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Part of the rationale for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was that it will increase trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, creating jobs and reducing migration to the United States (U.S.). Since poor data on illegal migration to the United States make direct measurement difficult, data on migration within Mexico, where census data permit careful analysis, are used instead to evaluate the mechanism behind predictions on migration to the United States. Specifications are provided for migration within Mexico, incorporating measures of cost of living, amenities, and networks. Contrary to much of the literature, labor market variables enter very significantly and as predicted once possible credit constraint effects are controlled for. Greater exposure to FDI and trade deters outmigration, with the effects working partly through the labor market. Finally, some tentative inferences are presented about the impact of increased FDI on Mexico- U.S. migration. On average, a doubling of FDI inflows leads to a 1.5 to 2 percent drop in migration.

The reform of China's collectively owned forest land, began in 2008, is arguably the largest land-reform undertaking in modern times in terms of area and people affected. Under the reform, forest lands have been contracted to rural households, allowing them more independence in exercising their rights and interests in the forest lands, giving them more opportunities to improve family incomes, and creating incentives for them to cultivate, conserve, and manage forests. These lands are home to some 610 million people, many of them poor. With urbanization, vast numbers of Chinese men have migrated to cities to work, leaving women as the predominant labor force in rural areas. Indeed, some 70 percent of China's agriculture labor force is now female. The immense scope of this change calls for a systematic examination of how China's rural women gain access to and exploit forest land and associated resources and services. The reform was designed to unfold in two broad stages. In the first, collectively owned forest lands suitable for contracting were allocated on equal terms to each household in affected villages. The ongoing second stage represents a deepening of the reform. It deals with subsidies and ecological compensation, financial services (including use of forest tenure as collateral and transfers of forest land), forest insurance, technical services and training, farmers' associations and cooperatives, and market services. However, the monitoring had not covered the gender dimension of the reform, meaning that the gender data required to accurately reflect the full effects of the reform have been lacking. Building on the annual monitoring conducted by the FEDRC, the study reported here added gender-related investigation and analysis to obtain gender data about the current reform situation, its problems, and their causes. It also included structured interviews with rural women and group meetings with local government agencies, women's federations, and village committees.The ultimate objective of the study is to achieve better gender-responsiveness in China's collective forest tenure reform. Specifically, this includes: (i) equality in access to and control of forest lands, as well as access to associated resources and services; (ii) women's participation and equality in decision-making concerning the conservation and utilization of forest resources; and (iii) impacts of the first two aspects on the status and well-being of women. The World Bank has had over 30 years of successful cooperation with China in the forestry sector. Women's access to the services and resources that are the focus of the second stage of the reform will be a critical element of the World Bank's continuing reform dialogue with its Chinese partners.

This disaster risk financing country note for Serbia provides an overview of the way its government currently finances the costs imposed by natural disasters. Meanwhile, poverty deepened after the financial crisis and during the recessions of 2012 and 2014, mainly because of losses in employment and labor income. In an effort to overcome its fiscal challenges, the government of Serbia adopted an ambitious fiscal consolidation and structural reform program to halt the rise in public debt and send it on a downward trajectory by 2017. This program is supported by a three-year stand-by arrangement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Because of the growing frequency and severity of disasters, the government has faced the rising costs of responding to disasters as well as the challenges of financing emergency response and reconstruction costs. Having sufficient access to financial instruments and resources in order to respond to disasters is crucial for building the financial resilience of the country and minimizing the negative impact of natural disasters on Serbia's economic growth. In this report, chapter one gives introduction. Chapter two provides the background and country context, including the recent economic impacts of disasters. Chapter three reviews the current institutional and legal framework for disaster risk management and financing. Chapter four is a review of the public financial management of disasters in Serbia, including ex ante and ex post disaster risk financing and insurance (DRFI) instruments currently in use for budget mobilization, and it looks at the 2014 floods in more detail. The chapter concludes with a summary of financial resources available and a look at the potential resource gaps.

