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This article deals with the allez and retour provisions (Claes 2005: 84 f) of the Swedish constitution in relation to IU membership. What are the rules governing the transfer of sovereignty to the Union? And what are the provisions for assessing the constitutionality of the incoming tide of Union law into the domestic legal order? I have three objects in this essay. First, to describe how these two groups of constitutional rules were actually modified in the 2010 revision of the 1974 Instrument of Government. 1 find that neither was changed in any material way. Second, to try to explain the apparent reluctance of the parties involved to clarify the constitutional implications of EU membership. I find that this reluctance is rooted in a belief that European integration is not furthered if the rules contained in the allez and retour provisions are made stricter and more precise. Third, to confront a question conspicuously omitted by the parties in their revision: namely, by what criterion should the allez. and retour provisions be intertwined, if an optimum of hi-level constitutionalism is to be achieved? I argue that, in the end, the underlying issue is whether Swedish citizens want to see the principle of free movement applied as widely as possible. Do they want this principle to be applied across the board? Or would they prefer instead to restrict its application to the case of capital and goods, thus leaving them free to structure the labour market and welfare state as they themselves see fit? Adapted from the source document.

The theory of social choice has recently benefited much from advances within the power index approach in game theory. One may start from the classical Wicksell framework of a unanimity regime & proceed to state the advantages of deviations from his model. A case can be stated for quantitative voting using some majority voting scheme, as it empowers the choice participants, also providing for blocking power. The power distinctions generated from the power index framework may be applied to the institutional evolution of the Council of Ministers with the EC or EU. It allows one to state in a concise manner the comparative advantages & disadvantages of alternative regimes for the European Community or Union. Tables, Figures, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

In Sweden, there is a consensus that Swedish membership of substantial parts of the European Union (EU) entails cooperation that at least in parts implies supranationalism. Due to this consensus one may assume that there is also some sort of common understanding of the concept of supranationalism. However, while many researchers includes majority voting in their definition of supranationalism, this is rejected outright by others. As shown, both sides have a point and this article, therefore, suggests that three dimensions are noteworthy when it comes to supranationalism: (1) when states have transferred the right to exercise public power to an organization the states cannot make decisions alone, (2) the institution is autonomous and makes binding decisions, (3) the decisions taken by the institution have effective precedence over national ones. Adapted from the source document.

A world government based on democratic principles would be ideal, but this is unlikely to come about any time soon. However, the mere impossibility of immediately implementing an idea does not make that idea wrong. Meanwhile one can work through existing institutions such as the UN and European Union to improve accountability in the arena of world politics. Adapted from the source document.

Political commitments in our time are often described as characterized by political de-collectivization & increasing individualism. In the article this polarity between individualism & collectivism is addressed. Empirically, it is based on a survey which 1066 global justice movement activists participated in. Among these, activism has both strong individual & collective orientations. Personal commitment & individual political action is emphasized at the same time as the activism aims at reforming institutions & is carried out in collective contexts, involving traditional political actors as parties & trade unions. Furthermore, this is done despite a low degree of trust in political institutions & traditional political actors, especially among activists who participated in the events during the EU summit meeting in Gothenburg 2001. Tables, Diagrams, References. Adapted from the source document.

This article confronts some general methodological issues involved when analyzing 'euroscepticism,' ie., opposition to European integration. Reviewing the literature on party-based & public euroscepticism, the article proceeds with a presentation & critical examination of conceptual frameworks & models suggested in previous research on public attitudes towards the EU. Drawing on eg., the Eurobarometer surveys, the strengths & weaknesses of different analytical frameworks arc demonstrated. The article concludes with a discussion about measurement issues related to empirical analyses of public opposition to European integration. Adapted from the source document.

On 1 January 1995 Sweden became member of the European Union. This basic fact is not mentioned in Sweden's fundamental law. Nor does the Swedish constitution have anything to say about the important changes to the practice of public policymaking that have taken place since Sweden joined the EU. At the same time, it is indeed apparent that the basic rules of the political game in Sweden have been transformed dramatically after EU accession. This constitutional change, however has taken place without any substantial changes being made to the wording of the most important of Sweden's four fundamental laws, i.e., the Instrument of Government (regeringsformen). Constitutional change can be brought about in two different ways: Constitutional amendment, or explicit constitutional change, refers to a change of the rules of the game which implies a modified wording of the constitutional text. Constitutional alteration, or implicit constitutional change, means the constitutional document itself remains unaltered while its meaning is changed through judicial interpretation or legislative action. How frequently used are these different methods when it comes to the constitutional changes brought about by EU membership? How can we explain the differences between member states? How can these competing methods for constitutional change be normatively justified? Is one of them to be preferred? The research project "Hur regleras EU-medlemskapet?" seeks to answer these questions in a comparative study on how EU membership regulated in different member states. Adapted from the source document.

Discusses a coming research project on how the Soviet Union used soft economic power to increase their influence in other countries. The differences in spreading policy and ideas in democratic and communist systems are researched. Preliminary results indicate that decision making structures in youth organizations and workers unions in Europe come from different sources varying from communists to Christian democrats. L. Pitkaniemi