Then the process of Enlargement has started, it was expected that Accession of much more agrarian and less developed countries from Eastern and Central Europe, compared to the Member States at that time, should encourage the radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies – Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy. Some researchers provided with numbers proving that Enlargement without reforming the EU redistributive policies would substantially increase the funding for implementation of these policies. While the other group of scientists noticed that the Enlargement process is getting momentum, whereas the internal EU reforms are postponing. The decision on the CAP reform was taken in 2003 by the Agricultural Council, while the Cohesion Policy reform was agreed in the Brussels European Council of 2005. In the Commission's reform proposals as well as during Member States' negotiations much attention was paid, especially in the case of the Cohesion Policy reform, to the challenges of Enlargement. In this paper the aforementioned last reforms of the EU redistributive policies are analysed: the CAP reform of 2002–2003 and the Cohesion Policy reform of 2004–2006 aiming to evaluate the impact of Enlargement on the Commission's reform proposals and the reform results. It is argued that the factor of Enlargement, although in the Commission's reform proposals was emphasised as encouraging to reform the CAP and the Cohesion Policy radically, in reality for the EU redistributive policy reforms had a minor impact. It is shown that Enlargement did not encourage radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies, because higher influence on the reform results was made by the financial interests of the Member States.
Then the process of Enlargement has started, it was expected that Accession of much more agrarian and less developed countries from Eastern and Central Europe, compared to the Member States at that time, should encourage the radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies – Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy. Some researchers provided with numbers proving that Enlargement without reforming the EU redistributive policies would substantially increase the funding for implementation of these policies. While the other group of scientists noticed that the Enlargement process is getting momentum, whereas the internal EU reforms are postponing. The decision on the CAP reform was taken in 2003 by the Agricultural Council, while the Cohesion Policy reform was agreed in the Brussels European Council of 2005. In the Commission's reform proposals as well as during Member States' negotiations much attention was paid, especially in the case of the Cohesion Policy reform, to the challenges of Enlargement. In this paper the aforementioned last reforms of the EU redistributive policies are analysed: the CAP reform of 2002–2003 and the Cohesion Policy reform of 2004–2006 aiming to evaluate the impact of Enlargement on the Commission's reform proposals and the reform results. It is argued that the factor of Enlargement, although in the Commission's reform proposals was emphasised as encouraging to reform the CAP and the Cohesion Policy radically, in reality for the EU redistributive policy reforms had a minor impact. It is shown that Enlargement did not encourage radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies, because higher influence on the reform results was made by the financial interests of the Member States.
Then the process of Enlargement has started, it was expected that Accession of much more agrarian and less developed countries from Eastern and Central Europe, compared to the Member States at that time, should encourage the radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies – Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy. Some researchers provided with numbers proving that Enlargement without reforming the EU redistributive policies would substantially increase the funding for implementation of these policies. While the other group of scientists noticed that the Enlargement process is getting momentum, whereas the internal EU reforms are postponing. The decision on the CAP reform was taken in 2003 by the Agricultural Council, while the Cohesion Policy reform was agreed in the Brussels European Council of 2005. In the Commission's reform proposals as well as during Member States' negotiations much attention was paid, especially in the case of the Cohesion Policy reform, to the challenges of Enlargement. In this paper the aforementioned last reforms of the EU redistributive policies are analysed: the CAP reform of 2002–2003 and the Cohesion Policy reform of 2004–2006 aiming to evaluate the impact of Enlargement on the Commission's reform proposals and the reform results. It is argued that the factor of Enlargement, although in the Commission's reform proposals was emphasised as encouraging to reform the CAP and the Cohesion Policy radically, in reality for the EU redistributive policy reforms had a minor impact. It is shown that Enlargement did not encourage radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies, because higher influence on the reform results was made by the financial interests of the Member States.
Then the process of Enlargement has started, it was expected that Accession of much more agrarian and less developed countries from Eastern and Central Europe, compared to the Member States at that time, should encourage the radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies – Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy. Some researchers provided with numbers proving that Enlargement without reforming the EU redistributive policies would substantially increase the funding for implementation of these policies. While the other group of scientists noticed that the Enlargement process is getting momentum, whereas the internal EU reforms are postponing. The decision on the CAP reform was taken in 2003 by the Agricultural Council, while the Cohesion Policy reform was agreed in the Brussels European Council of 2005. In the Commission's reform proposals as well as during Member States' negotiations much attention was paid, especially in the case of the Cohesion Policy reform, to the challenges of Enlargement. In this paper the aforementioned last reforms of the EU redistributive policies are analysed: the CAP reform of 2002–2003 and the Cohesion Policy reform of 2004–2006 aiming to evaluate the impact of Enlargement on the Commission's reform proposals and the reform results. It is argued that the factor of Enlargement, although in the Commission's reform proposals was emphasised as encouraging to reform the CAP and the Cohesion Policy radically, in reality for the EU redistributive policy reforms had a minor impact. It is shown that Enlargement did not encourage radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies, because higher influence on the reform results was made by the financial interests of the Member States.