Bangladesh has a comprehensive Disaster Management plan, but details on the implementation and sufficiency of funding should be clarified. Strengthening financial disclosure could encourage greater engagement from key local and international stakeholders. The country also offers great opportunities to increase the outreach of insurance to larger sections of the population, especially to those most vulnerable to the substantial exposure to natural hazards and especially flood. The micro-finance market is well developed and provides opportunities to expand the still very limited availability of micro-insurance propositions to the rural population. Index-based insurance programs supported by mobile payment systems have already been piloted and there is considerable scope for this to be expanded, especially when appropriately subsidized to address affordability issues. However, this will require further strengthening of the insurance market, in respect of the implementation of the Insurance Act 2010 and of consumer representation, which is underdeveloped but may contribute strongly to improve the public's confidence and help the industry to develop successful propositions also for emerging customers.

During 2015, and in the span of six-months, Nepal was hit by two major shocks. The first one was the April 2015 earthquakes that caused a huge loss of life and assets. The second shock has come in the form of a near complete disruption of external trade following the adoption of the new Constitution. Reflecting both the earthquake and trade related disruptions, inflation spiked to over 12 percent (y/ y) by mid-January rising 5 percentage points in just four months from mid-September 2015. This was the highest inflation level since FY2009, with increases in food and non-food prices contributing equally to the spike. As the trade disruptions ended, inflation has eased to back to single digits.

For the umpteenth time, the U.S. and Iran have come close to an open war neither side wants. The Israelis strike a building within the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, killing senior officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Iranians, with unintended irony, protest this violation of diplomatic premises, and almost start a war with Israel by launching hundreds of drones and missiles that the U.S., given ample warning, helps to inter­cept. The Israelis launch a counterstrike to demonstrate its ability to evade Iran's defenses. That appears to end the exchange until the next round.Sooner or later, if the U.S. and the Islamic Republic are going to avoid such a lose-lose conflict, the two sides will need to stop shouting and start talking. Forty-five years of exchanging empty slogans, accusa­tions, threats, and denunci­a­tions have accomplished little beyond furthering a few political careers and feed­ing a sense of self-righteousness. For suc­cessive U.S. adminis­trations, Iran remains a problem that will not go away.To para­phrase Trotsky, "You may have no business with Iran; but Iran has business with you." For Iran, the U.S. remains an obsession. The more Iran's hated rulers denounce it, the more attractive it becomes — as both a role model and a destination — to a savvy popula­tion suffering from inflation, unemployment, and the stern, miso­gynistic dictates of an aging and ossified ruling elite.The Islamic Republic, despite the wishes of many Iranians and their friends, is probably not going away soon. In the first months after the fall of the monarchy, the most-asked question in Tehran was, "When are THEY leaving?" (Inhaa key mirand?). Forty-five years later THEY are still in charge and show no signs of packing their bags.Why should we talk to the Islamic Republic, when it has the appalling history that it does? Why should we talk when its overriding policy principle is, in the words of one Iranian official, "opposition to you"? We need to talk because talking (and listening) to an adversary means serving our national interests by communicating. Talking never means either approval of or affection for the Islamic Republic.Talking to the Islamic Republic is not going to bring down that government, persuade the ruling clerics to step aside, or persuade them to stop repressing its women, musicians, journalists, lawyers, students and academics. Talking is not going to end the ruling clerics' bizarre obsessions with con­trolling every trivial detail of Iranians' private lives. What talking does is allow each side to present its point of view and to correct the dangerous "mythperceptions" that have prevented the U.S. and Iran from breaking out of a 45-year downward spiral of futility.For what has happened when the two sides have not talked? What has happened, for example, when the Islamic Republic's representatives at meetings refuse face-to-face meetings with their American counterparts? What has happened when one side ignores, or rejects outright, proposals from the other to meet in at setting of mutual respect?Whenever two sides — neighbors, relatives, countries — for whatever reason, cannot talk, each side becomes, to the other, simul­taneously sub-human and super-human. "Superhuman" means the other is capable of anything. In this case, a superhuman Iran can build and deliver a nuclear weapon in weeks, manipulate proxies to do its will anywhere, and rebuild the mighty Persian Empires of Greek and Roman times. On the other side, a superhuman United States can guide events in Iran and subvert its young people through a powerful, hidden network of agents – journalists, intellectuals, writers, etc. – ready