Universities as Constitutional Lawmakers (And Other Hidden Actors in Our Constitutional Orders)
In: 17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law Online 1 (2014)
47356 results
Sort by:
In: 17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law Online 1 (2014)
SSRN
In: Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 42
SSRN
In: The international & comparative law quarterly: ICLQ, Volume 35, Issue 4, p. 1015-1016
ISSN: 1471-6895
In: 170 U. Pa. L. Rev. 853 (2022)
SSRN
In: 54 Saint Louis University Law Journal 997 (2010)
SSRN
In: Queen's Law Journal, Volume 44, Issue 1
SSRN
In: Key facts key cases
In: Library of liberal thought
"Hilaire Barnett's Constitutional and Administrative Law has consistently provided students with reliable, accessible and comprehensive coverage of the Public Law syllabus. Mapped to the common course outline, the Fifteenth edition equips students with a thorough understanding of the UK constitution's past, present and future by analysing and illustrating the political and socio-historical contexts that have shaped the major rules and principles of constitutional and administrative law, as well as ongoing constitutional reform. This edition has been fully updated throughout, including a restructure to Chapters 22 and 26, as well as additional pause and reflect sections in order to aid student understanding of this complex area of the law. The online digital content also includes updates to the Multiple Choice Questions, Instructor Test Bank and Web Links. Ideal for students studying constitutional and administrative law for the first time, this is an indispensable guide to the challenging concepts and legal rules in public law"--
In: Media and Arts Law Review Vol. 21, No. 2 (2016)
SSRN
International audience The "right to decide", which would be granted to a part of the population of a State, is not expressly enshrined in the Constitutions. While certain notions, such as the right to self-determination, are close to it, the claim to the right to decide increasingly defends a separate basis in order to circumvent both international and constitutional obstacles to the right to unilateral secession. Even if the contours of this right are still ambiguous, a constitutional status of this right is beginning to take shape through the jurisprudence of the Spanish Constitutional Court in particular, which, while rejecting this right in its extreme version (unilateral secession), nonetheless enshrines its existence in a 2014 ruling. While it is logical for states to challenge this right from a strictly constitutional point of view, the fact remains that this demand expresses a political wish. The political dimension of the conflict between the State and the entity claiming the right to decide undoubtedly marks the limits of a strictly constitutional understanding of this right. Nevertheless, constitutional law retains a role of primary importance in defining the democratic guarantees that could surround the exercise of this right. ; Le « droit de décider », qui serait reconnu à une partie de la population d'un Etat, n'est pas inscrit expressément dans les Constitutions. Si certaines notions, tel que le droit à l'autodétermination, s'en rapprochent, la revendication du droit de décider défend de plus en plus fréquemment un fondement à part afin de contourner les obstacles à la fois internationaux et constitutionnels au droit à la sécession unilatérale. Même si les contours de ce droit restent encore ambigus, un statut constitutionnel de celui-ci commence à se dessiner à travers la jurisprudence du Tribunal constitutionnel espagnol en particulier, qui pour rejeter ce droit dans sa version extrême (la sécession unilatérale) n'en consacre pas moins l'existence dans un arrêt de 2014. Or, s'il est logique que ...
BASE
In: University of Illinois Law Review, Forthcoming
SSRN
In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Volume 39, Issue 2
ISSN: 1747-7107
The article presents a case of successful constitutional change in Switzerland, the "re-assignment of responsibilities between the federal government and the cantons and the new fiscal equalization scheme," which was adopted in 2004 by referendum. By starting from the general assumption that ways and means are needed to strengthen general interests at the expense of distributive interests in constitutional discussions, the article endeavors to identify favorable conditions for successful constitutional change. By using insights from "constitutional political economy" and "actor-centered institutionalism," four such conditions are revealed: the procedural separation of problem solving and bargaining interaction modes; the importance of ideational factors like "frames," "causal theories," and focal points; active agenda-crafting; and the structuring of constitutional debates by earlier decisions. In addition, this article highlights that other conditions, more directly linked to interest and interest struggle, can help to mitigate the intensity of distributive conflicts and are therefore indirectly conducive to a problem-solving interaction orientation of actors. Adapted from the source document.
In: International Journal of Constitutional Law 611-614
SSRN