Then the process of Enlargement has started, it was expected that Accession of much more agrarian and less developed countries from Eastern and Central Europe, compared to the Member States at that time, should encourage the radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies – Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy. Some researchers provided with numbers proving that Enlargement without reforming the EU redistributive policies would substantially increase the funding for implementation of these policies. While the other group of scientists noticed that the Enlargement process is getting momentum, whereas the internal EU reforms are postponing. The decision on the CAP reform was taken in 2003 by the Agricultural Council, while the Cohesion Policy reform was agreed in the Brussels European Council of 2005. In the Commission's reform proposals as well as during Member States' negotiations much attention was paid, especially in the case of the Cohesion Policy reform, to the challenges of Enlargement. In this paper the aforementioned last reforms of the EU redistributive policies are analysed: the CAP reform of 2002–2003 and the Cohesion Policy reform of 2004–2006 aiming to evaluate the impact of Enlargement on the Commission's reform proposals and the reform results. It is argued that the factor of Enlargement, although in the Commission's reform proposals was emphasised as encouraging to reform the CAP and the Cohesion Policy radically, in reality for the EU redistributive policy reforms had a minor impact. It is shown that Enlargement did not encourage radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies, because higher influence on the reform results was made by the financial interests of the Member States.
Then the process of Enlargement has started, it was expected that Accession of much more agrarian and less developed countries from Eastern and Central Europe, compared to the Member States at that time, should encourage the radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies – Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy. Some researchers provided with numbers proving that Enlargement without reforming the EU redistributive policies would substantially increase the funding for implementation of these policies. While the other group of scientists noticed that the Enlargement process is getting momentum, whereas the internal EU reforms are postponing. The decision on the CAP reform was taken in 2003 by the Agricultural Council, while the Cohesion Policy reform was agreed in the Brussels European Council of 2005. In the Commission's reform proposals as well as during Member States' negotiations much attention was paid, especially in the case of the Cohesion Policy reform, to the challenges of Enlargement. In this paper the aforementioned last reforms of the EU redistributive policies are analysed: the CAP reform of 2002–2003 and the Cohesion Policy reform of 2004–2006 aiming to evaluate the impact of Enlargement on the Commission's reform proposals and the reform results. It is argued that the factor of Enlargement, although in the Commission's reform proposals was emphasised as encouraging to reform the CAP and the Cohesion Policy radically, in reality for the EU redistributive policy reforms had a minor impact. It is shown that Enlargement did not encourage radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies, because higher influence on the reform results was made by the financial interests of the Member States.
Then the process of Enlargement has started, it was expected that Accession of much more agrarian and less developed countries from Eastern and Central Europe, compared to the Member States at that time, should encourage the radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies – Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy. Some researchers provided with numbers proving that Enlargement without reforming the EU redistributive policies would substantially increase the funding for implementation of these policies. While the other group of scientists noticed that the Enlargement process is getting momentum, whereas the internal EU reforms are postponing. The decision on the CAP reform was taken in 2003 by the Agricultural Council, while the Cohesion Policy reform was agreed in the Brussels European Council of 2005. In the Commission's reform proposals as well as during Member States' negotiations much attention was paid, especially in the case of the Cohesion Policy reform, to the challenges of Enlargement. In this paper the aforementioned last reforms of the EU redistributive policies are analysed: the CAP reform of 2002–2003 and the Cohesion Policy reform of 2004–2006 aiming to evaluate the impact of Enlargement on the Commission's reform proposals and the reform results. It is argued that the factor of Enlargement, although in the Commission's reform proposals was emphasised as encouraging to reform the CAP and the Cohesion Policy radically, in reality for the EU redistributive policy reforms had a minor impact. It is shown that Enlargement did not encourage radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies, because higher influence on the reform results was made by the financial interests of the Member States.
