"The author intends to present legal socialization - the concept of the sociology of law - which describes attitudes to norms, law and law enforcement institutions. For law to be effective, any individual in a given community needs to internalize a number of values and attitudes. The attitude to law will influence its application; its effectiveness will depend on the perspective adopted by the legal norm addressees who could either accept binding regulations or ignore them. An adequate legal policy helps construe legal norms in a manner to prevent costs of interventions which need to be taken when law is not convergent with social expectations." (author's abstract)
Rozdział prezentuje teoretyczna analizę relacji zachodzącej między prawem a kontrolą społeczną przedstawiając w jaki sposób prawo jako narzędzie kontroli społecznej określa nastawienia wobec prawa.
The prestige of law is one of the most crucial issues addressed in the sociology of law. The awareness of the degree of acceptance of the law by its addressees is a fundamental factor in the introduction of possible changes in the legal system.The notion of "prestige of law" was introduced to empirical sociology by Adam Podgórecki in the research he conducted in Poland in 1964.A new perspective in the study was to go beyond classical socio-demographic variables and put an emphasis on personality variables. It was also one of the first such studies internationally. In the fifty years that have passed since A. Podgórecki's research, similar studies, even using exactly the same questions, have been repeated many times in both nation-wide and local studies. It should be assumed that the changes taking place in Poland and in the consciousness of its citizens during that time, such as the change of the system, increasing civil rights and freedoms, Poland's accession to international organizations, etc., might be reflected in the increasing level of the prestige of law. But did it happen? Unfortunately not. The analysis of empirical research devoted to the prestige of law in the following article, especially after the political transformation that took place in 1989, but also nowadays, is an attempt to explain the reasons for its persistently low level. ; Prestiż prawa to jedno z najważniejszych zagadnień podejmowanych w socjologii prawa. Wiedza na temat stopnia akceptacji prawa przez jego adresatów jest czynnikiem podstawowym dla wprowadzenia ewentualnych zmian w porządku prawnym. Pojęcie prestiżu prawa zostało wprowadzone do socjologii empirycznej przez Adama Podgóreckiego w badaniach pod tym tytułem, które przeprowadził w Polsce w 1964 r. Nowym ujęciem w przeprowadzonych badaniach było wyjście poza klasyczne zmienne socjodemograficzne i położenie nacisku na zmienne osobowościowe. Było to też jedno z pierwszych takich badań w skali międzynarodowej. W ciągu pięćdziesięciu lat, które minęły od badań A. Podgóreckiego, podobne badania, nawet przy użyciu dokładnie tak samo sformułowanych pytań, powtarzane były wiele razy, zarówno w badaniach ogólnokrajowych, jak i lokalnych. Należy założyć, że zmiany zachodzące w Polsce i w świadomości jej obywateli przez ten czas, takie jak zmiana ustroju, zwiększenie praw i swobód obywatelskich, wstąpienie Polski do organizacji międzynarodowych itp., mogą mieć odzwierciedlenie w zwiększającym się poziomie prestiżu prawa. Czy jednak tak się stało? Niestety nie. Przeprowadzona w niniejszym artykule analiza badań empirycznych poświęconych prestiżowi prawa, zwłaszcza po transformacji ustrojowej, jaka miała miejsce w 1989 r., ale również w czasach obecnych, stanowi próbę wyjaśnienia przyczyn stale utrzymującego się jego niskiego poziomu.
The issue analysed by the author is that of the institution of Presidential immunity pertaining to the President of the Republic of Poland, and operating in such a way that a sitting President cannot be held criminally liable before a common court for acts tantamount to offences. Inclining towards the essence of this solution and its consequences when it comes to respect for constitutional principles of legalism and equality before the law, the author at the same time seeks to assess the completeness of the provisions in effect in Poland, in so doing identifying a lack of clear directives as to how a former President (i.e. one who has left office) is to be held criminally liable. The conclusion reached by the author can be said to boil down to a recognition that the liability of a former President before Poland's Tribunal of State for offences or crimes committed is of an accessory nature where common courts are concerned, with the condition underpinning recognition of the Tribunal's primacy in matters of jurisdiction being the National Assembly's adoption of a Resolution holding a former President liable constitutionally, and potentially at the same time initiating action in respect of given offences. Any lack of such a National Assembly Resolution must give rise to a particular kind of reactivation – in respect of the former President – of jurisdiction in the dispensing of justice by common courts, given the fact that one of the negative procedural premises has ceased to be non-applicable. Thus, unlike in the case of a President still holding office, the cognition of the Tribunal of State in relation to a former President is neither exclusive nor automatic. Such observations have also stimulated work by the author to develop de lege ferenda postulates regarding the subject matter, as set against the wider background of Poland's political and constitutional system.