to obey instructions from Washington.As for being "subhuman," in this view neither side is constrained by any sense of morality or humanity. It will do (and since it is also super­human, can do) anything. In such a case, the superhuman we fear and the subhuman we despise. When such a powerful and evil adver­sary threatens us, we feel justified in taking any action against it, because that adver­sary will stop at nothing and has only one goal: to destroy us by any means possible.At one level, leaders in both Tehran and Washington seek to avoid an Iran-U.S. war. Although Tehran's ruling clerics care little for the lives of ordi­nary Iranians – who would be the victims of such a war – they do care about staying in power and continuing to enjoy their villas and foreign currency accounts. A war with the U.S. would threaten their good life. In Washington, both Democratic and Repub­lican presidents have known that "another stupid war" in the Middle East is a political loser. In 2016, Trump ran against such wars, and his message was powerful. Although he foolishly abandoned the Iran nuclear deal and made a bizarre threat to blow up "52 historical sites" in Iran, he clearly had no stomach for a war. He summarily fired his national security adviser, a paid shill for the cultists of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), when he pushed the president toward confrontation.Does Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu want to drag the U.S. into a war with Iran? To all appearances he does, not only to rid Israel of a declared enemy, but, more important, to keep himself in power. The Israeli premier has used Iran to mani­pulate the U.S. and even to intervene directly in American domestic politics. The more extreme the rhetoric and actions from Tehran, the better for Netanyahu. It is said he went into mourning when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — notorious for his curious anti-Israeli rhetoric — left office in 2013. But he can usually depend on the Islamic Republic to help him both by overplaying its weak hand and by raising the volume on its tired slogans.Wars often begin with both sides saying they want peace. But miscalculations, underestimating or overestimating the other side, and third-party actions can push a country down a path it knows is self-destructive. Talking to the Islamic Republic will be hard, but it is worth doing if it can keep both sides off a road to disaster.

The EU has condemned Iran's April 14 drone and missile attack against Israel conducted in response to Israel's lethal bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria on April 1. However, while the condemnation is unanimous, EU officials and individual member states have different positions on the issue.Those differences broadly reflect the pre-existing divisions on the Middle East since the war in Gaza started last October. Even though the EU is united in its calls for restraint and de-escalation, these divisions are limiting the diplomatic role Europe could play in actually bringing those objectives closer to reality.The main fault-line is between the moderates who see the Gaza war's root causes and in turn push for an immediate ceasefire, and the hawks who prioritize Israel's nearly unqualified right using any means necessary to defend itself above any other consideration. These attitudes have conditioned responses to the conflict between Israel and Iran.Hours after the Iranian attack, the EU high representative for foreign policy Josep Borrell issued a brief condemnatory statement on behalf of 27 member states. In a separate interview, Borrell, a key member of the moderate camp, evaded the question of whether the EU would support Israel if Tel Aviv were to retaliate against Tehran. Instead, he emphasized the need for de-escalation and warned against sleepwalking into a regional war.He also said there are those who'd wish such an escalation to occur because would divert attention from the war and humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, in what could be interpreted as a snipe at Israel's beleaguered Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Among the EU member states, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, a notable moderate, made sure to condemn, alongside the Iranian attack, "all forms of violence that threaten the safety and well-being of innocent civilians," in a likely reference to Gaza, and called for conflict resolution through diplomatic channels. In another comment, Sanchez didn't even mention Iran, limiting his statement to an expression of a "maximum concern" at the regional escalation.At the other end of the spectrum is Germany which accused Iran of bringing the Middle East to the brink of the abyss through its "dangerous behavior." The German foreign ministry vowed to "diplomatically secure Israel's defensive victory" — without explaining what such a victory would entail and how it is supposed to be achieved all the while preventing a further escalation.Other European heavy-hitters — France and the non-EU United Kingdom — have equally taken strongly pro-Israeli stances. French President Emmanuel Macron called for Iran's isolation as an alternative to the "conflagration," including through "convincing the countries of the region that Iran is a danger, imposing more sanctions and pressure against Iran, also on its nuclear activities."British Foreign Minister David Cameron, meanwhile, offered a "complete understanding" for Israel's bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, on the grounds that it housed