Then the process of Enlargement has started, it was expected that Accession of much more agrarian and less developed countries from Eastern and Central Europe, compared to the Member States at that time, should encourage the radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies – Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy. Some researchers provided with numbers proving that Enlargement without reforming the EU redistributive policies would substantially increase the funding for implementation of these policies. While the other group of scientists noticed that the Enlargement process is getting momentum, whereas the internal EU reforms are postponing. The decision on the CAP reform was taken in 2003 by the Agricultural Council, while the Cohesion Policy reform was agreed in the Brussels European Council of 2005. In the Commission's reform proposals as well as during Member States' negotiations much attention was paid, especially in the case of the Cohesion Policy reform, to the challenges of Enlargement. In this paper the aforementioned last reforms of the EU redistributive policies are analysed: the CAP reform of 2002–2003 and the Cohesion Policy reform of 2004–2006 aiming to evaluate the impact of Enlargement on the Commission's reform proposals and the reform results. It is argued that the factor of Enlargement, although in the Commission's reform proposals was emphasised as encouraging to reform the CAP and the Cohesion Policy radically, in reality for the EU redistributive policy reforms had a minor impact. It is shown that Enlargement did not encourage radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies, because higher influence on the reform results was made by the financial interests of the Member States.
Valakas land reform was started in the Great Duchy of Lithuania in the middle of the 16th century and is mostly related to the changes in social and economic life. However, the reform not only changed the agrarian relationship between the estate and the village and the agronomy system, but also made complete changes in Lithuanian landscape. The rules of Valakas reform regulated the changes in Lithuanian landscape territory and settlement structures. Due to Valakas reform a three-field strip system, street strip villages with a new barton plan structure, a new building type (stockyard), the network of village streets and roads, the network of small estates, as well as new space forms of agro plantings were developed, town planning was changed, a rectangular plan system was applied for their reorganization. The research object of the present paper is the objects that developed in state lands of Upytė district under the influence of Valakas reform. The constituent parts of the research object are as follows: landscape that developed in Upytė district during the Valakas reform and its separate elements, such as replanned towns, formed street strip villages, the network of small estates. The object of the paper is analysed in several aspects: in the aspect of heritage research and in the aspect of heritage conservation. The aim of the paper is to localize the heritage of Valakas reform in state lands of Upytė district and to analyse the heritage situation in the view of heritage conservation as well as to provide a conservation outline. The present paper claims to be the first complex analysis of Valakas reform from identification and localization of Valakas heritage, to its accountancy, security. According to the inventory of Upytės district of the year 1554, the following landscape elements of state lands of Upytė district were formed: 357 villages and 2 towns. During the research 279 villages and 2 towns mentioned in Upytė district inventory were localized. After using the maps of the 19th-20th centuries for the analysis it was determined that 103 villages with the names defined in the inventory of the 16th century, no longer exist. During the field study inventory of 20 villages it was defined that the following elements of valakas landscape have remained up to the present: fragments of street villages, plan structure of barton buildings, fragments of street plantings, rectangular plan of town squares and street network, cultural layer of towns, fragmental network of small estates. The landscape which developed during the 16th century and its separate elements remained almost unchanged for even four centuries, i.e. until the first part of the 20th century. The structure of valakas landscape started disappearing at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, when grange reform and later kolkhoz reforms in the middle of the 20th century were started to be implemented. Although the typological notion of heritage is developing, in research projects and in the system of heritage conservation the term of Valakas reform does not exist in the way that terms of industry heritage, defence heritage or other groups of heritage which were determined by certain defence, social and political actions of the society, exist. The notion of this heritage group that has not been validated does not allow to understand the complex value of this heritage, as well as the necessity of its integral security Until present the heritage of Valakas reform has been saved by keeping the cultural value of separate element objects despite their primary complex whole. The Law of the Conservation of Cultural Heritage of the Republic of Lithuania is an attempt to fortify the complex or integral security of ethno cultural parts of towns and villages by providing them with the status of cultural reservation.
