes that polio-affected countries and their partners are making in their approach and structure, to ultimately bring about polio eradication. Compounding this emergency is a 50% gap in financing needed to fully carry out the necessary activities in 2012_2013 (as of April 2012). In the first quarter of 2012, this has already dictated the scale-back of activities in 24 countries in Asia and Africa, increasing the risk of unchecked spread if poliovirus from endemic areas enters these countries. The emergency eradication programme is about speed, focus and most of all accountability. From heads of state to chiefs of multilateral agencies and donors, from parent to vaccinator, every link in the chain must be tempered and strengthened to bring about a polio-free world. ; Executive summary -- -- Key events 2011-- -- Stopping transmission of polioviruses - 1. On track - 2. Back on track - 3. Off track - 4. Protecting polio-free areas -- -- Polio eradication - an emergency -- -- Financing -- -- Annex 1: 2011 progress report of the global milestones and process indicators of the GPEI Strategic Plan 2010-2012 -- Annex 2: Supporting data for progress report -- -- Acronyms and abbreviations ; "WHO/POLIO/12.02." ; On cover: logos for World Health Organization, Rotary International, CDC (U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), UNICEF. ; Available via the World Wide Web as an Acrobat .pdf file (10.45 MB, 52 p.).
Acid rock drainage (ARD) is defined as acidic waste-water contaminated with sulphate and heavy metals which is generated through the oxidation of sulphidic ores in the presence of water and oxygen. Mining activities accelerate this process by bringing these ores to the surface where they are further crushed and, eventually end up in waste rock dumps and tailing impoundments where they continue to generate ARD into perpetuity. Active mining operations are mandated to prevent the discharge of ARD into the environment. This ARD is commonly remediated by expensive yet highly effective active treatment strategies such as high-density sludge processes and reverse osmosis. South Africa has an extensive history of gold and coal mining which has left abandoned mine workings with associated waste rock dumps throughout northern and eastern parts of the country. As many of these mines have long been abandoned, the responsibility to mitigate the environmental impact of the generated ARD lies solely with government. Although these diffuse sites often generate smaller volumes of less aggressive ARD compared to that generated through mine water rebound, the sheer number and the continual ARD generation from these sites is a severe threat to South Africa's already poor water security. Biological sulphate reduction (BSR) has long been considered an attractive option for the longterm remediation of these low-volume sources of ARD – but its implementation has shown mixed success. BSR is a process catalysed through the innate metabolism of sulphate-reducing bacteria (SRB) which coexist within complex microbial communities. SRB themselves are a highly diverse group of anaerobic microorganisms which use sulphate as a terminal electron acceptor. The sulphide and bicarbonate produced during BSR can be used to precipitate heavy metals and aid in the neutralisation of the ARD, respectively. The implementation of BSR is, therefore, a comprehensive remediation strategy for diffuse sources of ARD. The study of BSR, using various reactor configurations and operating conditions shows much promise. However, the microbial ecology of the complex communities within BSR systems, and their links to the performance of BSR processes, has received far less attention in published literature. This is not a result of underappreciation of the role microbial communities but rather a historical lack of tools, specifically high-throughput techniques, available to assess complex microbial consortia. It is asserted that the success of a sustainable BSR process developed for the long-term remediation of ARD requires an in-depth understanding the microbial communities associated with this process. The identification of the microorganisms which are key to the process, thosewhich threaten the stability of the community and the optimal growth conditions of these microorganisms, can be used to inform how these bioreactors are designed and operated. This study investigated the performance and microbial ecology of several continuous BSR reactors using culture-independent metagenomic sequencing approaches. The performance and microbial ecology of these reactors were evaluated at a range of hydraulic residence times (HRT) over the course of approximately 1000 days of continuous operation, from five- through to one-day(s). The tested reactor configurations included a continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR), an up-flow anaerobic packed bed reactor (UAPBR) and a linear flow channel reactor (LFCR) that were each operated in duplicate and supplemented with either lactate or acetate as an electron donor. The different reactor configurations and supplied electron donors, as well as the varied applied HRT, generated a range of microenvironments which were hypothesised to lead to the divergence of the initial microbial community of the inoculum and generate numerous distinct microbial communities throughout and across the reactor systems. 