the IRGC personnel which "have done terrible things all over the world." Cameron was seemingly oblivious to the fact that it's a common practice for diplomatic premises to host military or intelligence officers, some of whom may not be the paragons of respect for human rights and adherence to international law.It seems that on the EU level, the hawks are having an upper hand. At its informal discussion on April 16, the bloc's foreign ministers agreed to pursue new sanctions against Iran concerning, notably, the alleged provision of drones and missiles to Tehran's allies in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Shiite groups in Syria and Iraq. They also agreed to identify and close whatever loopholes remain in the implementation of the existing sanctions on the supply of the components used for the production of unmanned aerial vehicles in Iran. These new measures are expected to be imposed on Iran at the formal foreign ministers meeting on April 22.Yet the hawks' victory does not seem to be complete: contrary to a push from some member states and support from Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission and formally Borrell's boss, there is still no agreement on the terrorist designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Borrell reiterated his position that such a listing would require a court decision from an EU member state that would have established the IRGC's involvement in terrorist activity on the EU soil. Presently, there is no such judicial ruling. The real reason, however, seems to be political: reluctance to further deteriorate the already seriously strained relations with Iran over a mostly symbolic designation.The EU is right in calling Iran to the task — a strike on a sovereign state, in the circumstances it took place, is a flagrant violation of the international law and cannot be accepted as a new normal. Yet the unambiguity of the condemnation of Iran's actions and the alacrity with which the direction of the new sanctions has been agreed stands in a sharp contrast with Europe's inability to bring the tiniest of consequences to bear on Israel, six months after its destructive war in Gaza.Equally of note, France and Britain, together with the United States, blocked a statement in the U.N. Security Council condemning Israel's attack on the Iranian consulate in Syria — a statement that, according to some experts, could have prevented an Iranian retaliation.Taking a tough stance on Iran, while justified on its own terms in light of Tehran's actions, seems to be a price Europe is willing to pay in order to convince Israel to exercise restraint in its own retaliation plans. However, de-escalation imperative requires that attempts to reassure Israel of Europe's support be balanced by an outreach to Tehran.If Europe were to follow Macron's and other hawks' calls for Iran's isolation, it would risk losing whatever leverage it still retains there. And Europe would need that leverage if it were to try to convince Tehran not to unleash an even stronger response to Israel's hypothetical retaliation.

The most important security issue for the United States, the contest/competition/rivalry with China, may soon fade away.The plausibility of this proposition is enhanced if we take as a parallel not the rivalry with the USSR during the Cold War, but the one that smoked through the 1980s and early 1990s when Japan appeared to be becoming "Number One." The rather benign ending of that rivalry may have something to say about what will happen as China slides into what many suggest will be a lengthy period of slow growth or even stagnation.In both cases, the perceived threats have been primarily economic.JapanAs with China today, concerns about Japanese economic growth and business practices were once intense and widespread.In a 1987 best-seller, Yale's Paul Kennedy confidently listed a set of reasons why Japan was likely to expand faster than other major powers, stressing the country's "immensely strong" industrial bedrock and its docile and diligent work force. He also predicted that Japan was likely to become "much more powerful" economically. Meanwhile, Harvard's Samuel Huntington assured us, in phrases that sound much like what we are hearing about the China challenge today, that a need had suddenly arisen to fear not "missile vulnerability" but "semiconductor vulnerability," that "economics is the continuation of war by other means," and that there was danger in the fact that Japan had become the largest provider of foreign aid and had endowed professorships at Harvard and MIT. One book of the time was even entitled, "The Coming War with Japan," and some analysts argued that Japan by natural impulse would soon come to yearn for nuclear weapons.Fareed Zakaria, managing editor of Foreign Affairs at the time, recalled a few years ago his experience "sorting through manuscript after manuscript arguing that Japan was going to take over the world."The public responded to this threatening perspective — especially after the diabolical Japanese bought Rockefeller Center (which they later sold at a loss) and a major Hollywood film studio. By 1989, the Japanese "threat" was seen by the public to be nearly comparable to the one posed by the still heavily armed Soviet Union, and America was convinced that Japan would be the number one economic power in the next century.Politicians predictably followed suit, finding that Japan-bashing sold well. In 1987, several members of Congress publicly sledgehammered Toshiba products on the front steps of the Capitol. Meanwhile, Donald Trump