The fact that the literature tends to find optimistic biases in national fiscal projections has led to a growing recognition in the academic and policy arenas of the need for independent forecasts in the fiscal domain, prepared by independent agencies, such as the European Commission in the case of Europe. Against this background the aim of this paper is to test: (i) whether the forecasting performance of governments is indeed worse than that of international organizations, and (ii) whether fiscal projections prepared by international organizations are free from political economy distortions. The answer to these both questions is no: our results, based on real-time data for 15 European countries over the period 1999- 2007, point to the rejection of the two hypotheses under scrutiny. We motivate the empirical analysis on the basis of a model in which an independent agency tries to minimize the distance to the government forecast. Starting from the assumption that the government's information set includes private information not available to outside forecasters, we show how such a framework can help in understanding the observed empirical evidence. ; Las previsiones presupuestarias que preparan las autoridades nacionales tienden a presentar, en promedio, una visión optimista de la senda futura de las finanzas públicas. Este hecho ha sido probado en numerosos trabajos en particular, en el caso de Europa, en la última década. Por ello, se escuchan voces que piden que otras instituciones, independientes de los Gobiernos nacionales, asuman un papel más relevante en el proceso de planificación presupuestaria. En particular, en el caso de Europa, se menciona a la Comisión Europea. En este marco, el objetivo del presente documento es contrastar dos cuestiones muy concretas con respecto a las previsiones presupuestarias preparadas por las instituciones internacionales: i) ¿es la exactitud de dichas proyecciones mucho mejor que la de las preparadas por las autoridades nacionales?, y ii) ¿están libres dichas previsiones de distorsiones derivadas de factores tales como los ciclos electorales? Nuestros resultados, basados en una muestra de datos (previsiones) obtenidos de informes publicados en tiempo real para 15 países europeos en el período 1999-2007, señalan que la respuesta a las dos preguntas es negativa. Además de la evidencia empírica, en el documento se desarrolla un modelo teórico muy estilizado con el que se proporciona una posible explicación de los resultados empíricos. Dicha explicación se basa en la idea de que las autoridades nacionales disponen de más información que los analistas externos en todas las etapas de elaboración y seguimiento de los planes presupuestarios. Así pues, la institución independiente, al tratar de aproximarse lo más posible a la previsión del Gobierno (para reducir el déficit de acceso a la información), puede acabar incorporando en su propia previsión parte del sesgo político habitual en las proyecciones oficiales.
Telegrams exchanged between Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles and the following people: his personal secretary Soledad González, private people, the Union of National telegraphers, Congressmen, Governors, the National Chamber of Commerce from Oaxaca, the Francisco Estévez Socialist Party, Senators, the Great Lodge of the State of Oaxaca, staff of the National Telegraph Office, the National Chamber of Commerce from Durango, Mayors, the Socialist Peasants Party of Puebla, the Progreso Working Federation, the president of the League of Agrarian Communities from San Luis Potosí, and the president of the League of Resistance from Campeche, the Kadoz Knights' Council from Jalisco, the Liquidation Commission of the Richardson Construction Company and the National Federation of Railroads. The aforementioned telegrams concern endorsement of the telegraph staff for managing the Postal Service, reports about the approval of anti-reelection reforms to the constitution in Mérida, Yucatán, reports on the social peace in Chiapas, a request to cancel the dance marathon, requests for scheduling appointments, requesting recommendations for employment, elections conflict in Puebla and Tlaxcala, complaints about the closing of schools, requesting the shipping of oranges, issues with the meat supply, elections of congress representatives in Morelia, Michoacán, a list of sent telegrams, notice indicating that he is aware of some matters, requesting for the prices of a ton of corn, cancelling scheduled appointments, replies of acknowledgement, confirming the shipping of mules, granting appointments, request to process deeds for lands in favor of the Richardson Construction Company. / Telegramas entre el Gral. PEC, su Secretaria Particular Soledad González, particulares, Unión de Telegrafistas Nacionales, Diputados, Gobernadores, Cámara Nacional de Comercio de Oaxaca, Partido Socialista Francisco Estévez, Senadores, Gran Logia Estado de Oaxaca, personal de la Oficina de Telégrafos Nacionales, Cámara Nacional de Comercio de Durango, Presidentes Municipales, Partido Socialista Campesino de Puebla, Federación Obrera Progreso, Presidente de la Liga de Comunidades Agrarias de San Luis Potosí y Presidente de la Liga de Resistencia de Campeche, Consejo de Caballeros Kadoz de Jalisco, Comisión Liquidadora Compañía Constructora Richardson y Federación Nacional Ferrocarrilera, acerca de: adhesiones para que el personal de telegrafistas maneje el ramo postal, informe sobre aprobación de reformas constitucionales antirreeleccionistas en Mérida, Yuc.; informes sobre paz social en Chiapas, solicitud de clausura del Maratón de Baile, solicitudes de audiencia, solicitudes de ayuda para empleo, conflicto electoral en Puebla y Tlaxcala, quejas por clausura de escuelas, solicitud de remisión de naranjas, problemas por abastecimiento y proveeduría de carne, elecciones de Diputados en Morelia, Mich.; listado de telegramas enviados, notificación de haber tenido conocimiento de asuntos, solicitud de precios de tonelada de maíz, cancelación de audiencias, respuestas de enterado, notificación de envío de mulas, designación de audiencias, solicitud de tramitación de escrituras de terrenos a favor de la Compañía Constructora Richardson.
Correspondence exchanged among Misters J.M. Villatero C., David Valenzuela, Francisco Meneses and others; Miguel Velázquez, Manager of the Mexican Legation in Guatemala; Federico Hernández de León, Director of the DIARIO DE CENTROAMERICA; Filadelfo Luarca and Zacarías Cáceres, Presidents of the Party and Workers League, respectively; Guillermo Ochoa, Minister of Foreign Affairs; The Minister of Public Education, Mr. Marcial G. Salas and Gen. Obregón. The correspondence pertains to a request made to Gen. Obregón to change the Mexican consul in Retalhuleu. Package from a Guatemalan commission sending greetings to Gen. Obregón. Mr. José Prado Romaña visits with Gen. Obregón to interview him. Invitation sent to the General from the directors of the Workers League and Party to attend the festival of the Anniversary of independence. Mr. Guillermo Ochoa congratulates Gen. Obregón on his election victory and sends him the newspaper EL PATRIOTA of Retalhuleu from September 19th, 1920. The paper published a letter written by Mr. César Rijan to Gen. Fausto Ruiz, denouncing him. (Transferred to file 1, box 1, folder 3, folder 2). Mr. Ochoa also includes a record regarding his denouncement of César Rijan due to the slander he committed. Thank you letter from the President of Guatemala, Carlos Herrera, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the photographs that Gen. Obregón sent them. / Correspondencia entre los Srs. J.M. Villatero C., David Valenzuela, Francisco Meneses y otros; Miguel Velázquez, Encargado de la Legación Mexicana en Guatemala; Federico Hernández de León, Director del DIARIO DE CENTROAMERICA; Filadelfo Luarca y Zacarías Cáceres, Presidentes del Partido y de la Liga Obrera, respectivamente; Guillermo Ochoa, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores; el Ministro de Instrucción Pública, el Sr. Marcial G. Salas y el Gral. Alvaro Obregón, relativa a solicitud que se le hace al Gral. Obregón para que sea cambiado el cónsul de México en Retalhuleu; envío de una comisión de Guatemala para saludar al Gral. Obregón; visita del Sr. José Prado Romaña al Gral. Obregón para entrevistarlo. Invitación que le envían los directivos del Partido y Liga Obrera al Gral. Obregón para que asista al festejo del Aniversario de su Independencia. El Sr. Guillermo Ochoa felicita al Gral. Obregón por su triunfo electoral y le anexa el periódico EL PATRIOTA de Retalhuleu del 19 de Septiembre de 1920, que publicó una carta del Sr. César Rijan dirigida al Gral. Fausto Ruiz en su contra. (Pasó al planero 1, cajón 1, carpeta 3, folder 2). También anexa un acta sobre la denuncia que por calumnia e injurias hizo el Sr. Guillermo Ochoa contra el Sr. César Rijan. Agradecimientos del Presidente de Guatemala, Carlos Herrera y del Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores por las fotografías que les envió el Gral. Obregón.
