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Diese Studie zielt darauf ab, den Baumwollertrag auf dem Feld und auf regionaler Ebene über das APSIM/OZCOT-Ertragsmodell zu schätzen, wobei ein optimierungsbasierter Rekalibrierungsansatz auf Grundlage eines den Wachstumszustand der Baumwolle beschreibenden Parameters entwickelt wird. Genutzt wird dazu der Parameter "Blattflächenindex" (LAI), abgeleitet aus atmosphärisch korrigierten Satellitenbildern des Landsat-8 OLI Sensors aus dem Jahr 2014. Zuerst wurden ein lokaler sowie ein globaler Ansatz eingesetzt, um die Sensitivität von Sorten-, Boden- und agronomischen Parametern auf die Dynamik des LAI zu testen. Mit der Sensitivitätsanalyse wurde eine Reihe sensitiver Parameter identifiziert. Dann wurde das APSIM/OZCOT-Ertragsmodell durch Beobachtungen über eine zweijährige Spanne (2006-2007) an der "Aksu Water Balance Station" kalibriert und mit den sensitiven Sortenparametern und dem aktuellen Wissen über Baumwoll-Sortenparameter kombiniert. Zusätzlich wurde die Beziehung zwischen dem tatsächlich in-situ beobachteten LAI und entsprechenden, aus sechs Landsat-8 OLI-Bildern abgeleiteten Vegetationsindizes modelliert. Darauf basierend wurden räumlich und zeitlich variable LAI-Karten generiert, die alle Wachstumsstufen abdecken. Mittels Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) und eines generellen Optimierungsansatzes (basierend auf dem Nelder-Mead Algorithmus) wurden vier sensitive agronomische Parameter (Reihenabstand, Aussaatdichte pro Reihe, Bewässerungsmenge und Düngung) durch Minimierung des root mean square error (RMSE) zwischen simuliertem LAI (APSIM/OZCOT-Modell) und dem aus Landsat-8 OLI Satellitenbilddaten abgeleiteten LAI im Vergleich zum beobachteten Baumwollertrag kalibriert. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass: (1) FRUDD, FLAI und DAISQ die wichtigsten Sortenparameter waren, die für die Kalibrierung der Baumwollsorte geeignet sind. (2) Nach der Kalibrierung zeigte sich, dass der LAI mit einem RMSE von 0,45 und einem mittleren Absolutfehler (MAE) von 0,33 im Jahr 2006 und 0,46 bzw. 0,41 im Jahr 2007 gut simuliert wird. Das Bestimmtheitsmaß zwischen beobachtetem und simuliertem LAI betrug in den Jahren 2006 und 2007 0,83 bzw. 0,97. Der Korrelationskoeffizient nach Pearson betrug 0,913 und 0,988 in 2006 bzw. 2007 mit einer signifikanten positiven Korrelation zwischen simuliertem und beobachtetem LAI. Der Unterschied zwischen dem beobachteten und dem simulierten Ertrag betrug 776,72 kg/ha im Jahr 2006 und 259,98 kg/ha in 2007. (3) Die Analyse des Baumwollanbaus im Jahr 2014 basierte auf drei Landsat-8 OLI-Bildern, welche die phänologischen Wachstumsunterschiede der Baumwolle und anderer Kulturen gut abbilden. Diese Satellitenbilder wurden am 136. (Mai), 168. (Juni) und 200. (Juli) Tag des Jahres aufgenommen. (4) Die Ertragsschätzung nach der Assimilation näherte sich dicht den im Feld beobachteten Werten und das Bestimmtheitsmaß lag nach der Neukalibrierung des APSIM/OZCOT-Modells für zehn Baumwollfelder bei 0,82. Der Unterschied zwischen den beobachteten und assimilierten Erträgen für die zehn Felder lag zwischen 18,2 und 939,7 kg/ha. RMSE und MAE zwischen assimiliertem und beobachtetem Ertrag betrugen 417,5 bzw. 303,1 kg/ha. Diese Ergebnisse liefern wissenschaftliche Nachweise für die Machbarkeit der Koppelung von Fernerkundungsdaten mit dem APSIM/OZCOT-Modell auf Feldebene. (5) Das Upscaling von der Feldebene auf regionale Ebene, der Assimilationsalgorithmus und das Assimilationsschema sind besonders wichtig. Obwohl die PSO-Methode gut geeignet ist, zeigt die rechnerische Effizienz der Assimilationsstrategie auf regionaler Ebene Mängel. Dies zeigen Vergleiche zwischen dem PSO und dem generellen Optimierungsansatz. Daher wurde der generelle Optimierungsansatz für die Assimilation zwischen Fernerkundungsdaten und dem APSIM/OZCOT-Modell auf regionaler Skalenebene verwendet. Zuletzt wurde die Assimilation auf regionaler Skalenebene nicht auf dem Rasterdatensatz, sondern objektorientiert für individuelle Parzelleneinheiten implementiert. Darüber hinaus wurde die Simulation des Pflanzenwachstums für die regionale Assimilation in zwei Phasen (vegetatives Wachstum und Fortpflanzungswachstum) unterteilt. (6) Die regionale Assimilation des aus Fernerkundungsdaten abgeleiteten LAI und dem APSIM/OZCOT-Modell während der vegetativen Wachstumsphase wurde durch die Anpassung von zwei Parametern implementiert: Zeilenabstand und Aussaatdichte pro Zeile. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass die Saatdichte der Baumwolle im südlichen Teil höher war als im nördlichen Teil des Untersuchungsgebietes. Das räumliche Muster der Baumwolldichte weist somit einen eindeutigen Zusammenhang mit Gebieten auf, die erst zwischen 2001 und 2013 auf tendenziell schlecht geeigneten Standorten neu erschlossen wurden. Schlechte Bodenqualität, mangelnde Bewässerungsanlagen und Waldgürtel um Baumwollfelder im nördlichen Teil bedingen dabei eine geringe Dichte der Baumwollpflanzen; zudem musste den Felder im nördlichen Teil ein größerer Reihenabstand zugewiesen werden, um abweichende Wachstumsverläufe zu erklären. (7) Die Bewässerungs- und Düngemenge wurden als weitere Schlüsselparameter für die regionale Assimilation während des Pflanzungswachstums verwendet. Das Ergebnis zeigte, dass die Bewässerungsgaben im Untersuchungsgebiet zwischen 58,14 bis 89,99 mm lagen. Die räumliche Verteilung der Bewässerungsmenge ist ebenfalls im nördlichen Teil höher, im südlichen Teil des Studiengebietes niedriger. Die Anwendung der Harnstoffdüngung reichte von 500,35 bis 1598,59 kg/ha im Untersuchungsgebiet. Die räumliche Verteilung der Düngung zeigte niedrigere Werte im nördlichen Teil und höhere im südlichen Teil. Die höhere Düngung im südlichen Studiengebiet zielt darauf ab, das Gewicht und die Anzahl der Baumwollkapseln zu erhöhen, um höhere Erträge zu erzielen. Während der zweiten Assimilation lag der RMSE hauptsächlich im Bereich zwischen 0,4 und 0,6 m2/m2. Der geschätzte Baumwollertrag reichte von 1489 bis 8895 kg/ha. Die räumliche Verteilung des geschätzten Ertrags ist im südlichen Teil höher als im nördlichen Teil des Untersuchungsgebietes. ; This study aims to estimate the cotton yield at the field and regional level via the APSIM/OZCOT crop model, using an optimization-based recalibration approach based on the state variable of the cotton canopy - the leaf area index (LAI), derived from atmospherically corrected Landsat-8 OLI remote sensing images in 2014. First, a local sensitivity and global analysis approach was employed to test the sensitivity of cultivar, soil and agronomic parameters to the dynamics of the LAI. After sensitivity analyses, a series of sensitive parameters were obtained. Then, the APSIM/OZCOT crop model was calibrated by observations over a two-year span (2006-2007) at the Aksu station, combined with these sensitive cultivar parameters and the current understanding of cotton cultivar parameters. Third, the relationship between the observed in-situ LAI and synchronous perpendicular vegetation indices derived from six Landsat-8 OLI images covering the entire growth stage was modelled to generate LAI maps in time and space. Finally, the Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) and general-purpose optimization approach (based on Nelder-Mead algorithm) were used to recalibrate four sensitive agronomic parameters (row spacing, sowing density per row, irrigation amount and total fertilization) according to the minimization of the root-mean-square deviation (RMSE) between the simulated LAI from the APSIM/OZCOT model and retrieved LAI from Landsat-8 OLI remote sensing images. After the recalibration, the best simulated results compared with observed cotton yield were obtained. The results showed that: (1) FRUDD, FLAI and DDISQ were the major cultivar parameters suitable for calibrating the cotton cultivar. (2) After the calibration, the simulated LAI performed well with an RMSE and mean absolute error (MAE) of 0.45 and 0.33, respectively, in 2006 and 0.46 and 0.41, respectively, in 2007. The coefficient of determination between the observed and simulated LAI was 0.83 and 0.97, respectively, in 2006 and 2007. The Pearson- correlation coefficient was 0.913 and 0.988 in 2006 and 2007, respectively, with a significant positive correlation between the simulated and observed LAI. The difference between the observed and simulated yield was 776.72 kg/ha and 259.98 kg/ha in 2006 and 2007, respectively. (3) Cotton cultivation in 2014 was obtained using three Landsat-8 OLI images - DOY136 (May), DOY 168 (June) and DOY 200 (July) - based on the phenological differences in cotton and other vegetation types. (4) The yield estimation after the assimilation closely approximated the field-observed values, and the coefficient of determination was as high as 0.82, after recalibration of the APSIM/OZCOT model for ten cotton fields. The difference between the observed and assimilated yields for the ten fields ranged from 18.2 to 939.7 kg/ha. The RMSE and MAE between the assimilated and observed yield was 417.5 and 303.1 kg/ha, respectively. These findings provide scientific evidence for the feasibility of coupled remote sensing and APSIM/OZCOT model at the field level. (5) Upscaling from field level to regional level, the assimilation algorithm and scheme are both especially important. Although the PSO method is very efficient, the computational efficiency is also the shortcoming of the assimilation strategy on a regional scale. Comparisons between the PSO and general-purpose optimization method (based on the Nelder-Mead algorithm) were implemented from the RSME, LAI curve and computational time. The general-purpose optimization method (based on the Nelder-Mead algorithm) was used for the regional assimilation between remote sensing and the APSIM/OZCOT model. Meanwhile, the basic unit for regional assimilation was also determined as cotton field rather than pixel. Moreover, the crop growth simulation was also divided into two phases (vegetative growth and reproductive growth) for regional assimilation. (6) The regional assimilation at the vegetative growth stage between the remote sensing derived and APSIM/OZCOT model-simulated LAI was implemented by adjusting two parameters: row spacing and sowing density per row. The results showed that the sowing density of cotton was higher in the southern part than in the northern part of the study area. The spatial pattern of cotton density was also consistent with the reclamation from 2001 to 2013. Cotton fields after early reclamation were mainly located in the southern part while the recent reclamation was located in the northern part. Poor soil quality, lack of irrigation facilities and woodland belts of cotton fields in the northern part caused the low density of cotton. Regarding the row spacing, the northern part was larger than the southern part due to the variation of two agronomic modes from military and private companies. (7) The irrigation and fertilization amount were both used as key parameters to be adjusted for regional assimilation during the reproductive growth period. The result showed that the irrigation per time ranged from 58.14 to 89.99 mm in the study area. The spatial distribution of the irrigation amount is higher in the northern part while lower in southern study area. The application of urea fertilization ranged from 500.35 to 1598.59 kg/ha in the study area. The spatial distribution of fertilization was lower in the northern part and higher in the southern part. More fertilization applied in the southern study area aims to increase the boll weight and number for pursuing higher yields of cotton. The frequency of the RSME during the second assimilation was mainly located in the range of 0.4-0.6 m2/m2. The estimated cotton yield ranged from 1489 to 8895 kg/ha. The spatial distribution of the estimated yield is also higher in the southern part than the northern study area.

