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Review of research -- Arrested development : globalization and the growth of radical populism and unreason : the American case in comparative perspective / David H. Kamens -- The northern exception : populism in Canada in the age of Trump, Brexit and COVID-19 / Michael Adams -- Defining new populisms : causes, characteristics and trajectories. Australia and beyond / Stephen Alomes -- Matteo Salvini -- a political chameleon and a populist par excellence? / Liane Ströbel -- Populist discourses in Italy : the case of immigration / Stella Gianfreda -- The Finns Party : from catch-all populism to radical anti-immigration discourse / Urpo Kovala, Tuija Saresma, and Tuula Vaarakallio -- "i respectant la voluntat dels ciutadans" : populism in the Catalan crisis / Sandra Issel-Dombert -- Moderating rhetorics of populism : moderators' encounters with antagonistic rhetoric in the 2020 U.S. Presidential and vice-presidential debates / Jennifer M. Love -- The French discourse of populism since 2015 : a corpus-based study of the uses of the terms populisme(s)/populiste(s) in Le Monde and Le Figaro from 2015 to 2018 / Thea Göhring -- Discursive strategies on non-European immigration to Spain in the Spanish press : an analysis of the newspapers El País and El Mundo / Alicia Rodríguez López -- Tremendously metaphorical : a rhetorical analysis of Trump's crooked Hillary image macro / Eleni Blum -- Populism on paper : is Viktor Orbán a strong leader in Hungary's HVG magazine? / Lilla Petronella Szabó and Ágnes Virág -- The role of the media in an extremely polarized society : the case of Venezuelan populism / Virpi I. Salojärvi -- Nicolás Maduro : populist rhetoric without populist leadership / Nelly Margarita Arenas -- Challenging populism through literature : anti-populist discourses in Behrouz Boochani, Valeria Luiselli, and Suketu Mehta / Ludwig Deringer -- Conclusion : summary of results and needed research / Ludwig Deringer.

How a new breed of dictators holds power by manipulating information and faking democracyHitler, Stalin, and Mao ruled through violence, fear, and ideology. But in recent decades a new breed of media-savvy strongmen has been redesigning authoritarian rule for a more sophisticated, globally connected world. In place of overt, mass repression, rulers such as Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Viktor Orbán control their citizens by distorting information and simulating democratic procedures. Like spin doctors in democracies, they spin the news to engineer support. Uncovering this new brand of authoritarianism, Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman explain the rise of such "spin dictators," describing how they emerge and operate, the new threats they pose, and how democracies should respond.Spin Dictators traces how leaders such as Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Peru's Alberto Fujimori pioneered less violent, more covert, and more effective methods of monopolizing power. They cultivated an image of competence, concealed censorship, and used democratic institutions to undermine democracy, all while increasing international engagement for financial and reputational benefits. The book reveals why most of today's authoritarians are spin dictators—and how they differ from the remaining "fear dictators" such as Kim Jong-un and Bashar al-Assad, as well as from masters of high-tech repression like Xi Jinping.Offering incisive portraits of today's authoritarian leaders, Spin Dictators explains some of the great political puzzles of our time—from how dictators can survive in an age of growing modernity to the disturbing convergence and mutual sympathy between dictators and populists like Donald Trump

How a new breed of dangerous authoritarian leaders hold power by manipulating information and faking democracyHitler, Stalin, and Mao ruled through violence, fear, and ideology. But in recent decades a new breed of media-savvy strongmen has been redesigning authoritarian rule for a more sophisticated, globally connected world. In place of overt, mass repression, rulers such as Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Viktor Orbán control their citizens by distorting information and simulating democratic procedures. Like spin doctors in democracies, they spin the news to engineer support. Uncovering this new brand of authoritarianism, Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman explain the rise of such "spin dictators," describing how they emerge and operate, the new threats they pose, and how democracies should respond.Spin Dictators traces how leaders such as Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Peru's Alberto Fujimori pioneered less violent, more covert, and more effective methods of monopolizing power. They cultivated an image of competence, concealed censorship, and used democratic institutions to undermine democracy, all while increasing international engagement for financial and reputational benefits. The book reveals why most of today's authoritarians are spin dictators—and how they differ from the remaining "fear dictators" such as Kim Jong-un and Bashar al-Assad, as well as from masters of high-tech repression like Xi Jinping.Offering incisive portraits of today's authoritarian leaders, Spin Dictators explains some of the great political puzzles of our time—from how dictators can survive in an age of growing modernity to the disturbing convergence and mutual sympathy between dictators and populists like Donald Trump

