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Australia is well endowed with constitutions. It has seven, one for the commonwealth and each of the six states, and nine if the documents establishing self‐government for the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory are included. This gives plenty of scope for constitutional reform: that is, changing the most important rules which specify how a political community is governed. In the event, public debate over constitutional reform in Australia has been sporadic and concentrated on a narrow range of issues. Perhaps this is as it should be. Constitutions should reflect broad public acceptance of the basic rules governing the operation of government, and if the system is running smoothly, there is little reason for change. Only when events occur that demonstrate that there are shortcomings in the structure of government should constitutional reform be considered.

Wie der Bericht einer 1983 eingesetzten Untersuchungskommission ("Miller Report"), der die illegalen Praktiken eines Ministers aufgedeckt hat, zeigt, existieren mannigfaltige Möglichkeiten von seiten der Exekutive, die Integrität der Legislative auszuhöhlen (z. B. Repression, Korruption, wirtschaftlicher Druck). (DÜI-Spe)

THROUGHOUT MOST OF THIS CENTURY, PRACTITIONERS AND STUDENTS OF URBAN POLITICS HAVE DEBATED THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH FALL UNDER THE LABEL OF MUNICIPAL REFORMISM. MORE RECENTLY, IN THE WAKE OF URBAN FISCAL RETRENCHMENT, INDUSTRIAL RELOCATION, AND SUNBELT-FROSTBELT COMPETITION, DEBATE AMONG ACADEMICS AND POLITICAL PRACTITIONERS HAS OFTEN FOCUSED UPON THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF VARIOUS KINDS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES EMPLOYED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. THIS ARTICLE REPRESENTS AN ATTEMPT TO ILLUMINATE DISCUSSION OF THE MORE RECENT CONTROVERSY OVER DEVELOPMENT POLICY THROUGH THE USE OF ARGUMENTS DRAWN FROM THE OLD MUNICIPAL REFORM DEBATE. MORE SPECIFICALLY, THIS PAPER CONTENDS THAT THE EXTENT TO WHICH A CITY ENACTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND ITS CHOICE AMONG DIFFERENT POLICIES MAY DEPEND, IN PART, UPON THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF PARTICULAR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AFFECTING REPRESENTATION AND EXECUTIVE POWER.

Contends that the extent to which a city enacts economic development policies partly depends upon the presence or absence of particular political institutions affecting representation and executive power. Examines the link between reformist cities and economic development policies in the United States. (AM)

The crucial questions surrounding the first state constitutions concerned suffrage, officeholding requirements, legislative structure, and the relationship of legislative to executive power. These questions were debated vigorously, and a vision of the proper structure of government based on unicameralism, a weak executive, and no checks and balances was advocated in nearly all the states by radical democrats. Their most conspicuous victory was in Pennsylvania in 1776, where a unicameral legislature was established and powers were separated but no checks were provided for legislative encroachments upon the other branches' responsibilities. Constitutional framers in other states rejected Pennsylvania's example, delayed their constitutional drafting processes, and succeeded in adopting a more balanced government with checks, such as upper houses and gubernatorial vetoes. Still, legislative supremacy prevailed under all the new state constitutions, making possible the legislative policies of the founding decade on debtor-creditor relations, paper money, and taxation that were of such great concern to the framers of the United States Constitution.