The Angkor. The Mayans. The Indus Valley.
A common element played a crucial role in the rise and fall of these ancient civilisations: water. Their ability to control, manage, and utilise water, through intricate networks of reservoirs, canals and storage facilities, allowed them to build thriving societies. They helped agriculture to flourish all year round and sustain large populations, whether to cultivate rice in Angkor in what is modern-day Cambodia, maize and beans in Central America for the Mayans, or wheat and barley in the Indus Valley in South Asia.
It was also water that doomed these civilisations. A combination of misuse and environmental changes, such as shifts in monsoon patterns and severe, prolonged droughts, contributed to their decline, research has shown.[1] Mass migration and the abandonment of urban centres ensued. Centuries on, these civilisations continue to fascinate and captivate scholars and ordinary people alike, yet the world seems to have missed the most relevant lesson: water security is key to stability and prosperity.
Not only is water essential for the functioning of the human body, it is also the basis of agriculture, which is especially important as the global population inches northward of 8 billion people. A community's fortune is directly related to its proximity and access to safe, clean water, whether to prevent the spread of waterborne diseases, improve sanitation and hygiene, or power industrial processes, energy production and transportation.
Unfortunately, a water crisis is brewing due to a potent mix of climate change and mismanagement (from overuse and contamination to inequitable distribution and the destruction of watersheds). Roughly half of the world's population is already experiencing severe water scarcity for at least part of the year.[2]
Yet water security and governance often take a back seat in international and national discussions around food, climate change and security, even though experts have called the climate crisis "a water resilience crisis".[3] The topics remain under-researched. The 2015 Paris Agreement did not mention water once.[4] Recommendations from the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit did not fully address the role of water. In March 2023, the United Nations finally convened the first global conference on water in 50 years, but there were no binding resolutions.
The presence of separate policies, agencies, and funding streams for water, agriculture, and environmental protection also often leads to "fragmented approaches where water security is not adequately integrated into food security strategies", said Nathaniel Matthews, Visiting Professor at King's College London and former Chief Executive Officer of the non-profit Global Resilience Partnership.[5]
Water must become a key part of climate negotiations and food security discussions at all levels. Governments, corporations and individuals must share a collective responsibility in the usage and protection of water resources. Failure to collaborate in the effective managing and distribution of this finite resource is likely to have severe repercussions on global hunger and climate action.The water-food-climate nexus
The sixth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has already warned that drought and flood risks and societal damages from these disasters are expected to increase with every degree of global warming. In large areas of northern South America, the Mediterranean, western China and high latitudes in North America and Eurasia, "extreme agricultural droughts" may become increasingly common as global temperatures rise: they could be at least twice as likely with a 1.5°C warming, 150 to 200 per cent more likely at 2°C, and over 200 per cent at 4°C.[6] Agricultural drought happens when soil moisture is low and insufficient for plant growth, causing crops to dry out, wrote the European Union's Copernicus programme.[7]
This creates a dilemma: the world will need more water to grow crops and raise animals just as it becomes scarce. The most tangible and pressing impacts could indeed emerge in food production. Agriculture is already the largest user of water worldwide, accounting for more than 70 per cent of freshwater withdrawals.[8] In some developing countries, agriculture's water usage can be as high as 95 per cent. On average, it takes 1,432 litres of water to produce a kilogram of rice in an irrigated lowland production system,[9] nearly 6,000 litres for a kilogram of pork, and more than 15,000 litres for a kilogram of beef.[10]
Farming is also a major source of water pollution, arising primarily from the run-off of nutrients, pesticides and other contaminants into water bodies, and posing potential risks to both human and planetary health. At the same time, water-related disasters, particularly drought and scarcity, are already wreaking havoc on nations rich and poor.
In Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia, a severe drought linked to El Niño has wrecked crops, pushed up food prices, and caused an estimated 20 million people to face acute hunger. In Asia, a "punishing heat wave" has threatened the production of wheat and other crops in India and caused rice prices to soar in Indonesia. Rain deficit and record-high temperatures in January 2024 had an impact on both shores of the Mediterranean, hitting winter crops and fruit trees on the coasts of Spain, Italy and Greece, and causing a reduction in crop growth in Morocco and Algeria, as reported by the EU's Joint Research Centre.[11]
Yet the world has been extracting water as if it is an inexhaustible resource. Over the last century, global water use has increased at more than twice the rate of population growth.[12] In the United States, a groundwater crisis is looming, mainly as a result of overexploitation, including from agriculture.
Furthermore, as awareness of water stress rises, it is critical that adaptation actions in one country do not worsen the situation in another. For example, if India's water-short farmers were to adopt more efficient methods of irrigation, cutting evaporation from their fields, farmers in East Africa might see less rainfall and worsening drought, as evaporation and subsequent moisture flows from large-scale irrigated farming in India contribute up to 40 per cent of rainfall in East Africa.[13] In turn, a reduction in rainfall in key months could have knock-on effects on crop productivity, food security, and migration, that might lead to wider repercussions including social unrest.[14]
"We face a systemic crisis of water, which is both local and global", the Global Commission on the Economics of Water, a group of experts, community leaders, and policymakers, wrote in its landmark report last year.[15] The same report added that demand for freshwater is expected to outstrip its supply by 40 per cent by the end of this decade.Elevate, collaborate, adapt and mitigate
Averting this crisis requires water to become a key part of the discussions on climate, food and biodiversity, from the UNFCC-led annual climate negotiations to the next Food Systems Stocktake. It means mainstreaming water security and governance across all aspects of public policy. It means abandoning a myopic focus on short-term economic wins.
As water resources continue to dwindle, merely adjusting to scarcity won't address the underlying issue. Indeed, latest research findings show that water-related adaptation becomes less effective as warming increases.[16] Urgent efforts must be made to reduce demand and usage across agriculture. The Global Commission on the Economics of Water has recommended nations "must phase out some USD 700 billion of subsidies in agriculture and water each year, which tend to generate excessive water consumption and other environmentally damaging practices".[17]
