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Almost four years since the onset of the global financial and economic crisis, unemployment and underemployment remain stubbornly high in many G20 countries, and many workers remain trapped in low paid, often informal, jobs with little social protection. Job creation has been anemic in many countries, too slow to fully reabsorb the mass of unemployed and underemployed or, particularly in some emerging market economies, to keep pace with labour force growth and the pressures of rural-urban migration. This raises concerns about the long-term negative effects on human capital, growing inequality and lower future output growth. The political pressures are high, and the risk of a drift towards protectionist measures aimed at 'keeping jobs at home' cannot be ignored. While there is substantial variation in national contexts, G20 countries can help minimize these risks through collective and collaborative work aimed at identifying and implementing credible policy reforms that will boost job creation, employment and the quality of jobs. The report aims at providing a preliminary review of countries' experiences against the backdrop of an evolving economic outlook and could form the basis of a more in-depth analysis, should Ministers request it. Improving labour market outcomes involves several challenges relating to both the quantity and quality aspects of job creation. There is a need in all countries to harness growth to generate labour market opportunities that correspond to labour force growth.

This paper analyzes the effects of land market restrictions on structural change from agriculture to non-farm in a rural economy. This paper develops a theoretical model that focuses on higher migration costs due to restrictions on alienability, and identifies the possibility of a reverse structural change where the share of nonagricultural employment declines. The reverse structural change can occur under plausible conditions: if demand for the non-agricultural good is income-inelastic (assuming the non-farm good is non-tradable), or non-agriculture is less labor intensive relative to agriculture (assuming the non-farm good is tradable). For identification, this paper exploits a natural experiment in Sri Lanka where historical malaria played a unique role in land policy. The empirical evidence indicates significant adverse effects of land restrictions on manufacturing and services employment, rural wages, and per capita household consumption. The evidence on the disaggregated occupational choices suggests that land restrictions increase wage employment in agriculture, but reduce it in manufacturing and services, with no perceptible effects on self-employment in non-agriculture. The results are consistent with the migration costs model, but contradict two widely discussed alternative mechanisms: collateral effect and property rights insecurity. This paper also provides direct evidence in favor of the migration costs mechanism.

This discussion paper is one of five discussion papers for the Thailand public financial management report. It focuses on efficiency and equity in the financing of health services, and the evolving role of central and local government in the health sector. Over the last few decades, Thailand has seen significant improvements in health outcomes, reflecting sustained public investment in both infrastructure and human resources. Thailand has also succeeded in expanding the coverage of health protection schemes, culminating in the introduction of the Universal Coverage (UC) scheme in 2001. These efforts have broadened access to health services, contributed to greater and more equitable utilization, and helped reduce the financial burden and the risk of impoverishment associated with health care expenses. However, there are fewer data on broader measures of health system performance, including dimensions of quality. Overall, available evidence suggests a mixed picture. For instance, while there has been improvement in the management of chronic conditions, a significant number of cases remain undiagnosed or untreated. Similarly, Thailand has seen recent improvement in 2-year survival rates from cancer and heart attacks, but still lags far behind Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. While the achievements of Thailand's health system are undeniable, this paper highlights three key challenges: (i) inequalities in utilization and spending; (ii) mounting cost pressures; and (iii) fragmentation of financing and unresolved issues concerning the respective roles of central and local government. This paper provides evidence of regional differences in diagnosis and management of chronic disease, and of survival rates from cancer and heart attacks. These data do not suggest a strong relationship between the health system and spending on the one hand, and on quality or health outcomes on the other. Indeed, efficiency may be a greater concern, with over-provision now a growing problem in some parts of the health system. However, more evidence is needed on these issues. For example, while high levels of spending and utilization in the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) are often noted, it is less clear whether this is associated with better outcomes (e.g. higher cancer survival rates or improved health outcomes for the elderly). The implications of geographic disparities in spending in the Social Security Scheme (SSS) and the CSMBS also warrant further attention.

This study attempts to estimate tax compliance costs and assess views of taxpayers on aspects of the tax system in Ethiopia. The study uses evidence mainly from a survey of both formal and informal businesses in Addis Ababa and four major cities (Adama, Hawassa, Mekele, and Bahir Dar) in the four largest regional states. The survey covered 1003 formal businesses and 499 informal businesses. Survey questionnaires were informed by the results of four focus group discussions conducted in Addis Ababa and Adama. The findings of the study are expected to offer tax policy makers and tax administrators an opportunity to pinpoint specific problems to help reduce the cost of complying with tax policies and procedures, thus improving the revenue performance and also the efficiency and business-friendliness of the tax system. The report is organized in four sections. The first part presents an overview of the Ethiopian tax system and recent reform initiatives; second section discusses the research objectives and the methods employed. Section three presents results of the survey while section four presents conclusions and recommendations.

In response to numerous reports and claims of poor quality or fake fertilizer that were extensively reported by farmers, fertilizer dealers, and government officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) over the past three years, the World Bank, in support of the Royal Government of Cambodia and in response to the food crisis through the smallholder agricultural and social protection support development policy operation (DPO) engaged the international fertilizer development center (IFDC) to perform a rapid appraisal of fertilizer quality in Cambodia. A total of 103 samples of fertilizer were collected for analysis of quality from 26 fertilizer dealers and three importers. Six Cambodian farmers were interviewed and three fertilizer manufacturers were visited and interviewed in Ho Chi Minh city, Vietnam. The field investigations involved extensive interviews and discussions with public and private stakeholders and site visits to fertilizer dealer shops and warehouse locations. It is essential that the Department of Agricultural Legislation in Cambodia and the field inspectors have access to reliable and fast fertilizer analytical services as visual inspections cannot detect product adulteration or below-guarantee analysis.

El Salvador's development over the past decade has been dichotomous. On the one hand, economic growth has remained persistently low, employment and labor force participation have barely increased, and progress on poverty reduction has slowed. On the other hand, inequality has fallen, and shared prosperity improved together with advances in many social indicators, such as pre-primary enrollment rates, access to prenatal care, immunizations, and water and sanitation. The increase in the use of social spending, which now accounts for 12.4 percent of GDP, together with an improvement in the quality of social spending, explain at least part of this dichotomy of redistributive and social gains despite low growth, a tight fiscal situation and generally low government revenues and spending. Looking forward, the key challenges El Salvador faces are related to continuing improving the quality and efficiency in the social sectors, while maintaining the overall level of social spending within an increasingly constrained fiscal environment, where fiscal constraints, low revenues, and the need to cut the deficit by 3 percent of GDP are significant elements, as well. Priority will have to be given to reallocations and improvements within the spending envelope for the social sectors to maximize impact. This document analyzes social spending for El Salvador for the education, health and social protection and labor sectors in depth and explores a series of policy options for El Salvador to reallocate social spending for more effective impacts, to enhance and reform social policies and social service delivery, and to improve the management of public spending and budget execution in the social sectors.

