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A discussion of 2 basic models for conflict: (1) in which the phenomena are mutually exclusive, & (2) in which they are mutually incompatible. The existence of mutually exclusive or mutually incompatible phenomena is of no consequence unless differing values are attached to them by diff persons; & whether or not conflicting values will lead to the raising of an issue depends upon the relative amount of utility each party associates with the conflicting values. Information with respect to conflict, even when available, sometimes 'becomes a casualty of images.' A conflict paradigm based upon the amount of available information is presented, employing as basic variables the amount of information perceived by the parties to a conflict &the amount available to an objective observer. With 3 categories of information - exclusiveness & incompatibility does exist, does not exist, &uncertainty - & 6 patterns of agreement-disagreement between the parties based on these categories, 18 possible situations result. 3 types are singled out for discussion: (a) mutually exclusive or incompatible values exist & are recognized, (b) mutually exclusive or incompatible values are recognized by only one or neither party, & (c) values are not mutually exclusive or incompatible. It is suggested that techniques are needed to determine whether or not values are mutually exclusive or incompatible, & under what conditions information will be effective in modifying images. I. Taviss.

Within the international system, states frequently fight even when opponents have little or nothing to offer them. Yet, international relations scholars envision conflict as a means for states to acquire some amount of a desired good, and view bargaining through this lens. This paper presents a model in which war and conflict bargaining can serve as signals to potentially hostile third parties. The analysis indicates that states sometimes have incentives to bargain harder than they would otherwise, in order to conceal information from future enemies. This can lead to war, even when a peaceful settlement should be possible.

On 13 August, the International Committee of the Red Cross appealed to the belligerents — Serbs, Croats and Muslims alike — urgently calling on them to respect international humanitarian law. The text of the appeal is given below."Following the visits its delegates have conducted during the last few days to places of detention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is evident to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that innocent civilians are being arrested and subjected to inhumane treatment. Moreover, the detention of such persons is part of a policy of forced population transfers carried out on a massive scale and marked by the systematic use of brutality. Among the long list of methods used are harassment, murder, confiscation of property, deportation and the taking of hostages — which reduces individuals to the level of bargaining counters — all in violation of international humanitarian law.

Scholars argue that institutions in democracies constrain leaders and prevent international conflict. However, many democracies specify rules of governance in times of emergency that divert substantial power to the head of state. The manipulation of these "emergency powers" provides a rational motivation for conflict. Using a novel data set of emergency provisions within democracies, I test the relationship between emergency power strength and conflict propensity using several steps to achieve causal inference, including an instrumental variable analysis that exploits the specificity of the state's constitution as a plausibly exogenous determinant of emergency power strength. I find that emergency power strength is a strong predictor of conflict onset in democracies in each test and that states with strong emergency powers are substantially more likely to enact a state of emergency due to an international conflict. I conclude with a discussion of my findings and avenues of future research using these data.

The pressing need to find new ways to settle social disputes and render them less destructive has led to a concern with the role that outsiders-or third parties-can play in the conflict resolution process. This book contributes to an increased understanding of the nature and activities of third parties in a wide range of conflict situations. Dr. Bercovitch first describes and interprets the major elements of the third-party intervention process, then provides an empirical examination of its structure and characteristics in settings as diverse as family struggles, labor-management problems, and international disputes. Throughout, he illustrates the dynamics of the process from the vantage point of the third parties themselves. Finally he points out the conditions most likely to strengthen this type of conflict management and discusses the means for determining the appropriate forms of intervention at different junctures of a dispute.