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World Affairs Online
Tax, Politics, and the Social Contract in Africa
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Tax, Politics, and the Social Contract in Africa" published on by Oxford University Press.
Electoral Competitiveness, Tax Bargaining and Political Incentives in Developing Countries: Evidence from Political Budget Cycles Affecting Taxation
In: British journal of political science, Band 48, Heft 2, S. 427-457
ISSN: 1469-2112
Studies of political budget cycles in developing countries have generally sought to inform understanding of short-term fiscal dynamics, but can also offer unique insight into broader political dynamics in developing countries. This article correspondingly employs markedly improved data in order to study the impact of elections on tax collection, and draw broader lessons. It shows that while electionsas a grouphave had no significant effect on tax collection, the subset ofcompetitive electionshas had a significant negative impact on pre-election tax collection; while this effect appears to be largest where incumbents are particularly unpopular. This provides powerful evidence that the impact of elections on political incentives in developing countries is conditioned by the existence of an electorally competitive opposition, while offering preliminary evidence that popular resistance to taxation by unpopular governments may be an important means by which taxpayers may generate pressure for improved governance.
Reassessing Tax and Development Research: A New Dataset, New Findings, and Lessons for Research
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 80, S. 48-60
Reassessing Tax and Development Research: A New Dataset, New Findings, and Lessons for Research
There is growing concern with the weaknesses of economic statistics relating to developing countries, and the risks that poor data have generated misleading research findings and poor policy advice. Cross-country tax data offer a striking example, with existing datasets frequently highly incomplete, analytically imprecise, plagued by errors, and sharply lacking in transparency. This paper introduces the new Government Revenue Dataset from the International Centre for Tax and Development, which provides a more reliable, transparent, and comprehensive basis for cross-national research. This new dataset has initially been used to re-examine major questions about the relationships between tax and aid, elections, economic growth, and democratization. The results deepen some previous conclusions and call others seriously into question—notably the assertion that aid dependence consistently undermines domestic revenue efforts. Above all, the research demonstrates the value of the new dataset, the broader sensitivity of many results to changes in data quality and coverage, and the consequent importance of expanded attention to, and investments in, data quality.
BASE
Electoral Competitiveness, Political Budget Cycles and Taxation in Developing Countries
In: ICTD Working Paper 24
SSRN
Working paper
China's challenge to international tax rules and the implications for global economic governance
In: International affairs, Band 94, Heft 6, S. 1287-1307
ISSN: 1468-2346
China's challenge to international tax rules and the implications for global economic governance
In: International affairs, Band 94, Heft 6, S. 1287-1307
ISSN: 0020-5850
World Affairs Online
How Can Governments of Low-Income Countries Collect More Tax Revenue?
In: ICTD Working Paper 70
SSRN
Working paper
The Political Economy of Domestic Tax Reform in Bangladesh: Political Settlements, Informal Institutions and the Negotiation of Reform
In: The journal of development studies, Band 52, Heft 12, S. 1704-1721
ISSN: 1743-9140
Rebuilding Local Government Finances After Conflict: Lessons from a Property Tax Reform Programme in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone
In: The journal of development studies, Band 52, Heft 12, S. 1759-1775
ISSN: 1743-9140
Rebuilding Local Government Finances After Conflict: Lessons from a Property Tax Reform Programme in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone
In: The journal of development studies: JDS, Band 52, Heft 12, S. 1759-1775
ISSN: 0022-0388
The Political Economy of Domestic Tax Reform in Bangladesh: Political Settlements, Informal Institutions and the Negotiation of Reform
In: The journal of development studies: JDS, Band 52, Heft 12, S. 1704-1721
ISSN: 0022-0388
The Political Economy of Domestic Tax Reform in Bangladesh: Political Settlements, Informal Institutions and the Negotiation of Reform
This paper explains the persistence of a tax system characterised by low revenue collection and extensive informality in Bangladesh. It combines analysis of long-term formal and informal institutions and of micro-level incentives shaping negotiation of short-term reform. The system is unusually informal, discretionary, and corrupt, but remains resistant to change because it delivers low and predictable tax rates to business, extensive opportunities for corruption to the tax administration, and an important vehicle for fundraising by political leaders and rent distribution to their elite supporters. We then explore the dynamics of micro-level reform and external pressure within the constraints of this overarching political bargain.
BASE
The Political Economy of Tax Reform in Bangladesh: Political Settlements, Informal Institutions and the Negotiation of Reform
In: International Centre for Tax and Development Working Paper 14
SSRN
Working paper