Valakas land reform was started in the Great Duchy of Lithuania in the middle of the 16th century and is mostly related to the changes in social and economic life. However, the reform not only changed the agrarian relationship between the estate and the village and the agronomy system, but also made complete changes in Lithuanian landscape. The rules of Valakas reform regulated the changes in Lithuanian landscape territory and settlement structures. Due to Valakas reform a three-field strip system, street strip villages with a new barton plan structure, a new building type (stockyard), the network of village streets and roads, the network of small estates, as well as new space forms of agro plantings were developed, town planning was changed, a rectangular plan system was applied for their reorganization. The research object of the present paper is the objects that developed in state lands of Upytė district under the influence of Valakas reform. The constituent parts of the research object are as follows: landscape that developed in Upytė district during the Valakas reform and its separate elements, such as replanned towns, formed street strip villages, the network of small estates. The object of the paper is analysed in several aspects: in the aspect of heritage research and in the aspect of heritage conservation. The aim of the paper is to localize the heritage of Valakas reform in state lands of Upytė district and to analyse the heritage situation in the view of heritage conservation as well as to provide a conservation outline. The present paper claims to be the first complex analysis of Valakas reform from identification and localization of Valakas heritage, to its accountancy, security. According to the inventory of Upytės district of the year 1554, the following landscape elements of state lands of Upytė district were formed: 357 villages and 2 towns. During the research 279 villages and 2 towns mentioned in Upytė district inventory were localized. After using the maps of the 19th-20th centuries for the analysis it was determined that 103 villages with the names defined in the inventory of the 16th century, no longer exist. During the field study inventory of 20 villages it was defined that the following elements of valakas landscape have remained up to the present: fragments of street villages, plan structure of barton buildings, fragments of street plantings, rectangular plan of town squares and street network, cultural layer of towns, fragmental network of small estates. The landscape which developed during the 16th century and its separate elements remained almost unchanged for even four centuries, i.e. until the first part of the 20th century. The structure of valakas landscape started disappearing at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, when grange reform and later kolkhoz reforms in the middle of the 20th century were started to be implemented. Although the typological notion of heritage is developing, in research projects and in the system of heritage conservation the term of Valakas reform does not exist in the way that terms of industry heritage, defence heritage or other groups of heritage which were determined by certain defence, social and political actions of the society, exist. The notion of this heritage group that has not been validated does not allow to understand the complex value of this heritage, as well as the necessity of its integral security Until present the heritage of Valakas reform has been saved by keeping the cultural value of separate element objects despite their primary complex whole. The Law of the Conservation of Cultural Heritage of the Republic of Lithuania is an attempt to fortify the complex or integral security of ethno cultural parts of towns and villages by providing them with the status of cultural reservation.
Land restitution in Eastern Lithuania has been rather slow, only in Vilnius district (which is the closest to Vilnius city) the restitution was exceptionally fast. Almost in all municipalities the percentage of lands returned to their owners was similar (ranging from 97% to 99%), but in Vilnius district municipality such lands comprised only 88%. Land restitution in Vilnius district is complicated, because a direct impact of Vilnius city is felt in this territory. The presence of Vilnius city increases the price of land in the areas closer to the city. There are some political factors involved as well.
Land restitution in Eastern Lithuania has been rather slow, only in Vilnius district (which is the closest to Vilnius city) the restitution was exceptionally fast. Almost in all municipalities the percentage of lands returned to their owners was similar (ranging from 97% to 99%), but in Vilnius district municipality such lands comprised only 88%. Land restitution in Vilnius district is complicated, because a direct impact of Vilnius city is felt in this territory. The presence of Vilnius city increases the price of land in the areas closer to the city. There are some political factors involved as well.
Land restitution in Eastern Lithuania has been rather slow, only in Vilnius district (which is the closest to Vilnius city) the restitution was exceptionally fast. Almost in all municipalities the percentage of lands returned to their owners was similar (ranging from 97% to 99%), but in Vilnius district municipality such lands comprised only 88%. Land restitution in Vilnius district is complicated, because a direct impact of Vilnius city is felt in this territory. The presence of Vilnius city increases the price of land in the areas closer to the city. There are some political factors involved as well.
Land restitution in Eastern Lithuania has been rather slow, only in Vilnius district (which is the closest to Vilnius city) the restitution was exceptionally fast. Almost in all municipalities the percentage of lands returned to their owners was similar (ranging from 97% to 99%), but in Vilnius district municipality such lands comprised only 88%. Land restitution in Vilnius district is complicated, because a direct impact of Vilnius city is felt in this territory. The presence of Vilnius city increases the price of land in the areas closer to the city. There are some political factors involved as well.
Land restitution in Eastern Lithuania has been rather slow, only in Vilnius district (which is the closest to Vilnius city) the restitution was exceptionally fast. Almost in all municipalities the percentage of lands returned to their owners was similar (ranging from 97% to 99%), but in Vilnius district municipality such lands comprised only 88%. Land restitution in Vilnius district is complicated, because a direct impact of Vilnius city is felt in this territory. The presence of Vilnius city increases the price of land in the areas closer to the city. There are some political factors involved as well.