Introduction: After the Second World War, the political and economical block that today we call European Union started when six countries sought to ensure the peace among them. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands put their heavy industries under a common management, with the Coal and Steel Treaty, so no one could build weapons or develop its war industry without the others knowing it. This experience led to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and 50 years later the ideas of people, goods and service freedoms continue spreading around, and the European Union has become one of the best examples of economical, political and cultural integration, and a reference around the world to encourage other regions to group. Therefore, among others, the Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA) appeared in 1960, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in 1967; the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), in 1991; and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1993. In the case of South America , in spite of their good intentions, the huge asymmetries between LAFTA members caused the apparition of sub-regional blocs: the Andeans Community (CAN) founded in 1969, and now grouping Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru; and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) founded in 1991, between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Nowadays, after more than 40 years of integration processes, there are still strong problems inside both sub-regional blocs. CAN Member States have several diplomatic discussions regarding their political models; and Peru, Ecuador and Colombia have or are negotiating independent Free Trade Agreements with external blocs, including USA and the EU. In the other side, MERCOSUR's main players -Argentina and Brazil- have commercial disputes at the World Trade Organization, surrounding their own sub-regional bodies . Nevertheless, these two sub-regional associations were the basis for the South American Community of Nations (CSN on Spanish) in 2004, and from that point, the present attempt to unify South-America: the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR, 2008), with the participation of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay and Venezuela. The integration levels in political and economical affairs in this latter group are expected to change the way international relations will be conduit in the future of South-America. This new regional bloc has an extension of 17 658 Km² and 383 million inhabitants (2007) . With a general GDP of $2348 953 (2007) and a GDP per capita of $6126 (2007), it is one of the regions with more perspectives of development, but it is also one of the regions with the highest degrees of economic asymmetry. While in 2007 Chile, Venezuela and Brazil had a GDP per capita (2007) of $9865, $8601 and $6819, there were other countries like Paraguay and Bolivia, with a GDP per capita (2007) of $1669 and $1342. These asymmetries have leaded to strong disagreements between South American countries during previous integration process. An example that just pooling economies is not the whole solution for development is the case of Paraguay, in the middle of MERCOSUR and with barely a quarter of the MERCOSUR's GDP $6642 (2007). 'Integration' will not always mean international governmental organizations where Member States have decided to transfer competitions and empowerment of supranational institutions; in this Master Thesis, the South American integration processes will be defined as '(...)the creation and maintenance of intense and diverse patrons of interaction between previously autonomous units.' Furthermore, 'Integration' in the context of the South American reality included two concepts: 'Regionalism' and 'Regionalization'. The first is related to the wave of thinking, the interaction projects and the political initiatives (the processes) and the second, to the institutions or the agreements that represent the integration (the result). This Master Thesis tries to be oriented to describe the processes more than the institutions or the agreements; nevertheless, it is not possible to present the first without the second and vice versa. What kind of integration can be expected in South America? What kind of goals, challenges and success can South-American Nations find in their way to a social, political and economical integration? Whereas the EU is -since its very beginning- a supranational initiative, South American regional and sub-regional blocs are characterised for being mostly, the result of intergovernmental agreements. Will this difference be determinant in the integration processes? In this thesis of Master in European Studies, the South American integration -processes and institutions- will be review under the framework of six dimensions that give the EU its character of integrated regional bloc and are advocated to deep the South America Integration. Three of them related to structural bodies: executive, judicial and legislative; and the other three related to the policies that defines a Union: Monetary Policy, Foreign and Security Policy; and, Social and Development Policy. In order to do not miss the main emphasis, the description and analysis of the executive supranational body will be deeper than the corresponding to judicial and legislative bodies and the three common policies. In addition, two cases of the South American Integration will be modeled, to present the best possible scenarios to foster the integration. By the comparison of the structures and policies, and by the scenario modeling; this Master Thesis attempts to demonstrate that the lack of supranational authority and law enforcement power will play a determinant role in the success or failure in the South American integration process. The analysis in this thesis can be divided in two sections, the descriptive part and the analysis of Case Study. The information for the descriptive part is mostly from published books, research papers, journals and case studies, the information for the Case Study comes mostly from News and Newspaper articles. The technique used in the analysis of the Case Studies is the Theory Game: a shared-decision model with two players that have different priorities for the same decision. The methodology for that is described more widely in section 4.1 Fundamentals of Game Theory. This Master Thesis presents the South American integration as a whole, and the UNASUR as the present meeting point of the Andean Community and MERCOSUR. Therefore, wherever South American Integration is mentioned, it is not limited to UNASUR, CAN or MERCOSUR analysis, because they coexist and overlap each other at the same time. Instead, time framework and integration approaches are considerations that need to be undeniably included. To write about the integration processes in South America is to review almost 40 years of history and political agreements and disagreements of twelve countries and the influence that they received from external factors, like Central-, North America and Europe. Nowadays, the remaining sub-regional blocs face the opportunity to pool agreements in a new attempt, together with the risk of breaking-off of the Treaties, by the influence of external agreements of Member States with third parties around the world. For reasons of space, and to focus in the present regional integration process, those external agreements, like the NAFTA or the negotiations between the CAN and the EU, and their influence in the South American regional integration process are not going to be covered in this Master Thesis. That does not mean that their influence is negligible, rather than that, in