Reforming subsidies is a crucial but knotty issue, so it could be accompanied by country-level efforts to encourage and promote water-saving technologies. Tried-and-tested methods include drip irrigation (which distributes water directly to plant roots by dripping water onto the soil at very low rates), collecting and storing rainwater for agricultural use, crop rotation (growing different types of crops in the same area), which retains soil moisture and water, and growing trees on farmland and pastures to conserve water.
Collaboration and cooperation across agencies, ministries and non-governmental organisations, both at the national and international levels, is also crucial. The G7 has already taken a positive step towards this. The recent joint communiqué from the G7 Climate, Energy and Environment ministers included a pledge to establish a G7 Water Coalition "to tackle the global water crisis" and which organises at least an annual meeting on the topic.[18]
More such efforts are needed: approximately 40 per cent of the world's population lives in transboundary river and lake basins, many of which are in areas of current or past interstate tensions, but only a fifth of countries have cross border agreements to jointly manage these shared resources equitably, wrote the UN.[19]
Africa, in particular, could benefit. A significant number of states suffer from water scarcity while two-thirds of the continent's freshwater resources are transboundary. Aside from the G7's new pledge, efforts on regional cooperation are still embryonic but there are promising signs that world leaders are becoming more aware of the importance of transboundary water management to optimise water use. In Asia, the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), a body comprising eight nations along the Hindu Kush Himalaya, has called on governments to use climate change "as the urgent catalyst for collaboration over three key river basins in Asia: the Indus, the Ganga, and the Brahmaputra".[20]
The responsibility to improve water security, however, does not rest only with governments and corporations. Actions at community and individual levels also play a role. Reducing food waste, for example, saves water indirectly since producing food requires significant volumes of water. Consuming fewer thirsty crops and meat and eating more seasonally is another option.
Overall, the combination of innovative technologies, centuries-old knowledge and established best practices – large-scale water conservation and recycling programmes, restoring wetlands and watersheds, investing in water storage and distribution infrastructure, just to give a few examples – could go a long way in ensuring water security for the current and future generations.
Water security and governance, however, is not just a technical issue. Water is "a global common good, to be protected collectively and in the interests of all", to quote the Global Commission on the Economics of Water.[21] This collective responsibility, together with collaboration, equitable management of shared water sources, innovative solutions and learning from the past, would help the world to chart a course toward resilience and prosperity, ensuring a future that transcends the fate of past civilisations.Thin Lei Win is an award-winning multimedia journalist specialising in the intersections of food systems and climate change. This commentary was prepared within the framework of the project Nexus25–Shaping Multilateralism. Views expressed are the author's alone.[1] The Earth Institute, "Did Climate Influence Angkor's Collapse?", in The Earth Institute News, 29 March 2010, https://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/2661; Joseph Stromberg, "Why Did the Mayan Civilization Collapse? A New Study Points to Deforestation and Climate Change", in Smithsonian Magazine, 23 August 2012, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/why-did-the-mayan-civilization-collapse-a-new-study-points-to-deforestation-and-climate-change-30863026; Emma Marris, "Two-hundred-year Drought Doomed Indus Valley Civilization", in Nature, 3 March 2014, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature.2014.14800.[2] IPCC, Fact Sheet: Food and Water, October 2022, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/outreach/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FactSheet_FoodAndWater.pdf.[3] Nathanial Matthews et al., "Elevating the Role of Water Resilience in Food System Dialogues", in Water Security, Vol. 17 (December 2022), Article 100126, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wasec.2022.100126; International Water Management Institute, Water Governance for Resilient Food Systems for Future Climates, September 2021, https://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/water-resilient-food-systems-statement.pdf; Dietrich Knorr and Mary Ann Augustin, "Vanishing Water: Rescuing the Neglected Food Resource", in Food Engineering Reviews, Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 2023), p. 609-624, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12393-023-09349-z.[4] UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, https://unfccc.int/node/512.[5] Interview with the author, April 2024.[6] IPCC, Fact Sheet: Food and Water, cit.[7] Copernicus, Observer: What Impact Does Drought Have on Vegetation, and How Does Copernicus Help?, 5 March 2020, https://www.copernicus.eu/en/node/8499.[8] UN Water, The United Nations World Water Development Report 2024. Water for Prosperity and Peace, Paris, UNESCO, March 2024, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000388948.[9] Rice Knowledge Bank website: How to Manage Water, http://www.knowledgebank.irri.org/step-by-step-production/growth/water-management.[10] Heike Holdinghausen, "Water: Thirsty Animals, Thirsty Crops", in Meat Atlas 2021, September 2021, https://eu.boell.org/en/node/8903.[11] Joint Research Centre (JRC), Prolonged Drought and Record Temperatures Have Critical Impact in the Mediterranean, 20 February 2024, https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/node/9424.[12] United Nations, The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2019, New York, United Nations, 2029, p. 35, https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2019/goal-06.[13] Patrick W. Keys et al., "Anthropocene Risk", in Nature Sustainability, Vol. 2, No. 8 (August 2019), p. 667-673, DOI 10.1038/s41893-019-0327-x.[14] Thin Lei Win, "Researchers Warn of 'Unexpected Implications' as Climate Risks Converge", in Reuters, 22 July 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1UH1UZ.[15] Mariana Mazzucato et al., Turning the Tide. A Call to Collective Action, Paris, Global Commission on the Economics of Water, March 2023, p. 11, https://watercommission.org/?p=8410.[16] Tabea K. Lissner et al., "Effectiveness of Water-related Adaptation Decreases with Increasing Warming", in One Earth, Vol. 7, No. 3 (15 March 2024), p. 444-454, DOI 10.1016/j.oneear.2024.02.004.[17] Mariana Mazzucato et al., Turning the Tide, cit., p. 7.[18] G7, Climate, Energy and Environment Ministers' Meeting Communiqué, Torino, 29-30 April 2024, point 33, https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/G7-Climate-Energy-Environment-Ministerial-Communique_Final.pdf.[19] UN Water, The United Nations World Water Development Report 2024, cit.[20] ICIMOD, Future of One Billion People and Globally Significant Ecosystems Relies on Collaboration over Indus, the Ganga and the Brahmaputra, 20 March 2024, https://www.icimod.org/?p=66108.[21] Mariana Mazzucato et al., Turning the Tide, cit., p. 7.