The recent farmers' protests that erupted across several EU countries have put the EU climate debate in the limelight of the European Parliament election campaigns. From Spain to Poland, farmers have been expressing grievances over falling margins; rising costs for energy, fertilizers, and transport; increasing competition from Ukrainian imports; and complex bureaucratic procedures. Adding to those grievances are the EU's environmental regulations that, according to the farmers, put an undue burden on the agricultural sector. As these protests, which frequently turned violent, started making headlines, far-right political parties appropriated the farmers' claims in a strategic attempt to rally their support for the upcoming European Parliament elections. Since then, leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen have also publicly embraced the plight of farmers. The recent concessions to farmers' demands have, though, also raised criticism from center-left parties and climate advocacy groups. As the EU is now in full campaign mode, how does this apparent polarization around climate policies affect the upcoming European Parliament elections and the future of the EU Green Agenda? The recent backlash to environmental regulations by the farmers' protests shows how fragile the future of the EU climate agenda is. In response to these protests several EU governments have answered backtracking on various planned green commitments. In France, the government has paused the planned measures to prohibit the use of certain pesticides in agriculture as well as promised to cut taxes on diesel fuels. Similarly the German government backtracked on its decision to abolish tax exemptions for agricultural vehicles and introduced a gradual–instead of immediate--phase out of fossil fuel subsidies for farmers. Tax exemptions for fossil fuels used in agriculture have been the most common concessions across EU member states in response to the protests. Agriculture and environmental protection are two sides of the same coin—a healthy environment is a prerequisite for successful agricultural production and ensuring food security. There is a similar trajectory of concessions also at the EU level. Following the protests at the beginning of the year, in February the Commission withdrew its proposal on the sustainable use of pesticides in agriculture, described by von der Leyen herself as a "symbol of polarization." This was followed by a removal of specific goals in reducing agricultural emissions from the proposed 2040 climate roadmap. Recently, in what is seen as a campaign move from President von der Leyen, the European Commission also reversed some of its proposals to make agriculture more sustainable. It loosened some of the environmental conditionality under the Common Agricultural Policy to reduce the bureaucratic burden farmers have been complaining about. Farmers' concerns on imports from Ukraine have also struck a blow to the EU's unity to support Ukraine for "as long as it takes". France and Poland, both having highly influential agricultural national lobbies, have joined forces to push for stricter limits on Ukrainian agricultural imports. A recent compromise agreement between EU institutions will extend the current trade measures until 2025 but also expand import caps on several sensitive agricultural products, resulting in Ukraine losing €330 million per year in revenue. The driver behind the these concessions have been projections of a far-right surge among the future members of the European Parliament at the expense of center-left, green, and liberal parties. Despite farmers representing only a small percentage of the electorate, their demands enjoy support among the general public, as they relate to broader concerns of rising living costs and inflation. In order to increase their support in the upcoming elections, the far-right parties throughout Europe have put forward misleading and inaccurate narratives about 'excessive' EU climate policies and environmental regulation. Through appropriating farmers' demands they have managed to portray EU climate policies as detrimental to the livelihoods of all Europeans, fostering a wider anti-EU sentiment that can endanger further progress on the EU's climate ambitions and measures. However, the recent steps to scale down climate goals and environmental regulations to appease farmers for electoral gains might backfire in both the short- and long-term. Next to economic woes, climate change remains one of the issues EU voters are most concerned about, particularly young voters. A recent study by the Jacques Delors Center found that there is little behind the apparent "growing backlash against climate policy". The majority of voters in Germany, France, and Poland continue being concerned about the effects of climate change and therefore still support policy measures–albeit to varying degrees. The return on the investment from the so-called "von der Leyen coalition" on watering down the climate goals to win back votes from the far-right parties might therefore be minimal. Rather than competing with fringe parties by appealing to farmers, their campaigns should focus on concrete climate policy proposals that work in congruence with the concerns of a broader electorate, such as higher costs of living and energy. The return on the investment from the so-called "von der Leyen coalition" on watering down the climate goals to win back votes from the far-right parties might therefore be minimal.The European Green Deal was once a beacon of von der Leyen's Commission and the corresponding European Parliament's working coalition (European People's Party (EPP), Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), and Renew). It promised a green and just transition, though the latter part seems to have missed its target audience. Continuing to subsidize an unsustainable agricultural sector that benefits only agri-business will be to the detriment of not only the environment, but also the livelihoods of farmers and communities more broadly. In its first ever European Climate Risk Assessment, even the EU's own environmental agency emphasized that "reduction of pollution from agricultural and industrial activities should be a priority for protecting Europe's ecosystems under climate change." Agriculture and environmental protection are two sides of the same coin—a healthy environment is a prerequisite for successful agricultural production and ensuring food security. It remains to be seen how this polarization around the extent of necessary climate measures and environmental regulations will affect the results of the European Parliament elections. The latest polls show significant gains for the Identity & Democracy (ID) and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), potentially making either of them the third largest group in the European Parliament. This will not necessarily affect the formation of another center-leaning working majority. However, as the EPP has been shifting rightward on some of its positions regarding environmental legislation–the vote on the Nature Restoration Law being a case in point–adoption of further climate legislation to deliver on the European Green Deal might be up in the air. The European Parliament elections are therefore an opportunity to select leaders who can effectively address farmers' complaints while not ceding ground to the demands of the anti-establishment far-right. The EU must continue delivering on its climate commitments if it wants to build a sustainable environment and a resilient society that benefits everyone.
