Suchergebnisse

Michael Tunç untersucht, inwiefern sich Prozesse des Zusammenwirkens der Differenzlinien Geschlecht, Ethnizität und Klasse bei ethnisch minorisierten Vätern/Vätern of Color (PoC) rekonstruieren lassen. Der Autor präsentiert aktuelle Begriffe, Ansätze und Ergebnisse der Männlichkeits- und Väterlichkeitsforschung. Für emanzipative Entwicklungen arbeitet er den Begriff der progressiven Männlichkeit aus, mit dem sich Spannungen zwischen hegemonialen und progressiven Deutungsmustern von Männlichkeit/Väterlichkeit migrantischer Männer/PoC angemessen analysieren lassen. Er stellt intersektionale rassismuskritisch-migrationsgesellschaftliche Ansätze vor und überträgt sie auf diversitätsbewusste Väterarbeit. Der Inhalt Forschungsstand der Sozial- und Erziehungswissenschaften im Kontext von Väterlichkeit, Männlichkeit und Migration Väter mit Migrationshintergrund und rassismuskritisch migrationssozialarbeiterische Väterarbeit Die Evaluation interkultureller Väterarbeit in NRW Die Zielgruppen Dozierende und Studierende der Erziehungswissenschaften, Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialen Arbeit Praktiker und Praktikerinnen in der Sozialen Arbeit und Pädagogik Der Autor Dr. Michael Tunç ist im Rahmen einer befristeten Professur für das Fachgebiet Migration und Soziale Arbeit am Fachbereich Soziale Arbeit der Hochschule Darmstadt tätig

What does English experience imply about American constitutional law? My book, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, argues that federal administrative power generally is unconstitutional. In supporting this conclusion, the book observes that eighteenth-century Americans adopted their constitutions not only with their eyes on the future, but also looking over their shoulder at the past – especially the English past. This much should not be controversial. There remain, however, all sorts of questions about how to understand the English history and its relevance for early Americans. In opposition to my claims about American law, Paul Craig lobs three critiques from across the pond. His two main arguments concern the English history of prerogative and administrative power – though in addition, he makes a conceptual point about the distinction between legislative and judicial power. It will be seen that Craig's account repeatedly misunderstands the history and even the conceptual framework. Nonetheless, his article usefully draws attention to some important issues. This is therefore a good occasion not simply to respond, but more broadly to explore three important questions about early prerogative and administrative power. First, how can one distinguish absolute prerogative power and administrative power in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England? Second, how did the English resolve the tensions between their inherited types of administrative power and their constitutional principles? Third, how did Americans resolve the tensions between their inherited types of administrative power and their constitutional principles?

What is the role of judges in holding government acts unconstitutional? The conventional paradigm is "judicial review." From this perspective, judges have a distinct power to review statutes and other government acts for their constitutionality. The historical evidence, however, reveals another paradigm, that of judicial duty. From this point of view, presented in my book Law and Judicial Duty, a judge has an office or duty, in all decisions, to exercise judgment in accord with the law of the land. On this understanding, there is no distinct power to review acts for their constitutionality, and what is called "judicial review" is merely an aspect of the more general duty of judges in all of their decisions. The difference between these paradigms has contemporary implications. If one assumes the judicial review paradigm, it is difficult to find constitutional authority for constitutional decisions, and it therefore seems that early American judges in the 1780s, and especially after 1789, must have created their own most significant power – as if they lifted themselves up by their bootstraps to achieve a power their constitutions apparently did not give them. The judicial review paradigm thereby implies that constitutional decisions have only a rather contingent authority and that the judges have a remarkable degree of power, including a discretionary power of their own rule. The other paradigm, in contrast, envisions the judicial role in terms of duty. As traditionally understood by common lawyers, judges have an office of judgment rather than of will – an office, moreover, in which they must decide in accord with the law of the land. From this perspective, judges have no distinct power over the constitutionality of government acts, but rather must make decisions on such matters because it is part of their office or duty. The implications of this vision are thus diametrically opposite to those of the judicial review paradigm. For example, when considered as a matter of duty, constitutional decisions have the deep, even profound authority of an ordinary exercise of judicial office. At the same time, judges have no power beyond their duty, and they therefore have to make constitutional decisions in the same way as their other decisions, merely in accord with the law of the land. Which paradigm is to be believed? Well, at least for historical inquiry, the answer must rest on the evidence. This Essay, therefore, evaluates each of the two paradigms in relation to the evidence.