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Habitus has been an attractive concept for works examining body-centric practices. This article draws on interviews and 18 months of ethnographic research with high-risk climbers primarily throughout North America. An important guide to this research has been the concept of habitus. However, this article demonstrates that there are limits to habitus being used to address the moment of action. The scope of habitus ranges widely, limiting its capacity to effectively address the experience of the individual. Rather than abandoning the concept, habitus can be extended through a reconceptualization drawing on the use of echoes as a metaphor. Using echoes as an allegorical mode of understanding dispositional acquisition and activation, the embodied echo can more radically and precisely explore the habitus in motion during the intensely body-centric practice of alpine climbing. This is particularly critical when exploring the use of speed as a form of safety in the alpine environment.

In this article I explore some of the aspects of shared doxic principles between outdoor fields and how these contribute to agents becoming interested in 'high-consequence' climbing styles. I argue that people who come to be high-risk climbers do not become involved for the purpose of participating in risky activities, but instead move into climbing through 'overlapping fields' that share practices and dispositions of climbing. Becoming a climber is a process that occurs gradually and imperceptibly, with much of the groundwork for an appreciation of climbing laid prior to actually taking part in climbing practice. In this paper, based on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork and 35 interviews with climbers, I demonstrate that participants typically have been members of easier to access and less risky outdoor sports prior to their involvement. These activities share some of the skills required to become a climber, or at least are complementary. Once this initial engagement with the practice has occurred, individuals become involved in less risky forms of climbing practice. These allow climbers-to-be an opportunity to form an appreciation of the basic safety systems of climbing. With this understanding, it then becomes possible to navigate through the trajectories of climbing practice, often bringing with them greater acceptances of risk and danger.

While censorship touched upon the careers of every German writer in the nineteenth century, a few cases stood out to contemporaries, defining their era. If the Demagogenverfolgung stamped the early 1820s and the prohibition of Young Germany the 1830s, the assault on left-wing or "Young" Hegelianism in 1842–43 was the major censorship case of the decade. Banning the Deutsche Jahrbücher, Rheinische Zeitung, and Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung was part of a significant, coordinated effort to undermine a small but influential faction of radical social critics. This wave of intellectual persecution radicalized the left, sowing the seeds for Marx's thoroughgoing assault on the foundations of European state and society. Understanding these cases in the context of a broader process of the transformation of censorship practices in modern Germany, however, remains an incomplete project for historians.

This article presents a mathematical model for measuring the global risk of nuclear theft and terrorism. One plausible set of parameter values used in a numerical example suggests a 29 percent probability of a nuclear terrorist attack in the next decade. The expected loss over that period would be $1.17 trillion (undiscounted), or more than $100 billion per year. Historical and other evidence is used to explore the likely values of several of the key parameters, and policy options for reducing the risk are briefly assessed. The uncertainties in estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism are very large, but even a risk dramatically smaller than that estimated in the numerical example used in this article would justify a broad range of actions to reduce the threat.

This article presents a mathematical model for measuring the global risk of nuclear theft & terrorism. One plausible set of parameter values used in a numerical example suggests a 29 percent probability of a nuclear terrorist attack in the next decade. The expected loss over that period would be $1.17 trillion (undiscounted), or more than $100 billion per year. Historical & other evidence is used to explore the likely values of several of the key parameters, & policy options for reducing the risk are briefly assessed. The uncertainties in estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism are very large, but even a risk dramatically smaller than that estimated in the numerical example used in this article would justify a broad range of actions to reduce the threat. Figures, References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2006 The American Academy of Political and Social Science.]