The recent farmers' protests that erupted across several EU countries have put the EU climate debate in the limelight of the European Parliament election campaigns. From Spain to Poland, farmers have been expressing grievances over falling margins; rising costs for energy, fertilizers, and transport; increasing competition from Ukrainian imports; and complex bureaucratic procedures. Adding to those grievances are the EU's environmental regulations that, according to the farmers, put an undue burden on the agricultural sector. As these protests, which frequently turned violent, started making headlines, far-right political parties appropriated the farmers' claims in a strategic attempt to rally their support for the upcoming European Parliament elections. Since then, leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen have also publicly embraced the plight of farmers. The recent concessions to farmers' demands have, though, also raised criticism from center-left parties and climate advocacy groups. As the EU is now in full campaign mode, how does this apparent polarization around climate policies affect the upcoming European Parliament elections and the future of the EU Green Agenda? The recent backlash to environmental regulations by the farmers' protests shows how fragile the future of the EU climate agenda is. In response to these protests several EU governments have answered backtracking on various planned green commitments. In France, the government has paused the planned measures to prohibit the use of certain pesticides in agriculture as well as promised to cut taxes on diesel fuels. Similarly the German government backtracked on its decision to abolish tax exemptions for agricultural vehicles and introduced a gradual–instead of immediate--phase out of fossil fuel subsidies for farmers. Tax exemptions for fossil fuels used in agriculture have been the most common concessions across EU member states in response to the protests. Agriculture and environmental protection are two sides of the same coin—a healthy environment is a prerequisite for successful agricultural production and ensuring food security. There is a similar trajectory of concessions also at the EU level. Following the protests at the beginning of the year, in February the Commission withdrew its proposal on the sustainable use of pesticides in agriculture, described by von der Leyen herself as a "symbol of polarization." This was followed by a removal of specific goals in reducing agricultural emissions from the proposed 2040 climate roadmap. Recently, in what is seen as a campaign move from President von der Leyen, the European Commission also reversed some of its proposals to make agriculture more sustainable. It loosened some of the environmental conditionality under the Common Agricultural Policy to reduce the bureaucratic burden farmers have been complaining about. Farmers' concerns on imports from Ukraine have also struck a blow to the EU's unity to support Ukraine for "as long as it takes". France and Poland, both having highly influential agricultural national lobbies, have joined forces to push for stricter limits on Ukrainian agricultural imports. A recent compromise agreement between EU institutions will extend the current trade measures until 2025 but also expand import caps on several sensitive agricultural products, resulting in Ukraine losing €330 million per year in revenue. The driver behind the these concessions have been projections of a far-right surge among the future members of the European Parliament at the expense of center-left, green, and liberal parties. Despite farmers representing only a small percentage of the electorate, their demands enjoy support among the general public, as they relate to broader concerns of rising living costs and inflation. In order to increase their support in the upcoming elections, the far-right parties throughout Europe have put forward misleading and inaccurate narratives about 'excessive' EU climate policies and environmental regulation. Through appropriating farmers' demands they have managed to portray EU climate policies as detrimental to the livelihoods of all Europeans, fostering a wider anti-EU sentiment that can endanger further progress on the EU's climate ambitions and measures. However, the recent steps to scale down climate goals and environmental regulations to appease farmers for electoral gains might backfire in both the short- and long-term. Next to economic woes, climate change remains one of the issues EU voters are most concerned about, particularly young voters. A recent study by the Jacques Delors Center found that there is little behind the apparent "growing backlash against climate policy". The majority of voters in Germany, France, and Poland continue being concerned about the effects of climate change and therefore still support policy measures–albeit to varying degrees. The return on the investment from the so-called "von der Leyen coalition" on watering down the climate goals to win back votes from the far-right parties might therefore be minimal. Rather than competing with fringe parties by appealing to farmers, their campaigns should focus on concrete climate policy proposals that work in congruence with the concerns of a broader electorate, such as higher costs of living and energy. The return on the investment from the so-called "von der Leyen coalition" on watering down the climate goals to win back votes from the far-right parties might therefore be minimal.The European Green Deal was once a beacon of von der Leyen's Commission and the corresponding European Parliament's working coalition (European People's Party (EPP), Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), and Renew). It promised a green and just transition, though the latter part seems to have missed its target audience. Continuing to subsidize an unsustainable agricultural sector that benefits only agri-business will be to the detriment of not only the environment, but also the livelihoods of farmers and communities more broadly. In its first ever European Climate Risk Assessment, even the EU's own environmental agency emphasized that "reduction of pollution from agricultural and industrial activities should be a priority for protecting Europe's ecosystems under climate change." Agriculture and environmental protection are two sides of the same coin—a healthy environment is a prerequisite for successful agricultural production and ensuring food security. It remains to be seen how this polarization around the extent of necessary climate measures and environmental regulations will affect the results of the European Parliament elections. The latest polls show significant gains for the Identity & Democracy (ID) and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), potentially making either of them the third largest group in the European Parliament. This will not necessarily affect the formation of another center-leaning working majority. However, as the EPP has been shifting rightward on some of its positions regarding environmental legislation–the vote on the Nature Restoration Law being a case in point–adoption of further climate legislation to deliver on the European Green Deal might be up in the air. The European Parliament elections are therefore an opportunity to select leaders who can effectively address farmers' complaints while not ceding ground to the demands of the anti-establishment far-right. The EU must continue delivering on its climate commitments if it wants to build a sustainable environment and a resilient society that benefits everyone.
An upcoming electoral contest with a backstory became even more interesting last week, driven by a rare political opportunity – an open judgeship, with this on the state's highest court, no less.Due to a reapportionment itself controversial because it involved Republicans essentially surrendering a safe seat on the Louisiana Supreme Court, a new majority-minority district without an incumbent that split Monroe and moved south into splitting Baton Rouge attracted three black Democrats in a race this fall. One, First Circuit Court of Appeals Judge John Michael Guidry, was getting a second shot at a spot on the state's highest court after having run a strong campaign almost a decade ago in a different district that was not M/M. Terms that don't come up often (of ten years length), an age limit of 70, and that incumbents basically never lose means his second chance is extraordinary.
Guidry, backed by business interests, almost found himself the winner by default almost immediately after qualifying. Someone connected with Guidry sued to remove the other two candidates from the ballot, Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Marcus Hunter and Louisiana Housing Corporation Chief of Staff Leslie Chambers, who is drawing support from trial lawyer interests. Both were argued not to have paid state income taxes in the past, where legally they must have done so to file candidacies, and also that Chambers wasn't domiciled in the district.
Democrat District Court Judge Don Johnson didn't boot either off the ballot, despite that indisputably both had returns filed late and not received by the state prior to qualifying. Both argued that they thought the reruns had been accepted, even though Hunter had two years' worth filed the day before qualifying began. But ever since the Supreme Court allowed Democrat former Shreveport Mayor Adrian Perkins to stay on the ballot despite falsely attesting to a majority of queries on his qualification papers for a reelection attempt in 2022, it has become difficult to disqualify anyone.
This isn't the only questionable financial matter Hunter has found himself involved with. In 2019, at a tax sale he bought a distressed property at 114 Texas St., Shreveport. The building, in place since at least the last decade of the 19th century and 80 years later was a popular entertainment venue, had been vacant for over two decades. At the time of purchase, it had deteriorated to the point potentially it could not be salvaged.
Hunter then did nothing with the property for three years, although he said he had plans to convert it to low-income housing financed through the LHC, prior to Chambers' association with it. Back then, his ally Stephen Jackson, now a Democrat state representative, sat on the LHC Board of Directors then representing that area as a parish commissioner; since his election to the Legislature, he was replaced. Jackson himself made news, that he rather would not have, by his conviction last year before his election of impersonating a police officer and still has ongoing legal problems set for adjudicating.
By Jun., 2022 the Shreveport Historic Preservation Commission recommended demolition as Hunter apparently dithered. Then, in Sep., 2022 the building mostly burned, from a fire that looked to be arson, perhaps started by vagrants but never determined. The city began demolition proceedings that Hunter opposed, but which a court ordered in October that happened shortly thereafter. The lot now sits empty, still owned by a partnership registered at Hunter's Monroe address with seemingly no plans afoot for it.
Judicial contests in Louisiana can turn on unusual circumstances, since in theory the job involves judicial decisions, not policy-making, that leave voters in a vacuum of information about how well someone will serve on the bench, with only a policy-making cue, party label, to guide them. As well, unlike candidates for legislative and executive offices or appointees, judicial candidates don't have to file public financial disclosure information, so only rarely does the public get an idea about their financial dealings.
If those campaigning on behalf of his opponents (technically, judicial candidates can't conduct their own campaigns, so surrogates do so) want to paint Hunter, a former state representative who, as many lawyers in the chamber desire, escaped to the much higher-paid/full-time job of judge, as sloppy with financial affairs as a means of casting doubt on his competence as a jurist, he certainly has given them the ammunition to do so.
In this exceptional electoral year, with more than 4 billion people set to go to the polls around the world, European citizens expressed their political preferences for the renewal of the European Parliament last 6-9 June. These were expected to be landmark elections, mainly for the possibility that far-right political forces could shake the set-up of the European parliamentary assembly.An increased role for Europe The unprecedented "Europeanisation" of the electoral campaigns around Europe speaks volumes about the role the European Union has assumed in the daily lives of European citizens, especially in the face of recent challenges such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the war on Ukraine. In fact, the media attention devoted to the elections in many European countries has been high, and European citizens have shown increased interest in them, with the turnout reaching 51 per cent, the highest of the latest 20 years.[1] Indeed, the actual results had a significant impact: nationally, in particular in France, which is still struggling with the consequences of a political crisis, and in Germany, where a crisis is looming on the horizon; on political alliances within the European Parliament; on the balance of power within European institutions; and, last but not least, on the EU's political agenda.The national repercussions Looking at national outcomes, polarisation, fragmentation and populism seem to be common trends across EU member states. In France, following the significant result of Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella's Rassemblement National (about 10 million votes) and the brave (hazardous for some) decision by President Emmanuel Macron to call anticipated national elections, there is still a high level of uncertainty about the formation of a new government. Set aside the scenario of a "cohabitation" with a government led by RN, with much relief by many around Europe, the prospect of a government supported by a varied coalition (more left-wing or moderate depending on the alliances) is still to materialise. Certainly, it would ensure some continuity in France's foreign and European policies, but it is destined to face stability issues. In Germany, the European elections confirmed the trend of a considerable support for hard-right populist parties: despite criminal allegations against Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) leaders (which led Le Pen to break with them at European level), the party still managed to obtain a considerable share of votes. Berlin has now to deal with a political system that is increasingly fragmented, making stable coalitions difficult. This is already affecting the resilience of the current coalition government led by Olaf Scholz, and the situation will probably get worse after the three regional elections coming up in September. France and Germany, the two largest member states, have been shaken by these EU elections, which will probably lead the respective governments to focus more on domestic politics at the expense of their role at EU level. High polarisation between pro and anti-European forces characterised also the elections in Poland, where the centre-right pro-EU Civic Coalition won, but pro-EU forces' advantage over nationalists decreased (it went down from 11 to 2 per cent). Nevertheless, the election strengthened the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk's position, nationally and at European level, which further alimented the government's ambition for a closer cooperation with Germany and France in the Weimar triangle format.The cordon sanitaire in the European Parliament In the European Parliament, a centrist, moderate, pro-European coalition has emerged, formed by the European People's Party (EPP), the Socialists and Democrats, the Liberals and the Greens. This same coalition has elected Ursula von der Leyen for her second term as President of the European Commission with a comfortable majority of 401 votes. Almost all the extremist parties voted against her, marking a clear diving line between the majority and the opposition. The vote of no confidence declared by Fratelli d'Italia – the party of Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni – only after the announcement of the results of the ballot in Strasbourg came as a surprise, given the close relationship built in the past months between Meloni and von der Leyen, von der Leyen's embrace of Meloni's stance on migration and Meloni's helping hand in neutralising Viktor Orbán's opposition to EU's sanctions against Russia and aid for Ukraine. With this vote, the Italian leader confined her party to the opposition at the EU level, thus abandoning her pragmatic approach towards Europe and her bridging role between the conservatives and the radicals in the European right. At the same time, Meloni saw her ambition to unify the far right in the European Parliament breaking into pieces with the move of her (supposed) allies Le Pen, Orbán and Matteo Salvini, who joined forces in the newly formed group "Patriots for Europe", and AfD leading the group "Europe of Sovereign Nations". If we consider that a cordon sanitaire has prevented representatives of these two groups to take relevant positions in the European Parliament's committees, we can safely say that the immediate risk of a radicalisation of the assembly has been avoided once again.The balance in the European Council and the new Commission's agenda And yet, the impact of the latest elections on the EU in the medium term should not be underestimated. In the European Parliament, much will depend on the EPP and its potential opening to Meloni's European Conservatives and Reformists on specific agenda issues. In the European Council, the influence of right-wing and far-right political forces has grown, either because they lead national executives or because they play a greater role at national level, while the influence of France and Germany may be reduced by their governments' weakened positions. With a less progressive European Parliament, implementing institutional reforms is going to be challenging, also considering the increase in the number of veto players. In this scenario, the re-election of von der Leyen at the helm of the European Commission supported by a pro-EU majority is positive, but her agenda for the next legislature will inevitably lean righter than her previous one. We have seen some anticipations in the months leading to the European elections. Reading von der Leyen's political guidelines 2024–29,[2] we notice that some of the requests of the progressive political forces have been incorporated, such as the attention to the social fairness dimension, the confirmation of the climate commitments and a tough stance on rule of law. However, the greatest attention is paid to issues that are prominent among the EPP's and more generally conservatives' priorities, especially when it comes to defence, competitiveness and migration. On defence, we will see a clear dive towards a European Defence Union, increased budgetary resources for military expenditures, reinforcement of the European pillar of NATO, continued support for Ukraine. Competitiveness and growth will become the new mantra that will supersede and incorporate green transition targets, and will bring with it a focus on the completion of the single market and the development of trade defence instruments. Finally, external aspects of migration, especially border control, will be at the frontline of the EU's migration policy.Looking ahead Crisis after crisis, the EU has proved its resilience by adapting its institutions and policies. The latest elections have tested once again the capacity of the EU to maintain an integrationist core despite the tendency to political radicalisation emerged in many member states. However, the changing political environment at national level will inevitably affect the centre of gravity of the EU's political agenda and the balance of power between its institutions. And all of these will have to be tested against the evolutions of the international environment, starting with the next US elections in November and the development on the battlefield in Ukraine. The new EU will definitely survive, but will it be able to thrive?Nicoletta Pirozzi is Institutional Relations Manager and Head of the EU, Politics and Institutions programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] European Parliament website: European Elections 2024: Election Results: Turnout, https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/turnout.[2] Ursula von der Leyen, Europe's Choice. Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024−2029, 18 July 2024, https://commission.europa.eu/media/58570_en.