some cases, like the Free Trade Agreements between the USA and Colombia, or Peru, it means the risk of the end of the CAN as a sub-regional economic bloc. In addition, a commercial developments analysis of the South American integration process requires a separate review of each commercial category and each bilateral agreement and therefore, a deeper description of those topics is not included. Other issues that are not going to be covered in this Master Thesis are those integration processes or commercial agreements that are not part or do not lead to the South American Union of Nations, like the 'Bolivarian Alternative for Our Americas' (on Spanish ALBA) or the 'Commercial Agreement of the Peoples' (on Spanish TCP). Their own dynamic and priorities are quite interesting; nevertheless going deeper in these issues could mean to reduce attention in the main topics of this Master Thesis. This Master Thesis uses study cases to describe two facets of the South American Integration process under the Two-Person Model of the Game Theory. The model used in this Master Thesis is characterised for the intersection of two players with mutual influence and different priorities. Game Theory is a useful analysis tool with many applications in mathematics, economics and political fields; nevertheless, as a model, it is a simplification of the reality and therefore, some details like the simplicity of its initial assumptions, the deep of the analysis, outsider players and feedback, are limited, further details of these limitations are presented in section 4.2. The analysis of a play of a Game, under the Game Theory can also be made by a mathematical approach. That mathematical approach is not going to be considered in this Master Thesis in order to keep the focus in the integration process.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Content: Dedicatory and Acknowledgementsii Abstractiii List of Contentsiv List of Tablesv List of Figuresvi List of Acronymsvii I.INTRODUCTION1 1.1Introduction2 1.2Methodology4 1.3Remarks4 II.SOUTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT6 2.1Political Framework Development towards the South-American Union of Nations7 III.SOUTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION UNDER THE EU FRAMEWORK26 3.1'New Regionalism' and the functional approach of South American integration.27 3.2South American- and EU- Integration Structures and Policies34 3.2.1A Supranational Executive Body37 3.2.2Supranational judicial functions41 3.2.3Supranational legislative functions43 3.2.4Common Currency and Supranational Monetary Institution46 3.2.5A Common Foreign and Security Policy47 3.2.6A Common Social and Development Policy48 IV.GAME THEORY AND SOUTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION CASE STUDIES50 4.1Game Theory51 4.1.1Fundamentals of Game Theory51 4.1.2Limitations of Game Theory54 4.2Case Studies55 4.2.1Case Study 1: Political Integration, the creation of the South American Energy Council (2007)55 4.2.2Case 2: Economical Integration, the Ecuadorian safeguards settlement (2009)62 V.CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL COMMENTS67 REFERENCES71 APPENDIXES Appendix A: South American figures78 Appendix B: Game Theory Glossary82 Appendix C: Combined priorities84 DISCLAIM89Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 3.2.1, A Supranational Executive Body: Regarding the legal order, Supranationalism means that sovereign states agree to abide by norms which are adopted at a higher level of organization. In the case of the European Union, Supranationalism is not referred to the transfer of sovereignty; it is only the transfer of the power to exercise that sovereignty. Together with that, the supremacy of the Community law and the principle of direct effect present that the legal system of the Community has a federal nature. Thence, a Supranational Institution has competences to exercise powers that belong to sovereign States. In addition, the exercise of this power should be in line with the principles of proportionality, i.e. No action shall go beyond that it is necessary; and subsidiarity, i.e. In competences that Supranational Institution shares with Member States, it does intervene only if the objective of the action cannot be achieved by the Member State. The interaction between national governments and EU Institutions, together with the freedom to act according to those competences, is the basis for the adoption of the EU rules. Beyond the legal order, Supranationalism may be employed in decision-making, monitoring and enforcement. Supranationalism can also be divided in decisional (pooling sovereignty) and normative (delegation of power). Decisional Supranationalism is referred to those decisions taken by voting procedures other than unanimity, and when governments decided to act either jointly or not at all. Normative Supranationalism refers to the delegation of power to autonomous institutions that are created by the Member States. Therefore, a Supranational Executive Body will be an Institution with the right to adopt normative decisions directly based on the Treaties, with the autonomy to execute those decisions, and without the need of approval by the Member States. Supranational actors contribute to the integration by different means and reasons. Moravscik presented that pooling or delegation in the EU, are means to assure that other governments will accept agreed legislation or enforcement in issue-areas, where joint gains are high and distributional conflicts are moderate, and where there is uncertainty about future decisions. Other contribution of supranational bodies to integration process is that they might reduce the transaction costs by institutionalizing the integrative dynamic and negotiating procedure; and, it may assist national governments in issues area in which there are reasonably clear added benefits working according to the rules, but with predictable temptations to chat in response to short-term pressures. In addition, supranational institutions bring mutual confidence; smaller countries, which want their interests taken in account, especially in multinational scenarios where there is not veto power, can relay in the impartiality of supranational actors, instead of intergovernmental decision-making procedures, where the most powerful Member States shape the process. Probably the best example of the contribution of a Supranational Executive Body to Regional Integration is in Competition Policy: The Commission received decision powers in the sphere of state aid, based on the EEC Treaty provisions, due to the necessity of an impartial and independent body to apply agreed rules to face national pressures. One of the earliest Community Regulations fixed the modalities by which the Commission would exercise that power directly to ensure that undertakings respected antitrust rules. A supranational executive body can also shape the process and foster the integration. An example is the development of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Monetary union was neither the uncontested solution to economic problems, nor an easily obtainable response to German reunification. Nevertheless, Commission officials successfully disseminated the notion that EMU altogether provided a coherent solution to the problems created by financial globalization and the end of the Cold War; furthermore, they were leading actors in the sudden proliferation of governmental initiatives in France, Italy and German in favour of the EMU. By doing that, they fostered solid political momentum behind an originally lukewarm and unfocused demand for monetary integration. There are several reasons and examples of the benefits of a Supranational Executive Body; nevertheless, South