16S rRNA gene amplicon sequencing was used to assess the microbial community structure of the numerous populations across the reactor systems and monitor how these communities responded to the change in the applied HRT. Genome-resolved metagenomics was employed in parallel to recover the genomes of all predominant microorganisms identified through gene amplicon sequencing. This allowed the interrogation of the composition of the respective microbial communities as well as the genetic potential of each microorganism and encompassing the communities represented within specific reactor environments. The CSTRs were selected as these systems are characterised as well-mixed, support solely suspended biomass and kinetic equilibriums are achieved rapidly. This allows the performance of these reactors to be predictable and provides a benchmark to which the LFCRs and UAPBRs could be compared. The lactate-supplemented CSTR performed largely as anticipated based on available literature, demonstrating a maintained sulphate conversion of approximately 55% over the course of the study. The reactor achieved a maximum observed volumetric sulphate reduction rate (VSRR) of 17 mg/ℓ.h at a one-day HRT. The system supported a low SRB diversity, constituted almost entirely by a Desulfomicrobium and two Desulfovibrio operational taxonomic units (OTUs). The acetate-supplemented CSTR was able to maintain sulphate reducing performance at HRT where complete washout of SRB had been predicted based on literature. This reactor exhibited a maximum VSRR of 10.8 mg/ℓ.h at a 1.5-day HRT and was dominated by the same Desulfovibrio and Desulfomicrobium observed in the lactate-supplemented CSTR, along with several other SRB genera at lower abundance. The LFCRs demonstrated an approximately ten-fold greater biomass retention than the corresponding CSTRs. This was facilitated through the incorporation of carbon microfibres, whichfacilitated microbial colonisation and biofilm formation within the reactors. Surprisingly, the lactate-supplemented LFCR, underperformed compared to the lactate-supplemented CSTR, achieving a maximum VSRR of 14.8 mg/ℓ.h at a one-day HRT. This reduced performance, in spite of the enhanced biomass retention, was concluded to result from the out-competition of lactateoxidising SRB in the reactor by Veillonella and Enterobacter OTUs. The acetate-supplemented LFCR exhibited a period of underperformance before recovering and subsequently demonstrated a maximum VSRR of 17.1 mg/ℓ.h at a one-day HRT. Evaluations of the microbial communities of this system during the HRT study revealed a dramatic shift in the SRB communities from being dominated by Desulfatitalea and Desulfovibrio to being dominated predominantly by Desulfomicrobium and Desulfobacter. The UAPBRs are governed by plug-flow which resulted in the generation of gradients of decreasing substrates and increasing products throughout the height of the reactors. This, as hypothesised, resulted in the stratification of the microbial communities throughout the height of these reactors. This allowed many associations to be made between specific microorganisms and their ideal growth environments. Both UAPBRs demonstrated competitive sulphate reducing performance. The lactate-supplemented UAPBR proved especially successful as this system was able to maintain >95% sulphate conversion at one-day HRT, corresponding with a VSRR of 40.1 mg/ℓ.h. The performance of this reactor was attributed to the significant quantity of retained biomass and the successful harbouring of lactate-oxidising SRB towards the inlet zone of the reactor as well as propionate- and acetate-oxidising SRB towards the effluent zones of the reactor. The acetatesupplemented UAPBR exhibited a maximum VSRR of 23.2 mg/ℓ.h at a one-day HRT and a maximum sulphate conversion of 79% at a 2.3-day HRT. The stratification of the microbial communities within the acetate-supplemented UAPBR was less pronounced than the lactatesupplemented UAPBR, as a result of the fewer available volatile fatty acid species. However, the stratification which was observed in this system could be used to postulate the growth kinetics associated with the identified SRB – a Desulfobulbus was associated with rapid acetate oxidation in the inlet zone while a Desulfatitalea and a Desulfosarcina could be implicated in sulphate scavenging in the effluent zone of this reactor. This proved particularly valuable for elucidating the roles of these same SRB in the well-mixed reactor systems. Genome-resolved metagenomics was employed to recover the genomes of the microorganisms identified in these systems and determine the metabolic potential of these microorganisms. Hydrogen-evolving hydrogenase genes were found to be widespread in genomes not capable of sulphate reduction. In contrast, hydrogen-consuming hydrogenases as well as autotrophic gene pathways were common amongst SRB genomes. The ubiquity of hydrogenase genes in these environments indicated that inter-species hydrogen transfer was an important feature within thesemicrobial communities. The dual consumption of both acetate and hydrogen was concluded to have facilitated the maintained sulphate reducing performance of the acetate-supplemented reactor systems at short HRT where system failure had been predicted. Indices of replication (iRep) were used to estimate the instantaneous growth rates of the microorganisms from metagenomic shotgun sequencing datasets. This revealed that, at a four-day HRT, the microorganisms within