The purpose of this article is to analyse the content of the projects substantiating the autonomy of the Urals and the composition of its territories reviewed by the Provisional Regional Government of the Urals (PRGU) in 1918. The presence of theses regarding the formation of a special Ural identity in them gives the study relevance not only due to an extremely fragmented coverage of these projects in the previous historiography but also in terms of filling the gaps in the history of the formation of the special regional social and political thought of the Urals in the context of the PRGU's coalition activity. Also, it is interesting to consider the projects from the point of view of the continuity of territorial planning practices by Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. To analyse the content and compare projects with each other to identify similarities, differences, and traces of manifestation of regional ideas, the author considers six notes submitted to PRGU by its main departments and the final report. Also, the article refers to individual views of L. A. Krol who initiated the establishment of PRGU, reconstructed according to his memoirs and minutes of the meetings of the PRGU Commission on Borders. It transpires that not all projects contained a reflection on the subject of a special regional identity, which is the essence of regionalism since the reason for the discussions was the pragmatic need to determine the electoral system for the regional parliament. A separate and unique project by Krol, which instrumentally justified the borders of the Urals, taking into account the current, but not the future political situation, cannot be considered regional. The discussion itself where Krol's proposals were ignored characterises the PRGU as a unique coalition body for 1917–1918 based on the principles of party dialogue. ; Целью статьи является анализ содержания проектов обоснования автономии Урала и состава его территорий, рассмотренных Временным областным правительством Урала (ВОПУ) 1918 г. Наличие в них тезисов о формировании особой уральской идентичности придает исследованию актуальность не только с точки зрения крайне фрагментарной изученности указанных проектов предшествующей историографией, но и в плане восполнения пробелов в истории формирования особой областнической общественно-политической мысли Урала в контексте деятельности коалиции ВОПУ. Обращение к проектам интересно и с точки зрения преемственности практик территориального планирования советской и постсоветской Россией. Для анализа содержания и сравнения проектов с целью выявления сходств, различий и следов проявления областнических идей рассмотрено шесть записок, поданных в ВОПУ его главными управлениями, и итоговый доклад. Исследуются также взгляды инициатора создания ВОПУ Л. А. Кроля, реконструируемые по его мемуарам и протоколам заседаний комиссии ВОПУ по границам. Выяснено, что не все проекты содержали рефлексию на предмет особой региональной идентичности, составляющей суть областничества, поскольку причиной дискуссий являлась прагматическая необходимость определить избирательную систему для регионального парламента. Отдельный и уникальный проект Кроля, инструментально обосновывавший границы Урала с учетом текущей, а не будущей политической конъюнктуры, областническим считать нельзя. Сама дискуссия, где предложения Кроля игнорировались, характеризует ВОПУ как уникальный для 1917–1918 гг. коалиционный орган на принципах партийного диалога.
Поступила в редакцию: 03.10.2019. Принята к печати: 15.12.2020. ; Submitted: 03.10.2019. Accepted: 15.12.2020. ; Целью статьи является анализ содержания проектов обоснования автономии Урала и состава его территорий, рассмотренных Временным областным правительством Урала (ВОПУ) 1918 г. Наличие в них тезисов о формировании особой уральской идентичности придает исследованию актуальность не только с точки зрения крайне фрагментарной изученности указанных проектов предшествующей историографией, но и в плане восполнения пробелов в истории формирования особой областнической общественно-политической мысли Урала в контексте деятельности коалиции ВОПУ. Обращение к проектам интересно и с точки зрения преемственности практик территориального планирования советской и постсоветской Россией. Для анализа содержания и сравнения проектов с целью выявления сходств, различий и следов проявления областнических идей рассмотрено шесть записок, поданных в ВОПУ его главными управлениями, и итоговый доклад. Исследуются также взгляды инициатора создания ВОПУ Л. А. Кроля, реконструируемые по его мемуарам и протоколам заседаний комиссии ВОПУ по границам. Выяснено, что не все проекты содержали рефлексию на предмет особой региональной идентичности, составляющей суть областничества, поскольку причиной дискуссий являлась прагматическая необходимость определить избирательную систему для регионального парламента. Отдельный и уникальный проект Кроля, инструментально обосновывавший границы Урала с учетом текущей, а не будущей политической конъюнктуры, областническим считать нельзя. Сама дискуссия, где предложения Кроля игнорировались, характеризует ВОПУ как уникальный для 1917–1918 гг. коалиционный орган на принципах партийного диалога. ; The purpose of this article is to analyse the content of the projects substantiating the autonomy of the Urals and the composition of its territories reviewed by the Provisional Regional Government of the Urals (PRGU) in 1918. The presence of theses regarding the formation of a special Ural identity in them gives the study relevance not only due to an extremely fragmented coverage of these projects in the previous historiography but also in terms of filling the gaps in the history of the formation of the special regional social and political thought of the Urals in the context of the PRGU's coalition activity. Also, it is interesting to consider the projects from the point of view of the continuity of territorial planning practices by Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. To analyse the content and compare projects with each other to identify similarities, differences, and traces of manifestation of regional ideas, the author considers six notes submitted to PRGU by its main departments and the final report. Also, the article refers to individual views of L. A. Krol who initiated the establishment of PRGU, reconstructed according to his memoirs and minutes of the meetings of the PRGU Commission on Borders. It transpires that not all projects contained a reflection on the subject of a special regional identity, which is the essence of regionalism since the reason for the discussions was the pragmatic need to determine the electoral system for the regional parliament. A separate and unique project by Krol, which instrumentally justified the borders of the Urals, taking into account the current, but not the future political situation, cannot be considered regional. The discussion itself where Krol's proposals were ignored characterises the PRGU as a unique coalition body for 1917–1918 based on the principles of party dialogue.
Telegrams exchanged between Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles and the following people: State secretaries, private citizens, Governors, the Insurance Company "La Mutualista", Mayors, the Mixtec Socialist Party, the Border Socialist Party, the Light and Mills Company of Nixtamal from the Federal District, the San Blas of Oaxaca Farmers Party, the Ejidatarios of San Juan Santa María Pungarabato, Guerrero; the Border Socialist Party from Tamaulipas, the Socialist Revolutionary Party from Chiapas, the Commission of the United Guards, the Hidalgo Socialist Party, the orphans of the La Luz Orphanage in Guadalajara, and the New Generation Party. The aforementioned telegrams concern the regulations to electricity billing, a mediation to protect the rights of the university workers in case of a breach of the collective agreement by the employer, squatting by Agrarian supporters, a request to repeal taxes on bars of the border area, a request for pardon of tax payment to the Salt manufacturers Coop, complaints about land seizure, requests for appointments, an offer presented by an insurance company to provide life insurance to the National Military staff, a report on the application of the law that restricts the number of priests, a request to continue the works of improving Tantoyuca, Veracruz, provision of guaranties, complaints about abuses of authority by the Judicial Police, election processes and endorsement to various candidates, complaints about the firing of workers at the Nixtamal Light and Mills Company, a request to restore lands, a request for financial assistance to orphans and gratitude for the financial aid provided to the typist who won the National Championship of Typing. / Telegramas entre el Gral. PEC y Secretarios de Estado, particulares, Gobernadores, Compañía de Seguros "La Mutualista", Presidentes Municipales, Partido Socialista Mixteco, Partido Socialista Fronterizo, Compañía de Luz y Molinos de Nixtamal del Distrito Federal, Partido Agricultores San Blas de Oaxaca, ejidatarios de San Juan Santa María Pungarabato, Gro.; Partido Socialista Fronterizo de Tamaulipas, Partido Socialista Revolucionario de Chiapas, Comisión Unión Veladores, Partido Socialista Hidalgo, Huérfanos del Orfanatorio de la Luz en Guadalajara y Partido Nueva Generación, acerca de: regulación en el pago de tarifas de luz eléctrica, intervención para que no se lesionen los derechos de los trabajadores universitarios al romper el contrato colectivo por parte de las autoridades, invasiones de agraristas, solicitud de suspensión de impuestos sobre cantinas de la zona fronteriza, solicitud de condonación de impuesto a cooperativa de salineros, quejas por despojo de tierras, solicitudes de audiencia, ofrecimiento de compañía de seguros para asegurar al personal del Ejército Nacional, informe sobre la aplicación de la ley que restringe el número de sacerdotes, solicitud de que prosigan trabajos de mejoramiento en Tantoyuca, Ver.; impartición de garantías, denuncios de abusos de policía judicial, procesos electorales y apoyo a candidaturas, denuncias por despido de obreros en la Compañía Luz y Molinos Nixtamal, solicitud de restitución de tierras, solicitud de ayuda económica para huérfanos y agradecimiento por el apoyo económico dado al mecanógrafo que ganó el Campeonato Nacional de Mecanografía.