This book provides experiences from studies on agricultural water management under climate change as references for agriculture and irrigation planners, decision makers, researchers and students. Chapters 2 and 3 provide an overview of global assessment of climate change impacts and water requirement for future agriculture. Chapters 4-7 provide analyses of crop water requirements in four case studies in developing countries. Chapters 8 and 9 are studies of irrigation management under sea-level rise in Vietnam's Mekong Delta. Chapters 10-12 discuss examples of adaptation alternatives such as water-saving techniques and groundwater exploitation, and related policy settings. The last chapter links the dominant approach of uncertainty presented in the climate change discourse with policy discussions on climate adaptation strategies.

The Southeast Asia Climate Outlook 2021 Survey Report is the second survey of climate change attitudes and perspectives of the Southeast Asian Region. Conducted annually by the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme at the ISEAS Yusof-Ishak Institute, this survey was designed to analyse the attitudes and concerns of Southeast Asian citizens towards climate change, governmental policies and actions and the role of different stakeholders in climate action. The Survey is divided into five sections. The first section presents the profile of the respondents including nationality, age, gender, education and affiliation. Section II explores the attitudes of respondents towards current climate change issues, government policies and actions taken. Section III delves into perceptions of energy and food security issues as well as perceptions of adequacy of mitigation and adaptation measures taken at the cities' level. Section IV examines the issues of individual countries' and regional climate governance, climate responses and possibility of a green recovery. The last section concludes with perceptions of global climate leadership and international climate cooperation prospects.