complained at the time, "They come over here, they sell their cars, their VCRs. They knock the hell out of our companies," and, "First they take all our money with their consumer goods, then they put it back in buying all of Manhattan."These concerns evaporated in the early 1990s when Japan's "threatening" economy stagnated and the American one surged. Huntington quickly decided that, as it turned out, the real problem was actually a "clash of civilizations" like the one going on at the time in Bosnia, and Kennedy moved on to warn of the dangers from job‑stealing robots and — as the rise in world population began to stagnate or even reverse — population explosions.ChinaWhen he began his quest for the presidency in 2016, Trump tried Japan-bashing again, designating it along with China and Mexico as a country where "we are getting absolutely crushed on trade."However, by that time Japan's growth had been mostly flat, and trade friction had become much more subdued even though the United States continued (and still continues) to run large trade deficits with Japan while Japan can still make foreign investment difficult.China-bashing sold much better, as Trump found out in a speech in which his line, "We can't allow China to rape our country, and that's what we're doing," inspired an approving roar from the audience. Trump spent the rest of the 2016 campaign building on that theme and repeating much of it in his 2020 campaign, as did many other candidates.Something similar to the Japanese experience may now be happening with the China threat as its growth slumps and the U.S., far from being "displaced" in its GDP ranking as number one, retains its statistical advantage.Most troubling for China is a growing set of difficulties, most of them deriving from a determination to prioritize control by the antiquated and kleptocratic Chinese Communist Party over economic development. The list of resulting problems is substantial: endemic corruption, environmental degradation, slowing growth, capricious shifts in government policies (including the abruptly canceled "zero COVID" policy), inefficient enterprises, fraudulent statistical reporting, a rapidly aging population, enormous overproduction, huge youth unemployment, increasing debt, a housing bubble, restive minorities, the alienation of Western investors, and a clampdown on civil liberties. There also seems to be something of a decline in confidence in, and in the credibility of, the Communist Party's dictates, a change that could have dire long‐term consequences for the regime.The ComparisonThere are some non-comparable elements between the cases, of course. Despite books like "The Coming War with Japan," concerns about Tokyo were less military than they are for China, which has increased its defense expenditures and is accused of threatening to invade Taiwan and becoming a dominant "hegemon" in its area, while expanding its global reach.Nonetheless, the perceived threat remains mainly economic. For example, a recent report by a devotedly anti-China committee in Congress restricts its concerns to what it calls China's "economic aggression" (while recommending a series of changes including a rise in tariffs that might cost the American economy nearly two trillion dollars over five years).Although books entitled "Destined for War" may continue to sell for a while, China's economic stagnation (but not collapse) is in the air, and some elements of its counterproductive "wolf warrior" diplomacy have been relaxed. As a result, the political appeal of China-bashing may be headed for a degree of remission.When Toyota became the number one car maker in the U.S. in recent years, scarcely anyone noticed and fewer cared. If there's an electric car in the future, it may well be Chinese. But, if the Japan analogy holds, it is likely that the reaction will be much the same.

Congressional leaders stripped a measure from this year's defense policy bill that would have expanded compensation for victims of U.S. nuclear testing, drawing condemnation from lawmakers who had spearheaded the initiative and bitter disappointment from activists who hoped the blockbuster film "Oppenheimer" would bolster support for their efforts.
"This is a grave injustice," Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.), who led the charge in favor of the expansion, said Thursday. "This bill turns its back on the people of the United States in defense of the lobbyists and the suits and the corporate entities who are going to get paid."
The initiative had passed as an amendment to the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act, earning bipartisan support in a 61-37 vote. The measure would have significantly expanded the 1990 Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA), which gave financial relief to some uranium miners and victims living downwind of the Nevada Test Site, where the U.S. carried out most of its nuclear experiments.
The original law is set to expire in May of next year, a deadline that will end benefits for those who have been receiving compensation. Activists hope that, in the short term, lawmakers will find a way to push that deadline back in order to keep the program alive.
"Downwinders" have long reported unusually high rates of cancer and other radiation-related diseases. One activist who spoke with RS earlier this year said 21 members of her family had gotten cancer, and seven had died from it. The explosions disproportionately impacted poor Latino communities and Native American Pueblos, leaving many victims trapped under a mountain of medical debt.
