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The empirical–normative distinction is taken by many political scientists to be exclusive and fundamental. Yet if the distinction is deep and exclusive then any theory, or any of its components, must be either empirical or normative but not simultaneously both. If this is the case then each theoretical statement will have as its central verb either an 'is' or an 'ought' (or some equivalent) and no statement taking an 'ought' as its central verb will be derivable from any statement taking an 'is' as its central verb. Correlatively no purely descriptive statement or conjunction of such statements will warrant any normative or evaluative conclusion.

EVIDENCE FROM EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS CONTRADICTS THE THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY IN THE U.S. HOWEVER, IT MUST BE NOTED THAT REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY ASSUMES FROM THE OUTSET THAT TRADITIONAL EXTERNAL CONTROLS OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SECURE RESPONSIBILITY. TO BE EFFECTIVE ANY TYPE OF CONTROL MUST RELY ON ETHICAL CHECKS, AND ON EXTERNAL SANCTIONS.

1 Introduction -- 2 Demand and Regional Growth -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Export Base Model -- 2.3 A Keynesian-Type Growth Model -- 2.4 The Multiplier-Accelerator Model -- 2.5 The Harrod-Domar Model -- 2.6 Conclusions -- 3 Supply, Factor Mobility, and Regional Growth -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Neoclassical Model of Regional Growth -- 3.3 The Data and Empirical Results -- 3.4 Dynamic Simulations of the Model -- 3.5 Conclusions -- 4 The Interaction of Supply and Demand -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Model -- 4.3 The Data and Empirical Results -- 4.4 An Alternative Formulation -- 4.5 Conclusions -- 5 Interregional Interactions -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Interregional Constraints -- 5.3 Patterns of Interregional Commodity Trade Flows -- 5.4 Interregional Trade and Regional Growth -- 5.5 Conclusions -- 6 Regional Economic Policy -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Sensitivity to Assumptions and Initial Conditions -- 6.3 Regional Policy Simulations -- 6.4 Conclusions -- References.