The Southeast Asia Climate Outlook 2021 Survey Report is the second survey of climate change attitudes and perspectives of the Southeast Asian Region. Conducted annually by the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme at the ISEAS Yusof-Ishak Institute, this survey was designed to analyse the attitudes and concerns of Southeast Asian citizens towards climate change, governmental policies and actions and the role of different stakeholders in climate action. The Survey is divided into five sections. The first section presents the profile of the respondents including nationality, age, gender, education and affiliation. Section II explores the attitudes of respondents towards current climate change issues, government policies and actions taken. Section III delves into perceptions of energy and food security issues as well as perceptions of adequacy of mitigation and adaptation measures taken at the cities' level. Section IV examines the issues of individual countries' and regional climate governance, climate responses and possibility of a green recovery. The last section concludes with perceptions of global climate leadership and international climate cooperation prospects.

The survey was designed to analyse the attitudes and concerns of Southeast Asian citizens towards climate change, governmental actions and the role of different stakeholders in climate action. The survey, comprising 30 questions in total, was also designed to draw views on climate change impacts, mitigation, adaptation, food security, agricultural production, cities' adaptation measures, renewable energy and the transition to low-carbon economies.

The survey was designed to analyse the attitudes and concerns of Southeast Asian citizens towards climate change, governmental actions and the role of different stakeholders in climate action. The survey, comprising 30 questions in total, was also designed to draw views on climate change impacts, mitigation, adaptation, food security, agricultural production, cities' adaptation measures, renewable energy and the transition to low-carbon economies.

