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In this essay I sketch a philosophical argument for classical
liberalism based on the requirements of public reason. I argue that we can
develop a philosophical liberalism that, unlike so much recent philosophy,
takes existing social facts and mores seriously while, at the same time,
retaining the critical edge characteristic of the liberal tradition. I
argue that once we develop such an account, we are led toward a
vindication of "old" (qua classical) liberal
morality—what Benjamin Constant called the "liberties of the
moderns." A core thesis of the paper is that a regime of individual
rights is crucial to the project of public justification because it
disperses moral authority to individuals thus mitigating what I call the
"burdens of justification."

T. H. Green claimed that 'rights are made by recognition. There is no right but thinking makes it so'. This 'rights recognition thesis' is widely rejected. I argue in this article that, so far from being an idiosyncratic doctrine of 19th-century British Idealism, the rights recognition thesis implies a compelling conception of rights, and one that, surprisingly, is more in tune with contemporary meta-ethics than are many contemporary rights theories. Green's moral theory, I argue, is a form of the widely embraced doctrine of 'moral internalism'. Such internalism, conjoined with a generally embraced analysis of rights, leads to some version of the rights recognition thesis.

T. H. Green claimed that 'rights are made by recognition. There is no right but thinking makes it so'. This 'rights recognition thesis' is widely rejected. I argue in this article that, so far from being an idiosyncratic doctrine of 19th-century British Idealism, the rights recognition thesis implies a compelling conception of rights, & one that, surprisingly, is more in tune with contemporary meta-ethics than are many contemporary rights theories. Green's moral theory, I argue, is a form of the widely embraced doctrine of 'moral internalism'. Such internalism, conjoined with a generally embraced analysis of rights, leads to some version of the rights recognition thesis. 17 References. Adapted from the source document.

Socialism, understood as the rejection of markets based on
private property in favor of comprehensive centralized economic
planning, is no longer a serious political option. If the core
of capitalism is the organization of the economy primarily through
market competition based on private property, then capitalism
has certainly defeated socialism. Markets have been
accepted—and central planning abandoned—throughout
most of the Third World and in most of the formerly Communist
states. In the advanced industrial states of the West, Labor
and "democratic socialist" parties have rejected
socialism, by deregulating markets and privatizing industries,
utilities, and transport. The U.K. Labour Party's 1945
manifesto declared the party to be a "Socialist Party,
and proud of it. Its ultimate aim is the establishment of the
Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain." Today the Labour
Party insists that markets are a given.

The 20th century did not witness a significant development in liberalism & liberal theory. Instead, liberal theory today is remarkably similar to the liberal theory of 100 years ago. The same conflicting principles that existed at the close of the 19th century -- such as individualism-collectivism, constructivism-anticonstructivism, value rationalism-skepticism -- are still present at the close of the 20th century. While innovative & complex thought has been introduced, the overall understanding of liberalism has remained static. This phenomenon does not necessary connote a weakness in liberal theory. However, both classical & contemporary viewpoints must be considered if liberalism is ever to become the prevailing political ideology. K. Larsen

At the close of the 20th century, liberalism has apparently vanquished its traditional rivals. However, whatever cause for celebration liberals might derive from their political victories over conservatives & socialists, in an important respect, the 20th century has been a disappointment for liberal theory. The same antinomies or tensions that marked it at the close of the 19th century characterize it today. In this essay, I show how disputes between liberal individualists & collectivists, & between rationalists & skeptics, have persisted throughout this century. I then examine several explanations for this apparent lack of progress in liberal theorizing. Adapted from the source document.