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The long-developing cultural divisions beneath our present political crisis Liberal democracy in America has always contained contradictions—most notably, a noble but abstract commitment to freedom, justice, and equality that, tragically, has seldom been realized in practice. While these contradictions have caused dissent and even violence, there was always an underlying and evolving solidarity drawn from the cultural resources of America's "hybrid Enlightenment." James Davison Hunter, who introduced the concept of "culture wars" thirty years ago, tells us in this new book that those historic sources of national solidarity have now largely dissolved. While a deepening political polarization is the most obvious sign of this, the true problem is not polarization per se but the absence of cultural resources to work through what divides us. The destructive logic that has filled the void only makes bridging our differences more challenging. In the end, all political regimes require some level of unity. If it cannot be generated organically, it will be imposed by force. Can America's political crisis be fixed? Can an Enlightenment-era institution—liberal democracy—survive and thrive in a post-Enlightenment world? If, for some, salvaging the older sources of national solidarity is neither possible sociologically, nor desirable politically or ethically, what cultural resources will support liberal democracy in the future?

Am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts befinden sich die USA inmitten eines ausgedehnten "Kulturkrieges", der "Progressive" und "Konservative" in nahezu jeder innenpolitischen Frage spaltet. Der Beitrag untersucht die Rolle der Institutionen der Zivilgesellschaft bei der Vermittlung dieser Konflikte. Insbesondere analysiert er die Funktion der in gewisser Weise einzigartigen Institution gemeinnütziger Arbeit und ihre Fähigkeit, eine Brücke zwischen den Streitparteien und Konfliktlinien zu schlagen. Häufig werden diese Stiftungen jedoch selbst zu speziellen Interessengruppen und ihre Beteilung führt dazu, daß der Konflikt verschärft und eine demokratische Lösung der Spannungen zwischen Wertorientierungen um so schwieriger wird. (pre)

In primitive and nonindustrialized societies the typical (and in many cases, the exclusive) tasks of religious elites have revolved chiefly around the creation, modification, and maintenance of the symbolic universe of society. Such work invariably implied privilege and various kinds and degrees of political power. But with the expansion of the modern world order, the situation of religious elites has altered dramatically. For one, religious-knowledge workers make up a very small percentage of the ranks of a much larger knowledge sector. For example, while the percentage of religious-knowledge workers (including clergy) relative to the entire economically active population in the United States has remained relatively constant since 1870, the percentage of religious workers to the knowledge workers has declined by one half in the period between 1950 and 1970—a period of dramatic growth of the knowledge sector (see Table 1). By 1970, the percentage of religious-knowledge workers to knowledge workers generally had shrunk to one sixth of its proportionate size a century earlier. Between 1970 and 1984, this proportion has leveled off somewhat. In Western Europe and Japan the same patterns have become firmly established as well.

Our Promethean longing -- Early formulations -- Three schools of enlightenment thinking: and one lingering and disturbing worry -- The new synthesis -- What has science found? -- The proclivity to overreach -- Intractable challenges -- The quest, redirected -- The Promethean temptation: and the problem of unintended consequences