Negotiating with North Korea … Again
In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Volume 63, Issue 6, p. 101-106
ISSN: 1468-2699
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In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Volume 63, Issue 6, p. 101-106
ISSN: 1468-2699
In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Volume 63, Issue 6, p. 101-106
ISSN: 0039-6338
World Affairs Online
In: The national interest, Issue 98, p. 74-78
ISSN: 0884-9382
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 607, Issue 1, p. 51-58
ISSN: 1552-3349
Traditional deterrence is not an effective approach toward terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe. Preventive strategies, which call for the elimination of an enemy before it is able to attack, are highly risky and often difficult to implement. The United States should instead consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses not on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently leak nuclear weapons and materials to them. By threatening retaliation against those states, the United States may be able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent.
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 607, p. 51-58
ISSN: 1552-3349
Traditional deterrence is not an effective approach toward terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe. Preventive strategies, which call for the elimination of an enemy before it is able to attack, are highly risky & often difficult to implement. The United States should instead consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses not on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently leak nuclear weapons & materials to them. By threatening retaliation against those states, the United States may be able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent. References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2006 The American Academy of Political and Social Science.]
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 607, Issue 1, p. 51-58
ISSN: 0002-7162
Traditional deterrence is not an effective approach toward terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe. Preventive strategies, which call for the elimination of an enemy before it is able to attack, are highly risky and often difficult to implement. The United States should instead consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses not on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently leak nuclear weapons and materials to them. By threatening retaliation against those states, the United States may be able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent.[Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2006 The American Academy of Political and Social Science.]
In: Arms control today, Volume 36, Issue 9, p. 6-8
ISSN: 0196-125X
World Affairs Online
In: The national interest, Issue 81, p. 129-131
ISSN: 0884-9382
Galluci reviews Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe by Graham Allison.
In: The national interest, Issue 81, p. 129-131
ISSN: 0884-9382
In: Harvard international review, Volume 26, Issue 4, p. 84
ISSN: 0739-1854
In: Naval War College review, Volume 55, Issue 1, p. 129-132
ISSN: 0028-1484
In: Arms control today, Volume 24, Issue 3, p. 13-16
ISSN: 0196-125X
World Affairs Online
In: Arms control today, Volume 22, Issue 5, p. 3-6
ISSN: 0196-125X
World Affairs Online
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Volume 93, Issue 3, p. 502-503
ISSN: 1538-165X
In: Studies in international affairs 24
World Affairs Online