the biofilms were comparably active to planktonic microorganisms. This, together with the dynamic changes in the composition of these biofilms during the HRT study, suggests these biofilms are even more active and competitive than previously thought. The combined use of next-generation gene amplicon sequencing and genome-resolved metagenomics has given unprecedented insights into the microbial communities of BSR reactor systems. Using this approach, it was possible to uncover a seldom discussed form of hydrogen cycling within BSR systems and has shown that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' approach when inoculating BSR reactors. The SRB within these systems were often highly specialised to particular environments, specific electron donors and each showed differing growth kinetics. The success of long-term, semi-passive BSR reactor systems would benefit greatly from the tailoring of SRB inoculums informed by the chosen reactor configuration and operating conditions. The outcomes of the kinetic reactor experiments have led to several recommendations for the design and operation of these systems.
This thesis consists of five essays in the field of political economy. The first part of the thesis includes three essays covering various aspects of the political economy of globalization and economic reforms, which are linked in several ways. The second part of the thesis includes two essays on the political economy of development in India. The aim of this introductory section is to give a brief and non-technical overview of the essays, as well as to explain the links between them. The discussion of the contribution of the research to the existing literature will be carried out separately in each essay. Globalization and economic reforms are two important concepts in the international political economy field. Explaining the social effects of both has been at the center of the international political economy literature for an extensive period of time. Much has been written about the effects of globalization on social outcomes (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008, Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch 2003) and there are at least two distinct trains of thought in academia and the public discourse. One view is that the structural changes towards more liberal economic policy can positively transform the economy and polity, increasing economic growth and welfare, as well as bringing much required modernization (Bhagwati 2004, Wolf 2004, Friedman 1999). On the other hand, more pessimistic voices, which include mainstream economists such as Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, and Marxist critical theorists, believe that globalization can simultaneously promote a 'race to the bottom' in social standards that degrades communitarian bases of social stability and welfare (Rodrik 1997, Stiglitz and Charlton 2006). In fact, the global financial crisis of 2008, where people took to the streets in both developing and developed countries, has made the issue of whether or not globalization and economic reforms create socially undesirable consequences, ever more crucial. The first part of the thesis sheds new light on various aspects of the social effects of globalization and economic reforms, reviewing findings in the literature to date and extending existing theories. A major contribution of the thesis is the rigorous and thorough empirical evaluation of the human rights effects of economic reforms, and to what extent globalization has induced a race to the bottom in labour standards, while also contributing new empirical findings to extend the research surrounding the side effects of participating in IMF programs. The thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 1, we focus on the impact of economic reforms and economic freedom on human rights. It is argued that economic policy reforms will benefit most people in terms of better access to goods, lower inflation, and better economic opportunities (Murphy et al. 1991). However, critics of market reforms see the majority as losers from such reforms, expecting resistance that would lead to political repression (Przeworski 1991). Using the change in the Index of Economic Freedom as a measure of market liberalization reforms, employing data from a panel of 117 countries for the 1981–2006 period, the results show a strong positive association between reforms towards more free markets and governments' respect for human rights, controlling for a host of relevant factors, including the possibility of endogeneity. These results lend support to those who argue that freer markets generate better economic conditions and higher levels of social harmony. In fact, halfhearted measures at implementing reforms could be dangerous to human rights. After exploring the impact of economic reforms on human rights, we continue by linking economic liberalization policies prescribed by international organizations such as the IMF to the outbreak of civil war in chapter 2. As the global economic downturn has heightened concerns over intervention by international financial institutions, as well as political stability, a prominently published work by Hartzell, Hoddie and Bauer (2010) purports to show that signing on to an IMF Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) increased the risk of civil war during the 1970–1999 period. They claim that the IMF's SAPs push economic