The amendment would have expanded RECA to include downwinders in New Mexico, where the first nuclear test took place, as well as a wider swathe of uranium miners and people living in Missouri who were exposed to waste from the Manhattan Project. The expansion would have also covered people in Montana, Idaho, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and Guam.
In a statement to RS, Rep. Teresa Leger Fernandez (D-N.M.) blamed the decision to kill RECA expansion on Republican House leaders, who quietly oppose the measure due to its projected cost of nearly $15 billion per year — a sharp increase from the $2.3 billion that RECA has paid out to date.
"Downwinders and uranium workers suffer from debilitating and deadly diseases related to building and testing nuclear bombs," Leger Fernandez argued. "Our bipartisan coalition will not give up — we will fight to pass RECA and secure justice for our beloved New Mexico communities who unknowingly sacrificed so much for our nation's security."
Activists note that the cost of RECA expansion, while large on its face, pales in comparison to the broader military budget, which the 2024 NDAA sets at roughly $874 billion. More than $30 billion of that budget came from programs that the Biden administration had not requested, and backers of the initiative suggested specific offsets for the increased cost, according to Hawley.
The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget argued in October that "any increase in expense should be fully paid for with higher revenue, lower spending, or some combination."
"If lawmakers are committed to expanding benefits for deserving individuals, they should be equally committed to paying for those expansions," the group said in a blog post.
So far, Hawley is the only lawmaker who has said he will vote against the NDAA in protest of the "backroom deal" to remove RECA expansion. Sen. Ben Ray Lujan (D-N.M.), who blames his father's death on radiation exposure from work at Los Alamos, recently tweeted that "[a]ll options are on the table" for getting the initiative signed into law.
RS reported in July that the Tularosa Basin Downwinders Consortium had attempted to contact "Oppenheimer" director Christopher Nolan and ask him to include a message about the downwinders in his film, but activists were unable to secure a meeting. Despite the rejection, supporters of RECA expansion hoped that the movie would create an opportunity for a public discussion of the impacts of nuclear testing.
Hawley's amendment passed in late July, roughly a week after the film's release. Activists stepped up their advocacy efforts in September and sent a group of advocates from throughout the west and Missouri to the Capitol to lobby lawmakers.
The decision to strip the bill from the NDAA was both surprising and "shockingly immoral," argued Tina Cordova of the Tularosa Basin Downwinders Consortium in an interview with RS.
"There have been so many people that I've spoken to in the last 24 hours that were so emotional, so heartbroken because they had such high hopes for this Congress," Cordova said.
As Cordova mentioned, many of those who would receive compensation from RECA live in Republican states and House districts. "When the Republicans in the House refuse to acknowledge their responsibility for this, they're voting against their constituents," she argued.
"I wouldn't be allowed to recklessly harm other people and walk away from responsibility for that," she continued. "It's like driving drunk and plowing into a van full of people and injuring them, and then telling the court that I simply don't have the resources to take care of the mess I've made."
Cordova said that, in the near term, activists will need time to process their disappointment after having come so close to success. But she and her allies are prepared to keep fighting until RECA expansion is finally passed.
"We all need time to dust ourselves off," she said. "But we will come back. We have developed a very broad coalition of people from all across this country from one coast to the other, and we will come back stronger than we were before."Sen. Lujan, who has introduced RECA-related legislation every year since 2008, said Thursday that he will continue pushing for expansion despite the setback. "I am not giving up on justice for New Mexicans and all those deeply impacted by radiation exposure and nuclear testing," he said in a statement. "Over the course of this process, our support has only grown and the fight doesn't end here."