Public spending on agriculture is one of the key policy instruments of the government to promote growth and alleviate poverty in rural areas. Amongst various types of government spending, Agricultural Research and Education (R&E) is found to be one of the most critical for promoting farm yields, which contributes towards augmenting incomes of peasantry and thus reducing rural poverty. In this paper, we look at agriculture R&E, but with a focus on extension and training system in India, with a view to examine its impact on agri-GDP growth. We look at the way entire R&E, and Extension in particular is organized, how much is being spent on this item both in absolute terms but more importantly as a percent of agri-GDP and on per hectare basis. We do this at all India level and in six special focus states, namely Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Punjab. While doing this, we also look at international experience, and if there are any lessons to be learnt between our focused states or across countries in search of "best practices". Based on this review and analysis, we offer some policy recommendations that can help propel growth in agriculture and reduce rural poverty faster. It is worth noting that India spends about 0.7 per cent of its GDPA (2014-15) on aggregate agriculture research including education, extension and training (AgRE&XT) as against the recommended level of 2 percent of agri-GDP by the World Bank (1981; p.8). Out of this 0.7 percent (AgRE&XT) of agri-GDP, agri- research and education (AgR&E) alone amounts to 0.54 percent at all India level. There are, however, considerable variations across states. Further, India's allocation of agriculture R&E is highly skewed towards crop husbandry. Sector-wise break up shows that around 70 per cent of agriculture R&E is allocated to crop husbandry alone, while only 10 per cent is allocated to animal husbandry and dairy development. Similarly, decomposition of expenditure on agriculture extension and training (AgXT) shows that around 92 percent of this expenditure was allocated for crop husbandry and a meagre 0.9 per cent was allocated for animal husbandry and dairy. This is in contrast to the gradual transformation of the agriculture sector in India towards animal husbandry and dairy. The study also takes lessons from the field with focused group discussions carried out in Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and the Punjab-Haryana Belt. With a current global tilt towards resource management and sustainability, there is an urgent need to re-prioritise the existing extension system to transcend from the traditional food security perspective to a more market led-extension system. Further, we show in this paper that there is a positive and significant association between public agriculture R&E and extension and training expenditure and agricultural GDPA in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Odisha and Madhya Pradesh using a simple OLS and Engle-Granger test of co-integration. In the light of these findings, the study makes the following recommendations to bolster agriculture R&E and Extension in India and the selected states viz., (i) strengthen links between research and extension by increasing cross sharing of experiences between the public, private and civil society sectors; (ii) diversify agriculture R&E and extension portfolio, at the margin, away from crops and more towards animal husbandry and dairy (high value agriculture); (iii) clearer articulation and definition of the capacity of extension service providers and their quality certification through an autonomous organisation with sufficient legal powers; and (iv) designing and implementing innovation networks through digital platforms to permit free two-way flow of ideas and technologies.

As the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) has made considerable progress in food security, addressing health, safety, and environmental concerns is also essential. The strategy and action plan will strengthen the commitment to food security, increase market access for small producers, and ensure inclusive food safety for the GMS. It aims at achieving the GMS vision of being a leading global supplier of safe and environment-friendly agriculture products through four pillars: policies, infrastructure, knowledge, and marketing.

The Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. On the average, disasters are affecting roughly 12.1 million Filipinos annually, according to the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. The adoption of social protection measures, such as insurance and cash transfers, will not only minimize the impacts of these events but also make Filipinos more resilient to risks, in general. In this issue of the Development Research News (DRN), the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) revisits some of the country's current and past social protection programs and identifies key strategies to improve their implementation.

This NTS Insight highlights a key issue to consider in pursuing an urban food cluster (UFC) for Singapore, and three strategic considerations in addressing this moving forward. Clusters are geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and associated institutions in particular fields that compete but also cooperate. Singapore has succeeded previously in developing clusters for industries such as petrochemicals, water, and biomedical services, increasing productivity growth and production capacity in these sectors. Urban food production has recently been identified as a potential new cluster, building on the rapid growth of agricultural technologies (agtech) which are the intersection of food production with advanced technologies. Apart from productivity growth and production capacity expansion, as was achieved by past clusters, the UFC will also seek to contribute to higher levels of food self-sufficiency and food security in the city-state.

"Meeting water and sanitation needs, coupled with protection of the environment and prevention of pollutants, is essential to every effort to improve the health and living conditions of billions of people. Meeting these needs is fundamental, not only to effectively diminish incidence of diseases that afflict a third or more of the people of the world, but also to improve education and economic well-being and elevate billions of individuals out of vicious cycles of poverty." These lines are from the Introduction to the First Edition of "Water and Sanitation Related Diseases and the Environment: Challenges, Interventions and Preventive Measures" written by Jens Aagaard- Hansen and Janine M.H. Selendy. The Second Edition will continue to address these goals in updated and revised chapters and new ones with an added emphasis on the current and anticipated impact of climate change. Preparatory measures and preventive measures and solutions will be presented providing guidance for possible action on the local, national and international levels. Consistent with the First Edition, this volume is being written by authorities from the fields of public health, medicine, epidemiology, environmental health, climate change, nutrition and malnutrition, environmental engineering, pharmacology, and population research to provide an interdisciplinary picture of conditions responsible for water and sanitation-related diseases and measures for prevention. Written taking into account the dynamic changes being brought about by climate changes, this book further examines the pathogens and their biology, morbidity and mortality resulting from lack of safe water and sanitation, changing distribution of these diseases, and the conditions that must be met to reduce or eradicate them. The scope of the volume will once again be international discussing anthropogenic and naturally occurring pollutants, pharmaceuticals, agricultural productivity, migration, nutrition, ecosystem dynamics, and the other areas addressed in the First Edition. The addition of Climate Change in the title is to emphasize that this vital subject will be addressed throughout the volume, including receiving special coverage in a chapter on climate change and human health, because of the importance of addressing current and anticipated changes due to climate change even more so than to the extent related concerns were raised in the First Edition thanks to added knowledge now available. Transformations now apparent and expected from climate change along with other dynamic changes in health and environmental influences throughout the world are part of the reality that has motivated authors from the First Edition and a new author, thus far, who are now writing eighteen chapters for the Second Edition. The realization of the widespread use of the current volume and its accompanying material has, naturally, been a major factor in encouraging their participation. It is imperative that discussion of water and sanitation- related diseases and interconnected environmental concerns be approached from a multi-factorial perspective. This involves discussion of water access and quality, sanitation and hygiene, specifics about the most prevalent diseases, and environmental factors, and guidelines and solutions. The First Edition begins to fill that niche in a format conducive to continuing discussion and graduate education, and that provides guidance with examples of successful preventive measures and interventions. The Second Edition will not only build on the substantial coverage of the First Edition, but also add new emphasis on climate change and the international nature of many of the diseases and pollutants discussed such as cryptosporidiosis, giardia, lead poisoning, harmful algal blooms, malnutrition and undernutrition, and soil- transmitted helminths (or worms). This will include coverage of the huge human migrations and the problems they face, the effects of population on the depletion of fresh water, and urban situations. Efforts underway to meet the new Sustainable Development Goals, reduce open-defecation, and to address crumbing infrastructures in many parts of the world, are among the features of the revised content. Pollution from pharmaceuticals addressed in the First Edition will also cover anti-biotic resistance which was covered in a separate chapter. Content will include updated chapters on the successful initiatives in Mexico "Extending the Right to Health Care and Improving Survival in Mexico" and on the eradication of Guinea worm, now down to less than 500 cases in the world. New coverage of successful sanitation and hygiene initiatives will feature the many successful installations and use of facilities underway thanks to the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council (WSSCC), and its Global Sanitation Fund"--Provided by publisher