liberalization to the point where some people are so negatively affected as to foment civil war. We advance this debate by critically examining their theoretical and empirical evidence, particularly questioning their crucial assumptions about the impact of IMF programs on the economic environment in terms of the actual winners and losers from economic liberalization, and who might be in a position to rebel. Separating the effects of crises from IMF interventions is crucial since crises also generate losers in their own right. With only minor adjustments to their study, we find the exact opposite of what they conclude. We show that their measure of signing on to an IMF program remains consistently insignificant in explaining the outbreak of civil war, using the threshold of 25 battle deaths when defining the onset of a civil war. These results suggest that their operationalization of the IMF variable, as well as the utilization of large-scale civil wars (1000 deaths and above), captures the effect of ongoing war rather than the effects of liberalization. After extending the time period under study from 1970–1999 to 1970–2008, as well as making some minor changes to operationalization, again we find that IMF involvement is at worst a poor predictor of conflict, and at best, an alleviator of the risk. The next chapter turns to a topic which is currently the focus of both politicians and the labour unions in general. We analyze whether inter-country competition for investment has adverse effects on labour standards. Among the many concerns over globalization is that as nations compete for international firms, they will relax labour standards as a method of lowering costs and attracting investment. Using spatial econometric estimation on panel data for 148 developing countries over 18 years, we find that the labour standards in one country are indeed positively correlated with labour standards elsewhere (i.e., a reduction in the labour standards of other countries reduces the labour standards of the country in question). This interdependence is more evident in labour practices (i.e., enforcement) than in labour laws. Furthermore, competition is most fierce in those countries which already have low standards. Since there has been a decline in the labour practices and laws across all three groups, this is possible evidence of a race to the bottom as nations compete for investment. The second part of the thesis focuses on essays on the political economy of development in India. India is often hailed as one of the success stories of globalization (Basu 2008). Indeed, after the inception of market economic reforms in 1991, economic growth has been both sustained and impressively robust in terms of national economic indicators (Basu 2008). However, despite rapid economic growth during the post-1990 period, the benefits of economic growth are unevenly distributed, and some areas and groups of people have seen their living standards decline (Banerjee 2010). One could argue that this is somewhat surprising given the rapid surge in economic growth in recent years (Bardhan 2010). In connection with this, two critical issues have attracted a lot of attention, both within and outside India. First is the issue of corruption which is seen as a hindrance to prosperity and development, and the second is the emergence of India as one of the major donors of development aid. In chapter 4, we focus particularly on the influence of the timing of elections on controlling corruption. Firstly, we develop a conceptual framework that extends theories of political budget cycles to corruption, where an incumbent government considers controlling corruption based purely on political considerations. More specifically, we investigate whether the timing of elections affects the responsiveness of the incumbent government to control corruption. Secondly, we empirically test the predictions of the conceptual framework using 30 Indian states during the 1988–2009 period. Consistent with the conceptual framework developed, i.e., an incumbent politician might exert greater effort in an election year to control corruption, the findings show that scheduled elections (and not unscheduled elections) are associated with an increase in the number of corruption cases registered. In addition, we find that corruption cases registered tend to increase as a scheduled election year draws closer. Furthermore, the effects are found to be stronger in 'swing states' (where the margin of victory of the incumbent in the previous election was 5% or less), and in state scheduled election years which coincide with national elections. On the other hand, there is no effect of scheduled elections on corruption cases being investigated by anti-corruption agencies. The following chapter examines a puzzling question about India. Here, we analyze what determines Indian development aid. It is indeed puzzling to note that India, which has a large domestic population suffering from underdevelopment, chronic poverty and mal-governance, is emerging as an important aid donor. With the intension of learning why poor countries provide foreign aid, this is the first work to econometrically analyze India's aid allocation decisions. We utilize cross-sectional data on aid commitments to 128 developing countries by the Ministry of External Affairs and the Export-Import Bank of India, obtained in US dollars from AidData for the 2008-2009 period. We then compare India's bilateral aid allocation with that of other donors to examine if India is any different regarding the motivation behind its allocation decisions. The findings show that India's aid allocation decisions are largely driven by commercial and political self-interest. While recipient need does not seem to be a key determinant, neighboring countries receive considerable attention.