The purpose of the article is to present the legal situation of a slave under Roman criminal law. The analysis conducted proves that the approach towards slaves changed along with the transformation of the government system of ancient Rome. In the Period of the Republic, criminal liability of slaves evolved in two directions. The dominica potestas was exercised by owners, as well as the collegial body – tresviri capitales. From the Principate period, Roman jurists were convinced that the legal status of a slave and a free person was identical under criminal law. The difference between these offenders was non-exercise of leges criminales with a penalty that would be inadequate for their legal status, or ruling and exercising of more severe penalties against slaves. ; Artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie sytuacji prawnej niewolnika na gruncie rzymskiego prawa karnego. Przeprowadzone rozważania dowodzą, że podejście do niewolników ulegało zmianie wraz z ewolucją systemu władzy w starożytnym Rzymie. W okresie republiki odpowiedzialność karna niewolników kształtowała się dwutorowo. Jurysdykcję w ramach dominica potestas wykonywali ich właściciele, a także kolegialny urząd – treviri capitales. Juryści rzymscy, począwszy od epoki pryncypatu, nie mieli żadnych wątpliwości, że status prawny niewolnika i osoby wolnej był na gruncie prawa karnego tożsamy. Różnica dotyczyła niestosowania wobec nich leges criminales z sankcją karną nieadekwatną do ich statusu prawnego czy też orzekania i wykonywania surowszej kary wobec niewolnika.
The institution of self-defence comprises both provisions of the General Part (art. 36 and 37:self defence and imaginary self defence) and the Special Part (art. 118 and 124: intentional killing,causing grievous bodily harm as a result of exceeding the borders of self defence or using excessivemeasures necessary to catch the perpetrator) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.There are diverse opinions in Ukrainian jurisprudence concerning the problem of how selfdefenceand other circumstances eliminate the illegality of a forbidden act. The aim of this paper isto present the main attitudes to these problems. The approach considering self-defence in the lightof legality is the most popular view. There is also an approach according to which one distinguishesthe prerequisites for self-defence and the elements of such self-defence taking into account elementssuch as: the subject – the aim – the objective side – the subjective control. The socially harmfulattack which justifies the use of self-defence should be analysed using both of these approaches.The features of a legitimate self-defence are: the subject – a private person; the aim – to causeinjuries to the attacker (the direct aim) in order to repel or stop the attack (the indirect aim) in orderto defend legally protected rights and interests of a person, interests of the society or the state (thefinal aim); the object – the attacker, his rights and interests; the objective side – actions casually connectedwith the causing of harm to the attacker, commensurable with the harmfulness of the attackand the state of the defence; subjective control – proper realisation by the subject of the prerequisitesand features of the defence and the will to cause commensurable harm to the attacker.Two types of exceeding the borders of self-defence are distinguished in the paper: exceedingthe borders of acceptable harm and exceeding the borders of adequate harm. Criminal responsibilityfor exceeding the borders of self-defence arises only in cases clearly provided for in art. 118 and 124of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The sanctions in these articles are much more lenient than in thecase of corresponding offences not committed while exceeding of the borders of self-defence (art.115, 119 and 121 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). ; Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim
The breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 30 years ago still has a substantial impact on the post-Yugoslav countries which proclaimed independence. Bearing in mind that the breakup also generated a military conflict, e.g. in Croatia, the restoration of Serbian-Croatian relations remains problematic. One of the challenges is passing a fair judgment on people responsible for war crimes or crimes against humanity. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established for this reason in particular. Ante Gotovina – a Croatian general, was one of those indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in connection with the military operation "Oluja" during which some heinous acts of crime took place. Gotovina played a clear and primary role in this operation, and therefore his actions were the main count of the indictment, firstly, for the prosecution and then for the Trial Chamber of ICTY. However, the sentence of 24 years imprisonment was never carried out following a successful appeal. The Appeals Chamber did not uphold the verdict of the Trial Chamber owing to a serious legal error and, consequently, it acquitted Gotovina of all the charges. This issue became yet another source of Serbian-Croatian conflict in connection with the most important people held responsible for the crimes committed in 1991-1995.
The article is devoted to a critical review of the European Parliament Resolution of February 16, 2017 on the regulations in the field of robotics. The authors analyze the approaches of the creators of the law in terms of perception of autonomous robots as subjects of law and pay attention to the legal liability for damage caused by robots. The authors conclude that the concept of robots as the subject of law and the possibility of endowing robots with artificial intelligence with the qualities of a legal or electronic entity are arguable. First of all, the legal personality of robots raises the problem of responsibility and protection of the rights of potential victims. The resolution of the European Parliament emphasizes the need for such a legal structure that will ensure the harmonization of the interests of developers and sellers of autonomous robots, users and victims – the imposition of liability on the manufacturer or liability insurance.