American Nations still working with Intergovernmental Structures. During the negotiations for the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty, its former General Secretary, Rodrigo Borja, presented a proposal for the authority and competences of UNASUR. In that document, member states, '(...) in exchange of the economical, political and geopolitical advantages that a common order can offer; agreed in the limitation of some of their sovereign faculties and will form the Union with common decision and executive multinational bodies'. The proposal was not accepted and finally, was part of the reasons of Borja's resignation. While in the case of the EU, the presence of a Supranational Executive Body is one of the strongest driving forces of the integration process, in the South American context, there is not yet a political will to pool sovereignty. Solón, pro-tempore General Secretary of UNASUR from 2006 to 2008, affirms 'Nobody doubts that in the future it will be necessary to move to supranational authorities (...) but today they want an agreement where everybody shall count with the other to have a meeting point'. Behind that attitude, the reasons that can be drawn are the political will of member states, driven by governments or national monopolies, which do not want to lose control over the process and the stagnation of the over-institutionalism in the past (Central America Common Market and the CAN). The stagnation of over-institutionalism drives member states to appeal to external bodies in the dispute settlement, continuing the weakening of the idea of a supranational body; the political will of member states, or its absence, could be explained for the existence of strong national political elites, allowed for the late trade liberalizations of national monopolies. Rajagopal refers to studies of how MERCOSUR member states have been primarily driven by domestic political considerations when they have furthered the integration process. This it could lead to conclude that they are not likely to develop the kind of supranational governance institutions present in the European Union; as policy elites in MERCOSUR, member states desire to maintain a great deal of domestic policy autonomy. In addition of its intergovernmental character, the faculties of the UNASUR Secretariat as Executive body are restricted by its small budget of 3 million US$/year, much more limited than the 5,4 million US$/year of the CAN General Secretariat ; and by the denial of the proposal of pooling the executive bodies of CAN and MERCOSUR. Another issue to consider is that the feasibility for South American countries to pool sovereignty or to delegate power varies from one Member State to another, according to their own constitutive and legal framework. In some cases, Constitutional texts are quite clear in stimulating regional integration and stressing the prevalence of regional law, like the Venezuelan Constitution that allows to 'confer on supranational organisations (...) the exercise of the powers necessary to carry out these integration processes (...)'(Art. 153, Venezuelan Constitution 1999). The Colombian external relations 'are based on national sovereignty (...) and on recognition of the principles of international law accepted by Colombia' and 'The State shall promote economic, social and political integration with other nations(…)', (Art. 19 and Art. 227, Colombian Constitution 1991). There are, however, other Member States whit Constitutions that needs amendment to pool sovereignty; like the Bolivian Constitutions which states 'The public authorities may not delegate the powers conferred on them by this Constitution, or confer on the executive branch powers other than those expressly conferred on them by it' (Art. 30, Bolivian Constitution). Therefore, the creation of a supranational executive body could not be totally accepted until the totality of the national Constitutions were in line with it. In addition to the considerations presented above, Chapter IV presents two Case Study based on the Game Theory to demonstrate the strong influence of an executive body with supranational competences in the integration process. Nevertheless, it is likely to expect that present integration structures will remain tied to intergovernmental political intentions, and the integration process will loose the benefits of a Supranational Executive Body.

The importance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to economic development and job creation is increasingly recognized across the world. With an expected 58 percent of gross value added in 2012, SMEs are perceived to be the backbone of the economy especially within the European Union (EU). Although they faced particularly challenging economic conditions in 2011-12, SMEs within the EU still account for more than 98 percent of all enterprises and 67 percent of total employment. For such businesses, access to finance is a key factor for business start-up, development, survival, and growth. In September-October 2012, the World Bank Centre for financial reporting reform (CFRR) surveyed Austrian banks with a view to understanding the role played by financial information and audits in lending decisions. Respondents to the survey represent approximately one third of the sector based on total assets. The survey also assessed how banks measure the quality of the financial information they receive as part of a loan application. The purpose of this report is to inform the accounting and auditing profession, policy makers, and SMEs and their representative institutions about banks' requirements and expectations regarding the scope of financial information provided by SMEs when applying for a credit.

Throughout the XXth century arms have not only been tradable goods, but also foreign policy instruments. This paper focuses on countries supplying major conventional weapons (MCW), and investigates whether changes in political conditions impact the quantity of MCW supplied to third countries. In particular, I concentrate on democratic exporters and estimate a gravity-type panel TOBIT for the years 1975-2004. Results suggest that the exporter's chief executive being right-wing has a positive and significant impact on MCW exports. This may reect a general right-wing tendency to support national industry and deregulate heavy industry exports. I also find that higher political competition is associated with higher MCW exports, and that executives serving the last year of their current term tend to increase MCW exports if they cannot be re-elected, and to decrease MCW exports if they run for re-election. ; La politique peut influencer les ventes d'armes de plusieurs façons et l'histoire indique qu'elle le fait réellement : tout au long du XXème siècle les armes ont non seulement été des marchandises commercialisables mais également des instruments de politique extérieure. Ce document se concentre sur des pays fournissant des armes conventionnelles majeures (ACM) et étudie si l'orientation politique du gouvernement en place a une importance sur la politique d'exportation d'armes. En particulier, je me concentre sur les pays démocratiques exportateurs pour vérifier comment l'orientation politique, de droite ou de gauche, a un impact sur la quantité d'armes fournis aux pays tiers. A cette fin, une équation de commerce bilatéral est estimée pour les années 1975-2004, en appliquant un modèle TOBIT en panel. Les résultats suggèrent que l'éxecutif d'un pays exportateur de droite a un impact positif et significatif sur les exportations d'ACM. Ceci peut refléter une tendance générale de droite d'abaisser les barrières douanières, avec des conséquences sur la derégulation des exportations de l'industrie lourde ou un appui ...

