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For almost seven decades, the government of the United States has been pursuing preeminent military power relative to all other states within the international system. This dissertation investigates why American leaders sought such capabilities. My argument is that certain structural characteristics of the American polity, of the international system, and of military technology produced strong incentives for US leaders to favor military primacy. I propose that the democratic and capitalist nature of the American political system, the relative size and productivity of the US economy, the anarchic nature of international affairs, and the emergence of nuclear weapons and modern military machinery are the structural features which push US leaders towards acquiring preeminent force. Empirically, I offer robust evidence that, both at the beginning and at the end of the Cold War, my mechanism played a pivotal role in creating the material constraints that defined US leaders' choices. My evaluation of the decision-making processes within both the Harry S. Truman and the George H. W. Bush Administrations is primarily based upon thousands of declassified archival sources.

This article questions the predominantly pessimistic assessments over the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). After analysing available evidence on states' interests and interactions within the NPT's framework, it argues that several negative expectations are unwarranted. Conversely, the article identifies three potentially threatening scenarios. Therefore, it scrutinizes the likely impact of reactive nuclear proliferation; analyses the probability of significant actors challenging the existent nuclear architecture; and explores whether the treaty's enforcement might soon be diluted. The article concludes the NPT is unlikely to face fundamental threats in the foreseeable future. Adapted from the source document.

This article analyses the potential motivations behind the opposition of a number of Central and Eastern European States (CESs) to the withdrawal of US deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) from Europe. It shows why CES governments obtain no military benefits from the deployed NSNW; it argues CES are unlikely to truly see them as a promising bargaining chip; it suggests CES can derive only limited prestige from US-deployed weapons and the contrasting norm of 'nuclear disarmament' likely offers a more attractive option; and it assesses potential bureaucratic interests as improbable to play a decisive role. In contrast, the article proposes a more nuanced elaboration of the transatlantic 'linkage' argument. It maintains CES have significant motives to keep the United States involved in Europe, shows how they are likely to mistrust US commitment pledges, and argues they are prone to use the NSNW debate as a convenient instrument (within a limited toolbox) towards locking in the US foothold on the continent. Adapted from the source document.

Jeder Konflikt mit einer Atommacht wie Russland birgt die Gefahr, dass Kernwaffen tatsächlich eingesetzt werden. Sorgen um dieses Risiko macht sich Präsident Wladimir Putin offensiv zunutze. Mit seinen nuklearen Drohungen rückt der Kreml von Russlands bisheriger Doktrin ab, die dem eigenen Atomarsenal eine Schutzrolle zuschreibt. Moskau will auf diese Weise nicht nur westliche Regierungen davor abschrecken, die Ukraine noch substantieller zu unterstützen, sondern auch die Öffentlichkeit des Westens einschüchtern. Solange aber die Nato nicht direkt in der Ukraine interveniert und sich das russische Regime nicht existentiell bedroht sieht, bleibt ein beabsichtigter ebenso wie ein unbeabsichtigter Nukleareinsatz extrem unwahrscheinlich. Dessen ungeachtet haben Moskaus Drohmanöver erhebliche Negativfolgen. Gelingt es Russland, unter dem Schild nuklearer Abschreckung erfolgreich einen konventionellen Krieg zu führen, könnte dies Europa und die globale Sicherheitsordnung weiter destabilisieren.