Rwanda is a country with a troubled history. Its genocide in 1994, fifteen years ago, is still considered as one of the most shocking episodes of the twentieth century. Since then, however, Rwanda seems to be recovering well. Economic growth in the immediate post-war period was spectacular and remained considerable in the years thereafter (8,6% between 1996 and 2001). The Rwandan government elaborated a poverty reduction policy (PRSP), which was implemented between 2001 and 2006. Rwanda was widely applauded for the efficiency in the elaboration and execution of policy objectives, and could count on extensive financial engagements from the international community. Some even speak of a 'Rwandan Renaissance' to refer to this seemingly spectacular success. There is however also a bleaker picture next to the growth success. The poverty problem remains pressing, certainly in rural areas. Indeed, the percentage of people living below the national poverty line of 1.22$ (PPP, 2006 prices) decreased between 2001 and 2006, from 60.3% to 56.8%. But because of the impressive population growth, the absolute number of poor people increased. In the countryside, an additional half million people lived in poverty in 2006 in comparison to 2001. In this rural environment, the problem of land scarcity is enormous. The overall majority of the rural population has to survive with less than 1 hectare per family and limited possibilities to diversify their income sources beyond subsistence agriculture. In addition, there is a strong inequality. In 2001, the 20% richest consumed as much as the remaining 80% of the population. Since then, inequality has further been rising. Several research questions arise. *) How are the peasants, the overall majority of the Rwandan population surviving in this optimistic post-genocide economic growth climate? Are they able to profit from economic growth? *) How are they dealing with the problem of extreme resource scarcity? They have to deal with enormous hazards and uncertainties, to which they have to adapt their livelihood strategies through risk avoidance and diversification. Are they able to productively exploit their land, and how do they survive if their land holdings are not (no longer) sufficient to produce enough food? *) How does the Rwandan government capture the challenges in the fight against poverty? How do policy makers see their role in rural development, and which type of agricultural and land policy do they adopt? The PhD provides an answer to these questions. It provides a unique insight in how the process of rural change - including the role of rural policies in this process - impacts upon the differentiation and polarization in livelihood profiles in the context of rural Rwanda. It points to the danger of the current Rwandan development model, based on large-scale professionalised farming. Moreover, it elaborates an alternative more sustainable development model based on broad-based economic growth and brings forward technically feasible solutions that build upon the potential and capacity of the large majority of small-scale farmers. But it also reflects upon the current political economy context in which the division of power and wealth make this technically feasible alternative development model politically unrealistic. The PhD points to the crucial role of international donors to support structures that help the voices from below reach the surface, the voices of the Rwandan small-scale peasants. The diversity in focus, level and techniques adopted in the various papers of the PhD allows us to look at the overarching theme - faces of rural poverty - from very different angles. Indeed, as mentioned by Scoones et alii (1996: 10), "models of change that oversimplify, standardise and aggregate in order to ease computation can be highly misleading; instead a methodological pluralism that includes qualitative and quantitative methods is seen to be most appropriate for increasing our understanding of complex, diverse and risk-prone agricultural systems". Some of the chapters analyse macro-level tendencies; others look with a micro-lens at particular case studies. Parts of the PhD engage in a quantitative analysis of nationally representative data. Other parts draw conclusions from in-depth qualitative field research in particular local settings. Some chapters focus on policy makers' perspectives, others literally bring in the voices of the Rwandan peasants. We consider this variety of approaches both relevant and complementary for a comprehensive understanding of the process of rural change and polarization in livelihood profiles in the context of rural Rwanda. The first two chapters provide an analysis of the policy makers' perspective with regards to rural development. The first chapter is titled: "Striving for growth, bypassing the poor? A critical review of Rwanda's rural sector policies". It studies Rwanda's current rural policies, which aim to modernise and 'professionalise' the rural sector. The chapter points to the risk for currently