"Telegrams exchanged between President Alvaro Obregón and Adolfo de la Huerta concerning the conditions of the agrarian debt with Spain; the situation of the American recognition and constitution of the Commission for the legitimation of the Bucareli agreements and the measurements to be taken in order to reduce expenses of the public expenditure. Telegram from Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles, Secretary of the Interior to Gen. Alvaro Obregón informing of the telegram he sent to Adolfo de la Huerta expressing his dissatisfaction with the Executive Branch's handling of election issues in San Luis Potosí and Nuevo Léon, which brought about his resignation from his position as Secretary of Finance and Public Credit. Gen. Calles' reply states that support to his friend and boss prevails above all issues. Telegram from Fernando Torreblanca to Gen. Alvaro Obregón asking if it is convenient to present the proposal of the Oil Bill. Telegram from Gen. Alvaro Obregón to Engr. Alberto J. Pani, Secretary of Finance commanding him to repeal the bill proposed to create the Unique Bank, because it does not fulfill the requirements of the legal and constitutional framework and because it would be equivalent to hand over the nation's economy to a group of foreigners. Telegram from Roberto V. Pesqueira to Alvaro Obregón requesting him to command actions so that misters Vargas and Hinojosa return funds to "La Monetaria" to avoid serious problems. / Telegramas entre el Presidente Alvaro Obregón y Adolfo de la Huerta, en los que tratan las condiciones de la deuda agraria con España; las condiciones para el reconocimiento norteamericano e integración de la Comisión para la formalización de los acuerdos de Bucareli y las medidas que deberían adoptarse para economizar los gastos del erario público. Telegrama del Gral. Plutarco Elías Calles, Secretario de Gobernación al Gral. Alvaro Obregón, en el que informa del telegrama que le envió Adolfo de la Huerta notificándole su inconformidad por el tratamiento dado por el Ejecutivo a los problemas electorales en San Luis Potosí y Nuevo León y como respuesta a ello su renuncia como Secretario de Hacienda. La respuesta del Gral. Calles es que en toda circunstancia hay que apoyar al amigo y jefe. Telegrama de Fernando Torreblanca al Gral. Alvaro Obregón consultándole sobre la conveniencia de presentar el dictamen sobre la ley petrolera. Telegrama del Gral. Alvaro Obregón al Ing. Alberto J. Pani, Secretario de Hacienda, ordenándole rechace el proyecto formulado para la creación del Banco Unico por apartarse del marco constitucional y porque equivaldría a entregar las finanzas del país a un grupo de extranjeros. Telegrama de Roberto V. Pesqueira a Alvaro Obregón en que le informa que Thomas W. Lamont está sorprendido por la inconsistencia de Adolfo de la Huerta y argumenta que Pani nunca obstruyó su labor. Telegrama de Santa Ana Almada Jr. al Gral. Obregón, solicitándole emita una orden para que los señores Vargas e Hinojosa regresen los fondos ""a la Monetaria"" para evitar mayor alarma."
The current global economic crisis is exposing a concomitant yet deeper governability crisis in the developed world. As anti-incumbent sentiment sweeps Europe, Americans are recovering from a relentlessly destructive Republican primary season is over and bracing themselves for the upcoming election season, which may arguably be the most important in our lifetime. The federal government is paralyzed by deep and irreconcilable views on how to solve the problems of huge sovereign debt, a gaping budget deficit, the cost of health care and immigration reform, to name some of the most salient issues. Controversial federal and state legislation aimed at solving these problems is increasingly being challenged at the Supreme Court, where nine unelected judges will determine their constitutionality. Globalization has produced a special set of challenges: an open world economy has forced governments to maintain fiscal stability over the long term in order to maintain the value of their currencies and stock markets, as well as access to credit. At the same time, advanced democracies are facing the limits of the welfare state, as well as demographic pressures as baby boomers retire; and immigrants (who could provide part of the solution to some of those problems) are less welcome today than ever. Trust in politicians, elected officials and major institutions, has declined steadily over the last twenty-five years; it is not by coincidence that this spreading disillusionment with the democratic order affects not only Europe but also the United States. The recent turnover of governments in Europe, and the polarization of American politics reveal an alarming lack of confidence in democracy and its institutions. This cynicism is growing: indeed, the question is no longer whether the government is sufficiently responsive to the demands and interests of citizens, but whether, in a context of global pressures, it is in fact capable of effectively solving the current problems. In the United States, widespread skepticism now extends to all formal institutions of governance, not only elected ones but even unelected ones. This sentiment is especially problematic and indicative of a very entrenched distrust that will not be easily dispelled. Only ten years ago, political scientists found that in spite of disenchantment with politicians and elected officials, Americans still had a strong respect for the Armed Forces, the Federal Reserve Bank and the Supreme Court. They had concluded that this was due to the fact that these bodies were insulated from populist pressures and the omnipresent poll. More recently, however, studies by Ronald Inglehart and others have found a severe decrease in public confidence in the Armed Services, the Judiciary, police, civil service and state legislatures. It is one thing for people to blame the current government for economic crisis; it is quite different if this skepticism extends beyond incumbents to the formal institutions of governance. Today, Americans are challenging the very constitutional premises on which the country was founded, namely, diffusion of power and checks and balances. The perceived (and factual) decline in capacity of political agents to act on behalf of citizens' interests and demands is due mostly to the forces of globalization and interdependence which have led to reduced effectiveness in public policy. Incongruence between the diktat of international markets and domestic needs has put constraints on political agents' actions. But there are other factors that need to be considered as well, namely, failure in political leadership, bad judgment on the part of voters and elected officials, the deterioration of social capital and a media that provokes rather than informs. How are politicians and political parties responding to this rising trend of dissatisfaction and anger? By following every poll, seeking lobbyists' approval and changing their positions daily to adapt them to the latest voters' opinions. This is weakening representative democracy and distorting the democratic process. Congressional inability to compromise and solve the problems results in the judicialization of politics as the two ideological camps increasingly rely on judicial review as the alternative. This is turn leads inevitably to the politicization of the Judiciary. The whole Constitutional architecture that was built around diffusion of power, checks and balances and fear of accumulation of power in any one branch of government is now being challenged by the protections given to individual interest groups and by ceding too much power to unelected, nominally non-ideological Supreme Court judges. Unfortunately, the current Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roberts has made its mark on politics early on by its Citizens United v. Federal Electoral Commission decision, which has allowed indirect, unlimited political contributions by corporations and unions, thereby further entrenching corporate power into the political system. Another good example of the judicialization of politics is the bitter debate surrounding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act passed by Congress in 2010, before the legislative election deprived Democrats of the ability to pass any other significant piece of legislation. In a cumbersome process that involved hundreds of lobbies from the grassroots as well as health insurance companies, hospitals and doctors, the administration was able to hammer out a compromise that met some of the basic requirements of patients and consumer groups, as well as the market-based method preferred by the rest o the coalition. The result was a law that was passed in spite of the negative vote of all Republicans in both Houses. It is based on a central pillar to reduce national health care costs: every citizen not covered by an employer or government plan must buy health insurance (so as to avoid the free rider problem of consuming without paying). The constitutionality of this law, main parts of which have not yet entered into force, was immediately challenged by 27 states as well as other organizations and individuals, and is now under Supreme Court review. The complexity of the issue and the polarized atmosphere surrounding it may well sway judges to exert their (ideological) "will" rather than their (objective) "judgment", to paraphrase Hamilton's warning, thus delivering an important political victory for Republicans this summer, at the height of the presidential campaign season. Conversely, a virulent anti-immigrant law passed by the state of Arizona is also being challenged before the Supreme Court. In this case it was the other side, the Justice Department, which sued over the right of states to pass immigration legislation, which is generally construed as a federal policy. Immigration will be a central issue in the coming presidential election, so the Court's ruling will again inevitably have political ramifications.In the XIX and XX centuries, The Leviathan state managed the process of modernization and industrialization and represented a shift from culturally- based decentralized institutions, whose legitimacy emanated from tradition, to state institutions deriving their authority from rational-legal instruments. Today we are experiencing a decline of state authority in a new context of globalization and open societies, and the trend is again toward decentralization of authority, focus on individual rights and less hierarchical, more market-oriented societal practices, that have yet to produce a new political order. Unfortunately, the "intermediary associations" of civil society that Alexis de Tocqueville identified as the main repository of democracy in America, are becoming less active, due to the increased post-modern individualism, itself reinforced by the technological revolution and by a cultural anarchy that demands the "democratization of everything"(think Wiki leaks, hacking, intellectual property piracy). An authority system linked to a stable culture which in turn is anchored on a moral code, breeds trust and generates internalized support. The current economic crisis, in the context of the highest income inequality in the history of the United States, has led to a revival of ideological rhetoric and endless partisan conflict, which erodes faith in the system as a whole. It is in moments like this that civil society becomes most relevant. Extreme capitalism has led to extreme individualism and lack of societal solidarity. Abundant resources allowed the social balance to tilt in favor of individual rights and entitlements and away from social responsibility. The present crisis may help restore that balance as individuals realize that the state has exhausted its capability for further entitlements and that society will have to rebuild its social capital to fill the void.
Telegrams exchanged between Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles and the following people: his personal secretary, Soledad González, private citizens, the Council of Public Welfare, the Parents Revolutionary Front, Governors, Congressmen, the President of the Chamber of Representatives, Fernando Moctezuma, the Union of Train Workers, the Confederation of Working Classes, the Female workers and peasants from Tepic, Nayarit, Agrarian Committees from Ixtlán, Nayarit, the Mexican Development Company. Ltd., Mayors, the President of the Agrarian Commission from Huescalapa, Jalisco, and Senators. The aforementioned telegrams concern the distribution of melon seeds sacks, personal matters; Chapultepec Mill matters; the Parents Revolutionary Front states that the Students' Movement from Jalisco is not reactionary, confirming the shut-down of rice exports operations, a notice stating that the memorial monument to Leonor's tomb is about to be ready; endorsement of Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles for his handling of the students' movement in Jalisco, requests for appointments; a request by the Union of Train Workers for not removing Superintendent Antonio E. Vera; election conflict in Nayarit; inauguration of a school in Tampico; Confirming the social peace in Chiapas; information about the news on the resignation of the Adviser of the Department of the Treasure in the United States, a request to ban the free importation of wheat; the Agrarian Committees from Ixtlán, Nayarit complain about the governor's abuses of authority; a report on the experimental station to grow trees, a request for a recommendation to get a bank loan; an invitation to the oil and water color paintings exhibit by María Izquierdo, Get-well greetings to Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles and a request to receive gold bars to be delivered at the Banco de México. / Telegramas entre el Gral. PEC, su Secretaria Particular Soledad González, particulares, Junta de Beneficencia Pública, Frente Revolucionario de Padres de Familia, Gobernadores, Diputados, Presidente de la Cámara de Diputados Fernando Moctezuma, Sindicato Gremial Trenista, Federación de Clases Trabajadoras, Obreras y Campesinas de Tepic, Nay.; Comités Agrarios de Ixtlán, Nay.; Compañía Desarrolladora Mexicana, S.A., Presidentes Municipales, Presidente de la Comisión Agraria de Huescalapa, Jal. y Senadores, acerca de: distribución de costales de semilla de melón, asuntos particulares, gestiones Fábrica Chapultepec, el Frente Revolucionario de Padres de Familia menciona que el movimiento estudiantil de Jalisco no es reaccionario, notificación de cierre de operaciones de exportación de arroz, notificación informando que el monumento de la tumba de Leonor está por terminarse, adhesiones al Gral. PEC por actitud en movimiento estudiantil de Jalisco, solicitudes de audiencia, solicitud del Sindicato Gremial Trenista para que no sea removido de su puesto el Superintendente Antonio E. Vera, conflicto electoral en Nayarit, inauguración de escuela en Tampico, notificación de paz social en Chiapas, informe de noticia sobre la renuncia del Consejero del Departamento del Tesoro de Estados Unidos, solicitud de que se impida la libre importación de trigo, protestas de Comités Agrarios de Ixtlán, Nay. contra actos violatorios del Gobernador, informe sobre estación experimental para el cultivo de árboles, solicitud de ayuda para crédito bancario, invitación a exposición de óleos y acuarelas de María Izquierdo, deseos de pronto restablecimiento al Gral. PEC y solicitud de recepción de barras de oro destinadas al Banco de México.