The Biden administration is reportedly considering allowing US military contractors to set up shop inside Ukrainian borders, with the aim of strengthening Kyiv's ability to maintain and repair weapons systems that Washington has provided to help it fight off Russian aggression.It is too soon to tell whether such a move, if enacted, would bring the United States closer to having its own troops participate in the war effort more directly, at least in some fashion. President Biden has, wisely, made it clear that he will not send US troops to Ukraine. But these latest reports nonetheless highlight the tensions — and risks — at the heart of the administration's current strategy.Undoubtedly, the Kremlin would view a full-fledged contingent of Western troops on Ukrainian soil as intolerable, and it is difficult to assess the precise threshold at which Moscow will consider one of its red lines to be crossed. Irrespective of the purpose for which they are being sent, a Western military presence in Ukraine risks establishing "facts on the ground" which would block Moscow's ability to realize its war aims. (The latter have less to do with territory and more to do with Ukraine's security orientation and the concomitant implications for foreign troop presence on its territory.) Russia is all too familiar with such a strategy, having imposed "facts on the ground" itself in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 in an effort to block both countries' paths into NATO. The result would almost certainly be an escalation of the conflict that would directly threaten the security of Western countries.The Biden administration has thus far carefully — and gradually — scaled up its military assistance to Ukraine. The benefit of this approach has been the ability to probe Russian red lines, seeing how Moscow reacts to the deployment of each new weapons system or each new Western green light. This is certainly a better approach than the one proposed by hawks to surge military equipment into Ukrainian hands to ensure Kyiv's "victory" at all costs, ignoring both the risk of military escalation and Ukraine's manpower deficit. However, Biden's strategy still faces a dilemma: with Russia making gains under status quo conditions, and a scaling down of support being unthinkable due to the high stakes identified by the administration (i.e., nothing less than the survival of the "rules-based international order" itself), the only politically palatable option left is to escalate Western involvement and go further down the rabbit hole. And if rising populism in Western societies is any indication, this option will only remain politically palatable for so long.There is a fourth option, however, and it is to embrace genuine diplomacy. Yesterday, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke with his newly appointed Russian counterpart, the first call between American and Russian defense ministers in over a year. But keeping lines of communication open, while necessary, is insufficient. There is no substitute for finally resolving the question of Ukraine's security status to the mutual satisfaction (or mutual dissatisfaction) of Moscow, Kyiv and the West.The forthcoming NATO summit in Washington will no doubt make clear once again that Ukraine has no realistic prospects of joining the alliance, irrespective of the promise made in Bucharest in 2008 and endlessly repeated ever since. Indeed, the fact that allies have been dragging their feet on this question for the past 16 years means that any extension of Article 5 to Kyiv would likely not be credible. Moscow could easily choose to test any Western commitment to come to Ukraine's defense, forcing Washington and its allies into a binary choice between starting World War III or undermining the credibility of allied deterrence across the board.Any further territorial gains are unlikely to prove more beneficial to Ukraine than the economic and human costs of continued war. Nor have more than two years of war turned Russia into any less of a threat to Europe or Ukraine. One might hope for Western sanctions to bite even further and for the Russian economy to overheat over the coming years, but hope is not a strategy. The status quo approach has left Ukraine in a position where it will likely have to settle for terms worse than those proposed in Istanbul in the spring of 2022, and certainly worse than those on the table in Minsk a decade ago.No Ukrainian president wishing to keep his job will easily swallow such a bitter pill, but this does not mean that the process of rebuilding some kind of pan-European security order cannot begin through discrete dialogue, even as the fighting continues.