The White House released its budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2025 on March 11th, and the news was depressingly familiar: $895 billion for the Pentagon and work on nuclear weapons at the Department of Energy. After adjusting for inflation, that's only slightly less than last year's proposal, but far higher than the levels reached during either the Korean or Vietnam wars or at the height of the Cold War. And that figure doesn't even include related spending on veterans, the Department of Homeland Security, or the additional tens of billions of dollars in "emergency" military spending likely to come later this year. One thing is all too obvious: a trillion-dollar budget for the Pentagon alone is right around the corner, at the expense of urgently needed action to address climate change, epidemics of disease, economic inequality, and other issues that threaten our lives and safety at least as much as, if not more than, traditional military challenges.Americans would be hard-pressed to find members of Congress carefully scrutinizing such vast sums of national security spending, asking tough questions, or reining in Pentagon excess — despite the fact that this country is no longer fighting any major ground wars. Just a handful of senators and members of the House do that work while many more search for ways to increase the department's already bloated budget and steer further contracts into their own states and districts.Congress isn't just shirking its oversight duties: these days, it can't even seem to pass a budget on time. Our elected representatives settled on a final national budget just last week, leaving Pentagon spending at the already generous 2023 level for nearly half of the 2024 fiscal year. Now, the department will be inundated with a flood of new money that it has to spend in about six months instead of a year. More waste, fraud, and financial abuse are inevitable as the Pentagon prepares to shovel money out the door as quickly as possible. This is no way to craft a budget or defend a country.And while congressional dysfunction is par for the course, in this instance it offers an opportunity to reevaluate what we're spending all this money for. The biggest driver of overspending is an unrealistic, self-indulgent, and — yes — militaristic national defense strategy. It's designed to maintain a capacity to go almost everywhere and do almost anything, from winning wars with rival superpowers to intervening in key regions across the planet to continuing the disastrous Global War on Terror, which was launched in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and never truly ended. As long as such a "cover the globe" strategy persists, the pressure to continue spending ever more on the Pentagon will prove irresistible, no matter how delusional the rationale for doing so may be.Defending "the Free World"?President Biden began his recent State of the Union address by comparing the present moment to the time when the United States was preparing to enter World War II. Like President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1941, Joe Biden told the American people that the country now faces an "unprecedented moment in the history of the Union," one in which freedom and democracy are "under attack" both at home and abroad. He disparaged Congress's failure to approve his emergency supplemental bill, claiming that, without additional aid for Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin will threaten not just that country but all of Europe and even the "free world." Comparing (as he did) the challenge posed by Russia now to the threat that Hitler's regime posed in World War II is a major exaggeration that's of no value in developing an effective response to Moscow's activities in Ukraine and beyond.Engaging in such fearmongering to get the public on board with an increasingly militarized foreign policy ignores reality in service of the status quo. In truth, Russia poses no direct security threat to the United States. And while Putin may have ambitions beyond Ukraine, Russia simply doesn't have the capability to threaten the "free world" with a military campaign. Neither does China, for that matter. But facing the facts about these powers would require a critical reassessment of the maximalist U.S. defense strategy that rules the roost. Currently, it reflects the profoundly misguided belief that, on matters of national security, U.S. military dominance takes precedence over the collective economic strength and prosperity of Americans.As a result, the administration places more emphasis on deterring potential (if unlikely) aggression from competitors than on improving relations with them. Of course, this approach depends almost entirely on increasing the production, distribution, and stockpiling of arms. The war in Ukraine and Israel's continuing assault on Gaza have unfortunately only solidified the administration's dedication to the concept of military-centric deterrence.Contractor Dysfunction: Earning More, Doing LessIronically, such a defense strategy depends on an industry that continually exploits the government for its own benefit and wastes staggering amounts of taxpayer dollars. The major corporations that act as military contractors pocket about half of all Pentagon outlays while ripping off the government in a multitude of ways. But what's even more striking is how little they accomplish with the hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars they receive year in, year out. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), from 2020 to 2022, the total number of major defense acquisition programs actually declined even as total costs and average delivery time for new weapons systems increased.Take the Navy's top acquisition program, for example. Earlier this month, the news broke that the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine is already at least a year behind schedule. That sub is the sea-based part of the next-generation nuclear (air-sea-and-land) triad that the administration considers the "ultimate backstop" for global deterrence. As a key part of this country's never-ending arms buildup, the Columbia is supposedly the Navy's most important program, so you might wonder why the Pentagon hasn't implemented a single one of the GAO's six recommendations to help keep it on track.As the GAO report made clear, the Navy proposed delivering the first Columbia-class vessel in record time — a wildly unrealistic goal — despite it being the "largest and most complex submarine" in its history.Yet the war economy persists, even as the giant weapons corporations deliver less weaponry for more money in an ever more predictable fashion (and often way behind schedule as well). This happens in part because the Pentagon regularly advances weapons programs before design and testing are even completed, a phenomenon known as "concurrent development." Building systems before they're fully tested means, of course, rushing them into production at the taxpayer's expense before the bugs are out. Not surprisingly, operations and maintenance costs account for about 70% of the money spent on any U.S. weapons program.Lockheed Martin's F-35 is the classic example of this enormously expensive tendency. The Pentagon just greenlit the fighter jet for full-scale production this month, 23 years (yes, that's not a misprint!) after the program was launched. The fighter has suffered from persistent engine problems and deficient software. But the official go-ahead from the Pentagon means little, since Congress has long funded the F-35 as if it were already approved for full-scale production. At a projected cost of at least $1.7 trillion over its lifetime, America's most expensive weapons program ever should offer a lesson in the necessity of trying before buying.Unfortunately, this lesson is lost on those who need to learn it the most. Acquisition failures of the past never seem to financially impact the executives or shareholders of America's biggest military contractors. On the contrary, those corporate leaders depend on Pentagon bloat and overpriced, often unnecessary weaponry. In 2023, America's biggest military contractor, Lockheed Martin, paid its CEO John Taiclit $22.8 million. Annual compensation for the CEOs of RTX, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and Boeing ranged from $14.5 and $22.5 million in the past two years. And shareholders of those weapons makers are similarly cashing in. The arms industry increased cash paid to its shareholders by 73% in the 2010s compared to the prior decade. And they did so at the expense of investing in their own businesses. Now they expect taxpayers to bail them out to ramp up weapons production for Ukraine and Israel.Reining in the Military-Industrial ComplexOne way to begin reining in runaway Pentagon spending is to eliminate the ability of Congress and the president to arbitrarily increase that department's budget. The best way to do so would be by doing away with the very concept of "emergency spending." Otherwise, thanks to such spending, that $895 billion Pentagon budget will undoubtedly prove to be anything but a ceiling on military spending next year. As an example, the $95 billion aid package for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan that passed the Senate in February is still hung up in the House, but some portion of it will eventually get through and add substantially to the Pentagon's already enormous budget.Meanwhile, the Pentagon has fallen back on the same kind of budgetary maneuvers it perfected at the peak of its disastrous Afghan and Iraq wars earlier in this century, adding billions to the war budget to fund items on the department's wish list that have little to do with "defense" in our present world. That includes emergency outlays destined to expand this country's "defense industrial base" and further supersize the military-industrial complex — an expensive loophole that Congress should simply shut down. That, however, will undoubtedly prove a tough political fight, given how many stakeholders — from Pentagon officials to those corporate executives to compromised members of Congress — benefit from such spending sprees.Ultimately, of course, the debate about Pentagon spending should be focused on far more than the staggering sums being spent. It should be about the impact of such spending on this planet. That includes the Biden administration's stubborn continuation of support for Israel's campaign of mass slaughter in Gaza, which has already killed more than 31,000 people while putting many more at risk of starvation. A recent Washington Post investigation found that the U.S. has made 100 arms sales to Israel since the start of the war last October, most of them set at value thresholds just low enough to bypass any requirement to report them to Congress.The relentless supply of military equipment to a government that the International Court of Justice has said is plausibly engaged in a genocidal campaign is a deep moral stain on the foreign-policy record of the Biden administration, as well as a blow to American credibility and influence globally. No amount of airdrops or humanitarian supplies through a makeshift port can remotely make up for the damage still being done by U.S.-supplied weapons in Gaza.The case of Gaza may be extreme in its brutality and the sheer speed of the slaughter, but it underscores the need to thoroughly rethink both the purpose of and funding for America's foreign and military policies. It's hard to imagine a more devastating example than Gaza of why the use of force so often makes matters far, far worse — particularly in conflicts rooted in longstanding political and social despair. A similar point could have been made with respect to the calamitous U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan that cost untold numbers of lives, while pouring yet more money into the coffers of America's major weapons makers. Both of those military campaigns, of course, failed disastrously in their stated objectives of promoting democracy, or at least stability, in troubled regions, even as they exacted huge costs in blood and treasure.Before our government moves full speed ahead expanding the weapons industry and further militarizing geopolitical challenges posed by China and Russia, we should reflect on America's disastrous performance in the costly, prolonged wars already waged in this century. After all, they did enormous damage, made the world a far more dangerous place, and only increased the significance of those weapons makers. Throwing another trillion dollars-plus at the Pentagon won't change that.This article was republished with permission from TomDispatch.

