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It is now four years since Norway formally embarked on the difficult task of facilitating negotiations in the protracted ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. With an international record in peace-making and development assistance, Norway entered the fray with unmatched legitimacy. Unlike Norway's previous efforts aimed at brokering peace, the Sri Lankan facilitation was undertaken by assigning a conspicuous role to key governmental functionaries, and was less secretive in nature. Although a ceasefire has been signed and six rounds of talks between the government and the Tamil Tigers have been held, Norway's third-party role has been criticized by nationalists for being partial towards the Tigers, and by a section of peace activists for focusing on a minimalist agenda of peace. In this article, I examine the qualifications and motivations of Norway as a facilitator and also the different perceptions that the key stakeholders have about its third-party role. Furthermore, I assess the nature of the Norwegian efforts so far and the hurdles ahead for taking the peace process forward.

Norway and Russia are both moving petroleum activities into the Barents Sea. The Norwegian activities have been characterized by an industry eager to participate, but ready to withdraw in adverse commercial conditions, and authorities supporting enterprise, whilst imposing strong restrictions. Russia still does not have a coherent policy for offshore development. The prioritization of state goals is unresolved, and the division of functions between state organs and state companies unclear. Private and foreign interests are kept at arm's length. There is still great uncertainty regarding the timing and pace of development, as well as the development concepts involved. The relationship between Russia and Norway in the energy sphere has been peaceful and cooperative, despite the jurisdictional dispute in the Barents Sea. The preliminary delimitation agreement improves the atmosphere further, and means that a promising area could be opened for petroleum activities and possibly joint exploration of deposits crossing the new boundary line.Keywords: Barents Sea, Norway, Russia, Boundary delimitationCitation: Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol. 1, 2/2010 p. 225-248. ISSN 1891-6252

- ; Norwegian forest policy has high-level, complex objectives for the products and benefits from the forest, including increased contribution to the climate, preservation of biodiversity, and creation of economic values. In Norway, it is first and foremost small-scale private forest owners who have to deliver on these expanded goals. The article reveals owners' lack of forestry competence, and elaborates on the role of forestry employees (advisers) in owners' decision-making processes, be it forestry- competent owners or not. There is, however, a decreased number of advisers in the private and public forest services, implying that forest owners are atomised in the meaning of being alone. This type of individualization and an increasing lack of forestry competence among forest owners are a contradiction. The mismatch is serious for the government and the forestry business because it probably hampers the fulfilment of the political objectives. The article presents six options for meeting the obstacles to goal fulfilment. The article is based on two research projects from the counties of Trøndelag and Hedmark. Data were collected between 2002 and 2007 and include survey, focus group interviews, in-depth interviews, fieldwork and document analysis ; The Research Council of Norway (more specifically Utviklingsfondet for skogbruk), Skogtiltaksfondet, the forest- and tree-based business in Trøndelag, Innovation Norway in North-Trøndelag, South-Trøndelag County Council District (byblilyst), The County Governor of South-Trøndelag, North-Trøndelag County Council District and The County Governor of North-Trøndelag. ''Management Active Forest Owners'' was financed by The Research Council of Norway, Ministry of Agriculture (via the organization Woman in Forestry) and The Norwegian Forest Owners' Federation

The Norwegian school history since the Second World War can be characterised as a rolling reform. The discourses on school reform in Norway are determined by the discussion on unity and equality. Two vast phases indicate the developments in the 20th century. In the first reform phase an obligatory comprehensive school (enhetsskole) was built up in the social democratic welfare state Norway. In the second reform cycle this comprehensive school – grunnskole – was prolonged in duration (10 years) and the secondary school – videregående skole – got connected. It is plausible and possible to speak in terms of an at least 12-year unity school system. Almost all pupils (98.8 per cent) from the grunnskole change to the videregående skole.