State strategies in international bargaining: play by the rules or change them?
In: Cambridge Studies in International Relations 134
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In: Cambridge Studies in International Relations 134
In: European journal of international relations, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 896-922
ISSN: 1460-3713
When will states receive concessions in multilateral negotiations? And on which issues are those concessions likely to be received? I highlight two factors that influence the likelihood a state will receive concessions on an issue in multilateral negotiations: (1) the degree to which the issues linked together in the negotiation are "differently valued" by the negotiating states, and (2) the costliness of states' "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" on each individual issue. The former creates the opportunity for an exchange of concessions; the latter creates the incentive for that exchange to occur. It is the interaction of having more differently valued issues on the table and having a more costly best alternative to a negotiated agreement on an issue that makes a state more likely to receive concessions on that issue. This argument stands in contrast to the standard negotiation literature, which has shown that having a more beneficial best alternative to a negotiated agreement will yield greater concessions. I argue that these contradictory assertions exist because there are two types of best alternatives to a negotiated agreement that must be taken into account – one at the negotiation level and those at the issue-specific level. The current literature has tended to focus on the former while I focus on the latter. I test my argument on an originally constructed dataset of concessions states received in the Uruguay Round trade negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. For each issue in the Round, I coded the costliness of each state's issue-specific best alternative to a negotiated agreement and the level of concessions it received on that issue. The results provide insights into the workings of multilateral negotiations.
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In: Perspectives on politics, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 595-596
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: British journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 2, S. 371-393
ISSN: 1469-2112
Agendas shape the strategies states adopt in international bargaining and, therefore, the substantive nature of the resulting outcomes. They are also a dynamic feature of the process, as states add and subtract issues in order to shift the bargaining outcome in their favor. This article analyzes when and why states will use these different 'issue-linkage' strategies. Focusing on the effects of a successful agreement and the costs of failure, it highlights conditions under which states are likely to add or subtract issues from the bargaining agenda. It tests these arguments using an original dataset of the bargaining strategies states have adopted in climate-change negotiations. It concludes by highlighting the implications the argument has for understanding the outcomes of international negotiations.
In: British journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 2, S. 1-23
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: American journal of political science, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 411-427
ISSN: 1540-5907
When and why will states adopt more (or less) cooperative bargaining strategies? Standard answers to this question focus on the role of state power. Other scholars highlight socialization effects. I argue that in most international negotiations, the institutional bargaining structure will mitigate the effects of power and socialization, and drive state bargaining behavior. Factors highlighted by formal models of international bargaining should therefore best explain the variation in the strategies states adopt. I introduce empirical measures of these abstract concepts, and test their effects against those of power and socialization using an original dataset of state bargaining strategies in the European Union (EU). The results show that structural factors best explain variation in the EU states' bargaining strategies. I conclude by highlighting the conditions under which these effects should explain state bargaining behavior in other international negotiations, and discuss the implications of this argument for the study of international bargaining.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 411-427
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 43, Heft 12, S. 1678-1682
ISSN: 1552-3829
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 17, Heft 5, S. 694-707
ISSN: 1350-1763
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In: Journal of European public policy, Band 17, Heft 5, S. 694-707
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 43, Heft 12, S. 1678-1682
ISSN: 0010-4140
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 17, Heft 5, S. 694-707
ISSN: 1350-1763
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 43, Heft 12, S. 1678-1683
ISSN: 0010-4140
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In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 65, Heft 2-3, S. 480-505
ISSN: 1552-8766
How do different types of external intervention affect the likelihood of a negotiated settlement in civil conflicts? Drawing on the negotiation literature, which shows that the nature of the parties' "best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)" influences the bargaining process between them, we argue different types of intervention affect governments' and rebel groups' BATNAs in different ways. This, in turn, affects the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. To test this argument, we address the fact that interventions are nonrandom, and that characteristics of civil conflicts that lead to different types of intervention also influence the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We therefore use a two-stage statistical model. The first stage predicts the likelihood of different types of intervention, and drawing on those results, the second stage analyzes the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. The results provide insights into how different types of intervention affect civil conflict outcomes.
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