The paper highlights development and some problematic issues of Ukraine's relations with the neighbouring European Union Member States - the Republic of Poland, Hungary, Romania and the Slovak Republic, that have been escalated and exploited from time to time by the Russian Federation. This situation poses a potential threat to Ukraine and international security in the Carpathian region and needs to be resolved as soon as possible. This also emphasizes the aggravation of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations after a conservative and essentially authoritarian government, headed by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, had come into power in 2010. A perceptible increase in tension between the parties is related to Ukraine's 2017 Education Act and the situation of the Hungarian national minority in Transcarpathia. Additionally, the paper focuses on Ukrainian-Polish contradictions in issues of historical memory and problems of Ukrainian migrants in Poland, Ukrainian-Romanian territorial disputes and some problems of Ukrainian-Slovak relations, in particular regarding the "Rusyns question" and so on. The author stresses that Ukraine belongs geographically and politically to Central Europe, therefore the states of this region are its most obvious friends and partners, and the task of governmental, regional and public institutions, international organisations and regional groupings is to overcome existing conflict situations and problems in mutual relations by joint active and consistent efforts. The factor of European integration, economic cooperation and interdependence of neighbouring countries, security challenges in Europe from Russia's aggression and the latest threats in contemporary international relations are strong levers for this, as well as for deepening interstate partnership and neighbourly, mutually beneficial cooperation between peoples of the Carpathian region

If there's one theme in Washington this week, it's this: Ukraine needs more weapons, and it needs them now. Two top Biden administration officials told Congress Wednesday that, if new Ukraine funding isn't passed soon, Russia could win the war within months or even weeks."A sovereign and secure Ukraine is critical to global security," Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said during a meeting with European defense leaders earlier this week. "And we must not waver in our support for Ukraine." While European leaders are attempting to fill some gaps in Ukraine's stockpiles on a bilateral basis, there is little that can be done to bolster Kyiv's defenses and keep its economy afloat without U.S. help. Congressional talks have so far failed to produce a deal that would trade border security measures for increased aid, and it's looking increasingly likely that any future funding, if it is forthcoming, will narrowly focus on military aid at the expense of economic support.A failure to pass new economic aid would badly damage Ukraine's government, which currently relies on American and European cash to pay state employees and provide many essential services in the country.Making matters worse is the fact that the European Union — which has been far more generous with budgetary support than military aid — is facing its own internal struggle over future funding. As the EU considers a new, $54 billion aid package, all eyes are on Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has long been skeptical of support for Ukraine."It's difficult. I know Viktor Orban well," said Luxembourgeois Foreign Minister Xavier Bettel. "It won't be easy to convince him."There is, however, some hope that Orban will change his mind. The Hungarian leader has long opposed Ukraine's accession to the EU but was willing to sit out a vote on the question last month after the bloc freed roughly $11 billion in Hungarian funds that had been frozen due to alleged democratic backsliding. In other words, Orban may throw his support behind more aid for the right price.Ukraine also marked a consequential victory Wednesday when Slovakia's controversial prime minister announced that he would back new aid during a visit to Kyiv.But all of this uncertainty has left Ukraine in a difficult position. The blame game has already begun in anticipation of challenges on the battlefield, according to Politico. "If Russia wins the war against Ukraine, some officials in Kyiv are ready to pin the blame on the West," an anonymous Ukrainian military official told the outlet.If the tide starts to turn against Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky "will desperately look for options of whom to blame," the official continued. The shifting dynamics suggest that the potential for a negotiated peace — a reasonably probable possibility just a month or two ago — is quickly fading as Russian leaders see an opportunity to pursue their likely advantage on the battlefield.In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— Russia President Vladimir Putin "may be willing to consider dropping an insistence on neutral status for Ukraine and even ultimately abandon opposition to eventual NATO membership" in exchange for keeping the Ukrainian territory Russia currently occupies, according to anonymous people close to the Kremlin who spoke with Bloomberg. The report says the proposal is part of Moscow's quiet signaling to Washington that it is open to talks to end the war, though U.S. officials deny any backchannel communications.— Russia's ambassador to Switzerland slammed the country's decision to host a pro-Ukraine peace conference without Russian participation, saying that Swiss actions have caused it to lose "its role as an impartial international mediator," according to Reuters. The Swiss talks will only include Kyiv's supporters and will be based on a 10-point Ukrainian plan that the Kremlin has rejected out of hand. The ambassador also reiterated Moscow's public demands for talks, which include an independent status for Ukraine and the protection of Russians and Russian speakers in the country.— Talks aimed at restarting the Black Sea grain deal have quietly begun, according to Ukraine's ambassador in Turkey, the country that held several previous rounds of negotiations on the issue, Reuters reports. Details on the new discussions are scarce, but the renewed interest in talks suggests that Ukraine's alternative shipping route, which hugs the coast of Romania, has not been as effective at boosting trade as was previously hoped. The news also points to Russia's increasing desperation to resume exports of fertilizers and fertilizer components, a key part of the original deal that Moscow abandoned due to alleged shortcomings in implementation.— Turkey's parliament formally approved Sweden's accession to NATO, marking a major step in Stockholm's so far arduous path to joining the bloc, according to the BBC. The Biden administration urged Congress to approve a sale of F-16s to Turkey shortly after the announcement, shedding light on what inducements helped Ankara come around.The final country that must sign off is now Hungary. While Budapest has yet to give a specific reason for slow-rolling the decision, some members of the ruling Fidesz party have said they oppose Sweden's accession due to its criticisms of alleged democratic backsliding in Hungary. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Orban said Wednesday that he "supports the NATO membership of Sweden" and will push parliament to move forward with ratification as soon as possible.— Russian officials threatened to seize as much as $280 billion in Western assets if the U.S. and Europe follow through on their proposal to give $300 billion in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine, according to Reuters. Cyprus and the Netherlands have the most to lose, according to Russian state media, while countries like France, Germany, Britain, Japan, and the U.S. would also have significant assets seized. Meanwhile, a bill that would allow the U.S. to seize Russian funds overwhelmingly passed a U.S. Senate committee Wednesday. Backers of the proposal expect that it will pass both chambers of Congress with significant bipartisan support.U.S. State Department news:In a Wednesday press conference, State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel praised Turkey's approval of Sweden's accession to NATO and called on Hungary to follow suit. "We look forward to Hungary concluding their ratification process and the Alliance welcoming Sweden into NATO without further delay," Patel said.