"The biggest piece of energy legislation in the UK's history has become law today… laying the foundations for an energy system fit for the future." That will surprise anyone involved in the gas and electricity privatisations between 1986 and 1990. The truth of the matter is that the government will now be messing about with our energy supplies more now than they were before, increasing regulation and reversing the tide of privatisation. The six claimed benefits are:The introduction of new business models for Carbon Capture and Hydrogen (CCH), which would create 50,000 jobs in Carbon Capture and 12,000 in Hydrogen.We would become world-leaders in nuclear fusion regulation.Energy network competition would be enabled through the introduction of competition to onshore electricity networks. This is predicted to save consumers up to £1 billion off their energy bills by 2050.The expansion of heat networks through Ofgem, creating better pricing for consumers and businesses.Better regulation of energy smart appliances.The extension of smart metre rollout to 2028, saving consumers £5.6 billion.There is no doubt that fossil fuel electricity will still be needed for a considerable period- in essence because the wind does not always blow nor sun shine. Current policy expectations for Net Zero means CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) must be upscaled and extended until fossil fuels are mitigated by a sufficient baseload of alternatives. The fossil fuel providers should be expected to take care of this problem with its costs, and supply, in effect, green electricity to the national networks. What is puzzling, and, frankly, nonsense is the idea that the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) has to discover how that should be done and show helpless private companies how to do it. Of course, the fossil fuel generators are happy enough for DESNZ, and therefore the taxpayer, to take charge and pick up the tab.Hydrogen is a more subtle issue. Contrary to popular belief it will not be efficient for heating homes (ever) or blending with natural gas for electricity generation (sometimes) except when it is virtually free because wind farms and / or solar are producing more than consumer / business demand needs. It also has uses for heavy goods vehicles but, because hydrogen's storage space to power ratio is poor, not for aircraft- except the smallest. In short, the DESNZ claims for hydrogen are wildly exaggerated.And so are its claims for fusion. Nuclear fusion, as distinct from fission, was discovered in 1922 and its use for commercial electricity generation has been receding ever since. There is no harm in government investing in scientific research, but the May 2022 Science Select Committee agreed there would be no commercial use by 2050.  It might be commercialised in the next century, so why is it in the Act now?DESNZ is correct in outlining that previous attempts towards energy market privatisation were only skin-deep. As energy analyst Ronan Bolton outlines: "The eventual market model and regulatory framework introduced in 1990 was a compromise. This was dictated by concerns about the risks that competition would pose to the coal and nuclear industries, along with concerns about the share price of the privatised companies if they were exposed to too strong a competitive threat." Yes, consumers had a choice of retailers but Ofgem and the National Grid, which bought the electricity and resold it to retailers at standard (wholesale) price, pretty much continued what the Central Electricity Generating Board had long done. Where DESNZ is wholly incorrect, is in moving the electricity market back to central control and regulation, rather than towards the full competition it claims.  The ways of achieving that include those suggested to the 2023 Energy Select Committee. One of them recommended that genuine competition nationwide (including Scotland) be introduced by distribution system operators (upgraded from today's local "retailers") whilst Ofgem and the National Grid retreated to simply balancing the books. In other words, DESNZ, having correctly identified the problem, recommends precisely the opposite of what is needed. Domestic energy is about 40% of energy consumption and home heating (neighbourhood hot water – popular in Iceland) is 2% of that. 0.8% is not a large enough part of the UK's energy problem to justify 17% of DESNZ targeting, though it clearly has room to grow, notably from local small modular reactors. In the five years to 2022, the number of people in government interested in home heating has doubled which may explain its appearance in the Act.Finally, the Act addresses smart metres. In 2019, it became clear that only half of domestic energy metres were "smart" and the target to make 100% smart should be shifted from 2020 to 2024. By the end of March 2021, things were not going much better: a 1% drop since the previous quarter and 44% overall. Smart metres were turning dumb, installation costs were rising and being passed on to consumers. The 100% target date is now 2028. Thus claimed £5.6 billion saving per annum does not follow reasonable assumptions.The Energy Act does, and does not, apply to Scotland and Northern Ireland which have their own legislation. The extent to which devolution applies is unfathomable. English and Welsh (presumably) consumers and businesses may save up to £16.6 billion but, as DESNZ has provided neither arithmetic nor rationales, their figures have the credibility of jingle bills. Absolutely no attention seems to have been given to dividing issues between what the free market can, and should, do for itself and where it is only the government that can bring some necessary public benefit.Instead, the Energy Secretary, a.k.a. Santa Claus, claimed: "The Act also supports our new approach to make sure that families don't feel a disproportionate financial burden as we transition to net zero, and forms a central part of our efforts to keep people's bills affordable in the long-term." In fact, as can be seen above, it does nothing for those objectives at all. And where are Chris Skidmore's recommendations?