Mining jurisdictions around the world are grappling with the significant environmental harms and costs associated with orphaned mines, i.e., mines whose owners are financially unable or otherwise unwilling to remediate and reclaim their mine sites. Numerous Canadian examples, including the notorious Giant Mine in the Northwest Territories, have significantly harmed water, soil, air, and wildlife, as well as human health, safety, and well-being. Such impacts can be particularly devastating for Indigenous peoples, who continue to rely on their traditional territories for cultural and other purposes.
Canadian governments have gradually developed remediation and reclamation liability regimesto ensure that mine operators remediate and reclaim in a timely manner, or to at least ensure that governments have access to sufficient funds to carry out this closure work themselves. While they differ in various ways, the basic logic of such regimes is the same: by requiring mine owners toset aside some funds (e.g., in the form of cash or a letter of credit), they act as a kind of insurance that the public will not bear the costs of remediation and reclamation.
Unfortunately, Alberta has refused to develop an effective regime to protect Albertans from bearing the costs of oil sands mine remediation and reclamation. The regime in place today will not ensure that there are sufficient funds set aside to complete this closure work in the eventthat operators fail to do so. In some respects, this is not news. It has been over two decadessince Alberta's Auditor General first identified serious deficiencies in Alberta's regime. Continued mismanagement has left Albertans with a significant risk that they will be responsible for cleaning up oil sands mines that threaten potentially irreversible environmental harm, including a growing inventory of nearly 1.6 trillion litres of toxic tailings.
Alberta's Mine Financial Security Program (MFSP), which applies to both coal and oil sands mines, is a misnomer. While it allows mine owners to post full security against their closure liabilities, it also allows them to rely on the estimated value of their assets (proved andprobable reserves) as collateral to avoid posting meaningful security. This is essentially themining equivalent of the province's failed asset-to-liability approach in the conventional oil and gas sector. The results are staggering. While the coal mining sector has chosen to secure nearly the entirety of its estimated closure liabilities (approximately $700 million), oil sands companies have posted less than $1 billion in security against an official estimate of approximately $46 billion in total closure liabilities. This is less than two percent of official estimates, and less than one percent of internal estimates leaked to the media in 2018, which suggested that total closure liabilities could be as high as $130 billion.
Finally, following two critical reports from the Auditor General (2015 and 2021), Alberta undertook a year-long review of the MFSP in 2022. The results of this review, however, are currently unknown.




Significant reforms are necessary. The MFSP rests on a series of unrealistic assumptions about asset values, future oil markets and prices, and the development of effective but also low-cost remediation and reclamation technologies. The MFSP's asset-to-liability approach, which allows oil sands companies to avoid posting security where their assets are deemed to be worth at least three times more than their liabilities (3:1), is also counter-intuitive and counter-productive: instead of collecting security when operators can afford it, operators would be required to post security when profitability is declining — precisely when operators are least able to afford it and resulting in further financial distress. Simply put, the MFSP will not provide insurance precisely when it is needed most.
Correcting the MFSP asset calculations, requiring annual security deposits, and opening the process for estimating remediation and reclamation costs to independent scrutiny are three reforms that could be instituted in the short term and that would go some way towards ensuring the fulfillment of the polluter-pays principle upon which all such regimes are ultimately based.
In the longer term, the MFSP exposes Albertans to far too much risk and uncertainty. Our primary recommendation is for Alberta to convene an independent and transparent expert panel,with opportunities for public participation, to recommend a regime that adequately incentives progressive remediation and reclamation and secures outstanding oil sands liabilities while not exacerbating the near-term risk of default. No matter the specific structure that is adopted for security, the assurance of independent, transparent assessment of the degree to which potential liabilities are fully funded, perhaps in the style of pension fund reporting, is essential.

I am not a lawyer, but, then again, the topic I am discussing today is not about legal stuff but political stuff.  That is, folks may say that there is a judicial process  or that the burden of proof has not been proven yet so we can't do x.  But when it comes to political decisions, one does not need proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  One does not even, dare I say it, need due process in many cases.Let me throw out a few less than hypothetical examples.Example 1: Someone comes to the Minister of National Defence and says that the Chief of Defence Staff, the top person in the armed forces, is hitting on subordinates.  The MND does not need a full investigation to decide that maybe having a guy who is violating the various policies on sexual misconduct should continue to lead the military during a time where addressing sexual misconduct was one of the highest priorities. The job of oversight is not about only making decisions after investigations have been completed.Example 2: India is suspected of assassinating a Canadian on Canadian soil.  It is then indicted for trying to do the same just a bit to the south--trying to kill someone in the US.  One does not need to wait for the legal process to play out to re-think an Indo-Pacific strategic that is partially predicated on India being a reliable partner in the effort to contain China* or what not.The commonality in these two cases is the use of legal proceedings as a dodge from talking about or actually changing policies in light of new information.  Sure, there is no certainty about the new info--there are reports, accusations, but not confirmed stuff, but, of course, there rarely is certainty.**  So, new information should change the calculations even if the new information is not 100% certain.  To be as blunt as possible, one does not make defence or foreign policy based on the decisions of courts most of the time.  While legal stuff matters--whether a particular option is legal or not, etc--it does not determine entirely what a country should be doing.  If, say, India's populist government appears to be acting in ways that are contrary to international law and violating Canadian/American sovereignty, then one needs to start adapting the old strategy (no matter how new/old it is) to account for that.   The larger point, I guess, is this: we make decisions all the time based on available info and on a variety of calculations.  We do not apply a burden of proof equivalent to what is required for a prosecution for many reasons.  Promotions are not as life-changing as imprisonment, so we don't have the same burden of proof--we don't need to know for certain that certain nominees to the Supreme Court have engaged in sexual harassment or assault to decide to find someone in whom we can have greater trust.  We can take into account accusations that are yet to be proven when thinking about extending someone who is charge of the entire military because no one is entitled to that job.  We need to stop treating high office like folks are entitled to it and that we need absolute certainty before booting people.  Same goes for, say, security clearances--suspicion can be enough to deny a security clearance and thus jobs that require such clearances.  Which is why it should be easier to boot people from the armed forces if they are suspected of being white supremacist.We need to take seriously the burden of proof when the state is taking away someone's freedom.  We can have a lower burden of proof for many other endeavors, including revising foreign policy strategies.* Folks can claim that Indo-Pacific strategies are not aimed at containing China, and I have to loudly scoff.  If that is not what the strategy is for, then why the urgency?  And if it is not for that, then we need a China containment strategy as well.** Not to mention that many trials do not really resolve things because the defendant had crappy lawyers or terrific ones, that the prosecution did terrific or made a hash of the case.  So, again, big policy decisions can't ride on juries and judges, etc.