formulated rural policy measures to be at the expense of the large mass of small-scale peasants. A second chapter, "Reengineering rural society: The visions and ambitions of Rwandan elites" illuminates a general trend of policy makers misplaced belief in the potential to socially engineer rural development. Based upon interviews conducted by the author in mid-2007, the chapter focuses upon three engineering ambitions: 1) policy makers aim to transform the agricultural sector into a professionalised motor for economic growth, with little place left for traditional smallholder agriculture; 2) policy makers have a vision on how to artificially upgrade the portrait of rural life by inserting 'modern' tools and concepts into the local realities, while hiding true poverty and inequality; 3) policy makers hope to transform Rwanda into a target-driven society from the highest up to the lowest level. The chapter takes the necessity of rural development and poverty reduction as the bench mark to point to the (potential) dangers, flaws and shortcomings of the reengineering mission of Rwandan policy makers. The next two chapters study the livelihoods of rural peasants on the basis of a quantitative approach. The third chapter, "Rural poverty and livelihood profiles in post-genocide Rwanda", identifies different livelihood profiles that prevail in the Rwandan rural post-conflict context. By means of exploratory tools such as principal component and cluster analysis, it combines variables that capture natural, physical, human, financial and social resources in combination with environmental factors to identify household groups with different livelihood profiles. The chapter also explores how household groups differ with regards to the intra-cluster incidence of poverty. Finally, for a subsample, it looks in detail at how the identified household clusters perceive changes in their living conditions between 2001 and 2004. The analysis allows identifying policies for poverty alleviation that take into account the different livelihood profiles and pathways in the rural setting. The fourth chapter focuses particularly upon the land resource, using a nationally representative database to analyse "the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity in rural Rwanda". Policies aiming for agricultural modernisation concentrate on promoting regional crop specialisation and monocropping. This chapter, however, identifies the strong inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity under the current land management system; also when taking into account farm fragmentation, crop diversification, frequency of multicropping and household size. In addition, increased farm fragmentation and a higher frequency of multicropping seem to have a positive (although modest) impact upon productivity. This seems to suggest that small-scale peasants' risk-cooping strategies not only protect them against risks but also pay off in terms of productivity. The chapter's findings are formulated at an aggregated meso level and are relevant for national rural policies. The final chapter, "Views from below on the pro-poor growth challenge: The case of rural Rwanda", is complementary to the previous two. It adopts a qualitative approach to focus on peasants' livelihoods and rural class differentiation at the micro-level. Based on field data from six case-study settings, we analyse local peasants' perceptions of the characteristics and degree of poverty for different locally-present socio-economic categories. This results in classifications that are based upon livelihood strategies (self-subsistent versus market-oriented peasants, agricultural and non-agricultural wage labour, …), and that relate much closer to local level dynamics (in comparison to the third and fourth chapter). We look at the opportunities and constraints of those categories, which are crucial determinants for their capacity to participate in growth strategies and for their social mobility potential. Further, we analyse how the peasant categories perceive specific policy measures included in the Rwandan government's 'pro-poor' agricultural strategies. Whereas the two quantitative chapters capture trends in rural livelihoods and land productivity at the macro level, and can claim representativity and external validity, they fail to capture local-level dynamics. The final chapter does provide insights into class (trans)formation processes at the local level, but can by no means claim validity beyond these local settings. Both approaches contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the process of rural change. The concluding chapter of the PhD is a reflection on the insights of the previous chapters with regards to the process of rural change and class (trans)formation in contemporary Rwanda. It looks at the causes, processes, mechanisms, contexts and symptoms of the rural differentiation process. It pleads for an alternative rural policy that promotes broad-based agricultural growth with a key role for small-scale peasants, in combination with an activation of the potential of (nearly) landless rural agents in the local off-farm sector. The technical feasibility and societal desirability of this solution for the Rwandan development problem has been proven in the previous chapters of the PhD. The final part of the concluding chapter however reflects upon the political feasibility of this technical solution, given the current political economy context. It points to the responsibility of donors to support mechanisms that allow bringing in the voices from below to the surface, the voices of the Rwandan small-scale peasants.
