Trade disputes and the trade dispute settlement understanding of the WTO: an interdisciplinary assessment
In: Frontiers of economics and globalization 6
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In: Frontiers of economics and globalization 6
In: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2015/67
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In: Economica, Volume 69, Issue 275, p. 505-523
ISSN: 1468-0335
Eligibility for public benefits may require an injury investigation. The thoroughness of the investigation is a policy decision of the government. An investigative authority chooses the optimal effort to infer from a noisy signal (business plan) the quality of management and market conditions when a firm petitions for benefits. Under plausible conditions, firms will underperform to raise the probability of an affirmative verdict, and the authority will expend low investigative effort. Good and bad managers will obtain relief under adverse market conditions. This is preferred by good managers, as they do not have to separate by sending a costly signal.
In: Pacific economic review, Volume 5, Issue 1, p. 5-14
ISSN: 1468-0106
Home and foreign duopolists collude in the absence of an antidumping (AD) law because competition law makes renegotiation of collusion more costly than imposition of punishment for defection. Introduction of an AD law with a weak injury standard can undermine collusion by providing a low‐cost mechanism for renegotiation. This induces dumping by the foreign firm and defection by the home firm. An AD law can be procompetitive, in contrast to recent literature suggesting that an AD law can facilitate collusion. The law is asymmetric, providing a greater incentive for home‐firm than foreign‐firm deviation.
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Volume 29, Issue 1, p. 228
In: Economica, Volume 63, Issue 249, p. 153
In: Economic Analysis and Policy, Volume 73, p. 272-284
This paper develops a model that offers a plausible interpretation for the empirical observation of diffusion of antidumping (AD) laws amongst WTO members. Contrary to the regnant belief that this proliferation is driven mainly by retaliatory motives, our model shows that adoption and use of AD laws involve a cooperative act amongst WTO members in an infinite horizon game. The diffusion of AD laws need not result in a Prisonner.s dilemma. Instead we show that the AD agreement of the WTO can serve as a risk-sharing vehicle amongst WTO members in response to adverse shocks incurred by domestic producers.
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In: LICOS Discussion Paper No. 253/2010
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In: Blackwell Handbooks in Economics v.4
This second volume of the Handbook of International Trade focuses on the economic and legal analysis of international laws and institutions as they impact trade. Containing chapters written by both economic and legal scholars, this volume encourages cross-discipline discussion with writing that is accessible to those approaching the material from any background. Central issues to those studying international trade are addressed, including:labor, environmental rights, and preferential trade agreements antitrust policy patent rights
In: Journal of international economics, Volume 15, Issue 1-2, p. 117-133
ISSN: 0022-1996