A unique analysis that looks at the true motivation of Trump supporters.The Authoritarian Personality, which was published by Theordor Adorno and a set of colleagues in the 1950s, was the first broad-based empirical attempt to explain why certain individuals are attracted to the authoritarian, even fascist, leaders that dominated the political scene in the 1930s and 1940s. Today, the concept has been applied to leaders ranging from Trump to Viktor Orban to Rodrigo Duterte. But is it really accurate to label Trump supporters as authoritarians?In The Securitarian Personality, John R. Hibbing argues that an intense desire for authority is not central to those constituting Trump's base. Drawing from participant observation, focus groups, and especially an original, nationwide survey of the American public that included over 1,000 ardent Trump supporters, Hibbing demonstrates that what Trump's base really craves is actually a specific form of security. Trump supporters do not strive for security in the face of all threats, suchas climate change, Covid-19, and economic inequality, but rather only from those threats they perceive to be emanating from human outsiders, defined broadly to include welfare cheats, unpatriotic athletes, norm violators, non-English speakers, religious and racial minorities, and certainly people from othercountries. The central objective of these "securitarians" is to strive for protection for themselves, their families, and their dominant cultural group from these embodied outsider threats.A radical reinterpretation of the support for Trumpism, The Securitarian Personality not only provides insight into a political movement that many find baffling and frustrating, but offers a compelling thesis that all observers of American political behavior will have to contend with, even if they disagree with it

"The far right is on the rise globally, with the rhetoric of anger and resentment emanating from personalities like Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Rodrigo Duterte, and Viktor Orban captivating and mobilizing large numbers of people. Indeed, in a number of countries, the extreme right has already captured the government or is on the threshold of power. While the swift turn of events has shocked or surprised many in the North, the extreme right's seizure of power is not an uncommon event in the South. Deploying what he calls the "dialectic of revolution and counterrevolution" and harnessing the methods of comparative history and comparative sociology, Walden Bello's Counterrevolution is a bold, sweeping enterprise that seeks to deconstruct the challenge from the far right. Using as case studies Italy in the 1920's, Indonesia in the 1960s', Chile in the 1970's, and contemporary Thailand, India, and the Philippines, Bello lays bare the origins, dynamics, and consequences of counterrevolutionary movements. Reflections on the rise of the right in the United States, Europe, and Brazil round out this remarkable, timely study by one of the premier intellectuals of the South. Bello weds his well-known analytical scalpel to vigorous and clear writing to produce what reviewers have already dubbed one of the most profound, exciting, and controversial contributions to the study of social movements in years, one that bears comparison to the classic works of Barrington Moore, Jr., and Theda Skocpol. While he is well known for his progressive views, Bello, who was a recipient of the Right Livelihood Award (aka the Alternative Nobel Prize) and named the International Studies Association's Outstanding Public Scholar, is one of those rare analysts who does not let politics get in the way of clear-sighted analysis."-- Provided by publisher.