Der Anbau von Gemüse in urbanen Gebieten stellt eine nachhaltige Strategie zur Nahrungsmittelsicherheit dar. Obwohl Gemüseanbau oft als Überlebensstrategie armer Bevölkerungsgruppen betrachtet wird, praktizieren ihn städtische Bewohner aller Einkommensschichten. Angesichts wachsender Bevölkerungszahlen in den Städten und steigender Armut wird der Anbau von Nahrungsmitteln zu einem entscheidenden Faktor der Existenzgrundlage, auch wenn er in vielen Entwicklungsländern – so auch in Ghana – offiziell untersagt ist. Im städtischen Großraum Tamale, im Norden Ghanas, wird Gemüseanbau durch Landknappheit, unklare Besitzverhältnisse und Wassermangel beeinträchtigt. Farmer weichen deshalb auf Flächen entlang temporärer Bachläufe, Abwasserkanäle, Erdlöcher, Brunnen, kaputter Abflussrohre und Rückhaltebecken aus. Urbanisierung und steigende Marktwerte für Land sowie unregulierte Grundstücksmärkte haben zu einem Anstieg an Landverkäufen in urbanen und peri-urbanen Gebieten geführt. Dabei konkurriert urbane Landwirtschaft mit anderen – ökonomisch gewinnträchtigeren – Formen der Landnutzung, wie beispielsweise der Industrie und des Wohnungsbaus. Für die Farmer besteht das größte Problem des rasanten urbanen Wachstums in den sich verändernden Landnutzungsmustern. Diese haben nicht nur zu einer Verringerung primärer Ackerflächen geführt, sondern auch zu geringerer landwirtschaftlicher Produktivität, einem niedrigen Lebensstandard und Nahrungsmittelunsicherheit. Die Situation im städtischen Großraum Tamale und den umliegenden Gebieten bildet diese Veränderungen besonders eindrücklich ab. Die vorliegende Arbeit analysiert die sozio-politische Konfiguration, die Ressourcenflüsse in Aktivitäten der urbanen Landwirtschaft, verstanden als Produktion und Vermarktung landwirtschaftlicher und gartenbaulicher Produkte, kanalisiert. Sie untersucht, wie die Farmer diesen Prozess durch verschiedene Governance-Systeme in ihren jeweiligen sozio-ökonomischen Umgebungen bewältigen und es notwendig machen, verschiedene Technologien in unterschiedlichem Maße zu bewerten und einzusetzen. Nach einer allgemeinen Stichprobenumfrage in Kombination mit einem Participatory-Appraisal-Ansatz zur Feststellung der spezifischen Eigenschaften des urbanen und peri-urbanen landwirtschaftlichen Systems, habe ich ein Mixed-Method-Design für meine Studie angewandt. Mit Hilfe des Global Positioning Systems (GPS) erfasste ich quantitative räumliche Daten aller freistehenden Anbauflächen. Mit einer unbemannten Drohne wurde eine Luftbildvermessung durchgeführt und mit der ArcGIS Software kartiert. Zusätzlich habe ich Google Earth-Aufnahmen mit Erinnerungen von Farmern trianguliert. Qualitative Daten erhob ich durch Gruppendiskussionen, mit Hilfe teilnehmender Fotografie, in Interviews und durch teilnehmende Beobachtung. Die Forschung fand zwischen Oktober 2013 und Februar 2015 statt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich die landwirtschaftlich genutzte Fläche in Tamale und Umgebung zwischen 2008 und 2014 trotz gleichzeitiger Entstehung neuer Gemüsefelder an den Stadträndern um 8,3 % verringerte. Obwohl die landwirtschaftlichen Flächen weniger werden, ist Gemüseanbau kein temporäres Phänomen. Der Gemüseanbau hat eine außergewöhnliche Resistenz gegen verschiedene Widerstände bewiesen und ohne externe Initiative oder Unterstützung eine Nische eingenommen. Er profitiert dabei von seiner Nähe zum Markt, der hohen Nachfrage nach schnell verderblichen Produkten und den fehlenden Möglichkeiten, Waren gekühlt zu transportieren. Obwohl Farmer immer wieder ihren Standort wechseln, sind andere Freiflächen – oftmals diejenigen, die als Bauland ungeeignet sind – das gesamte letzte Jahrhundert hindurch landwirtschaftlich genutzt worden. Die Studie zeigt, dass Konflikte zwischen traditionellen- und Regierungsinstitutionen um Landbesitz und -management die Nahrungsmittelsicherheit nicht nur gefährden, sondern gleichzeitig auch zu innovativen städtischen Versorgungsstrukturen führen. Im Zusammenspiel aus freundschaftlichen Beziehungen und Netzwerken zwischen Farmern und anderen Akteuren sind innovative Strategien hervorgegangen. Beispielsweise werden Überflutungsgebiete oder öffentliche Grünanlagen kultiviert, die weder von Chiefs verkauft noch von der Regierung bebaut werden können. Auch erschließen sich die Akteure den Kontakt zu Nichtregierungsorganisationen, die in der urbanen Landwirtschaft eine Überlebensstrategie und eine zukunftsfähige Alternative zur Herstellung von Nahrungsmittelsicherheit sehen und die Gemüsegärtner folglich unterstützen. Komplexe sozio-politische Realitäten wie der Mangel an verlässlichen legalen Rahmenbedingungen für städtischen Anbau führen durch unterschiedliche Landmanagementsysteme zu Konflikten zwischen "traditionellen" und staatlichen Institutionen. Akteure in diesen Konflikten sind Chieftaincy-Institutionen, die Landkommission, das Administrative Office of Stool Lands, sowie die Stadt- und Landschaftsplanungsbehörde. In ihrem Zusammenspiel kreieren diese Institutionen Räume, in denen Ressourcenzugang und –kontrolle in Form historischer Zugänge, öffentlicher Diskurse und Technologien immer wieder neu geformt werden. Zum Beispiel instrumentalisieren Farmer historische Erzählungen oder eignen sich Entwicklungsdiskurse an, um Landzugang einzufordern. Chiefs hingegen schöpfen ihre Autorität aus öffentlichen Diskursen, die sie als gewohnheitsmäßige Landeigentümer legitimieren. Sie beziehen sich darüber hinaus auf die Verfassung aus dem Jahr 1992, die Chiefs mit Machtressourcen ausstattet, indem sie ihnen erlaubt, Landfragen direkt zu klären sowie enteignetes Land an die Besitzer zurückzugeben, sofern die Regierung es nicht mehr benötigt. Um ihre Ansprüche auf Land geltend zu machen, errichten Farmer hingegen Umzäunungen, entfernen territoriale Markierungspfosten und zapfen Wasserleitungen an. Nichtregierungsorganisationen unterstützen die Farmer, indem sie ihnen Zugang zu Technologien wie solarbetriebene Bewässerung, Treibhäuser und verbessertes Saatgut ermöglichen. Der Zugang von Frauen zu landwirtschaftlich nutzbarem Land in einer mehrheitlich männlichen dominierten Produktionsweise wird erschwert durch eine permanente Rekonstruktion von Tradition, die eine