"There has been a lot of controversy among the Hungarian jurisprudence regarding the creation of the new Hungarian Criminal Procedure Act. It was also raised whether there was a need for a new code of procedure at all, whether it was not enough to adapt the existing regulations of the old Criminal Procedure Act to the new Criminal Code. The Criminal Procedure Act, which has been in force since July 1 2018, may seem a distant start compared to Ferenc Finkey's work, but we will see that knowledge of the legal history and the processes involved are essential to understanding the changes in the present. This is specially true for changes that affect the principles on which criminal proceedings are based. One of the biggest changes in the new Criminal Procedure Code – at the level of the priciples – is undoubtedly the relegation of the principle of official proceedings to the background, as it often turns to opportunism rather than officiality in order to increase simplification and efficiency. In fact, in his work, Finkey has already perfectly described the mechanisms that we can discover in today's changes. Perhaps it is no exaggeration to say that his work may have provided a basis for fundamental changes in the new Criminal Procedure Code. His theories presented in this study shed excellent light on the dynamics that have permeated all areas of legal history in law and on the processes that, if we recognize them help us understand why it is necessary for our laws to be recreated sometimes. All in all, we can see that the principles are never of absolute value, but their meaning is constantly changing, as the legislatorial ways breath in the spirit of the current age. When these principles are no longer able to keep up with change, they must be re-formed. And if we are to form such an important principle, we need to enforce a new vision throughout criminal proceedings that makes it necessary not only to make amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure but also to create a whole new law. In order to see the real effects of the present innovations and the actual processes it has initiated in our criminal procedural law, a comprehensive analysis of the practice will be needed. We need to examine how quickly law enforcement can respond to the loss of space in centuries-old traditions. It may also be a question of whether we can talk about a real loss of space at all, as it is also conceivable that the principle of officiality has narrowed at the level of the normative text, but the old routine, attitude, and instincts live on in the application of law. The outcome of this examination may also raise important questions, including legal certainty. It is essential that once our procedural law has reached the point where it had to be born again, the application of the law be reborn with it."
Traditionally, the quality of law is associated with observing certain principles of law making, the so-called principles of good legislation. Such a way of thinking, however, seems to be an over-simplification. Thus, the author indicates that the high-quality of legislation and the principles of good legislation are not the same. Law passed on the basis of good legislation procedures does not automatically result in the high-quality law, in particular, if one makes an assumption that the quality of law depends, above all, on legal certainty being ensured. The reflections presented here express an opinion on the immediate connection between the quality of law and the theory of law. In this perspective, thoughts on the quality of law resulted in an opinion how firmly the process of improvement in law quality is associated with the development of the theory of law. As regards the studies on the quality of law as a measure of legal certainty, three issues are pointed out in the material: 1. the quality of law from the point of view of its formation in reference to certain general social phenomena, 2. the quality of law relating to a person, 3. the quality of law in judicial activities.
The article tries to bring to the light the role of symbolism in the organized human life, in general, and the contemporary societies with the accelerating changes almost in all social structures, in particular. The rational of symbolism in changing socio-political and legal environment creates complexity of the issue, which has been studied in the article, taking into account the methodology of complex system theory. The interconnectivity and interdependency of law, morality and politics create the picture of synergy of different social norms with each other in changing environment. Their positive synergy is able to create a perception of the 'ethical state' – the focal point of equilibrium expressed in the attractor of future admired development. In the legal perspective, the symbol of that attractor appears to be the constitution as the society's and the nation's symbol of coexistence based on the values of mutual past, necessary present and admired future. It is substantiated that the Constitution is the phenomenon, representing a concrete constitutional idea and constitutional identity, and should be the one to be considered as such in a lot of people's minds if we intend to have a proper constitutional system and values. Hence, the Constitution is not just a document with a highest legal force, but also a symbol of a concrete constitutional system, and from this viewpoint the Basic Law has a symbolic significance. The authors substantiate that the mentioned significance of the Constitution makes it clear that constitutional policy in any state should be established and implemented in a manner, obviously demonstrating an attitude towards the Constitution, in the frames of which it is considered as a symbol of a concrete constitutional system. The most important circumstance in this context is to never transform the Constitution (directly or indirectly) from a symbol to an instrument in the hands of both the people and the state power and the whole constitutional policy of the state should be based on the discussed essential idea. Moreover, according to the authors the Constitution should not be subject to amendment parallel to every change of political situation of the state or formation of a new political majority merely conditioned by the mentioned changes. The Constitution has a fundamental role from the aspect of regulating social relations, has symbolic significance and can't be used just as a tool for solving ongoing political problems.
In my article, I examine some of legal opinions of Ferenc Finkey's with regard to substantive criminal law, from the perspective of today's criminal lawyer. I present the concept of criminal offence in Finkey's works, dealing with the issues of unlawfulness and guilt, also pointing to aspects not discussed in the previous literature. In the case of the act of trying to kill a dead person, my opinion is that it is more proper to establish criminal liablity for an unsuitable attempt of homicide instead of excluding liability. Regarding to the continued offence, I accept the the young Finkey's position, while with regard to the concurrence by one act, I do not agree with Finkey at all. My conclusion is that Ferenc Finkey's books and articles would be welcome for today's criminal lawyers to get acquainted with them as well.
