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Analyzes the US Central Intelligence Agency in terms of individuals who do its work. Uses analyses of bureaucratic personalities and behavior developed by Anthony Downs.

THIS STUDY DISCUSSES THE KEY ROLE PLAYED BY THE MALAYAN GOVERNMENT'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE VICTORY OVER THE MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY. IT ARGUES THAT THE SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNITY'S SKILLS OWED MUCH TO TEMPLER AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO HIS INSISTENCE THAT INTELLIGENCE WAS GIVEN DUE WEIGHT IN THE WAR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES AND TO THE ENCOURAGEMENT HE GAVE TO THE WORK OF THE CHINESE AFFAIRS OFFICERS. THE PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF THE AUTHOR AS SECRETARY FOR CHINESE AFFAIRS MALACCA IS DESCRIBED AND EXAMPLES GIVEN OF CONCRETE STEPS TAKEN DURING THE "HEARTS AND MINDS" CAMPAIGN AND OTHER SUCCESSFUL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES.

Aviation had a highly significant role in supporting French military operations in Algeria. This was particularly true of aerial reconnaissance & intelligence gathering. Initially, however, the Air Force effort was handicapped by inappropriate approaches, too few army/air liaison officers, & skepticism among army officers aware of the difficulties of earlier air operations against an insurgency in Indochina (1946-1954). It also lacked sufficient suitable aircraft types. Gradually, improved aircraft & photographic techniques permitted systematic & detailed aerial mapping & intelligence work, as well as rapid provision of close air support during ground battles. Better integration of air & ground forces, along with more coordinated command & control, arrived from 1959 onwards when an air force general, Maurice Challe, became inter-service commander-in-chief in Algeria. This permitted an authentic & mostly effective combined-arms & joint service approach to the locating, tracking, engagement, & destruction of Algerian nationalist bands. Adapted from the source document.

THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT DURING THE PHILIPPINE WAR BETWEEN 1899 AND 1902 HAD TO DISCOVER THE IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT THROUGH BITTER EXPERIENCE. FOR MUCH OF THE WAR, AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE WAS AS DIFFUSE, UNCONNECTED AND DISORGANIZED AS THE RESISTANCE SOLDIERS ENCOUNTERED IN THE FIELD. AS A RESULT OF INDIFFERENCE AND MISPLACED OPTIMISM AT HEADQUARTERS, THE U.S. ARMY FAILED TO CREATE A COHERENT PROGRAM TO GATHER AND DISPERSE INTELLIGENCE FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING. THIS NEGLECT, IN TURN, LED TO AN EXTENSIVE INTEREST IN LOCAL INTELLIGENCE BY FILED OFFICERS WHO, ALMOST BY ACCIDENT OBTAINED INFORMATION ON GUERRILLA LEADERS AND STRONGHOLDS OR FOCUSED ON THE VITAL GUERRILLA INFRASTRUCTURE. HOWEVER, THE LACK OF CENTRALIZATION BECAME A POSITIVE BOON AS UNKNOWN AND UNTRAINED OFFICERS WERE ABLE TO STEP INTO THE VOID AND DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT INTELLIGENCE METHODS SINGULARLY WELL ADAPTED TO DEAL WITH A GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION.

MANY ANALYSTS ARGUE THAT BETTER INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IS NECESSARY TO IMPROVE THE UNITED STATES' ABILITY TO PREVENT, DETER AND DEFEAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) TERRORISM, BUT FEW GIVE ANY CONCRETE ANALYSIS OF EXACTLY WHAT VARIOUS TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING THE WMD TERRORIST THREAT. THIS STUDY OUTLINES THE EMERGING WMD TERRORIST THREAT AND DISCUSSES THE RESPECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS THAT TECHNICAL, HUMAN AND OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE CAN MAKE IN ASSESSING THE VARIOUS STAGES OF A WMD TERRORIST ACT. ACCORDING TO THIS ANALYSIS, NEITHER IMAGERY NOR TRADITIONAL HUMAN COLLECTION IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE CRITICAL INFORMATION NEEDED BY POLICY MAKERS. RATHER INFORMATION COLLECTED BY CASE OFFICERS WORKING UNDER UNOFFICIAL COVER AND BY CLANDESTINE MEANS OFFER THE BEST CHANCE OF IDENTIFYING GROUPS INTERESTED IN PRODUCING AND USING WMD.

Considers how South African democracy is being threatened by illegal spying carried out by its own National Intelligence Agency (NIA). Such activity is attributed to (1) senior intelligence officers' belief that it is legitimate for them to "bend the rules," & (2) failure by Parliament & the executive branch to curtail these practices. As part of a Commission on Intelligence in South Africa, the author offers several recommendations for addressing this problem & calls for a complete overhaul of the laws on spying. K. Hyatt Stewart