männliche Herrschaft in Landangelegenheiten reklamiert. Dennoch verfügen Frauen über eine Vielzahl flexibler Strategien, um sich trotz Knappheit Zugang zu Land zu verschaffen und ihrer Rolle in der Versorgung des Haushalts nachzukommen. An Bewässerungsstandorten, die von Regierungsbehörden kontrolliert und verwaltet werden, wurden Bewirtschaftungspraktiken zur Unterstützung von Frauen eingeführt, die es den Frauen ermöglichen, direkten Landzugang zu erhalten, anstatt wie gewohnheitsrechtlich Zugang zu Land ausschließlich über ihre Ehemänner zu erhalten. Hierdurch ergaben sich Veränderungen in den Besitzverhältnissen der Frauen gegenüber Land. Landbesitz von Frauen in der Umgebung von Bewässerungsstandorten stellt ein bislang ungeschildertes Phänomen in der Literatur über Gender und Ressourcenzugang in Ghana und in Afrika im Allgemeinen dar. Die theoretischen Implikationen der Studie beziehen sich auf die Erkenntnis, dass Farmer Akteure sind, die überlegte Entscheidungen zwischen unterschiedlichen ihnen zur Verfügung stehenden Governance-Systemen treffen, um ihre Interessen bestmöglich durchzusetzen. Indem sie beispielsweise innerhalb ihres Netzwerks aus diversen Unterstützern wie Nichtregierungsorganisationen, Chiefs und Regierungsbehören manövrieren, verhandeln sie effektiv den Zugang zu und die Kontrolle über Ressourcen. Auch nutzen Farmer diverse Foren wie zum Beispiel Versammlungen und Gerichtsverhandlungen, um ihre Ansprüche durchzusetzen und zu rechtfertigen und um bestehende Governance-Stukturen zu hinterfragen. Sie ignorieren administrative Vorgaben oder umgehen sie, um wiederum diejenigen Governance-Systeme zu stabilisieren, mit denen sie sich verbündet haben. Im Prozess des Entscheidens für ein bestimmtes Governance-System und damit gegen ein anderes, entsteht ein neues Governance-System. In einigen Fällen werden mehrere Governance-Systeme miteinander verknüpft, so dass neue, an die Interessen des jeweiligen Akteurs angepasste hybride Systeme entstehen. Zusammenfassend lässt sich feststellen, dass Interaktionen zwischen Akteuren nicht nur Szenarien von Kooperation und Konflikt darstellen, sondern darüber hinaus auch Prozesse der gegenseitigen Gestaltung und der Ko-Konstruktion von Governance-Systemen sind. Diese spielen eine entscheidende Rolle dafür, wie Gender, Landknappheit und Nahrungsmittelsicherheit mit dem Zugang zu und der Kontrolle von Ressourcen in urbanen und peri-urbanen Gebieten interagieren. Die auf Grundlage dieser Ergebnisse formulierte Empfehlung lautet, dass Stadtplanungspolitiken das Phänomen der urbanen Landwirtschaft integrieren müssen, wenn städtische Armut verringert und Nahrungsmittelsicherheit gewährleistet werden soll. Überflutungsgebiete oder Grünflächen sollten Farmern legal und transparent im Hinblick auf die Zuteilungsmechanismen zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Neue Formen von städtischer Landwirtschaft wie Gemüseanbau in Säcken oder andere innovative Methoden, die der sozialen Realität der Stadtbewohner angepasst sind, sollten eingeführt und die Kapazitäten der Farmer gestärkt werden, sich diese anzueignen. Schlagwörter: Gemüseproduktion, Technologie, Ressourcen, Beziehungen, Legitimität, Zugang, Governance ; Vegetable farming in Ghana`s urban areas is mostly a sustainable livelihood strategy. Alt-hough it is considered a means of survival for the poor, vegetable farming is practiced by urban dwellers across the income spectrum. As poverty and urban population increase, so is the need to supplement income with privately cultivated foodstuff. In Ghana's Northern Regional capital of Tamale, vegetable farming is constrained by a number of factors including land availability, land tenure security, and access to water. As a result, many vegetable farmers have resorted to cultivating lands along streams and canals, dugouts, wells, broken sewers, and reservoirs. The scarcity of land for vegetable farming in the urban and peri-urban areas of Ghana is as the result of competition. Farming competes with other land use forms such as industry and housing, both of which attract higher economic rents. The most serious threat to farmers posed by urbanization is the changing land use pattern. Changes in land use have resulted in less availability of prime agricultural land for farming which has lowered agricultural production, food security, and standard of living. Such is the situation in the Tamale metropolitan area and its surroundings in Ghana's Northern Region. This study analyzes the socio-political process by which resource flows are directed towards the production and selling of vegetables in Ghana`s urban areas. It examines how this process is managed by farmers through different governance systems in diverse socio-economic environments which prompt them to value the different technologies differently. I employed a mixed-method approach for this study after a general random sampled survey, and a participatory appraisal was conducted to characterize the urban and peri-urban agricultural system. I collected quantitative spatial data by measuring all open space cultivated areas with a Global Positioning Systems (GPS). Aerial maps were obtained with an Un-manned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and mapped with ArcGIS software. Images from Google Earth maps triangulated farmers' recollection. Qualitative data were collected using focus group discussions, participatory photography, interviews and participant observation. This study was carried out between October 2013 and February 2015. Results reveal that the area of cultivated farmlands has decreased by 8.3% between 2008 and 2014, even as new vegetable sites emerged in the peri-urban fringes. Even though these farming areas are reducing, vegetable farming is not a temporary phenomenon. It has shown a remarkable resistance against various constraints and maintains a niche without external initiative or support as it takes advantage of market proximity, the high demand for perishable cash crops and the typical lack of refrigerated transport. Although farmers change their location over time, other open areas - usually those unsuited for construction - have been under continuous cropping for the past century. This