In relation to the topic, the formal absence of a legal text called the constitution of the European Union is noticeable. Simple logic dictates the conclusion that in absence of European constitution, there is no constitutional law of the European Union. However, the reality is much more complex than it seems. The United Kingdom, for example, does not have a written act called a constitution, but instead several constitutional contents whose sources are in laws, legal practice and so-called constitutional customs. Germany also formally does not have a constitution, but a Fundamental Law that pursue a constitutional role. The term is not apparently so important but the status of the text. The constitution is a set of norms that are supreme, stable and difficult to change. It accords competences to the state bodies and guarantee essential civil rights and freedoms. The relevant question in this case is the existence of constitution and constitutional law of the European Union, not in a formal, but in an essential sense. The European Union does not have the characteristics of a unitary, but could it be considering as a federal state? In political-legal theory, opinions appeared that such a thing is impossible for the following reasons. As an example of the emergence of a federal state, the history of the United States of America is cited. According to the constitution of 1878, the US received competences in foreign affairs, defense, monetary policy, as well as in the field of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. The European Union rested on the process of federalization in the economic area. The treaties establishing the Community and the Union have merged the national markets of the member states into one. Originally the European Communities did not have powers in foreign affairs, defense, security and justice. Only in 1993, with the Maastricht Treaty, the newly created European Union get the possibility to take decisions in the aforementioned areas, but even then federal mechanisms were not applied. The rule was unanimous decisions of represents of member states government reassemble in the Council of EU. The state sovereignty was preserved. For the obvious lack of authority at the supranational level, the European Union cannot currently be considered as a classic federal state. However, it can be observed as a sort of federal community, which was originally intended to evolves into something more than that. In a historical sense, this situation in itself is not new. It also appeared in the 19th century with the so-called emerging federal states such as the United States of America, the Swiss Confederation, Germany, Canada or Australia. However, the European Union is a permanent political-legal structure that has certain attributes of a federal state. The notion of a federal community, allows to take into account the essential role of the member states in such system of integration. The federal community as a permanent entity, rests on the contractual relationship that defines the common goals of its members. The aforementioned goals in practice change the internal conditions in the member states, but also their global political status. Several indications point to the federal nature of the European Union. The use of the term Union is not harmless. The founding fathers of the US Constitution of 1878, called their new created federal state Union in order to mark the difference with the previously existing Confederacy. The inspires of the European Union in the constitutive treaty emphasize that its main goal is to constantly create closer ties between European nations. This sentence indirectly indicates a strong, integrative, federal dynamic. In its legal practice, the Court of Justice does not ignore the initial international nature of constitutive treaties, but points to the following. The treaties establishing the Communities and the European Union represent the basis of an independent, hierarchically organized legal order, the kind that states have. As the highest legal act and source of law, they have a constitutional function. The law of the European Union is directly integrated into the law order of the member states and has primacy in relation with the national law. The legislative acts of European derivative law (regulations, directives, decisions) cannot contradict the provisions of the founding treaties. Like the Supreme Court in a federal state, the Court of Justice of the European Union control the compliance of legislative acts with constitutive treaties. The same principle applies in the field of international relations. An international agreement concluded by the European Union or its member states must be in accordance with the provisions of the founding treaties. Their constitutionality is checked by the Court of Justice. The Lisbon Treaty gave the European Union another federal distinction. It recognizes to the European Union a possession of legal personality, which means a full legal capacity to conclude international agreements with other countries and international organizations. The division of competences between the federal state and its members is for many the essence of the federalist legal order. The parallel existence of two levels of government imposes the need to clearly demarcate the fields of action of one and other authorities. In 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon established a principled delimitation of European and national competences. This is another step in the direction of federal legal regulation. The existence of European citizenship gives to the European Union one more federal characteristics. European citizens acquire rights and obligations parallel to those related to national citizenship. Opponents of such a solution were those who believed that the Union represents only an international organization. The founding treaties assign competences to the institutions of the Union, as well as guarantee basic human rights and freedoms. The legislation of the European Union determines the functioning of the member states and in many areas directly or indirectly governs the life of their citizens. Treaties establishing the European Union have in practice a constitutional role and value.