This article is aims to explores the rise of populism in Central and Eastern Europe, with a specific focus on the gaining power bond between Hungary and Poland within the European Union (EU). It examines the factors driving the rise of populism in the region, including economic disparities, historical legacies, and immigration concerns. The article discusses the definition of populism, its characteristics, and its prevalence in contemporary global politics.The rise of populism in Central and Eastern Europe is analyzed within the context of post-communist transitions, economic challenges, and the refugee crisis. The article highlights the role of populist politicians in promoting anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic views, as well as their criticism of liberal democratic values and EU institutions. It emphasizes the complex interplay between global trends and local factors in fueling the populist surge in the region.The qualitative comparative analysis applies to investigates the gaining power bond between Hungary and Poland is examined, focusing on the shared opposition to EU policies and the development of a strategic alliance. The article discusses how Hungary's Fidesz party, led by Viktor Orbán, and Poland's Law and Justice party, led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski have challenged EU initiatives and prioritized national sovereignty and conservative social values (Balcer and Vegh, 2022). It highlights the tensions and divisions caused by this bond within the EU, as well as the measures taken by the EU to address concerns regarding democratic norms and the rule of law.The article concludes by underscoring the significance of the Hungary-Poland bond and its implications for the EU's unity and stability. It emphasizes the need for EU leaders to navigate these challenges, uphold liberal values, and find ways to bridge divides in order to maintain cohesion and influence in the region. The future of the power bond and its impact on European politics will shape the trajectory of democracy and integration in Central and Eastern Europe.

In the article, the author analyzes the «pre-elections» that took place in Hungary in September – October 2021, in other words, the «primaries» of the opposition. Such an attempt of being elected to the Parliament in Central European countries was applied for the first time since the change of the system and its result, judging by the subsequent emotions of the participants, cannot yet be considered unambiguous. There is no such norm in the Constitution of the country, however, instead of creating an electoral coalition, as, for example, in the neighboring Czech Republic, Hungarian opposition politicians decided to go further, in a certain sense, binding themselves to the model of the American electoral system. The essence of the vote, as it was explained by the participants of the event, was not to disperse the opposition forces, but to gather them into one fist in order to defeat the FIDESZ / KDNP coalition that had already won three times subsequently before the spring of 2022. The outcome of first primaries in history of Hungary is interesting by the fact that in the end, the victory was by a politician of a new generation who took part in this event, but did not bind himself to signing program documents, and who only recently created his own political movement. The question of how consistent his former candidates for the post of prime Minister from the opposition will be in the remaining six months is also interesting. One way or another, Hungary's political system is being tested by a new electoral mechanism, which is designed to consolidate the main political forces of this country. No less interesting in this regard is the line of conduct of the ruling party and Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who did not interfere in the new political process taking place in full view of the whole country.

Both populism and conspiracy theories are gaining attention as they tend to saturate everyday political rhetoric. Earlier research notices how populist and conspiratorial rhetoric intertwine, yet they rarely focus on them as explanations for current social change, and even more, as arguments against it, in defence of an 'authentic' way of life. Both populism and conspiracy theories are often pathologized, while their explanatory aspects are neglected. This thesis aims to fill these gaps: it is interested in how right-wing populism and conspiratorial rhetoric used by them highlight the difference between an 'authentic', organically evolved society and unwanted, dangerous changes in it. Therefore, it does not only explain social change: it claims that 1. it is an attack on the 'authenticity' of a given society and 2. this attack is planned by conspirators 3. who are in fact 'the elite', acting against 'the people'. As case study, this thesis analyses speeches held by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, between 2015 and 2020, three in each year, held publicly and translated to English on official government websites. The research question is, how epistemic work is found in the data, using the methodological toolkit of epistemic governance and membership categorization analysis (MCA), built in the framework of World Society Theory and the Bordieuan field theory. The thesis is interested in how basic assumptions on our world appear in the data, how actors in the political field are re-arranged, and how certain qualities are attached to them. Findings show how the issue of European immigration after 2015 and the influence of the European Union was understood as an attack on the 'authenticity' of Hungary and Europe and constructed as a global conspiracy against national sovereignty. Also, by utilizing MCA, the thesis reflects on how populism re-arranges actors of the political field compared to how it is understood in liberal democracies.