Rwanda is a country with a troubled history. Its genocide in 1994, fifteen years ago, is still considered as one of the most shocking episodes of the twentieth century. Since then, however, Rwanda seems to be recovering well. Economic growth in the immediate post-war period was spectacular and remained considerable in the years thereafter (8,6% between 1996 and 2001). The Rwandan government elaborated a poverty reduction policy (PRSP), which was implemented between 2001 and 2006. Rwanda was widely applauded for the efficiency in the elaboration and execution of policy objectives, and could count on extensive financial engagements from the international community. Some even speak of a 'Rwandan Renaissance' to refer to this seemingly spectacular success. There is however also a bleaker picture next to the growth success. The poverty problem remains pressing, certainly in rural areas. Indeed, the percentage of people living below the national poverty line of 1.22$ (PPP, 2006 prices) decreased between 2001 and 2006, from 60.3% to 56.8%. But because of the impressive population growth, the absolute number of poor people increased. In the countryside, an additional half million people lived in poverty in 2006 in comparison to 2001. In this rural environment, the problem of land scarcity is enormous. The overall majority of the rural population has to survive with less than 1 hectare per family and limited possibilities to diversify their income sources beyond subsistence agriculture. In addition, there is a strong inequality. In 2001, the 20% richest consumed as much as the remaining 80% of the population. Since then, inequality has further been rising. Several research questions arise. *) How are the peasants, the overall majority of the Rwandan population surviving in this optimistic post-genocide economic growth climate? Are they able to profit from economic growth? *) How are they dealing with the problem of extreme resource scarcity? They have to deal with enormous hazards and uncertainties, to which they have to adapt their livelihood strategies through risk avoidance and diversification. Are they able to productively exploit their land, and how do they survive if their land holdings are not (no longer) sufficient to produce enough food? *) How does the Rwandan government capture the challenges in the fight against poverty? How do policy makers see their role in rural development, and which type of agricultural and land policy do they adopt? The PhD provides an answer to these questions. It provides a unique insight in how the process of rural change - including the role of rural policies in this process - impacts upon the differentiation and polarization in livelihood profiles in the context of rural Rwanda. It points to the danger of the current Rwandan development model, based on large-scale professionalised farming. Moreover, it elaborates an alternative more sustainable development model based on broad-based economic growth and brings forward technically feasible solutions that build upon the potential and capacity of the large majority of small-scale farmers. But it also reflects upon the current political economy context in which the division of power and wealth make this technically feasible alternative development model politically unrealistic. The PhD points to the crucial role of international donors to support structures that help the voices from below reach the surface, the voices of the Rwandan small-scale peasants. The diversity in focus, level and techniques adopted in the various papers of the PhD allows us to look at the overarching theme - faces of rural poverty - from very different angles. Indeed, as mentioned by Scoones et alii (1996: 10), "models of change that oversimplify, standardise and aggregate in order to ease computation can be highly misleading; instead a methodological pluralism that includes qualitative and quantitative methods is seen to be most appropriate for increasing our understanding of complex, diverse and risk-prone agricultural systems". Some of the chapters analyse macro-level tendencies; others look with a micro-lens at particular case studies. Parts of the PhD engage in a quantitative analysis of nationally representative data. Other parts draw conclusions from in-depth qualitative field research in particular local settings. Some chapters focus on policy makers' perspectives, others literally bring in the voices of the Rwandan peasants. We consider this variety of approaches both relevant and complementary for a comprehensive understanding of the process of rural change and polarization in livelihood profiles in the context of rural Rwanda. The first two chapters provide an analysis of the policy makers' perspective with regards to rural development. The first chapter is titled: "Striving for growth, bypassing the poor? A critical review of Rwanda's rural sector policies". It studies Rwanda's current rural policies, which aim to modernise and 'professionalise' the rural sector. The chapter points to the risk for currently formulated rural policy measures to be at the expense of the large mass of small-scale peasants. A second chapter, "Reengineering rural society: The visions and ambitions of Rwandan elites" illuminates