study found that conflict between traditional and government institutions over land ownership and management has inadvertently led to innovative provisioning in vegetable production in the city, even though it has simultaneously threatened its contribution to food and nutritional security. Innovative strategies for continual vegetable production have emerged as a result of cordial relationships and networks that have developed between farmers and other actors. For example, farmers cultivate public green zones and floodplains which cannot legally be sold by chiefs nor used to construct government buildings. Farmers are also building alliances with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) that see urban agriculture as a viable activity and survival strategy for urban and peri-urban dwellers to maintain agricultural activity. Furthermore, the lack of a legal framework for urban farming in the Tamale area has led to conflicts between traditional and state institutions with implications for land tenure management systems. The conflict is often between the various chieftaincy institutions, the Lands Commission, the Administrative Office of Stool Lands, and the Town and Country Planning Department. Claim to land and other resources is made through historical recollections, public discourses, and technology. For example, farmers use stories from past events to legitimise their claims over land or restructure development discourses while chiefs rely on public discussions and discourses which support their rights as customary landowners to lay claim to lands. Chiefs also make use of the statutory laws and the 1992 Constitution which empowers the chieftaincy institution and puts within its jurisdiction lands not claimed by the government. To circumvent boundaries created by chiefs and others, farmers employ technologies such as fencing and pipe-borne water connections systems. Their efforts are supplemented by non-governmental organizations who furnish them with equipment such as solar-powered irrigation facilities, greenhouses, and improved seeds in order to boost their production. Moreover, women's access to farmland has always been hampered by the reconstruction of traditions that support male dominance in land affairs. However, some recent policy developments have renegotiated the condition of access to farmlands in favour of women. For instance, the introduction of gender-sensitive agricultural practices on government irrigation sites has resulted in the allocation of plots of land directly to women as opposed to through their male relatives as it was previously done. This has revolutionised the traditional gender roles in agriculture and has empowered women through primary land ownership. Women's ownership of land on irrigation sites is a novel finding that contributes to the broader literature on gender and resource access in Ghana and Africa. The theoretical implication of this study is that farmers' choice of, or relationship to, various local, national, and international actors is not foreordained but is instead based, to a large extent, on pragmatism. For example, by shifting alliances between non-governmental organisations and the government or supreme chiefs, they facilitate cooperation and possible negotiation for access and control over resources in their interests. Farmers also use multiple forums like meetings and courts to be able to gain legitimacy and challenge existing governance systems. Actors sometimes ignore or employ distinct strands of governance or undermine them to achieve their aims. These challenges are often used to gain legitimacy for the governance systems they are allied with. In the process of choosing one governance system over another, a new governance system comes into being. In other cases, combinations of different governance systems are forced to construct new hybrid systems tailored to an actor's interest. To conclude, the interplay between the various actors (farmers, traditional chiefs, government and non-governmental agencies) is not always a simple case of cooperation or conflict. Instead, it is a malleable process of mutual reshaping and co-construction of the governance systems which reconfigure gender roles, improve access to scarce lands, and increase food security. It is my strong recommendation that urban planning policy makers integrate agriculture into the larger discourse about poverty reduction and the alleviation of food insecurity. Green zones and flood-prone government lands in the urban areas which are currently been wasted should be allocated to farmers for food cultivation. This, however, must come with clearly defined mandates and guidelines that err on the side of transparency in land allocation and ownership. Innovative methods such as the farming of vegetables in sacks and other locally suitable means of maximizing production should be introduced alongside the strengthening of farmers' capacity to adopt those means.

Peru's recent robust growth has raised its economic prospects and has been broadly shared. The next step in development - high-income status - is challenging for all middle income countries and requires sustained growth. Raising productivity growth is key to sustaining Peru's high growth rates of income per capita, including in the context of a less favorable external environment. This report looks at Peru's principal challenges and opportunities to maintain strong and inclusive growth through higher productivity. It will require a reduction of inefficiencies by reaping more benefits from international trade and an improved innovation framework. The report has five parts. Part one analyzes the sources of Peru's recent strong growth. Part two examines more closely the dynamics and challenges to Peruvian firms' productivity growth. Part three analyzes elements that will increase the efficiency of Peru's labor and capital resources - regulation, labor markets, and human capital. Part four is focused on further opportunities to reduce misallocation while at the same time speeding up within-firm productivity through expanding Peru's technological possibilities, particularly through innovation and the spillovers from international trade. Part five concludes.