The outbreak of COVID-19 has significantly reshaped debates on the globalorder, democratic politics and the liberal mode of governing societies. Somehave compared the virus to the "ultimate empty signifier", which alloweddifficult ideological groups to fill it with their own securitizations, creating inan instant a plethora of political otherings. For IR realists, the suddencollapse of cross-border movement and other privileges of the globalizedliberal elite came as a vindication of their long-cherished argument: thenation state remains the key actor in international politics, and the post-national world had largely been a utopian liberal illusion. Right-wingnationalist populists have been saying the same thing but in a differentlanguage and were apt to make COVID-19 instrumental to their purposes.Thus, Viktor Orbán quickly linked it to the agenda of migration and used thestate of exception as a pretext to further limit the democratic process inHungary. However, as students of populism have also stressed, the populistresponse to the pandemic has been far from uniform. In a yet broaderperspective, while some democratic governments enacted draconianmeasures in response to the pandemic, suspending basic individualfreedoms, some dictatorships like Belarus experienced a sudden "flow ofliberalism", refusing to cut down on both economic activity and cross-border movement. This special issue focuses on comparing the liberal andilliberal reactions (both domestic and international) to the pandemic,looking into how it has affected the democratic and non-democratic formsof governance; examining where the responses have been similar oroverlapping, i.e. where COVID-19 has practically blurred or erased theborder between liberal and illiberal politics; looking into how different typesof regimes and political groupings have borrowed new elements and stylesof politics, e.g. in which circumstances populist or autocratic politicianssuddenly seemed more liberal than their liberal and democraticcounterparts; and investigating the ramifications of these changes for theliberal components of the globalized international order.

International audience ; The construction of the figure of the alien is one contributory element in the genesis of a European geopolitical territory. The article develops this hypothesis through three topics of reflection: (1) the Schengen Area and the impact of the refugee crisis, especially in the case of Hungary; (2) the representation of citizenship in the United Kingdom, which, at least for the moment, is within the EU but outside the Schengen Area; and (3) the internal debates in Switzerland on the country's membership of the Schengen Area. These examples put into perspective what might otherwise be seen as a straightforward tendency toward the emergence of a "European people," since they show that the notion of the European citizen is still quite vague. The article also examines the EU's external border, which is a more complex matter than that outlined by security fences and shipwreck sites. Bilateral border management agreements with countries beyond the European Union, such as the Eastern Partnership and agreements with African states, suggest that the border is both an ideological operation and a frontline.Outline The Schengen Area: A geopolitical entity? Establishing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the European frontier The improvisation of summer 2015 On the geopolitical uses of a crisis: Viktor Orbán on the campaign trail European gods Different geopolitical representations of citizenship Between Europe and sovereignty: The great divide of the Swiss Fortress Europe? The external border of the European Union Conclusion: What prospects for a geopolitical entity under construction? ; La construction de la figure de l'étranger est un élément de la genèse d'un territoire géopolitique européen. L'article aborde cette hypothèse à travers trois sujets de réflexion : (1) la limite Schengen et l'impact de la crise des réfugiés, notamment dans le cas hongrois ; (2) la représentation de la citoyenneté au Royaume-Uni qui est, à ce jour, dans l'Union européenne (UE) et hors Schengen ; et (3) les débats ...

International audience ; The construction of the figure of the alien is one contributory element in the genesis of a European geopolitical territory. The article develops this hypothesis through three topics of reflection: (1) the Schengen Area and the impact of the refugee crisis, especially in the case of Hungary; (2) the representation of citizenship in the United Kingdom, which, at least for the moment, is within the EU but outside the Schengen Area; and (3) the internal debates in Switzerland on the country's membership of the Schengen Area. These examples put into perspective what might otherwise be seen as a straightforward tendency toward the emergence of a "European people," since they show that the notion of the European citizen is still quite vague. The article also examines the EU's external border, which is a more complex matter than that outlined by security fences and shipwreck sites. Bilateral border management agreements with countries beyond the European Union, such as the Eastern Partnership and agreements with African states, suggest that the border is both an ideological operation and a frontline.Outline The Schengen Area: A geopolitical entity? Establishing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the European frontier The improvisation of summer 2015 On the geopolitical uses of a crisis: Viktor Orbán on the campaign trail European gods Different geopolitical representations of citizenship Between Europe and sovereignty: The great divide of the Swiss Fortress Europe? The external border of the European Union Conclusion: What prospects for a geopolitical entity under construction? ; La construction de la figure de l'étranger est un élément de la genèse d'un territoire géopolitique européen. L'article aborde cette hypothèse à travers trois sujets de réflexion : (1) la limite Schengen et l'impact de la crise des réfugiés, notamment dans le cas hongrois ; (2) la représentation de la citoyenneté au Royaume-Uni qui est, à ce jour, dans l'Union européenne (UE) et hors Schengen ; et (3) les débats ...