a general trend of policy makers misplaced belief in the potential to socially engineer rural development. Based upon interviews conducted by the author in mid-2007, the chapter focuses upon three engineering ambitions: 1) policy makers aim to transform the agricultural sector into a professionalised motor for economic growth, with little place left for traditional smallholder agriculture; 2) policy makers have a vision on how to artificially upgrade the portrait of rural life by inserting 'modern' tools and concepts into the local realities, while hiding true poverty and inequality; 3) policy makers hope to transform Rwanda into a target-driven society from the highest up to the lowest level. The chapter takes the necessity of rural development and poverty reduction as the bench mark to point to the (potential) dangers, flaws and shortcomings of the reengineering mission of Rwandan policy makers. The next two chapters study the livelihoods of rural peasants on the basis of a quantitative approach. The third chapter, "Rural poverty and livelihood profiles in post-genocide Rwanda", identifies different livelihood profiles that prevail in the Rwandan rural post-conflict context. By means of exploratory tools such as principal component and cluster analysis, it combines variables that capture natural, physical, human, financial and social resources in combination with environmental factors to identify household groups with different livelihood profiles. The chapter also explores how household groups differ with regards to the intra-cluster incidence of poverty. Finally, for a subsample, it looks in detail at how the identified household clusters perceive changes in their living conditions between 2001 and 2004. The analysis allows identifying policies for poverty alleviation that take into account the different livelihood profiles and pathways in the rural setting. The fourth chapter focuses particularly upon the land resource, using a nationally representative database to analyse "the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity in rural Rwanda". Policies aiming for agricultural modernisation concentrate on promoting regional crop specialisation and monocropping. This chapter, however, identifies the strong inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity under the current land management system; also when taking into account farm fragmentation, crop diversification, frequency of multicropping and household size. In addition, increased farm fragmentation and a higher frequency of multicropping seem to have a positive (although modest) impact upon productivity. This seems to suggest that small-scale peasants' risk-cooping strategies not only protect them against risks but also pay off in terms of productivity. The chapter's findings are formulated at an aggregated meso level and are relevant for national rural policies. The final chapter, "Views from below on the pro-poor growth challenge: The case of rural Rwanda", is complementary to the previous two. It adopts a qualitative approach to focus on peasants' livelihoods and rural class differentiation at the micro-level. Based on field data from six case-study settings, we analyse local peasants' perceptions of the characteristics and degree of poverty for different locally-present socio-economic categories. This results in classifications that are based upon livelihood strategies (self-subsistent versus market-oriented peasants, agricultural and non-agricultural wage labour, …), and that relate much closer to local level dynamics (in comparison to the third and fourth chapter). We look at the opportunities and constraints of those categories, which are crucial determinants for their capacity to participate in growth strategies and for their social mobility potential. Further, we analyse how the peasant categories perceive specific policy measures included in the Rwandan government's 'pro-poor' agricultural strategies. Whereas the two quantitative chapters capture trends in rural livelihoods and land productivity at the macro level, and can claim representativity and external validity, they fail to capture local-level dynamics. The final chapter does provide insights into class (trans)formation processes at the local level, but can by no means claim validity beyond these local settings. Both approaches contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the process of rural change. The concluding chapter of the PhD is a reflection on the insights of the previous chapters with regards to the process of rural change and class (trans)formation in contemporary Rwanda. It looks at the causes, processes, mechanisms, contexts and symptoms of the rural differentiation process. It pleads for an alternative rural policy that promotes broad-based agricultural growth with a key role for small-scale peasants, in combination with an activation of the potential of (nearly) landless rural agents in the local off-farm sector. The technical feasibility and societal desirability of this solution for the Rwandan development problem has been proven in the previous chapters of the PhD. The final part of the concluding chapter however reflects upon the political feasibility of this technical solution, given the current political economy context. It points to the responsibility of donors to support mechanisms that allow bringing in the voices from below to the surface, the voices of the Rwandan small-scale peasants.