"Correspondence between José Inocente Lugo, B.A., Undersecretary of the Interior, and Gen. Alvaro Obregón, concerning the dissolution and restoration of the City Council of Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche. Lugo, B.A., asks for a meeting with Gen. Obregón. Lugo, B.A., recommends Professor Ausencio Naranjo for a job. Lugo, B.A., transcribes his message to the Secretariat of War and Navy, related to the report about Gen. Múgica's attitude on the City Council of Morelia, Michoacán; report of some people that plan to assassinate Gen. Obregón. Lugo, B.A., announces that Senator Carlos B. Zetina will accompany them during the visit to the "Excelsior" Footwear Factory. Lugo, B.A., sends the response of the Governor of the State of Mexico regarding the elections; sends a copy of the memorandum addressed to the National Agrarian Commission and the Ministry of the Interior, the landowners in Morelos, who request to promote industrial wealth and the solution of the agrarian problems. Gen. Alvaro Obregón tells J.I. Lugo, B.A., that the law promulgated by the Carranza government does not allow freedom of suffrage. Reply indicating that it will be repealed. Lugo, B.A., informs Gen. Obregón of the political situation in the State of Campeche and transcribes a message from the Mexican Consul in Laredo, Texas announcing Governor elect of Texas trip to Mexico. Gen. Obregón transcribes and addresses to J.I. Lugo, B.A the message from Engr. Pascual Ortiz Rubio, informing that his brothers were taken prisoners by members of the Mugiquista Party in Morelia and asks for their help releasing them. File L-36 / Correspondencia entre el Lic. José Inocente Lugo, Subsecretario de Gobernación y el Gral. Alvaro Obregón, relativa a la disolución y restauración del Ayuntamiento de Ciudad del Carmen, Camp. El Lic. Lugo solicita una entrevista al Gral. Obregón. El Lic. Lugo recomienda al Prof. Ausencio Naranjo para un empleo. El Lic. Lugo transcribe su mensaje a la Secretaría de Guerra y Marina, relativo al informe sobre la actitud del Gral. Múgica en el Ayuntamiento de Morelia, Mich.; informa de unas personas que piensan atentar en contra de la vida del Gral. Obregón. El Lic. Lugo comunica que el Senador Carlos B. Zetina los acompañará en la visita que tendrá lugar en la Fábrica de Calzado ""Excelsior"". El Lic. Lugo envía la respuesta del Gobernador del Estado de México sobre el asunto de las elecciones; envía copia del memorándum que dirigieron a la Comisión Nacional Agraria y a la Secretaría de Gobernación los hacendados de Morelos, quienes solicitan se promueva la riqueza industrial y la solución de los problemas agrarios. El Gral. Alvaro Obregón indica al Lic. J.I. Lugo que la ley electoral promulgada por el gobierno de Carranza no permite la libertad del sufragio. Respuesta indicando que será derogada. El Lic. Lugo informa al Gral. Obregón sobre la situación política en el estado de Campeche y transcribe mensaje del Cónsul de México en Laredo, Tex. informándole sobre el viaje a México del Gobernador electo de Texas. El Gral. Obregón transcribe al Lic. J.I. Lugo el mensaje del Ing. Pascual Ortiz Rubio, informando que sus hermanos fueron hechos prisioneros por miembros del Partido Mugiquista en Morelia y solicita su participación para liberarlos. Exp. L-36"
The EU Council summit of December 14-15 offered a significant, if perhaps mainly symbolic, gesture toward Ukraine in agreeing to the formal opening of accession negotiations. But at the same meeting, the bloc failed to approve financial (not military) support for Ukraine for the four-year period through 2027, amounting to 50 billion euros. Approval of this aid was vetoed by Hungary. Thus, a very muddled message about how EU countries are dealing with the Ukraine war issue, nearly two years from the start of the Russian invasion in Feb. 2022. Supporters of the aid package have agreed to take it up again in January, and, if necessary, to get commitments from the 26 supporters of the package to provide the funding for Ukraine bilaterally, rather than as part of the EU budget. In the lead-up to the meeting, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban pledged to block both the opening of accession talks and the financial aid package. In the end, he left the room just before the vote to open accession talks was held. He may have done so because, days before the Council meeting, the Commission unblocked 10 billion euros of funding for Hungary that had been suspended because of Hungary's failure to meet EU rule-of-law standards. In acquiescing to the opening of accession talks for Ukraine, Orban is very much aware that the process will require unanimous approval by the Council at many junctures ahead. Moreover, it may be very protracted: accession talks are still ongoing with North Macedonia (since 2020), Montenegro (2012), Serbia (2014) and Albania (2022). But the war aid issue is much more urgent. According to the Kiel Institute's Ukraine assistance scorecard, the EU institutions have been to date by far the largest provider of financial support to Ukraine. The IMF has cautioned that even a brief delay in providing this support could potentially destabilize Ukraine's precarious fiscal situation and the provision of essential services to its people. The mood in Europe shifting?Efforts to persuade Orban to end his opposition to the Ukraine aid package could well produce results in time for a January reconsideration, but the optics of the EU hesitations are not good, coming as they do in lockstep with those of Washington. These developments have been widely depicted in Western media as a failure of President Zelensky's personal lobbying efforts to unblock essential U.S. and EU aid before the end of 2023. Hungary was alone in open opposition to the two measures of support for Ukraine. It is nevertheless clear that the mood in Europe has turned cooler on Ukraine, given the Eurozone's weak economic performance and the failure of the counteroffensive to make any significant territorial gains. The recent electoral success of the populist, Euro-skeptic Freedom Party in the Netherlands, whose leader Geert Wilders has long opposed military aid to Ukraine, can be interpreted as part of a trend toward Ukraine fatigue in Europe. On the other side of the ledger, pro-European and pro-Ukraine Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who led liberal forces to victory in October against the nationalist-populist former ruling party, made his inaugural appearance at the Council summit and firmly aligned himself against Orban. Although French President Emmanuel Macron had also personally lobbied Orban to change his position, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz claimed credit for persuading him to leave the room when the accession vote was about to be taken. Interpreting the accession decision— strategic intent and economic constraintsThe EU Council voted unanimously to open EU accession talks with Ukraine for "strategic" reasons — because not doing so would have been seen as a rebuke to Ukraine's deepest aspirations. The appeal of this message of encouragement to Ukraine apparently was enough to assuage the worries in several member states in Central and Eastern Europe about the potential impact on their own national economics of eventual EU membership for Ukraine. A leaked internal analysis from the Commission estimates the budgetary impacts of an EU enlarged to include Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and six western Balkans states. By far the most significant impact would be due to Ukraine's accession. The study found that EU agricultural and cohesion funds for Ukraine as an EU member would amount to 186 billion euros in the first seven years. Agricultural support to other EU members would need to fall by about a fifth, and the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta – would no longer be eligible to receive cohesion funding. Unless there were a dramatic reform of EU programs, the enlargement to include nine new members would turn several net recipient countries into net contributors to the EU budget. The politics of such a dramatic reversal of fortunes in countries accustomed to EU largesse could be difficult to manage and might well give rise to greater popular euro-skepticism. Early indications of this potential impact have arisen in Poland, where popular support for the Ukrainian war effort remains quite robust. However, the situation has been clouded since mid-2023 by emerging grievances among those affected by competition from Ukraine. Troubles arose earlier this year among Polish grain producers affected by cheaper Ukrainian grain. Since November 6, Polish truckers' grievances have erupted in protests involving hundreds of trucks at all major border crossings, bringing Ukrainian trucks' passage to a standstill. The protesters claim that a relaxation of permit requirements for Ukrainians trucks entering the EU — a measure adopted by the European Commission to support Ukraine's economy after Russia's invasion — has harmed the livelihood of Polish truckers. In recent weeks, Hungarian and Slovakian truckers have joined in blocking major border crossings with Ukraine to their respective countries. Prime Minister Donald Tusk has stated that he will end the blockade but will do so in a way that meets some of the Polish truckers' grievances. Even as a convinced European, Tusk is proceeding cautiously. The opening of accession talks is a substantial watershed for Ukraine, but it seems highly unlikely that Ukraine could accomplish the daunting agenda of legal and institutional reforms required for accession while being engaged in a full-scale military confrontation on its territory. Bulgarian regional expert Ivan Krastev argues that the providing of this long-term perspective to Ukraine in fulfillment of its aspirations to be recognized as fully European and a part of the West may induce greater willingness by Ukraine's leaders to consider pursuing a negotiated settlement. "Only strong security guarantees and a promised European future could persuade Ukrainians to accept territorial concessions at some point," he said.In other words, the promise of Europe, while genuine on its own terms, may also serve as encouragement of efforts to end the war short of the full accomplishment of Ukrainian war aims.
