Search results

Why do hegemonic powers appear to have so few viable policy levers with which to cope with their fears of decline, and often adopt policies that are least well-suited, if not antithetical to the task? In this work I suggest that status threat generates a set of typical and quite maladaptive responses at both the individual/organizational level, and in the context of popular political culture, that exacerbate decline. This phenomenon, "pre-emptive decline," is evident in both elite-driven policy and mass political responses and is reviewed here in maladaptive courses of action adopted in 19th century Britain, and in the contemporary United States.

Large-scale war is a world-system phenomenon of the rivalry phase. Such conflicts have once again become a concern, and nuclear weapons make these prospects especially dangerous. This is particularly problematic since several world-systems perspectives suggest the chances for war will be greatest in the period from 2030 to 2050. I review the logic of rivalry, the reasons for the endurance of nuclear weapons, old and new nuclear strategies, and the processes that may pose the greatest existential dangers. Chase-Dunn and Podobnik (1995) identified processes that militate both in favor of and in opposition to nuclear war, and I pay particular attention to the way in which world-systems developments that increase the likelihood of major war have persisted, while those that retard the chances for major war have diminished. These dangers suggest that it may be time to turn some of our attention to the dynamics of systemic war and nuclear weapons.

n/a

It is difficult to read Jerry Cohen's missive about the IPE literature and respond with anything but applause. I too am concerned with the myriad articles in IPE that endlessly explore marginal variations on a narrow theme. (I would like to think that even if it were my preferred "narrow theme," it would still concern me.) We should also be cognizant of the costs of publishing only articles that articulate overly particularistic "new" visions of the great questions of our age. The disconnected "islands of theory" that would emerge could peak our interest, but they might not add up to much. Surely there is some middle ground that could offer both interesting speculation and cumulation. Adapted from the source document.

"World System History" published on by Oxford University Press.

"Fundamentalism and Globalization" published on by Oxford University Press.

Giovanni Arrighi dedicated Adam Smith in Beijing to the memory of Andre Gunder Frank. In this review I have been asked to consider the elements of Arrighi's volume that Frank would have liked, and those he would have disliked. I identify five elements of world system history, which Frank worked to build during the last 20 years of his career, and assess areas of consonance and contradiction with Arrighi's volume.

In a very controversial argument, Andre Gunder Frank suggested that scholars abandon ideas like 'transitions' and 'modes of production' in favor of more accurate, less Eurocentric concepts. This work reviews three relevant debates on the use of these concepts. The class backgrounds of 64 popes from 1300 to 1900 are then analyzed to see if leaders of a powerful, non-hereditary office altered over that time. The analysis offers no support regarding the role of transitions or modes of production in helping to understand elite recruitment. This finding supports Frank's suggestion that we consider alternative conceptual foundations for understanding development.