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The allegory of the orchard : The political determinants of health inequities -- Setting the precedent : America's attempts to address the political determinants of health inequities -- The political determinants of health model -- How the game Is played : successful employment of the political determinants of health -- Winning the game that never ends -- Growing pains : tackling the political determinants of health inequities during a regressive period -- The future of health equity begins and ends with the political determinants of health.

Abstract. Political economists have advanced a variety of diverse and competing hypotheses to explain the domestic political dimension of inflation. With few exceptions, however, these hypotheses have been tested individually without regard to competing explanations. This study uses pooled time‐series data on fifteen industrial democracies to examine five prominent political hypotheses that purport to explain either political pressures that cause inflation or institutional arrangements that insulate governments from these pressures. The results indicate that: (1) Central Bank independence provides an effective counterweight to inflation by insulating monetary policy making from inflationary (particularly, partisan) impulses; (2) Government spending increases caused by distributive and redistributive politics intensify inflationary pressures even in countries with independent Central Banks and neocorporatist arrangements; (3) Inflation is determined partially by the ideology of the party controlling government. Leftist governments in pursuit of income redistribution produce higher inflation than conservative governments; (4) Elections do not have significant effects on inflation under any structural circumstances; and (5) Neocorporatism does not consistently reduce inflation or contain the inflationary effects of partisan manipulation and fiscal expansion. However, neocorporatism may stop inflation if wage moderation by labour is accompanied by the government's commitment to pursue restrictive monetary policy.

THE ARTICLE SUGGESTS THAT THE MASSIVE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OFTEN REFERRED TO AS "POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT" IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOVEMENT FROM HIGH TO LOW BIRTH-AND DEATH RATES IN NATIONAL POPULATIONS. THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGING POLITICAL SYSTEM IS INDEPENDENT OF (AND IN ADDITION TO) THE EFFECTS OF SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGES PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED IN THE THEORY OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION. THE ARTICLE REPORTS FIRST THE NATURE OF THE SYSTEMATIC CONNECTION BETWEEN CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM ON THE ONE HAND AND CHANGE IN VITAL RATES ON THE OTHER. SECOND, IT PRESENTS A NEW EMPIRICAL MEASURE OF THE CAPACITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF WHOLE POLITICAL SYSTEMS.

Anhand von Daten aus 15 Industriestaaten wird der Einfluß politischer Faktoren auf die Entwicklung der Inflation untersucht. Folgende Ergebnisse werden formuliert: 1) unabhängige Zentralbanken und unabhängige Geldpolitik wirken inflatorischen Tendenzen entgegen; 2) steigende Staatsausgaben erhöhen die Inflation; 3) linke Regierungen produzieren, u.a. durch eine Politik der Einkommensverteilung, mehr Inflation als konservative Regierungen; 4) Wahlen haben keinen Einfluß auf die Inflation; 5) neokorporatistische Strukturen reduzieren Inflation nicht in jedem Fall. (AuD-Pls)

The article suggests that the massive transformation of the political system often referred to as "political development" is responsible for the movement from high to low birth-and death rates in national populations. The effect of the changing political system is independent of (and in addition to) the effects of socioeconomic changes previously presented in the theory of demographic demographic transition. The article reports first the nature of the systematic connection between change in the political system on the one hand and change in vital rates on the other. Second, it presents a new empirical measure of the capacity and effectiveness of whole political systems.

The popularity of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stimulates research on its
determinants. This paper highlights the importance of political determinants
in explaining inward FDI variation across countries. Adopting the argument
that no single theory exists for FDI, it identifies the political factors
based on the results of related empirical studies. The literature review?s
primary concern is to provide underpinnings for further research on inward
FDI distribution in the contemporary international political scene. It sets
up the theoretical links between political regimes, political determinants,
and FDI. The paper focuses on the importance of specific political variables
established in all political systems to influence foreign investors'
decision-making process. The distinguished determinants are property rights
protection, the signing of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), human
rights, and quality of governance.

Housing benefits differ substantially across countries. In this paper, we apply power resource theory, developed primarily in relation to the emergence and subsequent expansion of social citizenship, to housing policy. The purpose is to analyse the political determinants of housing benefits, and particularly the role of left parties and the partisan mobilization of labour. The empirical analyses are based on new housing benefit data for 31 affluent democracies from the period 2001-2018. The results of a series of fixed effects pooled time-series regressions show that the strength of left government is positively associated with the size of housing benefits. However, the positive influence of left cabinets is conditional on the relative size of rental housing and the fractionalization of the party system. Our findings highlight the need to combine actor-oriented explanations of the welfare state with theories about the corporatist power structures of society.

From a normative perspective, it is striking that the degree of central bank independence (CBI) varies considerably across countries. Taking a political economy perspective, this paper demonstrates how different degrees of CBI may be the result of 'strategic policy-making'. While an independent central bank reduces the incumbent politician's chances to influence current monetary policy it also raises the costs of future policy changes for political successors. Hence, when deciding on the degree of CBI, incumbent politicians face a trade-off: current influence on monetary policy versus policy durability. This paper shows how various factors change this trade-off and hence the institutional choice. The model predicts that the level of CBI incumbent politicians choose will increase in politicians' ability to screen central bankers' preferences, in the degree of political polarization, and in the weight politicians place on future policy outcomes. In contrast, the likelihood for the implementation of an independent central bank decreases in the re-election prospects of incumbents and in the utility central bankers receive from holding office.

From a normative perspective, it is striking that the degree of central bank independence (CBI) varies considerably across countries. Taking a political economy perspective, this paper demonstrates how different degrees of CBI may be the result of strategic policy-making. While an independent central bank reduces the incumbent politician's chances to influence current monetary policy it also raises the costs of future policy changes for political successors. Hence, when deciding on the degree of CBI, incumbent politicians face a trade-off: current influence on monetary policy versus policy durability. This paper shows how various factors change this trade-off and hence the institutional choice. The model predicts that the level of CBI incumbent politicians choose will increase in politicians' ability to screen central bankers' preferences, in the degree of political polarization, and in the weight politicians place on future policy outcomes. In contrast, the likelihood for the implementation of an independent central bank decreases in the re-election prospects of incumbents and in the utility central bankers receive from holding office.

This paper investigates empirically the determinants of air quality in a large cross-section of countries. We assess air quality by sulfur emissions and, following the literature, we consider three different groups of determinants: economic, political and cultural. We confirm the existence of an EKC for sulfur (inverted-U shaped relation between wealth and pollution). Political determinants are proxied by ethnic or religious fractionalization indexes and the country's legal origin (we consider five possible legal origins: English common law, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian legal system and Socialist legal system). Cultural determinants are assessed by the percentage of a country's population that belongs to one of the three main religions (Catholic, Muslim or Protestant). Our goal is to establish the economic, political and cultural profile of a country that manages to be efficient in providing good air quality. We conclude that a country will provide higher air quality if it has one or more of the following characteristics: it is ethnic and/or religious homogeneous, it has a German or Scandinavian legal tradition; it is Protestant. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion